CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Sociologický časopis

Volume 38 (2002): 6 (Winter)

Sociologický časopis

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Vydává Sociologický ústav Akademie věd České republiky

Published by the Institute of Sociology Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review (ISSN 0038-0288). Objednávky přijímá A.L.L. production, s.r.o., P.O.B. 732, 111 21 Praha 1, tel. (02) 683 5821, fax (02) 684 7731, e-mail: katka@predplatne.cz a redakce. Objednávky do zahraničí přijímá redakce. Vychází 6 čísel ročně (4 česky, 2 anglicky). Cena 44 Kč, v zahraničí 14 € (14 $), Slovensko 65 Kč, roční předplatné v ČR 264 Kč.
Časopis je citován v *Current Contents/Social&Behavioral Sciences (CC/S&BS)*, v počítačové databázi *Social SciSearch* a v aktuálních oznámeních *Research Alert*, publikacích Institute of Scientific Information, USA. Obsah časopisu (od roku 1993) je uveřejněn na internetu na URL http://www.soc.cas.cz

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review (ISSN 0038-0288) is published bimonthly (4 issues in Czech, 2 issues in English) by the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Orders: Czech Sociological Review, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic, e-mail: prodej@soc.cas.cz. One issue costs 14 $ (14 €).
The Review is cited in publications of the Institute of Scientific Information, *Current Contensts/Social &Behavioral Sciences (CC/S&BS)*, *Social SciSearch* and in *Research Alert*.
Contents of the Review (since 1993) are published on the Internet URL http://www.soc.cas.cz

Podávání novinových zásilek povoleno ŘPP Praha, čj. 1043/95 ze dne 20. 3. 1995. MK ČR E 4901.

Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic, Prague

*Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (ISSN 0038-0288) vydává Sociologický ústav Akademie věd ČR v Praze, a to 6 čísel ročně (4 čísla česky a 2 čísla anglicky).

Cíl a poslání

*Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW je recenzovaný oborový časopis zaměřený na oblast sociologické teorie a metodologie, přinášející výsledky a interpretace sociologických výzkumů. Zaměřuje se na rozvoj oboru a jeho výuku a zároveň chce být užitečný při řešení praktických problémů české sociální a ekonomické politiky.

Nabídka rukopisů

Redakce přijímá tři tištěné kopie, které neobsahují jméno ani pracoviště autora, recenzní řízení je oboustranně anonymní. V průvodním dopise uveďte úplnou kontaktní adresu včetně telefonního čísla a e-mailové adresy. Nabídnout rukopis jinému časopisu, zatímco je posuzován naším časopisem, je považováno za neetické.

Formát rukopisu: Rukopisy musí být psány na stroji nebo tištěny na tiskárně počítače a musí splňovat ČSN 88 0220 (úprava rukopisů pro sazbu), tj. řádkování 2, 60 úhozů na řádce, 30 řádek na stránce A4. Tabulky, grafy a obrázky jsou přiloženy za textem. Stati, výzkumné a metodologické texty do 20 stran, recenze do 7 stran, zprávy a informace do 5 stran, anotace 1 strana. V elektronické podobě se příspěvky zasílají redakci buď na disketě formátu IBM PC, nebo e-mailem, text a tabulky v editoru Word pro Windows. Pokud příspěvek obsahuje grafy a obrázky, vyžadujeme zdrojové soubory (soubor, v němž byly vytvořeny), grafy nejlépe v programu Excell, obrázky nejlépe ve formátu TIF nebo EPS. Rukopis obsahuje vedle vlastního textu *abstrakt* (20 řádků), *summary* (80 řádků) a *název stati v angličtině a češtině, abecední seznam citované literatury* a *stručnou informaci o autorovi.* Redakce provádí jazykovou úpravu textu.

Rozhodnutí o vydání: Rozhodnutí je autorovi sděleno do osmi týdnů od data přijetí rukopisu.

Adresa redakce: *Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, telefon (02) 2222 1761, 221 183 217-218, fax 221 183 250, e-mail: sreview@soc.cas.cz
Návštěvní dny v redakci jsou pondělí a čtvrtek 10-16 hod.

*Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (ISSN 0038-0288) is published 6x annually (4 issues in Czech with abstracts and article summaries in English and 2 issues in English) by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague.

Scope and Mission

*Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is a scholarly review focusing on the field of sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic policy.

Manuscript Submission

The editors require three legible copies, which do not state the name or workplace of the author, in order for the review process to be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number and e-mail address. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the *SČ/*CSR, is deemed unethical.

Manuscript format: Manuscripts must be typed or computer printed (12-point type preferred), double-spaced, with 60 columns (characters) per line, 30 lines to an A4 page. The maximum length of research and methodological essays is 20 pages, 7 pages for reviews, 5 pages for news or information, and 1 page for annotations. Manuscripts should be submitted on diskette in IBM PC format or by e-mail. Submit text and tables in Word for Windows, and graphs and illustrations as separate files in the format in which they were created; graphs preferably in Excell, illustrations preferably in TIF or EPS. Along with the manuscript please submit a twenty-line *abstract*, a complete *bibliography*, and a brief up-to-date *curriculum vitae*.

Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within eight weeks from the date of the manuscript's arrival.

Postmaster: *Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic, fax +420 2 2118 3250, e-mail: sreview@soc.cas.cz

Editorial

In this issue, we have for the first time applied the rule we would like to follow - one half of the articles are from the 'West' and one half from the 'East'. The Western articles mostly address issues of social capital, social cohesion and welfare systems. We failed to find a parallel text in our region - such research is only emerging in transition countries. The other contributions vary and are all by Czech authors, although there was no intention to represent the 'Eastern' part of the issue by a single country.

Let me now briefly introduce the individual contributions.

Martin Raiser, Christian Haerpfer, Thomas Nowotny and Claire Wallace write about social capital in transition. Using data from the World Values Surveys of 1990 and 1995, they document the degree of trust and civic participation and find that these indicators of social capital are significantly lower in transition countries than in the West. Unlike in established market economies, trust is not positively related to growth in transition countries, while participation in civic organisations does show a positive correlation.

Regina Berger-Schmitt asks whether the social cohesion between EU Member States has increased and responds that it has hardly increased in strength over the past 15 years. The entry of the other candidate countries would probably weaken social cohesion even further, especially owing to limited public approval of their accession among many Member States. Social cohesion could be strengthened through greater solidarity of the prosperous with the backward countries.

Martin Seeleib-Kaiser shows the effects of globalisation on social policy arrangements in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United States. He starts with the hypothesis that the specific perception of globalisation and the constructed links to social policy arrangements within the political discourse will have to be taken into account. He concludes that the interpretation of globalisation can lead to a redefinition of the economic costs and benefits of social policy within the various welfare systems.

Dana Hamplová uses empirical surveys to test differences between marriage and cohabitation with regard to qualitative differences in partnership arrangements. She finds that although cohabitation likely represents a departure from the traditional pattern, it leads more towards a female breadwinner than towards an egalitarian setting. Moreover, the arrangement does not differ among various social strata. Nevertheless, the hypothesis about less investment and less specialisation among cohabiting persons in comparison with married couples is confirmed to some degree at least.

Zdeněk R. Nešpor presents the first results of his survey of returning Czech emigrants from the communist era. He explains why emigrants decide to return and analyses their (re)integration into Czech society. He concludes that economic and work characteristics have played the most important role in the (re)emigration process. Paradoxically, their social acceptance has developed in sharp contrast to their successfulness, partly as a result of envy on the part of Czechs, and partly owing to a significant difference in their

attitudes regarding the choice between individualism and collectivism. To ease the access to Czech social survey data, Jindřich Krejčí presents information about the content of the Sociological Data Archive at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. It is a continuation and technical specification of the article on social reporting in the previous issue of the CSR.

In the information section, we highlight the commemoration of the 70th birthday of Professor Ivo Možný, an outstanding personality in contemporary Czech sociology. Alongside a review of his most recent book on Czech society, written by Andrew Roberts of Princeton University, we also present a brief interview with Professor Možný and a list of some of the main books by our distinguished colleague.

The next volume of CSR will contain a block of papers addressing equity in higher education. Growing tension between the rapidly increasing demand for tertiary education and the gradually deepening financial crisis in institutions serving tertiary education is becoming a worldwide problem. This problem requires a truly interdisciplinary approach, as was clearly demonstrated in the most recent reports of the OECD and the World Bank. We shall contribute to this analysis in connection with an important event to be held in the Czech Republic.

Sociologists addressing inequality in access to higher education, economists designing new models of financing higher education, and policy-makers who are expected to come up with consistent reforms of higher education will meet in Prague in June 2003 to discuss the most recent developments in this area. The conference is titled 'Cost-sharing and Equity in Access to Higher Education: Conflicting or Compatible Goals?' and the CSR will publish some of its most important contributions.

Last but not least, I am happy to say that Professor Stein Ringen has joined the Editorial Board. Professor Ringen is an outstanding Norwegian scholar in social policy working in Green College at the University of Oxford, and is the author of the books *The Possibility of Politics* (Oxford 1987) and *Citizens, Families, and Reform* (Oxford 1997). He is familiar with the Czech/Moravian sociological community, and has good knowledge of its people as well as its problems. His willingness to help us is therefore more than welcome.

Jiří Večerník
Editor-in-Chief

Social Capital in Transition: A First Look at the Evidence*

MARTIN RAISER◇**, CHRISTIAN HAERPFER◇◇, THOMAS NOWOTNY◇◇◇, AND CLAIRE WALLACE◇◇

◇ Office of the Chief Economist, EBRD (corresponding author), ◇◇ Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Vienna, ◇◇◇ University of Vienna, Austrian National Bank

Abstract: This paper provides what we believe to be the first collection of data on social capital in the transition countries of Central/Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. Using data from the World Values Survey 1990 and 1995 we document the degree of trust and of civic participation and find that these indicators of social capital are significantly lower than in OECD countries. The paper also provides a preliminary investigation of the link between social capital and growth during transition. Unlike in market economies, in transition countries trust is not positively related to growth; while participation in civic organisations shows a positive correlation. We also construct indicators of trust in public institutions and find positive correlations with growth rates. The positive association of civic participation with growth is robust to the use of instrumental variable techniques to control for potential problems of endogeneity.

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6: 693-720

Introduction

Social capital has received increasing attention as a crucial variable influencing economic performance. [Knack and Keefer 1997; Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999]. Particularly, the widely divergent and often disappointing results in the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy have been explained by variations in the stock of social capital. [Nowotny 1998, Stiglitz 1999]. Such efforts, however, have so far failed to take into account the differences in the definitions and concepts of social capital as they have emerged in the sociological and political literature [Tardos 1998]. Moreover, for the transition economies at least, the weight ascribed to social capital in explaining the variations in economic performance stands in stark contrast to the dearth of empirical evidence that would support such conclusions.

This paper aims to make a first step towards correcting these deficiencies. We start with a brief view on the salient concepts that have become associated with the term 'social capital'. We argue that only one class of definitions used in this literature - namely definitions of what we term 'formal social capital' - will lead to non ambiguous proposals concerning the impact of social capital on the economic performance of a specific

* The authors would like to thank Peter Sanfey for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect EBRD's official position.

** Direct all correspondence to: Martin Raiser, Chief Economists Office, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, One Exchange Square, London, EC2A 2EH, e-mail: raiserm@ebrd.com

country. We then present some first and preliminary evidence on the relationship between 'formal social capital' and economic reform and economic growth. We find that, generally, the stock of social capital is low in the transition countries. The relationship between this level of social capital and economic performance is not clear, however. We find that extended trust - that is trust in persons other than relatives and close friends - is not related to growth. This distinguishes the transition countries from countries with a fully evolved market economy where this correlation does exist. Active participation in various civic groups, on the other hand, does correlate positively with growth; as does trust in public institutions.

