

Revolution for Whom?

Analysis of Selected Patterns of Intragenerational Mobility in 1989-1992

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Abstract: The question "*Who gets ahead and why?*" is one of the most frequent in sociology. It takes on special significance during periods of deeper social change, which are expected to alter the criteria of allocation of individuals to social positions and distribution of rewards. Post-communist transformation undoubtedly is a process evoking such kind of expectations. While in the long-term view, the question of "winners" and "losers" of post-communist transformation is more of a question of the *character* of social change and its general direction, from a short-term view more concrete question becomes more important: Who are those who have taken the process of transformation into their own hands, and who are those who used this process to their advantage in the transformation of their life chances? This paper is an attempt to shed more light on this issue with the analysis of recent survey data. The analyzed data comes from the first (1989) and second (1992) wave of the longitudinal study, "Family '89." Our analysis confirms the assumption that the greatest circulation occurs in the group of higher professionals, especially among those who were members of the Communist Party in 1989 or were in positions qualifying them as "cadres." Both of these attributes, i.e., membership in the Communist Party as well as membership in the "cadres" group in 1989, did significantly increase the chances for downward mobility, but these characteristics only very slightly affected chances for upward mobility. Despite this, it was precisely these two groups (especially the *cadres*) that had, in comparison with others, far higher chances to enter the group of entrepreneurs.

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1. Introduction

The question "*Revolution for whom?*" asked in connection with developments in Eastern Europe could evoke the idea that the authors plan to discuss widely the meaning and historical significance of political, economic and social changes started by the collapse of totalitarian regimes. As analytically oriented sociologists, we do not want to ask a rhetorical question that opens a wide area for noncommittal discussion of an undoubtedly attractive theme. Rather we wish to contribute to the understanding of one of the relevant and relatively clearly defined phenomena of post-communist transformation: intragenerational mobility prompted by changes in the political and economic system. From this standpoint it is obvious that the question asked in the title actually is an attempt at a more

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attractive formulation of an elementary question that stands behind the study of mobility and social stratification: "*Who gets ahead and why?*"

The question "*Who gets ahead and why?*" is one of the most frequent in sociology, at least from the time when Sorokin [Sorokin 1927] formulated it as a question of the functions of mobility and regularities of its development. Regardless of whether we are willing to accept a functionalist interpretation of social stratification and mobility, we can - we believe - agree with Sorokin in that the significance of "channels for vertical circulation" in society is comparable with the significance of "channels for blood circulation in the body" [Sorokin 1927: 180].

The question "*Who gets ahead and why?*" takes on special significance during periods of deeper social changes, which are expected to bring not only higher rates of mobility but also changes in the *criteria* of allocation of individuals to social positions, in other words a change in the stratification system. Post-communist transformation undoubtedly is a process bringing such kind of expectations. Sociologists view post-communist transformation above all as a process with the goal of renewing the vital but deeply eroded connections among abilities, performance, position and reward, a linkage that forms the foundation of the stratification systems of modern industrial and post-industrial societies and the foundation for the motivation of social behavior.

The question "*Who gets ahead during the period of post-communist transformation and why?*" therefore is a question whose legitimacy is rooted not only in general sociological theory but also in current discussion of the nature of the process of social transformation under way in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The answer to this question is neither universal nor simple. It is true that the countries in which this process is taking place had one strong, if not dominant, social denominator, i.e., a totalitarian political regime linked to egalitarian ideology. But at the same time it is evident that behind this common denominator were hidden a considerable number of economic, cultural and social differences with deeper historical roots - differences that come to the fore during a period of post-totalitarian transformation, when the bonds of the common denominator have loosened. Therefore, there is no doubt that any attempt at a simple interpretation of the transformation of the stratification system in Eastern Europe and the mobility linked to it would be incompatible with the nature of this process. An attempt by some sociologists to generalize observations of the post-totalitarian transformation of one specific social system (nation) to the entire post-communist "East" and/or derive the interpretation of social transformation from macro-economic theories of transition can only end in failure (see for example [Nee 1989, 1991]).¹

The interpretation of mobility and transformation of the stratification system in Eastern Europe is not and cannot be simple and "mono-paradigmatic." It is not possible simply to derive it from macro-economic theories (even if we are dealing

1) We mean above all macroeconomic theories of a transition from a model of centrally planned (redistributive) economy or from an economy of scarcity toward a free-market model (see for example [Kornai 1990]).

with theories undoubtedly robust and generally accepted). Complications arise because unlike "economic *transition*," "social *transformation*" is the combination of many - often conflicting - processes with different timing and temporality. All of these processes at any given moment form not only the objective state of social structure and stratification but also the ways this structure and its transformation are perceived and interpreted by various social groups. From a long-term perspective, post-communist transformation is a kind of social change during which a renewal of devastated universalism and deeper linkage of the stratification process with meritocratic principles of allocation and distribution occurs (see for example [Machonin 1992, Matějů 1991, 1993]). In the context of Sorokin's theory of mobility, post-communist transformation could be understood and analyzed as a process of gradual return from a situation of social disorder, indicated by, among other things, very low status consistency (Lenski) and low economic effectiveness to an economically more effective and modern social order, in which the processes of allocation, selection and distribution are based more on meritocratic principles and on principles of universalism. At the same time, however, it is possible to understand and analyze post-communist transformation as a process of disintegration of a relatively consistent system, regardless of the fact that its legitimacy was nearly exclusively of an ideological nature.

It seems that consensus as to the principal aim of the transformation process exists only in that it creates the basis for a new system legitimized by political democracy and by the effectiveness of the economy. The development of inequalities, social mobility, transformation of social structure and changes in the stratification system are questions either not addressed or taken as superfluous. This neglect corresponds with the idea that the answer to these questions is contained in the answer to questions related to the development of political and economic system. It is unwise to disregard the changes in mobility and social stratification during the critical time of post-communist transformation. To do so underestimates the fact that transformation of a social system and a change in the nature of social stratification are quite autonomous processes whose temporality is different from the temporality of transformation in a political and economic system, where the time between cause and effect often is much shorter. At the same time, both theory and history demonstrate that the relationship between an economic system and its effectiveness on the one hand, and the character of a stratification system, on the other, is complex but extremely close.

Three years that have passed since the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe is a too short period for results of sociological research to provide sufficiently reliable evidence in support of any general hypothesis about the development of mobility or the transformation of a stratification system. Nevertheless, there is certain evidence supporting of the hypothesis that post-communist transformation is widely understood as a process of increasing inequalities linked with departure from the "principles of equality of outcomes" (supported by redistribution) to the principle of "equality of opportunity" (linked with the principle of open competition). In other words, the transformation is generally interpreted as a process of the revitalization of consistency of

socioeconomic status, i.e. as the strengthening of ties between abilities, positions, productivity, reward and prestige. Analysis of data from several surveys carried out in Czechoslovakia in late 1991 [Matějů and Řeháková 1992] showed that despite a marked persistence of a low level of income differentiation and a certain opacity of emerging criteria of income differentiation [Večerník 1992], it was possible to draw a very distinct line between "winners" and "losers" of the transformation. In line with a popular understanding of the process of post-communist transformation, position of "winners" is held by individuals with social attributes which will increase positive life chances only in the event that the social system will evolve in the direction of more universalism and meritocracy.

However, if in the long-term perspective, the general question of "winners" and "losers" of post-communist transformation is more of a question of the *character and deep nature* of social change taking place in these societies, from a short-term view a number of specific questions arise: Who are those who have taken the process of transformation into their own hands, and who are those who used this process to their advantage in the significant improvement of their life chances? Mink and Szurek [1992] ask this question in two ways. First, they ask "*which social class was the revolution for?*". And second, "*who has profited most from it so far?*" [Mink and Szurek 1992: 1-2]. For the first question, the answer is straightforward. The revolution was conducted in the first place in the name of a entrepreneurial class that did not exist at the time [Ibid.: 2]. The answer to the second question is then consequential: Profiting from the revolution are above all those who gradually constitute the entrepreneurial class, or - better said - those who have the best chance of getting into it.