Social capital may be created more easily in prosperous economies: it is therefore not clear what is the cause and what the effect in the link between social capital and growth. Indeed, what we find is that more rapid economic growth and higher participation in civic organisations seem to be joint results of good progress in economic and political reform and transformation. Both growth and civic participation are also heavily dependent upon favourable or unfavourable initial conditions. We can, however, identify some initial conditions that seem to be closely correlated with civic participation but do *not* seem to correlate with growth. Using these initial conditions as instruments in a regression of growth against civic participation allows us to confirm the result of the simple correlation. The positive contribution of civic participation and trust in public institutions to growth is then jointly tested and supported in a regression framework, which also controls for the level of economic reform.

1. Definitions of social capital

The theories on social capital may be broadly divided into two sub groups. Following Putnam [1993], social capital is defined as a cultural phenomenon, denoting the extent of civic mindedness of members of a society, the existence of social norms promoting collective action and the degree of trust in public institutions. According to Putnam social capital has the properties of a public good. His work on Italy further suggests that social capital is accumulated over long periods of history. According to Platteau [1994], the emergence of universalist morality in western philosophical thinking accompanies the accumulation of social capital. This permits societies to deal successfully with the problems of collective action. Similarly, Raiser [1999] argues that 'extended trust' is needed in the transition countries in order to permit the evolution of a modern and market-based division of labour. Political scientists in turn focus on the connection between social capital and the development of those political institutions that establish and uphold the rule of law and which thus greatly facilitate economic exchange. The empirical evidence we present below allows us to test - to some extent at least - the relationships between moral norms, collective action and trust in public institutions for the transition countries.

In contrast to the definition by Putnam, social capital in the definition of Pierre Bourdieu [1993] refers to the investment in social networks by individuals. Social capital here is a private good, which can be converted into cultural capital, real wealth or 'symbolic capital' that signals social status. An individual's stock of social capital is thus a crit-

ical component of his or her power in society. Coleman [1988], who seems to have introduced the notion of social capital, similarly emphasises the benefits of social capital to the individual or to a network of individuals. For Coleman, social capital consists of the sum of the 'relational capital' several individuals hold and is governed by norms of reciprocity which are enforced by peer pressure, gain or loss in reputation, and the like. However, social capital may have positive economic externalities at the local level, by facilitating collective action.[1] Coleman's definition thus lies somewhere between a public and a private good. For reasons explained below, it is convenient to group Bourdieu's and Coleman's definitions of social capital together, as both are based on the notion of reciprocity in social and economic relationships rather than universalistic moral norms and values.

In both these interpretations, social capital facilitates economic exchange. However, the mechanisms through which this is achieved differ fundamentally. In Putnam's model of a working democracy, there is positive feedback between individuals' sense of civic duty, their participation in social life and the efficiency of existing institutional arrangements for contract enforcement. Moral obligations are reinforced in social networks and cheating is expensive. Moreover, civic participation enhances formal rule compliance and improves the accountability of government. Social capital therefore is complementary to formal institutions in supporting a complex division of labour. We label this type of social capital 'formal'. The choice of terminology reflects the fact that this social capital is accessible to all, independently of personal characteristics, rather like a formal institution such as a legal right or liberty. Its effect on economic performance at the country level should be unambiguously positive.

In Bourdieu's and Coleman's view, social capital may facilitate economic transactions between individuals, but this may often happen at the expense of excluding others. Belonging to a business club, for example, might yield solid pay - offs for those with sufficient wealth and social standing to be accepted as members. But the same business clubs might play the role of a protective guild vis a vis potential new entrants. Similarly, it is not clear whether a high degree of social capital at the local level translates necessarily into a benefit for the wider society.

The real test for all dense social networks is how they adapt to new economic circumstances that would require transactions with non-members (for case studies of efficient and non-efficient adaptation see [Humphrey and Schmitz 1996]; see also [Sedaitis 1997] for the case of Russia). Based on the relational and reciprocal aspect of most transactions conducted within these types of network, we label the Bourdieu/Coleman variety of social capital 'informal'. As explained, the effect of informal social capital on a country's overall economic performance is uncertain and could be negative.

Formal and informal social capital may co-exist, but they do not necessarily complement each other. When formal institutions are weak, informal social capital may have particular importance [Fukuyama 1995]. Over time, social relations may become increas-

[1] It is intriguing to think of social capital as an asset that is accumulated the more it is used. Hence, where norms of reciprocity exist, the more I offer help to my neighbour, the more he or she will feel obliged to help me.

ingly formalised and dense local networks might co-exist with a high level of civic participation and well-developed formal institutions. However, reliance on informal social capital ('connections'), particularly in relationships with public officials could also undermine trust in the impartiality of formal public institutions and corrode their functions through corruption, clientilism and 'tunnelling' out of public resources for private ends. Unfortunately, the data at our disposition does not provide for very clear-cut distinctions between formal and informal social capital. But it allows us to test whether in the transition countries the two types of social capital are closely related to one another, or whether the presence of one type of social capital implies that there is less of the other type.[2]

2. The role of social capital in transitional societies

The transition from central planning to a market economy and the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime is fundamentally a process of accelerated institutional change. Both formal and informal institutions need to adapt to the requirements of democracy and of market transactions. The resulting uncertainty places a heavy load on social arrangements. Mechanisms are thus needed to stabilise mutual expectations and to make behaviour of actual or potential counterparts more predictable [Wallace 1999].

There is large scope in transition for co-ordination of economic exchange through informal institutions and networks. These include barter arrangements, transactions in the grey and black economy and enterprise networks. All of these are based on 'informal social capital' [Kolankiewicz 1996; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1997]. Many empirical studies have highlighted the relevance of such informal social capital in the transition process; as for instance the extent to which relationships between enterprise directors and bureaucrats as they existed under communism have been adapted to take advantage of new economic opportunities [Stark 1997; Hayri and McDermott 1998]. Yet, the use of such informal networks can imply high overall costs to the general public. Entry of potential competitors may be discouraged. State institutions may be 'captured' and subverted to serve not the public interest but private gain [Hellman et al. 2000a]. In transition countries, the single individual might thus garner high returns from his informal social capital [Aslund 1996]. In absence of effective and countervailing public institutions, the social return on this capital could, however, become negative.

Both leading Eastern European dissidents (e.g. Vaclav Havel or Gyorgy Konrad) and Western social scientists have lamented the absence of a fully developed, vibrant civil society in communist and post-communist countries. This deficit would pose a major obstacle on the path of political and economic transition [see Smolar 1996; Rose 1993]. All

[2] The question of complementarity between formal and informal social capital has a parallel in the discussion of whether relational contract enforcement and formal, written contracts are complements or substitutes. Some recent evidence for market economies suggest that important complementarities exist between the two (Poppo and Zenger, 2000) although on aggregate the use of relational contracting is arguably more pervasive in less developed countries.

communist countries had experienced a phase of stark, totalitarian rule; and even after severe repression ended with the Stalinist era, participation in public affairs remained forced and ritualistic. People therefore tended to retreat from the public sphere into privacy; into the realm of relatives and immediate friends; or into innocuous groups promoting non-controversial cultural and leisure activities. Public institutions were perceived as alien, and - in central Europe in particular - as imposed by a foreign power.

Distrust in public institutions is thus one of the most pernicious legacies of communism [Gati 1996]. Surveys that compare corruption and the rule of law in the various countries of the globe generally place the transition economies well below the advanced market economies, and in the case of the CIS member states even below developing countries with similar income levels [see Surcke 2000, Transparency International 2000]. In short, communism seems to have left as legacy the perception that while each individual might profit from informal social capital, private returns to civic participation and other forms of 'formal social capital' would be low. Despite potentially very high returns to civic mindedness and cooperation during the transition, it would not be easily established - thus providing one possible reason for the disappointing economic performance of many transition economies.

In the remainder of this paper, we investigate three sets of questions. First, how do the transition economies compare with market economies as regards the nature and the stock of social capital? Second, what is the relationship between the stock and type of formal social capital and economic performance? Third, is the level of formal social capital in each country positively or negatively associated with the level of informal social capital?

3. Social capital in transition - preliminary evidence

In the empirical work that follows, we benefit from the availability of data from the 1990 and 1995 World Values Survey [WVS], which included 12 and 21 transition economies respectively to construct measures of moral attitudes, trust and civic participation. In this we follow Knack and Keefer [1997], who use a measure of 'trust' among anonymous individuals and the degree of participation in civic organisations as their measures of formal social capital. As measures of informal social capital we take the importance people attach to family and friends, also from the WVS. We then compare the data in the WVS with survey results from the New Democracy Barometer - NDB [see Rose 1998 and Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1997] and from EBRD's Business Environment Survey-WBES [see Hellman et al. 2000b]. Table 1 summarises all indicators used, gives their definitions, and shows which concept of social capital - formal or informal - they should be attributed to.

Before going any further an important caveat on the information conveyed by different country survey data should be noted. The responses given to questions that measure trust may be influenced in important ways by cyclical swings in public morale, or by specific events in any one year. Since the resulting variations over time are unlikely to coincide across countries, substantial biases could result from comparing countries at one

point in time. Equally important is the bias given to answers on issues of belief (such as trust and civic mindedness) by varying cultural traditions, or by the absence of a routine of opinion surveys. Such differences inevitably flavour the responses given and sometimes in ways that contradict the common perception of outsiders. Hungarians for instance, hold both their present political and their present economic regime in low esteem. Citizens in transition countries, worse off politically and economically, seem to have much higher esteem for their own institutions [see Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1997]. Notwithstanding such shortcomings, opinion surveys have provided a valuable tool for comparative cross-country analysis.

3.1 The hour-glass society - trust among anonymous individuals

The vast World Values Survey aims to uncover differences in the social and political attitudes as they exist between the populations of the countries covered. The key question on trust is as follows: 'Would you agree that people can generally be trusted or would you say that you cannot be too careful about other people?' Table 2 shows the average scores for the trust variable for all 21 transition countries in 1995 and in 1990, as well as the average for the OECD countries, for China and for Turkey. The latter two are the only developing countries that were made available to us from the data set, with China being of particular interest, as it is also a transition country.

The main finding is that in transition countries trust is generally lower than in the average OECD country; and much lower than in China; but much higher than in Turkey. Moreover, there is no indication at all from the data that in the transition countries, trust is correlated with economic performance. For instance, in 1995 the highest score for trust was achieved in the economically despondent Ukraine, whereas the second lowest score was registered for Poland, which, at that time, had already experienced two years of solid economic growth. A high level of trust might, however, have played a role in explaining the superior economic performance of China during its transition.[3]

Note that the results are generally robust over time, as the results for the 1990 survey available for 12 transition economies show. There is a general tendency for trust to decline between the two rounds in both market and transition economies. Changes in trust between rounds have very little to do with performance during the transition either - both stagnating Russia and booming Poland see their score decline by 13.9 and 16.6 percentage points respectively; which is rather similar to the declines in trust observed in the USA and the UK.