Regarding recruitment of a class of entrepreneurs, one general and quite widespread hypothesis predicts a tendency for the former political elite to undergo a "reincarnation," e.g., a tendency to successfully transform the embodiment of political power into the embodiment of economic power. This issue is actually one of the few sociological hypotheses that receives journalistic treatment and thus also publicity. Basically, there exist two different, but not contradictory, methods of operationalization of this thesis and thus two approaches to their testing and verification. It can be expected that political scientists, in the interest of verifying the hypothesis about the presence and the success of the reconversion strategy, will narrow down the former elite to the very top of the pyramid of totalitarian political power. That will naturally boost the "contrast" of the results, but at the same time it will dramatically narrow the area for application of a quantitative approach to the analysis of this phenomenon and for a possible generalization of the results. On the contrary, sociologists oriented to the study of social stratification and mobility will be, in the interest of the application of traditional statistical procedures, less rigid in their definition of the elite. That undoubtedly will reduce the contrast of the obtained results and their monographic potential, but it will substantially strengthen the link of the hypothesis concerning reconversion strategies to more general theoretical hypotheses about the social role of various forms of capital, and their convertibility [Bourdieu 1986, Treiman and Szelényi 1991, Matějů 1993].

This paper is an attempt to shed more light on this issue, with the help of analyses of recent survey data. Regarding theoretical context, we classify this paper among those exploring more general questions of development of a stratification system rather than questions that are the focus of political scientists studying the circulation of elites. In agreement with hypotheses formulated by Treiman and Szélényi [1991] and with results arrived at by Matějů [1993], we will attempt to answer the following questions: To what extent is the intragenerational mobility characteristic of the first phase of post-communist transformation linked to political and especially social capital accumulated during a communist regime? Whether and with what mechanisms does conversion of capital occur? And how much do the specific mobility chances of those who possess various assets accumulated in the past differ from the mobility chances of individuals who lack these assets during a critical period of transformation.

Methodologically, however, this paper moves roughly through the center of the two abovementioned directions. This is not because we aim to move away from the claims that "stratifiers" traditionally lay on quantitative analysis and methods of testing hypotheses, but rather because the empirical material we have at our disposal is specific and in this area of research rather unique. We verify the thesis of the conversion of capital (political and social to economic), that was formulated as a hypothesis about the significantly higher chances of former cadres and holders of political capital to enter the entrepreneurial class. This hypothesis will be tested on the data from a longitudinal study that was begun in Spring, 1989, before the collapse of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. It was continued on the same individuals in Spring, 1992, after two and a half years of post-communist transformation.² It is specifically the longitudinal nature of analyzed data and the speed of changes during the period of post-communist transformation that moves this paper into a specific position of quantitative analysis of individual biographies.

This analysis relies on two main concepts: the concept of various forms of capital and their convertibility, and a specific approach to the concept of vertical mobility. The concept of capital we are using is in agreement with an attempt to generalize the theory of capital for its use in sociology [Bourdieu 1986], primarily with one of its constitutive theses involving convertibility as one of the fundamental attributes of capital. This theoretical interpretation is implicitly contained even in hypotheses formulated by Szélényi and Treiman [1991] for the study of the development of social stratification in Eastern Europe. Certain evidence in support of this theory was already found through analysis of data from the longitudinal research "Family 1989" [Matějů 1993], which showed that the position of former "cadres" in the "income space" does not worsen during transformation. It has been proved that members of this group are able to maintain, or even improve, the relatively advantageous position built in the past. Regarding the question of what tools former cadres of the socialist regime use to maintain their advantageous

²) A closer characterization of the research project and data file is listed in the section "Data, Variables and Method."

standing in the income space, this analysis provided an answer, which is also in agreement with theoretical expectations. Former top cadres of a redistribution regime more often than others become members of the group of entrepreneurs, which is a strategy in which the social and political capital accumulated during the former regime is one of the things prominently evaluated.

As to vertical mobility, we believe that the post-communist transformation is fundamentally a process that forms or significantly modifies the vertical axis of social differentiation. One of the legacies of the past is that the answer to the question of who is "on top" and who "on the bottom" can differ significantly, depending on who is answering it and from what angle that person views the society, which criteria of success he or she applies, etc. This "schizophrenia" in understanding success and social verticals [Matějů 1991] will weaken in connection with the strengthening of value universalism, without which it is difficult to imagine an effectively functioning stratification system. For these reasons we supplemented *objective* indications of vertical mobility (movement between groups defined by the traditional classification EGP and movement along the axis of the hierarchy of formal authority and management) with some *subjective* dimensions of mobility (perceived change of one's position as "significant," personal testimony about functional ascent or descent, etc.). For our own analysis of mobility chances, we chose to examine the following five relevant categories: upward mobility, downward mobility, stability (actually no change in a given period of time), start of entrepreneurial activity as a parallel source of income, and move to the group of entrepreneurs (self-employment). The choice of these non-traditionally defined analytical categories reflects not only the specificity of the social situation in post-communist countries, but also limitations of a statistical nature that we will discuss later.

2. Data, Variables, Method

The analyzed data come from the first and second wave of the longitudinal research project, "Family '89," [Matějů, Tuček, and Rezler 1991]. At the beginning of 1989, when this project was launched, a survey of parents (i.e., people 40-50 years old) of 3,917 8th-graders was conducted.³ In this first wave of the longitudinal study in 1989, information was obtained about 2,709 families (response rate 73%). In Spring of 1992 a follow-up survey of parents was conducted, on a sub-sample of 2,518 families. The total response rate of the first follow-up reached 76%. For the purpose of analysis of adult respondents (individuals), the analytical sample was reduced in such a way that the proportion of men and women at least roughly corresponded to their proportion in the given age cohort. The reason for the reduction was the marked predominance of women among respondents during the

³) The sample was made in two stages: In the first step communities were chosen (in Prague also quarters), in the second step elementary schools within the communities were picked. In selected schools a survey all 8th grade students was conducted. Given the limited number families, the selection of communities went by criteria of proportional representation of various types of municipal and rural communities, or various types of municipal environments (working-class areas, housing estates, traditional higher status residential areas, etc.)

first wave of study in 1989.⁴ The reduction, by which the analytical data file of individuals (respondents in both 1989 and 1992) was created, was made by decreasing a number of women by additional random sampling. The resulting analytical file counts 1,298 cases. This group is limited by age: the average age is 44 years (mode 43 years) with a standard deviation of 5 years (75 percent of the group is within the interval of 40-50 years old). As for the social profile of the sample, we did not find any important deviations from the profile of the population of that age.

The questionnaire applied in 1989 contained a series of questions related to the social standing of both parents of a child (i.e., the respondent and partner), the social standing of the child's grandparents (parents of the respondent and partner) and intergenerational mobility of the parents (respondents). Further, membership and function of parents (respondents) in political parties and other organizations was recorded, as was their income, material standard of living, the extent of their involvement in the networks of contacts and informal exchange ("social capital"), etc. With regard to possibilities for analysis of intragenerational mobility, the questionnaire applied in 1992 was constructed largely symmetrically, which means it was oriented primarily to determining changes that occurred during the three-year period between the first wave and the 1992 follow-up.

The types of mobility were defined along the lines of so called EGP class schema [Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992]. For substantive and statistical reasons (limited number of cases for higher order cross-tabulations) we worked from a somewhat reduced class schema: 1. higher professionals; 2. lower professionals - technicians; 3. routine non-manual workers; 4. skilled workers; 5. unskilled workers; 6. farm workers. In the first step we considered mobility as any kind of change in the respondent job that occurred between spring of 1989 and spring of 1992 in terms of the above classification, if the respondent qualified the change as significant or important change in his/her job or occupation. Considering the fact that the categories above can be considered as ordered (both in terms of socioeconomic status and prestige), upward or downward movement was clearly defined.

In the second step, we added to the group under mobility study also individuals who remained stable in terms of the above-listed categories but stated that significant change occurred in their placement in the hierarchy of formal authority or management (being named to a management position, transferred to a higher management function, complete loss of management position, descent to a lower management function, etc.)

⁴) At the time the first wave, it was not expected that parents would join their children in the follow-up surveys. Because the goal was to determine the main characteristics of families, no special emphasis was placed on proportional representation of men and women. Logically then, there were more women, because they were the easier part of the population to "catch." It was not until the end of 1989 when, prompted by the events of that period, the decision was made to conduct a follow-up survey of even the adult population.