We further check the consistency of this important result by looking at various other measures of moral attitudes or civic mindedness reported in the WVS. Respondents were asked to record the frequency with which they engaged activities that implied a disregard for the common good. Again, it seems that compared with citizens in the advanced and wealthy countries, citizens in the transition countries are significantly less 'civic-mind-

[3] Note that Fukuyama classifies China as a 'low trust' economy and puts much stronger emphasis on informal social capital (the extended family) in explaining its recent success.

ed' (see also [Ockenfels and Weimann 1996]; but for a qualifying view see [Bolle 1999]). However, when asked about their attitudes towards the needs of others, citizens in the transition countries do not seem to differ that much from citizens in OECD countries. Their level of professed altruism is roughly comparable to the level of altruism in the OECD countries. On all of these counts, China shows higher scores than the transition countries to its West.

As has been mentioned, international, cross-country surveys on attitudes and opinions are plagued with numerous difficulties of interpretation. The results presented here should therefore be accepted with quite some caution. One major conclusion imposes itself nonetheless: extended trust in the sense of trust among anonymous individuals cannot be a major factor explaining the variations of economic performance among the transition countries of Central/Eastern Europe and of the FSU. The evidence rather indicates that trust is generally low in the transition economies. Rose [1995] summarises the arguments why this may be so in the picture of an 'hour-glass society'. Under communism, individuals forged strong mutual ties at the level of family and close friends, but rarely did they venture out of this well-defined circle. This part of the population formed the bottom of the hour-glass. At the top of the hour-glass were the similarly closed circles composed of the privileged, powerful and few members of the 'nomenclatura'. There was little interaction between these two levels.

Table 3 proceeds to check this particular argument. It reports the degree of importance individuals attach to families on one hand, and friends on the other. These are the only two indicators of informal social capital that become available through the WVS. People in transition countries value families as highly as do people in wealthy countries with fully developed market economies (albeit with some notable variation across countries). However, people in transition countries seem to rely far less on friends than people in OECD countries. Moreover, in such wealthy countries reliance on friends is highly correlated with the level of trust towards outsiders. This correlation does not exist in transition countries. Social circles in transition economies would seem to be smaller and more closed than in market economies, where the positive association between informal social capital (such as networks among friends) and general moral attitudes (extended trust) is higher.

3.2 Widening the hour glass - civic participation in transition

The World Value Survey also includes questions on the participation of individuals in civil society and on their confidence in public institutions. Participation in civil society is measured by active membership in civic organisations, including the Church, sports clubs, arts associations, environmental associations, and charities. In addition, there are also questions on membership in groups that represent economic or political interests such as trade unions, political parties and professional associations. The variable used in this analysis is the share of respondents saying that they are actively involved in such organisations.

Just as in the case of extended trust, participation in civic organisations is significantly lower in the transition countries than it is in countries with fully developed market economies - at least in most cases. The difference are more pronounced in 1995 than in 1990, however. In 1995, only the level of participation in political parties is comparable to the level of participation as it exists in established democracies and market economies. Unlike in the case of extended trust, there now is a significant correlation between participation rates in some of these civic organisations and economic growth during the transition. Cumulative growth between 1989 and 1998 correlates positively with participation in professional associations, in sports clubs, as well as with participation in 'other not further defined organisations' (we ignore this category in our further analysis).

We now divide the organisations listed in Table 4 into three groups:

1) Organisations that relate more to the private sphere, to personal beliefs, to personal morality and to the realm of leisure. This group includes the Church, sports clubs, arts organisations and environmental organisations, and charities. For the purposes of this paper we will call this group 'Type One' organisations.
2) Organisations which pertain more closely to the political and economic realm. The group includes political parties, trade unions, and professional groupings. For the purposes of this paper, we call this group 'Type Two' organisations.
3) For further analysis, we also form a subgroup of the 'Type One' organisations, excluding environmental and arts groups, which may be of least relevance for the formation of business ties and thus for economic performance.

This sub-division mirrors the sub-division into 'Putnam' and 'Olson' groups established in Knack and Keefer [1997].[4] 'Type One' groups relate directly to the idea of a vibrant civil society and thus are assumed to impact positively on growth. Expectations with regard to the economic impact of the 'Type Two' groups diverge. They could affect economic growth negatively, especially if they become associated with rent-seeking by vested interests. But, on the other hand, they are an essential element of a pluralistic society and polity. As a matter of fact, Knack and Keefer find that in mature market economies, participation in the 'Type Two' groups has the stronger and more significant impact on growth. This suggests that at least in mature market economies, the benefits of functioning political institutions that can resolve social conflicts overweighs the disadvantages of organised vested interests seeking rents and blocking decision making.

All three sub-groups display a positive correlation with cumulative growth over the 1989-1998 period in the transition economies. These correlations are significant at the 5% level. Because of its stronger correlation with economic performance, we henceforth focus on the sub-group of 'Type One' organisations (excluding arts clubs and environmental associations) in all subsequent analysis. Correlations do not establish causality, of course. To take into account the possibility that economic growth may influence civic engagement, we repeated the exercise using civic participation in 1990. For that year, the sample of transition economies is much smaller, and the correlations of civic participation to subsequent

[4] Knack and Keefer (1997) use the term 'Putnam Group' for the first type of organisations; and the term 'Olson Group' for what we describe as 'Type Two' organisations.

growth are insignificant. Thus intense civic participation at the start of transition does not seem to have contributed to subsequent growth. Chart 1 shows the changes in 'Type One' and 'Type Two' group participation for the 8 countries for which data is available in both survey years. Slovenia, Hungary and Romania show an increase in civic participation in all three groups, Russia only in the 'Type Two' groups, and the other four countries show declines in civic participation between 1990 and 1995.

Does this evidence suggest that growth determines the extent of civic participation rather than vice versa? Not necessarily. The nature of civil organisations is unlikely to be constant during the transition. At the start of transition, most organisations could have still been coloured and impregnated by the communist legacy; while by 1995, most of such organsisation would have established an autonomous identity. More or less forced membership would have become supplanted by voluntary membership. We could also interpret our data as implying that an active civil society is an endogenous *outcome* of a successful transition, which in turn feeds back into higher growth rates. Indeed, in the next section, we find that high civic participation is a feature of countries with generally more favourable initial conditions and thus better overall performance during the transition.

We also ask, whether and how civic participation is correlated with political attitudes and with the volume of *informal* social capital. Indeed, citizens in transition countries are not less interested in politics than are citizens of countries with developed market economies. But unlike in the countries with market economies, in the transition countries political interest does not correlate with political participation in a cross-country comparison. As noted further above, people in transition countries attach less importance to friends than do people in fully consolidated democracies and market economies (although more than people in China!). Moreover, strong reliance on friends does not lead to higher civic participation - again in contrast to market economies.

The results obtained so far show a curious disjuncture in transition economies between the cross-country pattern for civic participation and the variation of social and moral attitudes of individuals. In some ways, one might be tempted to conclude that actions speak louder than words and that the civic participation variables are simply a more reliable representation of individual attitudes and ultimately of the level of social capital than questions about trust, reliance on the family, or interest in politics. Another interpretation, however, would be that these results show the path dependence of attitudes towards everything beyond the intimate circle of relatives and close friends. These attitudes change but at a sluggish pace. Civic organisations, on the other hand, have to adapt rapidly to a changing economic and political environment. Individual attitudes and habits that define the relation to these organisations change much more slowly. This interpretation is confirmed by other experiences of transition towards democracy. In post totalitarian Germany [Conradt 1980] and Austria, or in post authoritarian Portugal, democratic institutions became established and consolidated quite quickly, whereas it took much longer - a generation at least - for the corresponding democratic attitudes to become universally shared.

3.3 Trust in state institutions

We now turn our attention to attitudes towards the state, or trust in public institutions. While a key aspect of a functioning market economy and democracy, this might be conceived not so much as a prerequisite for the accumulation of social capital; but as its consequence. The WVS asks respondents to rate their degree of confidence in a number of institutions, including government, the press, the army, the legal system, the civil service, trade unions, the enterprise sector, the church and others. Scores range from 1-4, with 4 representing a lot of confidence and 1 no confidence.

Table 5 reports average scores for confidence in various institutions and again compares the answer to those given in countries with fully developed market economies. The results show that in transition countries, trust in public institutions is *not* systematically lower than in the wealthier Western countries. But there are notable exceptions concerning some key institutions: the legal system, the police, the trade unions, commercial companies and political parties. The results are roughly similar for 1990 and for 1995. The five first years of transition have not improved confidence in these essential institutions.

While, on the face of this evidence, the much-lamented lack of trust in institutions seems to be specific to a few - albeit important - areas, further robustness checks on the data raise concern about the results of the WVS. We compared the responses from NDB and BEEPS (implemented jointly by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in 1999 - see [Hellman et al. 2000b]) with those given in the WVS. Both the NBD and the BEEPS include alternative ratings of trust in institutions by households and enterprises respectively. The NDB asks respondents to rate their trust in a given institution on a scale of 1-7 (with higher scores reflecting more trust). The BEEPS asks enterprises to rate the performance of various state institutions on a scale of 1 to 5.

Table 5 reports the correlations between the WVS and NDB and BEEPS trust scores for all those institutions where comparable questions were asked. Several correlations are negative, which raises suspicions about the usefulness of the data. The strongest positive correlations can be established for the following institutions: i) political parties, ii) the police, iii) the army, iv) the Church, and v) the legal system. As it happens, with the exception of the Church and the army, these are also among the institutions where transition economies record significantly lower levels of trust than OECD countries. We henceforth focus only on trust in the legal system, the police, the army, political parties and the Church as potential determinants of performance during the transition.

In the bottom of Table 5, we present correlations of confidence in the five institutions highlighted above with cumulative growth in 1989-1998. Confidence in the police shows the strongest positive correlation with growth, while confidence in the Church is weakly negatively related to cumulative growth during 1989-1998. The other correlations remain statistically insignificant. Table 5 also presents the correlation of an aggregate 'confidence in the rule of law index' with growth. This index is constructed as the sum of confidence in the police, the legal system and the army. It is weakly correlated with growth during the 1989-1998 period.

This result is somewhat disappointing given the importance generally attributed to

trust in public institutions. Indeed, when using the data from the NDB or the WBES, we get much stronger correlations. In Figure 2, we present a correlation of the average NDB score for trust in seven public institutions (the army, the civil servants, the courts, the government, the parliament, the political parties, and the police) against annual growth, pooled over the 4 years in which the NDB was implemented - 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998. The correlation is positive and highly significant. The correlations with each of the subcomponents are also highly significant. In Figure 3, we correlate cumulative growth in 1989-1998 against the degree of confidence in the legal system obtained from the BEEPS - again with highly significant results. Thus, while the WVS data do not yield strong conclusions about the relevance of trust in public institutions for a successful economic transition, data from other sources suggest that trust in public institutions is important.

3.4 Civic participation and trust in institutions - making social capital work

The evidence found on the positive relationship between civic participation and growth and between trust in public institutions and growth might suggest that civic participation and trust in institutions are themselves highly correlated. Indeed, at the heart of Putnam's argument about the role of civil society and of social capital for economic performance lies an argument about the impact that civil society has on the quality of government (thus the title of his famous book: *Making Democracy Work*).

Table 6 presents correlation coefficients between the two groups of civic organisations and trust in various public institutions. The strongest positive correlation can be established between civic participation and trust in the police. Trust in the legal system and the army is also positively related to civic participation. The correlation between civic participation and trust in these three institutions is slightly higher for 'Type Two' groups than for 'Type One' groups. There thus seems to be some association between civic engagement and trust in public institutions, particularly those associated with the rule of law. But the results are too weak to draw strong conclusions.

Data from the BEEPS again show only a weak positive correlation between civic participation and confidence in the legal system. However, taking trust in public institutions in the NDB as our measure of trust in the state, we find a strong positive correlation with civic participation both for 'Type One' and 'Type Two' groups. The small sample of just 12 transition economies cautions about reading too much into these results, but they do suggest that Putnam's argument of how democracy works might find some support in the transition economies. Note that a consistency check for market economies confirms that trust in state institutions in positively associated with civic engagement in both 'Type One' and 'Type Two' groups.