In the third step, two special categories describing specific forms of mobility during the period of post-communist transformation were defined: the beginning of the parallel entrepreneurial activity, and entry into the group of entrepreneurs (self-employed). Given the goal of the analysis, these two attributes had clear precedence over others, which means they were used for "extraction" of cases regardless whether they were placed in one of the categories in the first two steps.

Variable "TYPMOB" defined by the procedure described above was our main dependent variable, with five values (1. downward; 2. no change; 3. upward; 4. parallel (part-time) entrepreneurship; 5. "full" entrepreneurship).

Other variables used in the analysis were defined in the following manner:

CADRE89: 1 = respondent in 1989 did not occupy a managerial position at all or did occupy such position at the lowest level; 2 = respondent in 1989 occupied a managerial position at the middle or highest level (i.e., from a managerial position on the level of heading a smaller plant or firm and higher, including a managerial position on the level of a district or county National Committee, at a university, in a hospital, in a larger research institution, on the level of a regional National Committee, directorship of a large state firm, on the level of a deanship of a university or on the level of other central organs, etc.).

CLASS_3: "class" - a special variable created for logit models: 1 = higher professional; 2 = lower professional; 3 = other.

PARTY: 1 = respondent was not a member of the Communist Party in 1989; 2 = respondent was a member of the Communist Party in 1989.

With respect for the goals of the analysis and the nature of the data we applied logit models. Because the dependent variable (TYPMOB) was not dichotomous, a general multinomial logit model was chosen as the most appropriate analytical tool. Odds of downward or upward mobility, odds of parallel entrepreneurship and "full" entrepreneurship were defined as ratios of the probability that the respective event occurred to the probability that respondent remained stable.⁵ All calculations were performed by the procedure LOGLINEAR (a generalized logit model with the contrasts SIMPLE[2] for variable TYPMOB and REPEATED for variables CADRE89, CLASS_3 and PARTY) within the statistical package SPSS. Descriptions of the models and applied equations are provided in the appendix.

3. Results of the analyses

From 1,300 analyzed cases (men and women), 68% were stable, 8% underwent downward mobility, 10% experienced upward movement, 6% declared parallel entrepreneurship and 8% declared a shift to full entrepreneurship. As for marginal frequencies of "strategic" independent variables, the data from 1989 identify 26% of respondents as members of the Communist Party and 10% as "cadres" (individuals holding in 1989 managerial position at the middle and high levels of

⁵) Reader should not confuse this meaning of "odds" defined for the purpose of logit analysis with its usage to mean just a probability of a particular event.

state administration and "redistributive" bureaucracy). These relatively small marginal frequencies posed serious limitations on testing more complex (multidimensional) logit models. For this reason, instead of testing just one complex model, which would have had a very low or even zero frequencies in a number of cells of a hypothetical classification, we had to create a final picture of different chances for certain types of mobility from results obtained from several rather simple models, which provided more reliable (stable) parameter estimates.

All of the tested models assumed that for the first phase of post-communist transformation, intragenerational mobility is more likely for members of upper status groups (service class, professionals, etc.) than for middle and lower status individuals. This assumption proved to be justified. The first model tested (MODEL I), with two independent variables: "class" (CLASS_3 and membership in the Communist Party (PARTY), confirmed that indeed there is a certain "line of calmness," that is, a boundary separating rather mobile from rather stable part of the population. In line with our expectations, this line is located between higher professionals and others (table 1).

Table 1. Probability of selected mobility patterns by class (reduced classification) and party membership in 1989. Estimated percentages from MODEL I

CLASS_3	PARTY	Type of mobility				
		downward move		upward move		part-time entrepreneur
		stable	move	stable	move	entrepreneur
higher professions	no	12.36	56.97	8.70	8.69	13.28
	yes	26.55	42.76	6.53	14.20	9.97
lower professions	no	4.55	73.57	11.24	3.81	6.84
	yes	11.53*	65.13*	9.95	7.35	6.05
other	no	4.55	73.57	11.24	3.81	6.84
	yes	11.53*	65.13	9.95	7.35	6.05

*) Adjusted residual for this cell exceeded value +/- 1.96

Statistics of model fit: $\chi^2 = 15.791$, df = 15, p = .396


Source: Longitudinal project "Family '89"

While in the group of professionals the given model predicts only 53% of those who remained stable, with lower professionals (as with "others") the predicted proportion of stable exceeds 71%. In agreement with laymen's expectations is the fact that former party members generally are more mobile than non-party members. The presented model predicts, for example, that among higher professionals, nonparty members 57% were stable, whereas among party members only 43% remained at the positions they held in 1989. Also not surprising is the finding that higher professionals, especially if they were members of the party, have an unusually strong tendency to descend. The preferred model predicts 27% downwardly mobile in the group of higher professionals - party members and only



12% descending among higher professionals who were not members of the party. The odds of downward move was 3.5 times greater for higher professionals than for others and 2.9 times greater for party members than for others. However, in contrast with general belief and even in contrast with some analyses conducted in other countries [Kolosi and Rona-Tas 1992] is the finding that party membership has not been a significant barrier to upward intragenerational mobility between 1989 and 1992. That applies even to the group of higher professionals (where - according to the definition - belong not only professionals but also managers, directors and their deputies, chiefs of departments, etc.). The tendency to upward mobility (obviously in higher professionals represented only by "functional" ascent) is not significantly different for former party members and nonparty members. Our model predicts this tendency as identical for all groups considered (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Mobility chances (logits): higher professionals and party members



Tendency toward entrepreneurship dominates among higher professionals. The odds of entrepreneurship are 2.5 times greater for members of this class than for others. However, it is interesting that former party members more often choose parallel entrepreneurship (i.e., entrepreneurship with "insurance" in the form of a continuing employee status). The odds of parallel entrepreneurship is 2.2 times greater for former party members than for others, whereas entrepreneurship without this "insurance" doesn't show this difference.

It is generally believed that communist-party membership in itself functioned more as a certain "protection" than a reliable tool of success, defined either by holding a position in the power structure or a position endowed with significant redistribution power. To what extent the membership in the former group of

"cadres" (regardless of party membership) was a source of different life chances during transformation is shown by parameters of a second model (MODEL II). Dependent variables remained the same as in the first model ("chances" of individual types of mobility), whereas for independent variables the membership in the group of former "cadres"⁶ was added alongside the variable "class." The plausibility of the above assumption was confirmed by an overall test of the model as well as estimated parameters (table 2, figure 2).

Table 2. Probability of selected mobility patterns by class (reduced classification) and "cadre" membership in 1989. Estimated percentages from MODEL II

CLASS_3	CADRE	Type of mobility				
		downward move		upward move	part-time entrepreneur	full-time entrepreneur
		move	stable			
higher professions	no	15.86	56.67	8.00	9.56	9.91
	yes	20.93	30.11	9.63	14.68	24.65
lower professions	no	6.03	73.76	10.42	4.35	5.45
	yes	9.95	49.04	15.69	8.35	16.97
other	no	6.03*	73.76	10.42	4.35	5.45
	yes	9.95	49.04	15.69	8.35	16.97

*) Adjusted residual for this cell exceeded value -1.96

Statistics of model fit: $\chi^2 = 10.823$, df = 13, p = .626


Source: Longitudinal project "Family '89"

It is again evident that odds of downward move for higher professionals who simultaneously can be qualified as members of the group of former cadres are clearly the highest. The model predicts in this special group only 30% stable and more than 20% descending. But the model also demonstrates that for former cadres, the way up was not blocked any more than for others. On the contrary, their odds of ascent were 2.3 times greater than for others, regardless of membership in the group of higher professionals or others. In addition a former higher professional today has a 2.4 times greater chance of appearing in the group of private entrepreneurs than does someone else. The odds of becoming entrepreneur for a former "cadre" is nearly five times (4.7) higher than for "non-cadre" (regardless of whether he/she was a higher professional or not). This finding is very close to the general belief of the significant flexibility of representatives of the former regime, and their ability (even the appropriate

⁶) It is necessary to explain how it is possible that the group of "cadres" is not completely contained in the group "higher professionals." The definition of variable CADRE allows that an individual held a managerial position at the highest level (e.g., on the level of a regional National Committee), but he/she was not classified among the top professionals nor among the top management personnel. We worked from the assumption that redistributive power and thus also social capital of certain officials was higher than in the case of some top professionals in management positions.