4. Social capital, initial conditions and economic reforms

What factors might explain the variation in social capital among the transition countries? And are these factors also important in explaining differences in economic performance

across countries? An answer to these two questions is an important step in identifying the causal links behind the correlations established so far. They might shed some light on possible policies that might raise trust.

4.1 Initial conditions and social capital

The existing literature provides some limited guidance on the possible determinants of the level of social capital in transition. Alesina and La Ferrara [2000] investigate the variation in trust among residents of the US. They find that social inequalities and ethnic heterogeneity at the local level are important determinants of trust. This is in line with the reasoning in Knack and Zak [1998] who present a model and some cross-country evidence linking trust to social distance - measured in this case by income inequality. Income inequality at the start of transition did show some variation across countries [Atkinson and Micklewright 1992], and ethnic divisions were very important in some countries but not in others. As Table 7 shows, *initial* income inequality is not related to civic participation five years later in 1995. By the mid-1990s, however, income inequality had started to diverge dramatically across the region and was negatively (albeit only weakly) correlated with the level of civic participation.

Since moral traditions and other aspects of culture are path dependent by their very nature, variations in civic participation could reflect underlying variations in historical developments [Putnam 1993; Platteau 1994]. It is not evident which aspects of different historical developments should be highlighted in this respect. We focus here on religious affiliation, GDP per capita and the rate of urbanisation. The first is a proxy for cultural differences, the second two variables measure differences in economic development. The correlations in Table 7 show that civic participation in 'Type One' groups and the overall investment climate rating is higher in places where the main religious affiliation is with either Protestantism or Catholicism. The level of urbanisation is negatively associated with civic participation - a finding that might support the notion of anonymity and isolation in urban agglomerations. Initial GDP per capita is not strongly correlated with either civic participation or trust in institutions.

Variations in the size of adjustment cost following years of distortive policies under central planning might also influence the level and quality social capital in the process of economic and political transition. Where such costs are very high, people may remain tied to subsistence strategies and might tend to be politically passive rather than actively participating in the process of change. This in turn would tend to reduce the opportunity for gaining trust in others as well as gaining trust in public institutions. We propose to capture the extent of adjustment costs during transition here with the simple geographic distance to Brussels, the numbers of years spent under central planning, the share of exports to the CMEA normalised by GDP, a dummy for whether a country had a prior history as a nation state and a dummy for the endowment with natural resources. As Table 7 reveals, higher economic distortions tend to be strongly correlated with lower civic participation rates, as does abundance with natural resources. Economic distortions are, however, by and large not associated with higher or lower trust in public institutions.

Looking at the final column in Table 7 it becomes apparent that most of the initial conditions listed here are also significantly associated with growth performance across the transition economies. This finding confirms the view, expressed further above, that variations in economic performance and the creation of social capital are really joint products of the same underlying causes. But this fact poses a methodological problem because it does not allow us to use the correlations between initial conditions and social capital to get around the issue of causality in the relationship between social capital and growth.[5]

Luckily, two of the variables seem to be highly correlated with civic participation but not with growth rates. These are exports to the CMEA and the urbanisation rate. At least for civic participation rates, these variables would seem to provide reasonably good instruments. For trust in public institutions no valid instruments are available. We now verify the results obtained so far in a regression framework, explicitly testing to what extent endogeneity of the social capital variables biases our results, using exports to the CMEA and the urbanisation rate as instruments for civic participation.

4.2 Civic participation, trust in public institutions and reform - preliminary regression results

So far we have presented just simple correlations. But these leave open the question as to whether the various measures of social capital are jointly significant and what weight to attribute to civic participation and trust in public institutions respectively. We will now use some very simple and preliminary regression to analyse this issue. We also conduct a very basic robustness test by including economic reforms into the model. Many other potential determinants of growth in transition are not included, raising the possibility of spurious results due to model misspecification. To some extent we would argue that such problems are unavoidable when investigating transition outcomes. But the very small number of observations obliges us to limit the number of variables.

We examine a very simple model of the form:

Growth = a + b*Civic engagement + c*Trust in institutions + d*Reforms + e

We also examine some interaction effects between all three variables. Trust in institutions is measured by the BEEPS investment climate scores. Reforms are measured as the average over the 1989-1998 period using EBRD's transition indicators. Growth is given as the logarithmic difference in income levels in between 1998 and 1989.

Table 8 presents the results of our various specifications. At the bottom of each column are two test-statistics, which examine whether endogeneity bias is a problem for our results. The Sargan-test for valid instruments essentially tests whether the instruments used also belong in the regression equation. As we established in the previous section, exports to

[5] In other words, the initial conditions variables really belong in the growth equation. They would thus be correlated with the residuals of a simple regression of growth against social capital and thus not be valid instruments.

the CMEA and the urbanisation rate would seem to qualify as valid instruments due to the low correlation with growth but high correlation with civic participation. The Sargan test statistic fails to reject the validity of these two instruments in all the regressions. Note that for trust in institutions no instruments could be found and results thus need to be read with caution. The Hausman test checks the assumption of exogeneity directly by comparing the OLS and the IV estimators. Again in all the regressions shown, we fail to reject OLS estimation.[6]

The results in columns 1 and 2 confirm the simple correlations presented above. Over the 1989-1998 period, civic engagement is positively associated with economic growth. The value of the coefficient for 'Type One' groups is considerably lower than for 'Type Two' groups. Yet, the cross-country variance in the latter is also smaller - the value of the coefficients in both cases imply that one standard deviation in civic participation would explain around a 20 percentage point difference in cumulative growth. Moreover, the results suggest that although civic engagement may increase trust in formal institutions, it seems to have an independent positive effect on growth. One way through which civic engagement might directly benefit economic performance is by facilitating self-enforcement of market rules, without the need for recourse to third party enforcement by formal institutions.

Columns 3-4 show results of interacting civic engagement with trust in formal institutions. As mentioned, complementarity between these two variables is implied in Putnam's [1993] view of social capital. If his theory is correct, this also would imply a positive coefficient on the interaction term. Multicollinearity clouds the results in the case of 'Type One' groups, although the sign of the coefficient on the interactive term is positive. For 'Type Two' groups, we find no evidence of complementarity - in fact the interactive term is significantly negative.

In columns 5-6 of Table 8, we add economic reforms to the set of regressors. Economic reforms are positively correlated with each of these three variables, causing significance levels to drop relative to columns 1-4, although the total fit of the regressions improves considerably. Note, however, that for 'Type Two' groups the coefficient remains significant (column 6) and is only moderately reduced in value from the result in column 2.

One way to correct for problems of collinearity is to adopt a two-step procedure, first regressing reforms against civic participation and trust in public institutions and then using the residuals from this regression as a proxy for reforms in the performance equation. The result for 'Type One' groups appears in columns 7. Once the correction is used, the positive impact of social capital reappears, while reforms maintain a positive impact on growth. Finally, we attempted to find evidence for a positive interaction between reforms and the level of social capital but did not find convincing evidence that reforms work more effectively where civil participation or trust in the government are high.

[6] Following Greene (2000, p. 385) we chose a simple F-test implementation of the Hausman test, which involves first regressing the potentially endogenous variable against the set of instruments and using the obatined fitted value as an additional regressor in the original equation. The F-test rejects the OLS specification if the fitted value is significantly different than zero. Support for the OLS model also comes from a comparison of coefficients in the two specifications: the coefficients on civic participation do not change much between the OLS and IV models.

5. Conclusion and policy implications

To recapitulate, this paper has yielded the following results. First, we established that - unlike in countries with mature market economies - differences in trust among anonymous individuals are not a good explanation for variation in economic performance of the transition countries. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that the low level of trust observed in all of these countries would impair the prospects for their long term economic growth and would disadvantage them in this respect in comparison to other emerging markets.

Second, the evidence shows that civic participation does seem to be correlated with economic growth, although the two are probably joint products of the same underlying causes. Nonetheless, our results are robust to corrections to account for endogeneity and to the inclusion of reforms as a determinant of growth. The causal mechanism linking civic participation to growth would seem to lie in the potential of civic organisations to improve the effectiveness of markets, for instance by facilitating the transmission of information, by lowering the costs of monitoring and enforcement, and by giving voice in the political process to market participants.

Third, trust in public institutions is also positively correlated with growth. Institutions that seem to be of particular relevance during the transition are the legal system and the police, while results for political institutions are more ambiguous. Trust in the media and in the Church does not seem to be related to economic performance.

Fourth, there is some evidence that trust in public institutions is positively correlated with civic participation. Our results are thus consistent with Putnam's theory of how democracy works. Yet, both civic participation and trust in public institutions have independent positive effects on growth. Civic engagement thus benefits economic performance not just by improving the performance of the state, but also by facilitating bilateral exchange. Our results suggest therefore that Putnam and Coleman may both be right.

What implications can be drawn from this analysis for policy? As we have shown, levels of social capital achieved in the mid-1990s were significantly correlated with variables characterising the different economic and social starting points in the transition. Those countries closest geographically and historically to Western Europe seem to have had the greatest ease in developing a civil society that could support the transition process. Keeping alive the hope of 'returning to Europe' may be one way in which the outside world could help build trust and social capital in the region - particularly in Southeastern Europe. In Russia and the CIS, a careful dialogue will be needed in order to help overcome legacies of distrust.

The negative correlation between income inequality and social capital that had evolved by the mid-1990s suggests that policies aimed a reducing high levels of income inequality could be important in a strategy of increasing trust in others and in public institutions. By the same token, governments should eschew chauvinistic tendencies within their countries, which only serve to exacerbate social divisions and thereby undermine trust. Finally, as Stiglitz [1996] and Dic Lo [1998] argue based on the success of East Asia, there are ways for governments to build trust in public institutions by offering a dia-

logue to members of the public and consulting over important policy changes. Low trust in public institutions is one of the predicaments politics in transition countries are faced with. But it is a predicament politics can deal with - at least in many important respects.

MARTIN RAISER *is Director for Country Analysis and Strategy at the EBRD. He holds a PhD from Kiel University, where he was a research fellow prior to joining the EBRD in 1996. His research interests include the role of social capital in transition, the political economy of reform and growth in transition and developing countries and the specific development challenges of the Caspian.*

CHRISTIAN HAERPFER *works at the Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna. He is involved mostly in research of opinions in Eastern Europe. Lastly, he published the book* Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe. The Democratisation of the General Public in 15 Central and Eastern European Countries, 1991-1998 *(London: Routledge),*

THOMAS NOWOTNY *worked at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London and later at the Austrian National Bank. He is a political scientist who has written many articles about Eastern Europe and the enlargement issues. He also works as a lecturer in the Department of Politics of the University of Vienna.*

CLAIRE WALLACE *works in the Department of Sociology at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, Austria. She is also visiting professor at the University of Derby, UK and currently the editor in chief of the journal European Societies. She has been undertaking work on transformations in Eastern and Central Europe for the last decade.*

References

Aslund, A. 1996. „Reform and Rent-Seeking in Russia's Economic Transformation". *Transition*, 26. January 1996: 12-16.

Atkinson, A., J. Micklewright 1992. *Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Distribution of Income.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bolle, F. 1998. "*Does Trust Pay?*" European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), mimeo, August 1998.

Bourdieu, P. 1993. "Forms of Capital". In: Richardson, J. (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research in the Sociology of Education.* New York: Greenwood Press.