"equipment") to "make their own" even a system growing from the ruins of the one in which they formerly ruled. The general tendency of this group toward entrepreneurship is evident even from the odds of parallel entrepreneurship, which for former cadres is again nearly three times higher than for others.

Figure 2: Mobility chances (logits): professionals and cadres



The greater importance of being a "cadre" rather than a normal member of the Communist Party for mobility in all relevant directions is also apparent from the last tested model (MODEL III), in which we placed side by side among independent variables membership in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1989 and membership in the group of cadres. The odds of downward movement were about the same for party members as for cadres (2.7 and 2.1 times higher, respectively, than for individuals without these attributes), but upward mobility was far more likely for former cadres (2.2 times higher in relation with others) than for "common" party members, who in this respect did the same as nonparty members (see figure 2). As far as the entrepreneurship is concerned, parallel as well as pure, it is a far more likely strategy for cadres than for regular party members. The odds of becoming an independent entrepreneur (full time) were roughly the same for party members and nonmembers, but nearly five times higher (4.8) for cadres than for others.


Table 3. Probability of selected mobility patterns by party and "cadre" membership in 1989. Estimated percentages from MODEL III

PARTY	CADRE	Type of mobility				
		downward move	stable	upward move	part-time entrepreneur	full-time entrepreneur
no	no	5.42	73.27	10.54	4.34	6.43
	yes	7.48	48.94	15.66	7.35	20.56
yes	no	13.01	64.52	9.28	7.52	5.66
	yes	17.01	40.78	13.05	12.04	17.13

Statistics of model fit: $\chi^2 = 3.756$, df = 6, p = .710

Source: Longitudinal project "Family '89"

Figure 3: Mobility chances (logits): cadres and party members.



4. Discussion

The analysis focused on mobility patterns generally considered characteristic for the first period of post-communist transformation. Our look at these mobility patterns focused particularly on differences in mobility chances between groups that are for a number of reasons the focus of political scientists and sociologists studying development in post-communist countries. Most importantly, under observation are former "nomenklatura cadres," regular members of the Communist Party and also higher professionals - groups in which one can expect the greatest circulation mobility.

Our analysis confirmed the hypothesis that the greatest circulation prompted by the transformation of society occurs in the group of higher professionals and especially those members of the group who were members of the Communist Party in 1989 or were in positions qualifying them as "cadres." Both of these attributes, i.e., membership in the Communist Party as well as membership in the "cadres" group in 1989, did significantly heighten the chances for downward mobility (and that practically regardless of what group the individual belonged to), but these characteristics only very slightly affected chances for upward movement. It cannot be said, therefore, that former party members or former cadres face significantly bigger obstacles than others on their "way up." Despite this, it was precisely these two groups (especially the cadre group) that had, in comparison with others, far higher chances to enter the group of entrepreneurs. The difference between regular party members and cadres stemmed from the fact that the regular party members - apparently in the spirit of their "safeguarding" life strategy - tended to choose rather "parallel entrepreneurship," while "cadres" moved to the new entrepreneurial class as its "full time" members. Membership in the group of cadres (regardless of membership in the party) turned out to be a far more important factor in this particular strategy for getting ahead than just membership in the Communist Party.

The question of how to interpret these facts remains open. It seems that Djilas' "new class" of the old regime or the class of "redistributors" in the interpretation of Szelényi accumulated sufficient capital (economic, social, cultural, etc.), which is now promptly being converted to advantageous positions that enable extensive reproduction of this accumulated capital. Our analysis, similar to analysis of strategies of economic success based on the same data [Matějů 1993] significantly supports Treiman's and Szelényi's theory of the role of various assets and their convertibility during post-communist transformation and gives further arguments in support of rejecting Nee's simplifying theory of "market transition" [Nee 1989, 1991].

When applying a simple causal interpretation of complex social phenomena and historical processes, there is always the danger of false correlations. That is why we must always consider the possibility of the existence of a third common cause of two phenomena, whose strong relations tempt a causal interpretation. One of the clues, which we should not lose sight of in connection with this, is the possibility of certain specific dispositions toward success as part of a personality profile, dispositions "correctly" ruling what tools of success to choose under what conditions. That which can appear as convertibility of capital, whose analysis is recommended by Treiman and Szelényi [1991], or as the success of "reconversion" strategies, which Mink and Szurek discuss [1991], could be the result of certain predispositions and strong motivations to always be on top. Predispositions of this type at the same time could have strong intergenerational ties, and they could be stronger than moral imperatives, which might block the use of certain mobility channels under certain conditions. If so, the difference between the "circulation" and "reproduction" hypothesis about the changes of elites during post-communist

transformation [Treiman and Szelényi 1991] might not be as great as their authors presume. That is a question we are not yet able to answer.

For reasons discussed in the introduction, we cannot yet formulate general conclusions about the nature of the transformation of the stratification system in post-communist countries, nor about generally true answers to questions about processes of the circulation of elites in Eastern Europe. The meaning of a given factor of mobility can seldom be reliably judged from the perspective of a short period of time. So far it is not possible for objective reasons (the short duration of a such profound social change, the lack of large data sets, etc.) to conduct even routine analyses of the development of mobility. Despite this, we believe that the results we present in this paper can contribute to the understanding of the process of social transformation occurring in eastern Europe, or at least a more precise formulation of questions for further analysis.

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Appendix: Specification of logit models

In this section symbols i , j , k are related to the categories of the variables CLASS_3, CADRE and PARTY respectively. The scores x_i , y_j a z_k in the equations are equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} x_i &= \begin{cases} 2, & i = 1 (\text{CLASS_3} = \text{higher professional}) \\ -1, & i = 2 (\text{CLASS_3} = \text{lower professional}) \\ -1, & i = 3 (\text{CLASS_3} = \text{other}) \end{cases} \\ y_j &= \begin{cases} 1, & j = 1 (\text{CADRE} = \text{no}) \\ -1, & j = 2 (\text{CADRE} = \text{yes}) \end{cases} \\ z_k &= \begin{cases} 1, & k = 1 (\text{PARTY} = \text{no}) \\ -1, & k = 2 (\text{PARTY} = \text{yes}) \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

MODEL I:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(n_{1ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -1.83935 + 0.41842x_i - 0.52593z_k \\ \ln(n_{3ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -1.87904 \\ \ln(n_{4ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -2.21092 + 0.35972x_i - 0.38900z_k \\ \ln(n_{5ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -2.06945 + 0.30665x_i \end{aligned}$$

All coefficients in the equations are statistically significant. The model returns three significant adjusted residuals in the following three cells: "downward * lower professional * member of the Communist Party;" "downward * others * member of the Communist Party," and "no change * lower professional * member of the Communist Party". We examined two additional models that added two effects to the first equation: first there was the effect that distinguished between lower professionals and "others" and second there was a combination between this effect and the effect of the membership in the Communist Party. Both models improve fit and decrease the adjusted residuals in question, but the coefficients of the additional effects are not statistically significant. Consequently, we chose the simplest model that was acceptable.

MODEL II:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(n_{1ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.63927 + 0.41039x_i - 0.45481y_j \\ \ln(n_{3ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.54839 - 0.40893y_j \\ \ln(n_{4ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.95018 + 0.35054x_i - 0.53071y_j \\ \ln(n_{5ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.54625 + 0.28711x_i - 0.77200y_j \end{aligned}$$

All coefficients in the equations are statistically significant. The model returns one significant adjusted residual in the cell "downward * others * cadre = no". The competing model evokes another effect in the first equation that distinguishes odds between lower professionals and "others." This significantly improves fit and decreases the adjusted residual in question, but the coefficient of the added effect is not significant. Consequently, we again chose the simpler model.

MODEL III:


$$\ln(n_{1jk}/n_{2jk}) = -1.73956 - 0.36330y_j - 0.50165z_k$$

$$\ln(n_{3jk}/n_{2jk}) = -1.53909 - 0.39965y_j$$

$$\ln(n_{4jk}/n_{2jk}) = -2.02261 - 0.46478y_j - 0.33788z_k$$

$$\ln(n_{5jk}/n_{2jk}) = -1.65027 - 0.78277y_j$$

All coefficients are statistically significant, and the model returns no significant adjusted residual.



I'VE BEEN ON THE ROAD TO EUROPE FOR ALREADY THREE YEARS, BUT I DIDN'T KNOW IT WAS THE BALKAN ROAD.