Coleman, J. 1988. "Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital". *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (supplement): 94-120.

Conradt, D. 1980. "Changing German Political Culture". Pp. 212-272 in Almond, G. S. Verba (eds.), *The Civic Culture Re-Visited.* Boston: Little Brown,

Dasgupta, P., I. Serageldin (eds.) 1999. *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective.* Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Ferrara, la A. and E. 2000. "*The Determinants of Trust*", NBER Working Paper, No 7621, March 2000.

Fukuyama, F. 1995. *Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.* New York: Free Press.

Gati, C. 1996. "The Mirage of Democracy". *Transition*, 22 March 1996: 6-12.

Greene, W. 2000. *Econometric Analysis.* Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

Greif, A. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organisation of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies". *Journal of Political Economy* 102 (5): 912-950.

Havel, V. 1989. *Living in Truth.* Boston: Faber and Faber.

Hayri, A., G. A. McDermott 1998. "The Network Properties of Corporate Governance and Industrial Restructuring: A Post-Socialist Lesson". *Industrial and Corporate Change* 7 (1): 153-193.

Hellman, J., G. Jones, D. Kaufman et al. 2000a. *Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition.* The World Bank, mimeo, September 2000.

Hellman, J., G. Jones, D. Kaufman, M. Schankerman et al. 2000b. *Measuring Governance and State Capture: The Role of Bureaucrats and Firms in Shaping the Business Environment.* World Bank Working Paper No. 2312, Washington D.C.

Humphrey, J., H. Schmitz 1996. *Trust and Economic Development*, Brighton Institute of Development Studies, Discussion Paper no. 355.

Knack, S., P. Keefer 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. CXII (December 98): 1252-1288.

Knack, S., P. Zak 1998. *Trust and Growth.* University of Maryland, mimeographed.

Kolankiewicz, G. 1996. "Social Capital and Social Change". *British Journal of Sociology* 47, 3: 427-441.

Linz, J., A. Stepan 1996. *Transition and Consolidation.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

Lo, Dic 1995. "Economic Theory and the Transformation of the Soviet-Type System: The Challenge of the Late Industrialisation Perspective". In Chang, Ha-Joon, P. Nolan (eds.), *The Transformation of the Communist Economies.* London: Macmillan.

Konrad, G. 1987. *Antipolitics.* New York: H. Holt.

Marody, M. 1997. "Post-Transitology or is there any Life after Transition", *Polish Sociological Review* 117/1: 13-21.

Matzner, E. 2000. *Monopolare Weltordnung.* Marburg: Metropolis.

Market Economy, *World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies*, Washington D.C.

Nowotny, T. 1998. *Central/Eastern Europe and Transitology.* Wien: ÖIIP.

Ockenfels, J. Weimann 1996. *Types and Patterns: An Experimental East-West Comparison of Co-operation and Solidarity.* Magdeburg: Otto-von-Guericke-Univerisity Magdeburg, Working Paper 11.

Olson, M. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development". *American Political Science Review*, Sept. 1993.

Platteau, J. P. 1994. "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist - Part II: Trust and Generalised Morality". *Journal of Development Studies* 30, 4: 754-817.

Poppo, L., T. Zenger 2000. *Substitutes or Complements? Exploring the Relationship between Formal Contracts and Relational Governance*, John M Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis, mimeo.

Putnam, R. 1993. *Making Democracy Work.* Princeton University Press.

Raiser, M. 1999. *Trust in Transition.* EBRD Working Paper, No. 39, London.

Rose, R. 1993. "Rethinking Civil Society: Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust." *Journal of Democracy* 1, 1: 18-29.

Rose, R. 1995. "Russia as an Hour-Glass Society: A Constitution without Citizens". *East European Constitutional Review* 4, 3: 34-42.

Rose, R., W. Mishler, C. Haerpfer 1997. *Getting Real. Social Capital in Post-Communist Societies.* University of Strathclyde, Studies in Public Policy, No. 278.

Rose, R. 1998. *Getting Things Done with Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII.* University of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 303.

Rose, R., W. Mishler, C. Haerpfer 1998. *Democracy and its Alternatives: Testing the Churchill Hypothesis in Post-Communist Countries.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Schmitter, P. 1993. *Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy.* Vienna: IHS.

Sedaitis, J. B. 1997. "Network Dynamics of New Firm Foundation: Developing Russian Commodity Markets". Grabher, G., D. Stark (eds.), *Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages and Localities.* Oxford University Press.

Schiff, M. 2000. *Love thy Neighbour: Trade, Migration and Social Capital.* Development Research Group, The World Bank, Washington D.C., mimeo.

Stark, D. 1997. "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism". Grabher, G., D. Stark (eds.), *Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism: Legacies, Linkages, an Localities*, Oxford University Press.

Smolar, A. 1996. "Civil Society After Communism: From Opposition to Atomization". *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 4, 1: 24-38.

Stiglitz, J. 1996. *Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle,* the World Bank Research Observer, vol. II, no. 2 August 1996, p. 151-177.

Stiglitz, J. 1999. "*Wither Reform*?" Paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C., April 1999.

Surcke, M. 2000. "*The Quality and Size of Government in Transition Economies - are they still different*?" Hamburger Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (HWWA), mimeo, August 2000.

Shleifer, A. 1997. *"Government in Transition"*, Cambridge MA, Harvard Institute for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 1783.

Tardos, R. 1998. "*Ways of interpretation and the uses of the social capital concept*". Paper presented at the INSA Sunbelt conference.

Wallace, C. 1999. "Investing in Social Capital. The Case of Small Traders in Central and Eastern Europe". *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*: 23, 4: 751-770.

Table 1. Formal and informal social capital, data, definitions, and sources

	Source	Definition	Type of social capital
Generalised trust	WVS	Percentage of respondents that say they trust other people (alternative response: can't be too careful about others)	Formal
Civic-mindedness	WVS	Mean score (1 = always, 10 = never) of frequency of immoral actions (fare dodging, tax cheating, buying stolen goods, accepting bribes)	Formal
Altruism	WVS	Percentage of respondents who say they think about others (alternative response: only think about oneself)	Formal
Civic participation	WVS	Percentage of respondents who are active in civic organisations (alternative responses: members, but inactive; not members)	Formal
Ascribed trust	WVS	Percentage of respondents who value family a lot (alternative responses: rather, not at all)	Informal
Process-based trust	WVS	Percentage of respondents who value friends a lot (alternative responses: rather, not at all)	Informal
Political interest	WVS	Percentage of respondents who frequently discuss politics (alternative response: politics not frequently discussed	Formal
Confidence in formal institutions	WVS	Mean score (1 = low confidence; 4 = high confidence) for each institution	Formal
Trust in institutions	NDB	Mean score (1 = no trust, 7 = great trust) for each institution	Formal
Confidence in legal system	BEEPS	Mean score (0 = low confidence; 3 = high confidence)	Formal
Quality of investment climate	BEEPS	Mean score of obstacles to investment (0 = high obstacles; 3 = low obstacles) formed over 10 dimensions, including policy instability, inflation, exchange rate, finance, taxes and regulation, infrastructure, judiciary, corruption, street crime, organised crime	Formal

Table 2. Extended trust in transition

	1990	1995
Transition economies	***26,4***	***23,2***
Albania		27,0
Armenia		24,7
Azerbaijan		20,5
Belarus	25,5	24,1
Bulgaria	30,4	28,6
Croatia		25,1
Czech Republic	30,2	28,5
Estonia	27,6	21,5
Georgia		23,4
Hungary	24,6	22,7
Latvia	19,0	24,7
Lithuania	30,8	21,9
FYR Macedonia		8,2
Moldova		22,2
Poland	34,5	17,9
Romania	16,1	18,7
Russia	37,5	23,9
Serbia+Montenegro		30,2
Slovakia	23,0	27,0
Slovenia	17,4	15,5
Ukraine		31,0
OECD	***44,5***	***43,0***
China	60,3	52,3
Turkey	10,0	5,5
T-test: Transition economies vs. OECD*	0,00	0,00
Correlation with growth: cumulative growth 1989-1998	-0,15	-0,27

Notes:

* T-test reports P-values for difference in means; 0.00 means statistically significant at more than 1% level.

Source: *World Values Survey* 1990, 1995.

Table 3. Ascribed and process-based trust in transition economies

	1995				1990			
	Reliance on family		Reliance on friends		Reliance on family		Reliance on friends	
	a lot	rather	a lot	rather	a lot	rather	a lot	rather
Transition economies	***86,04***	***11,91***	***35,35***	***50,17***	***79,52***	***17,21***	***27,35***	***49,09***
Albania	96,28	3,22	19,14	67,59				
Armenia	86,30	12,09	44,65	46,56				
Azerbaijan	85,13	13,26	35,27	56,73				
Belarus	84,48	13,30	31,73	50,75	76,85	19,74	36,52	43,86
Bulgaria	88,53	10,24	41,46	45,54	76,07	20,12	38,43	39,23
Croatia	85,34	12,23	48,41	43,55				
Czech Rep.	91,08	7,26	38,65	50,83	85,59	10,97	27,96	52,58
Estonia	78,13	19,61	26,89	59,27	68,54	27,15	22,81	51,10
Georgia	91,19	7,11	67,84	27,87				
Hungary	89,52	8,17	38,33	37,87	88,54	8,44	27,48	44,93
Latvia	68,06	25,50	24,29	57,01	72,52	23,26	16,38	52,73
Lithuania	73,97	23,22	21,89	56,02	65,31	28,79	19,01	53,08
FYR Macedonia	97,98	1,82	49,64	42,44				
Moldova	79,04	18,11	21,39	50,97				
Poland	90,15	9,50	26,11	58,49	90,59	7,91	22,76	56,20
Romania	88,83	8,90	20,76	47,45	83,21	15,23	24,70	49,03
Russia	84,06	12,65	29,35	49,78	78,94	17,68	29,24	47,59
Serbia+Montenegro	88,79	9,76	48,28	45,57				
Slovakia	90,95	8,23	32,26	59,17	87,47	9,94	25,27	53,35
Slovenia	82,52	14,59	41,14	46,22	80,63	17,31	37,66	45,37
Ukraine	86,59	11,43	34,99	53,98				
OECD	***85,99***	***12,12***	***56,79***	***38,69***	***84,02***	***13,48***	***47,02***	***44,74***
China	76,67	22,06	29,91	55,95	62,19	33,00	21,55	51,96
Turkey	97,53	2,05	70,47	27,64	87,17	11,95	55,40	36,61
T-Test: TEs vs. OECD*	0,49	0,46	0,00	0,00	0,07	0,08	0,00	0,05
*Correlate with Trust***								
TEs	*-0,08*	*0,07*	*-0,01*	*0,16*	*-0,03*	*-0,01*	*0,00*	*0,11*
OECD	*0,16*	*-0,20*	***0,43***	*-0,30*	***0,53***	***-0,56***	***0,79***	***-0,68***
All	*-0,16*	*0,17*	***0,35***	*-0,22*	*0,22*	*-0,25*	***0,57***	***-0,41***
*All1****	*0,01*	*-0,02*	***0,60***	***-0,45***	***0,45***	***-0,47***	***0,81***	***-0,59***

Notes:

Numbers in columns are percentage shares of respondents who consider family (friends) as very (rather) important.

* T-test reports P-value for difference in sub-group means; 0.00 means statistically significant at more than 1% level.

** Trust is measured as in Table 2. All correlations significant at 5% level are shown in bold.

*** All countries without China and Turkey.

Source: *World Values Survey* 1990, 1995.

Table 4. Civic participation, 1995

	Share of active participants in institutions, %										
	Church	Sports	Arts	Unions	Parties	Environ-ment	Profes-sional	Charity	Other	Type I*	Type II**
Transition economies	***5,38***	***5,25***	***3,75***	***3,75***	***2,49***	***0,90***	***2,72***	***1,45***	***2,06***	***12,08***	***9,13***
Albania	4,82	5,12	3,32	1,61	13,17	0,81	4,94	0,81	0,40	10,75	19,72
Armenia	1,45	5,05	8,15	1,25	1,15	1,15	2,35	1,60	0,35	8,10	4,75
Azerbaijan	1,50	1,55	2,10	2,80	1,80	0,25	0,85	0,25	0,05	3,30	5,44
Belarus	2,34	1,91	1,63	2,39	0,43	0,53	0,14	0,19	0,57	4,45	2,96
Bulgaria	0,84	1,68	1,68	4,94	2,24	0,19	0,56	0,75	0,47	3,26	7,74
Croatia	16,29	10,67	6,64	6,06	2,77	1,43	6,13	4,70	4,28	31,66	14,97
Czech Republic	4,72	11,20	3,42	3,32	2,54	1,49	3,60	1,14	7,90	17,06	9,46
Estonia	2,35	5,78	5,19	1,18	0,59	0,39	1,27	0,59	1,37	8,72	3,04
Georgia	2,20	3,28	5,56	1,47	2,59	0,58	1,54	1,31	0,58	6,80	5,60
Hungary	9,40	8,31	2,15	8,00	2,62	0,62	6,00	2,46	5,54	20,17	16,62
Latvia	3,50	5,08	5,00	1,92	0,75	0,83	3,25	0,67	1,58	9,25	5,92
Lithuania	3,47	2,78	2,98	1,09	1,09	0,40	1,19	0,60	0,43	6,85	3,38
Macedonia	4,42	6,03	4,62	4,92	5,73	2,31	4,32	3,22	2,81	13,67	14,97
Moldova	12,50	4,17	4,78	5,89	0,91	1,32	1,73	1,52	0,00	18,19	8,54
Poland				2,08	0,52						
Romania	14,85	4,28	4,20	10,41	5,08	2,26	3,71	2,02	0,24	21,15	19,21
Russia	1,86	3,33	3,28	7,21	0,78	0,44	0,88	0,54	0,54	5,74	8,87
Serbia + Montenegro	2,31	5,59	1,97	1,97	3,29	0,46	2,96	1,84	1,25	9,74	8,23
Slovakia	9,43	7,25	2,02	2,41	2,20	1,10	3,21	1,47	6,42	18,15	7,83
Slovenia	7,27	10,26	4,49	4,59	1,30	0,80	4,88	2,89	6,29	20,42	10,77
Ukraine	2,03	1,67	1,74	3,13	0,64	0,57	0,85	0,46	0,18	4,16	4,62
OECD	***17,13***	***24,32***	***14,06***	***8,10***	***5,24***	***3,54***	***9,28***	***9,45***	***9,30***	***43,52***	***20,99***
China		10,07	5,73	5,87	6,40	2,40	2,27	2,87	12,67	12,93	14,53
Turkey	1,23	4,10	3,25	2,56	4,74	1,33	5,38	2,40	2,19	7,73	12,68
T-test: TEs vs. OECD	*0,03*	*0,00*	*0,00*	*0,01*	*0,06*	*0,01*	*0,01*	*0,01*	*0,00*	*0,00*	*0,01*
*Correlation with cumulative growth 89-98****	*0,35*	***0,64***	*-0,17*	*0,12*	*0,16*	*0,22*	***0,57***	*0,30*	***0,75***	***0,51***	*0,42*

Notes:

* Type I is the sum of paricipants in Church, sport clubs and charity organisations.

** Type II is the sum of participants in political parties, trade unions and professonal organisations.

*** Correlations are with average growth 1989-1998 for TEs economies only.

Correlations significant at the 5% level are shown in bold.

Source: *World Values Survey* 1995.

Table 5. Trust in formal institutions, 1995

	Confidence in institution															
	Church	Army	Legal System	Press	TV	Unions	Police	Government	Parties	Parliament	Civil Service	Companies	Ecology mov.	Women mov.	European Union	RoL*
Transition economies	2,68	2,68	2,35	2,28	2,41	2,09	2,32	2,32	1,91	2,17	2,30	2,29	2,49	2,32	2,54	2,45
Albania	2,61	2,68	2,65	1,99	2,17	1,82	2,94	2,39	2,05	2,61	1,99	2,04	1,58	2,10	3,34	2,75
Armenia	2,84	2,93	2,08	2,16	2,33	1,82	2,07	2,25	1,75	1,95	2,17	2,41	2,33	1,95	2,58	2,36
Azerbaijan	2,82	2,59	2,43	2,07	2,20	2,12	2,39	3,30	2,55	2,92	2,33	2,25	1,72	1,75	1,91	2,47
Belarus	3,00	2,95	2,45	2,31	2,42	2,33	2,21	2,49	1,77	2,05	2,48	2,75	3,00	2,84	2,77	2,54
Bulgaria	2,60	3,15	2,23	2,37	2,79	2,13	2,47	2,62	2,07	2,35	2,42	2,15	2,32	2,35	2,88	2,61
Croatia	2,66	3,02	2,54	2,08	2,07	2,05	2,69	2,53	2,05	2,37	2,32	2,13	2,55	2,07	2,18	2,75
Czech	2,11	2,33	2,09	2,34	2,45	2,27	2,36	2,11	1,87	1,91	2,24	2,24	2,54	2,26	2,39	2,26
Estonia	2,61	2,39	2,62	2,52	2,74	2,30	2,42	2,43	1,93	2,32	2,61	2,60	2,94	2,71	2,67	2,47
Georgia	3,00	2,43	2,29	2,51	2,53	1,91	2,07	2,33	2,02	2,15	2,41	2,36	2,22	2,16	2,53	2,26
Hungary	2,35	2,62	2,51	2,11	2,33	1,93	2,55	2,33	1,89	2,25	2,51	2,18	2,32	2,09	2,73	2,56
Latvia	2,70	2,07	2,23	2,43	2,55	2,16	2,11	2,20	1,68	1,99	2,35	2,36	2,65	2,44	2,55	2,14
Lithuania	2,82	2,36	2,10	2,73	2,80	2,20	2,01	2,31	2,01	2,17	2,36	2,26	2,59	2,38	2,50	2,16
Macedonia	2,20	2,39	2,08	2,00	2,07	1,79	2,08	1,83	1,72	1,76	1,91	2,06	2,31	2,08	2,34	2,19
Moldova	3,05	2,60	2,45	2,22	2,40	2,15	2,11	2,29	1,83	2,23	2,51	2,41	2,47	2,38	2,85	2,39
Poland	2,90	3,00	2,54	2,45	2,46	2,06	2,53	2,30	1,79	2,21	2,24	2,51	2,97	2,53	2,64	2,69
Romania	3,21	3,15	2,44	2,24	2,48	2,15	2,28	1,96	1,76	1,92	2,11	2,22	2,46	2,32	2,46	2,62
Russia	2,79	2,89	2,29	2,30	2,41	2,28	2,09	1,95	1,86	1,92	2,41	1,85	2,96	2,81	2,45	2,42
Serbia + Montenegro	2,22	2,75	2,45	2,04	2,07	2,02	2,39	2,24	1,84	2,16	2,21	2,20	2,47	2,15	1,91	2,53
Slovakia	2,67	2,75	2,32	2,37	2,48	2,21	2,29	2,31	2,00	2,10	2,29	2,17	2,49	2,41	2,54	2,45
Slovenia	2,27	2,41	2,27	2,39	2,56	2,05	2,46	2,34	1,80	2,05	2,17	2,33	2,62	2,40	2,37	2,38
Ukraine	2,85	2,79	2,34	2,33	2,41	2,20	2,17	2,29	1,85	2,18	2,32	2,53	2,70	2,64	2,64	2,43
OECD	2,44	2,69	2,60	2,23	2,35	2,33	2,87	2,26	2,04	2,29	2,38	2,47	2,60	2,40	2,24	2,72
Turkey	2,67	3,59	2,86	2,46	2,44	2,47	2,84	2,30	1,93	2,35	2,69	2,62	3,18	2,99	2,43	3,10
T-test: TEs vs. OECD **	0,05	0,47	0,01	0,27	0,23	0,00	0,00	0,27	0,02	0,09	0,07	0,01	0,14	0,18	0,00	0,00
Correlation with NDB (1996)	0,88	0,79	0,30	0,22	-0,05	-0,02	0,63	0,04	0,42	0,15	-0,47	-0,77				
Correlation with BEEPS (1999)		0,30	0,37				0,50	0,73		0,71						
Correlation with BEEPS RoL***		0,27	0,12				0,57									0,44
Correlation with cumulative growth 1989-98	-0,34	0,05	0,19				0,54		-0,14							0,33

Notes:
Table reports mean scores, on a scale of 1 (low confidence) to 4 (high confidence)
* Average of scores for confidence in legal system, police and army.
** T-test reports P-values for difference in means; 0.00 mean statistically significant at more than 1% level.
*** Percentage of respondents who believe that their contract and property rights will be upheld by the courts.
Source: *World Values Survey* 1995; *New Democracies Barometer* 1996; *Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey* 1999.

Table 6. Trust in formal institutions and civic participation

Simple correlations	Civic Participation	
	Type I	Type II
Confidence in*		
legal system	0,21	0,30
police	0,37	0,57
army	0,06	0,22
political parties	-0,19	-0,09
church	-0,22	-0,22
WBES Confidence in legal system**	0,30	0,16
NDB average trust***	0,84	0,74

Notes:

Type I is the sum of participation in churches, sports clubs and charities.

Type II is the sum of participation in political parties, unions and professional associations

* Source: *World Values Survey* 1995.

** Source: *Busines Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey* 1999.

*** Source: *New Democracies Barometer*, 1996; average of trust in legal system, police, army, political parties, church.

Table 7. Initial conditions, social capital and growth (simple correlations)

Initial Conditions	Type I Groups	Type II Groups	WBES investment climate	WBES legal system	Confidence in RoL (WVS)	Cumulative growth 1989-1998
GINI coefficient for income p.c. 1987-1990	0,17	0,04	-0,27	0,11	0,34	-0,35
GINI coefficient for income p.c. mid 1990s	-0,42	-0,37	-0,27	-0,26	-0,22	**-0,60**
Ethnic heterogeneity index mid-1990s	-0,18	**-0,49**	-0,13	-0,35	**-0,57**	**-0,50**
Religion*	0,43	-0,11	0,71	0,43	-0,15	**0,59**
Distance to Brussels	**-0,56**	-0,33	-0,23	-0,03	-0,16	**-0,70**
Exports to CMEA/GDP 1990	**-0,66**	**-0,83**	0,05	-0,24	-0,34	-0,37
Natural resource endowment*	-0,35	-0,09	-0,31	-0,10	0,08	-0,25
GDP per capita at PPP 1990	0,30	-0,15	**0,57**	0,13	-0,32	0,47
Urbanisation rate 1990	-0,42	**-0,60**	0,38	-0,13	-0,40	-0,06
Years under central planning	**-0,63**	**-0,56**	-0,21	-0,38	-0,23	**-0,62**
Established sovereign nation*	0,34	**0,82**	-0,03	0,27	**0,60**	**0,51**

Notes:

Correlations printed in bold are significant at the 5% level.

Type I is the sum of participation in churches, sports clubs and charities.

Type II is the sum of participation in political parties, unions and professional associations

* Defined as dummy variables: religion = dominant religion is western Christianity; natural resources: 2 = rich, 1 = moderate, 0 = poor

Established nation state: 2 = historical sovereign nation, 1 = autonomous part of historical nation (e.g. Czech lands, Russia), 0 = new nation state

Sources:

Data for initial conditions come from de Melo et al. (1997) for 'exports to the CMEA', 'natural resource endowment', the 'urbanisation rate', 'years under central planning' and 'established sovereign nation'.

Data for the GINI coefficients are from Atkinson and Micklewrigth (1992) for 1987-1990 and from UNICEF (1999) for mid-1990s.

Ethnic heterogeneity index and the dummy for religious affiliation were calculated based on data from the Europa World Yearbook (1999).

Distance to Brussels and GDP per capita in 1990 are taken from EBRD's database, as reported in Transition Report 1999.

Table 8. Social capital, reforms and performance: regression results; dependent variable: cumulative growth 1989-1998

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Constant	-1,53***	-1,91***	-0,85	-2,62***	-1,93***	-2,15***	-1,53***
	(0,41)	(0,30)	(0,98)	(0,47)	(0,48)	(0,42)	(0,41)
Type I groups (Civic)	0,021***		-0,026		0,007		0,02**
	(0,007)		(0,576)		(0,007)		(0,007)
		0,040***		0,11***		0,029**	
Type II groups (Civic)		(0,011)		(0,03)		(0,011)	
Quality of investment climate (Trust)	0,57*	0,75***	0,095	1,25***	0,31	0,50	0,57*
	(0,27)	(0,18)	(0,662)	(0,34)	(0,34)	(0,29)	(0,27)
			0,032				
Type I*Trust			(0,038)				
				-0,05*			
Type II*Trust				(0,02)			
EBRD reform index					0,46	0,35	
(average 1989-1998)					(0,27)	(0,25)	
							0,46
EBRD reform index (residual)							(0,27)
Adjusted R-squared	*0,42*	*0,56*	*0,45*	*0,60*	*0,52*	*0,63*	*0,52*
Number of observations	*19*	*19*	*19*	*19*	*19*	*19*	*19*
Sargan test for valid instruments (X-square)	*0,08 (0,00)*	*0,06 (0,00)*	*0,09 (0,00)*	*0,17 (0,00)*	*0,004 (0,00)*	*0,23 (0,00)*	*0,23 (0,00)*
Hausmann test OLS vs. IV (F-stat)	*1,56 (0,23)*	*0,00 (0,95)*	*1,04 (0,32)*	*0,01 (0,92)*	*0,76 (0,40)*	*0,15 (0,71)*	*0,76 (0,39)*

Notes:

The regressions use simple OLS. All results were checked using Two Stage Least Squares and Exports to the CMEA and the Urbanisation Rate as instruments. The coefficient estimates for civic participation tend to increase in the TSLS estimations but all other results remain unaffected.

* = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance

In column 7, the residual of a regression of EBRD reform index against Type II group participation is used as a measure of reform to get rid of multicollinearity.

The Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments do not belong into the regression on their own right for X-square values higher than a critical level.

The Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis that IV is prefered over OLS for F-values above a critical level.

Source: *Own estimates.*

Figure 1. Changes in civic participation, 1990–1995



Notes:
Type I (large) is the sum of participation in churches, sports clubs, arts clubs, environmental associations and charities. Type I (small) excludes arts clubs and environmental associations. Type II is the sum of participation in political parties, unions and professional associations
Source: *World Values Survey* 1990 and 1995.

Figure 2. Trust in public institutions and growth, 1993–1998



Notes:
The figure represents a correlation of trust in public institutions against growth pooled over the four years: 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998. Each dot represents one country in one of these four years.
Sources: *New Democracies Barometer* 1993–1998; for growth EBRD database.

Figure 3. Growth and confidence in the legal system in late 1990s



Notes:
Confidence in the legal system is measured on an index of 1 (low) to 5 (high). It provides the mean response to the question whether respondents trusted the legal system to enforce their contract or property rights.
Sources: *Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey for Confidence in Legal System*; *EBRD database for cumulative growth.*

Social Cohesion between the Member States of the European Union: Past Developments and Prospects for an Enlarged Union

REGINA BERGER-SCHMITT*
Centre for Survey Research and Methodology (ZUMA), Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: The economic and social cohesion of Europe constitutes a main policy goal of the European Union. In this article a broad concept of social cohesion is proposed, which covers two principal dimensions: in addition to disparities in living conditions, which can be called the inequality dimension of social cohesion, social ties between countries are another important aspect, designated in brief as the social capital dimension. For both dimensions empirical analyses of selected indicators are presented. They address the question of whether the social cohesion among EU Member States increased during the past 15 years. Furthermore, the prospects for social cohesion within an enlarged EU are dealt with by analysing potential consequences that the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland implies for social cohesion. The analyses reveal that social cohesion within the European Union did not really become stronger during the past 15 years. The entry of the three candidate countries would probably weaken social cohesion even further, especially owing to the limited public approval of their accession in many Member States. Social cohesion could be strengthened by greater solidarity between the prosperous and the 'backward' countries. The main prerequisites for this - mutual understanding, trustful relations, and a sense of community - may be enhanced by intensifying communication and interaction among countries.

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6: 721-748

1. The concept of social cohesion

The concept of social cohesion emerged during the 1990s as a central policy goal at the national and the supranational level. There may be several reasons for the great interest politicians take in issues of social cohesion. First of all, the social cohesion of a society is viewed as a condition of its political stability and security. Inequalities and divisions within a society increase the risk of the political disruption and breakdown of the political system [Council of Europe 2000]. Second, social cohesion is considered a source of wealth and high economic performance, as has been demonstrated in several empirical research studies [for example, Putnam 1993; Hjerppe 1999; Ritzen 2001]. It is also important for

* * Direct all correspondence to: Regina Berger-Schmitt, Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, Postfach 12 21 55, 60872 Mannheim, BRD, tel. +49 621 12 46 - 0, e-mail: berger@zumamann-heim.de

other aspects of welfare, such as health, education and general subjective well-being [Rose 2000; Coleman 1988, Putnam 2001]. Third, deficiencies in social cohesion, such as weak social ties and a low level of social solidarity, may have the effect of increasing public expenditure, for example through the need to provide social services which would otherwise be performed by private networks of help and support or volunteer work.

The large degree of attention devoted to the goal of social cohesion in politics has been accompanied by a number of scientific works on conceptual issues and empirical questions[1]. A review of these works shows that the concept of social cohesion has been used in a variety of meanings covering a multitude of aspects. At that it is not always clear whether these aspects are considered as constituents, causes, or consequences of social cohesion - a fact which of course does nothing to reduce the equivocal nature of the concept.

On a general level, social cohesion may be defined as a characteristic of a society which deals with the relations between societal units such as individuals, groups, associations, and territorial units [McCracken 1998], wherein different kinds of relations are the focus of interest. There have been various efforts to identify the dimensions of social cohesion and thus to contribute to a conceptual clarification [Jenson 1998, O'Connor 1998; Woolley 1998]. A review of this work reveals a rather high level of agreement on the key aspects of the concept of social cohesion, which may be subsumed under two main headings. As I have discussed elsewhere [Berger-Schmitt 2000, 2002b], I distinguish between two principal dimensions of social cohesion:

(1) The first dimension can be shortly denoted as the inequality dimension. It covers all aspects of the distribution of welfare in a society: issues of equal opportunities among different population groups, the extent of disparities and social cleavages, and the amount of social exclusion and discrimination

(2) The second dimension can be shortly denoted as the social capital dimension. It embraces all aspects which are generally considered as constituting the social capital of a society: social ties that bind, in terms of social contacts, shared values and norms, trust in other people and in societal institutions, feelings of solidarity, a sense of belonging to the same community and a common identity.

Alongside the distinction between the two dimensions incorporated in the concept of social cohesion, I suggest a differentiation be made between two levels of reference: a national and an international level. On the national level, inequalities and social ties *within* societies are of interest, while on the international level inequalities and social ties *between* societies are concerned. The present article is confined to this second perspective in dealing with the social cohesion between European countries.

[1] The literature and research reviews by Jenson [1998], Jeannotte [2000], OECD [2001] and Beauvais/Jenson [2002] provide a good overview.

2. Social cohesion among European countries

The economic and social cohesion of Europe has constituted a main policy goal of the European Union for several years, first declared in the Treaty on European Union in 1993 and repeatedly confirmed in many policy documents [e.g. European Commission 1997, 1998, 2000]. At the Lisbon Summit of the European Council in March 2000, the European Union's goal for the next decade was described as becoming "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" [European Council 2000, p. 2]. In subsequent meetings of the European Council[2] the strengthening of social cohesion was emphasised as one of the most important European policy concerns, too.

The significance of this policy goal also becomes evident in the demand for a Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe every three years which was formulated in the Treaty on European Union. The second report, published in 2001, deals like the first report with the extent of the disparities among European countries and regions with respect to selected aspects of living conditions, e.g. gross domestic product per capita, poverty, employment and unemployment, education, and infrastructure. The reports thus concentrate exclusively on those aspects of economic and social cohesion which I attribute to the inequality dimension. In my view, this is too narrow a perspective, which overlooks other very important issues of the social cohesion among European countries that I have tried to describe by using the term 'social capital dimension': social ties among countries in terms of contacts and relations among their peoples, agreement in basic values, feelings of belonging to a common community or the emergence of a common European identity.

This article will address both dimensions of social cohesion. In particular, two main questions will be investigated:

- Has social cohesion among the member states of the European Union increased, that is, have disparities in living conditions diminished and social ties among countries increased? With respect to each dimension of social cohesion the development of selected indicators from the middle of the 1980s until the end of the 1990s will be analysed for the EU Member States.
- What changes to social cohesion can be expected from the eastward enlargement of the European Union? The large economic gaps between existing Member States and candidate countries are well known, but what about inequalities in other welfare components? And what are social ties between people from applicant countries and people from current EU Member States like? These issues will be examined by considering actual data on the EU countries and three applicants for membership - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - with respect to a selection of welfare indicators from different domains of life , as well as indicators of social ties.

[2] Especially the meetings in Nice, December 2000; Laeken, December 2001, Barcelona, March 2002.

2.1 The development of social cohesion among the Member States of the European Union

2.1.1 The development of disparities in living conditions

With regard to the question of whether living conditions in different EU Member States have become more similar over time an analysis was made of the developments of more than 20 indicators from several domains of life (Table 1). For each indicator, data from the middle of the 1980s, the early 1990s, and the end of the 1990s was compiled[3]. With respect to the first and the last points of measurement, Table 1 shows the figures for the country with the best situation, for the level reached by the country with the worst situation, expressed as a percentage of the best situation, and for the average level of all countries compared to the best one (overall disparity).

For the majority of the indicators, the Nordic countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands prove to be the countries with the best situation, while most of the Southern European countries - Portugal, Spain, and Greece - along with Ireland are the Member States with the worst situation. This is especially true with respect to indicators of material wealth, education, employment, health, and social protection, while in reference to transport and environmental conditions the results are not uniform and no unique leading or lagging countries are indicated. There are no fundamental differences between the middle of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s in terms of the countries offering the most and the least favourable living conditions, but the size of the discrepancies between the top and the bottom indicator values has clearly diminished in many cases. However, the overall disparity of living conditions in the European Union considerably decreased in only 7 of the 22 indicators and even markedly increased in 7 other indicators. A reduction in disparities can be observed in all life domains with the exception of health, where the differences among countries have mostly widened.

A comprehensive picture of the development of the relative level of welfare in the individual Member States can be gained by adding up the index values of all indicators and computing the average value for each country and point of measurement. This comprehensive welfare index has an upper limit of 100, which is reached when a country is on top with respect to all 22 indicators. The results are displayed in Figure 1, which reveals that at the end of the 1990s the overall differences in living conditions among EU Member States are nearly as large as about 15 years ago, and most of the countries have maintained their relative levels of welfare. The highest level of welfare can be observed in Sweden, even though the gap in relation to the other countries has somewhat diminished. This is especially due to a relative decrease in the level of material wealth and an increase in unemployment in comparison with other European countries. The next welfare positions are occupied by Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Austria, which are characterised by relative improvements in living conditions. Finland, Germany, France, and Belgium show in comparison a medium and unchanged level of welfare. At the end of the 1990s the

[3] Depending on the indicator the data is from 1985, 1986 or 1987 respectively 1991, 1992 or 1993 respectively 1997, 1998 or 1999.

United Kingdom is in a medium position, too, but the level of welfare has increased comparatively during the past 15 years, owing to relative improvements within the domains of education, employment and environment. Furthermore, as a result of positive developments in wealth, education, employment and social protection, Portugal has notably advanced. In contrast, the relative levels of welfare in Spain and in Ireland rose only slightly, and Greece has hardly reduced the gap between it and the countries offering the most favourable living conditions. Thus little progress has been made so far in achieving the goal of converging living conditions in the European Union.

2.1.2 The development of social ties

Disparities of living conditions in the Member States of the European Union represent only one dimension through which advances in social cohesion and European integration can be measured. As explained above, another equally significant dimension is the strength of social ties among people.

An important precondition for enhancing social relations, interactions and understanding between people from different countries is that of language skills. Being able to speak English, as the most widely known language, is especially useful for communication between people. Table 2 shows that the percentage of people who speak English well enough to take part in a conversation rose in all countries between 1987 and 1999. At the top of the ranking of countries are the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, where in 1999 more than three quarters of the population was able to speak English. In Luxembourg, Finland, and Austria the English language is widespread among about one-half of the population. By contrast, in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France, English is spoken by only a minority, at less than one-third of the population, although compared to 12 years ago considerable improvements have taken place in these countries, too.

If one takes into account the major European languages other than English - German, French, Spanish and Italian - the results are similar. The percentage of people who speak at least one of these five languages in addition to their mother tongue has increased in most of the countries. In 1999 this skill was highest in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, where at least twice as many people as in Spain, Portugal, France, or Italy are able to converse in a foreign language. However, by far the least knowledge of foreign languages can be found among the English and the Irish, who obviously rely on the English proficiency of other people.

Therefore, as measured by their language abilities, the chances of developing relations with people from other European countries are rather good for the Dutch, the Luxembourgers, the Scandinavians and the Austrians, but rather poor in Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy.

Information about the actual relations among people from different European countries is based on the indicator of trust in other people. Mutual trust is considered to represent an important base for the development of a 'sense of community' [Deutsch et al. 1957, p. 36]. It is a prerequisite for establishing long-term co-operation between coun-

tries [Follesdal 2001; Gabriel 1999]. Thus, it is crucial for strengthening the social cohesion between European countries and promoting European integration.

In 1996[4] the extent of trust in people from other EU countries was highest in the Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands (Figure 2). These countries, as well as Luxembourg and Austria, are at the same time also the Member States of the EU which are most trusted by people from other countries. By contrast, all Southern European people not only express rather little trust towards other Europeans but are also rated low with respect to their own trustworthiness[5]. These results confirm earlier studies which revealed a correlation between the economic power of a country and the degree of trust it is ascribed with [Inglehart 1991]. Furthermore, the assumption stands to reason that trust between people of different nationalities is fostered by language skills, which facilitate communication and therefore enhance the opportunities of getting to know foreign people[6].

In comparison with 1990 mutual trust among all Europeans somewhat decreased, but the decline is very pronounced with respect to the level of trust expressed by people in Portugal and Greece. In 1996, these two countries indicated by far the lowest degree of trust in other people, a result which is also confirmed by other Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 1997 using a differently worded question [Berger-Schmitt 2002a]. Possible reasons for the relative distrust of Southern European people, especially the Portuguese and the Greeks, may be their relatively low level of welfare compared to other countries of the European Union[7]. But despite this it can be held that social cohesion between European countries as measured by the indicator of trust did not increase within the period under consideration.

The extent of social cohesion in Europe can be evaluated not only by indicators of social relations between countries but also by indicators of ties between the individual countries and the larger collective they belong to, such as, for example, identification with Europe. The formation of a common European identity among citizens is an important political objective, which has been mentioned explicitly in the Treaty on European Union and the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The identification of people with Europe and with the goals of European unification is crucial for the progress of European integration. Since political decisions at the level of the European Union affect more and more the personal living conditions of citizens, public support of European policy makers and the will-

[4] This is the most recent data from the Eurobarometer which are comparable to data collected earlier, first in 1990. Before 1990 and in 1997 trust to people from other countries was measured by two other versions of the question. After 1997, the question about trust was not asked anymore.

[5] It should be noted that the level of trust among the Southern European countries is not higher than between Southern European and Central or North European countries of the EU.

[6] By means of Eurobarometer 44.0 conducted in 1995 it is possible to analyze the relation between knowledge of foreign languages and trust in people from other countries at the microdata level. The results show positive correlations between English proficiency and trust as well as between the abilities to converse in a particular language and trust in people from the respective country.

[7] This hypothesis is supported by the positive correlation between trust and life satisfaction at the individual level.

ingness of citizens to co-operate are required [Münch 1999]. In this context, identification with Europe is considered to serve as a source of legitimisation for political decisions [Pfetsch 1998; Reese-Schäfer 1999]. Furthermore, especially with respect to the reduction of welfare disparities and financial equalisation between prosperous and poorer Member States a consciousness of belonging together and solidarity among people are required [Armingeon 1999; Habermas 1998; Lepsius 1997]. A European citizenship was introduced with the Treaty on European Union, also aimed at promoting the development of a sense of community and a common European identity among citizens [Follesdal 2001; Garcia 1997].

However, until now people's identification with Europe is not very strong and has not been rising significantly over the years. This can be documented for most of the EU Member States by the figures below (Table 3). In 1999 identification with Europe was especially weak in the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, and Ireland. Furthermore, the two countries with the lowest degree of trust in people from other countries - Portugal and Greece - also felt a low level of affiliation with Europe, which has moreover been significantly declining since 1992. In contrast, the citizens of Luxembourg, Italy, and Spain have related to Europe to a rather high extent for many years.

The reasons for this mostly weak European identity are probably complex and differ in the individual countries. For example, the scepticism of the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries towards European integration is well known and is founded on a fear of a loss of autonomy and other negative effects of EU membership. But there may be other, more general reasons for the overwhelmingly low degree of identification with Europe. In the scientific discussion of this issue at least two arguments can be found. First, the democratic deficiency of the European Union, that is, the poor possibilities citizens have for influencing EU decision-making and the lack of transparency in the policy-making process, has been considered as detracting from the formation of a European identity among citizens. If people are only weakly involved in the political life of the European Union their awareness of a European common welfare and their loyalty towards EU institutions will hardly be encouraged [Habermas 1994, 1998; Garcia 1997; Hörnlein 2000][8]. Second, the internal heterogeneity of Europe, that is, the disparities in living conditions, the lack of a common European culture, the diversity of languages and a divergence of values are deemed to constitute obstacles to the formation of a common European identity [Lepsius 1997; Fossum 2001; Immerfall 1997, Münch 1999].

2.2 The impact of the enlargement of the European Union on its social cohesion

If - according to the latter argument - the emergence of a European identity and a sense of community were hampered by the heterogeneity of the European Union, the accession of Central and Eastern European countries would further undermine social cohesion in

[8] In response to these concerns the democratic legitimacy of EU decisions has been enhanced insofar as the power of the European Parliament was extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

two ways: on the one hand by widening disparities in living conditions, and on the other hand by the impact of an increasing heterogencity on the sense of community.

In the next section, disparities in living conditions between the current EU Member States and three of the countries from the first group that is to join the EU, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, will first be examined on the basis of the latest available data. The significance of EU enlargement for its social cohesion will then be evaluated with respect to the quality of social ties both between countries and to the European Union as a whole.

2.2.1 Disparities of living conditions between EU Member States and candidate countries

Analyses of the disparities between the EU Member States and the candidate countries have usually concentrated on economic indicators, and it is a well-known fact that there is a large economic gap between the current EU Member States and the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe. This discrepancy has proved to be even wider than in the case of previous enlargements, as has been demonstrated in comparisons of per capita GDP [Weise et al. 2001; Delhey 2001; Amato/Batt 1999]. It seems obvious that a convergence of income levels and the standard of living can only be reached by strong financial support from the EU and will require a substantial amount of time.

However, in view of the goal of strengthening economic *and* social cohesion the impact of enlargement on cohesion within the European Union should be analysed in a more comprehensive way. Indicators of welfare covering further life domains have to be included in assessing the extent of disparities of living conditions between EU Member States and candidate countries. This has been done in the following analyses of 26 indicators from several life domains similar to those considered in Table 1. For each of these indicators the EU country with the best situation and the relative positions of the 'worst' EU country and of the three candidate countries included are shown (Table 4). In addition, the total disparity across all EU countries is indicated, as well as the prospective disparity following the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the EU.

First of all, the results confirm the wide discrepancies between EU Member States and applicants for membership with respect to indicators of wealth. The three candidate countries included clearly range below the least prosperous EU country, and the disparity in wealth within the EU would markedly increase if they were part of it. This is true with the exception of one indicator - the motorisation rate - which is higher in the Czech Republic than in the EU country with the lowest level of economic development - Greece. The Czech Republic also performs with respect to many other indicators better than Hungary or Poland. It is well known that it belongs to the most prosperous countries of the first wave of accessions, behind Cyprus and Slovenia.

Enlargement of the EU would also widen disparities in living conditions with respect to the availability of modern communication technologies. However, it should be noticed that the use of PCs and the Internet is more widespread in the Czech Republic than in Greece - the country at the bottom end in the range of EU countries. Also, in Hungary and in Poland, PCs are no less available than in Greece.

As for the indicators of all other life domains - education, employment, health, social protection, transport and environment - the inclusion of the three applicant countries into the EU would overwhelmingly result in only a slight increase of disparities or no increase at all. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that for most of these welfare indicators at least one of the candidate countries - and in many cases all of them - ranks higher than the EU country with the lowest performance level. There are some very large gaps to the disadvantage of the respective EU country with the least favourable situation, for example in the education level, the labour force participation of women, the ratio of physicians to inhabitants, the density of the railway network, the frequency of road accidents involving personal injury, and carbon dioxide emissions. A few indicators even show one of the candidate countries in a better position than the country in the lead within the EU: for example, the Czech Republic has the highest percentage of population aged 45-49 years with at least upper secondary education and has the most dense railway network.

An overall measure of welfare for each country was calculated in the same way as was done in Figure 1. This comprehensive welfare index, with a theoretical upper limit of 100, has a value of 53 in the Czech Republic and a value of 51 in Hungary and in Greece. Thus, the overall level of welfare in the Czech Republic and in Hungary is about as high as in Greece - the EU country offering the poorest living conditions - whereas Poland, with a mean index value of 47, compares rather badly.

These results show that it is important to differentiate between the candidate countries in assessing the consequences of EU enlargement on its economic and social cohesion. Measured against overall disparities of welfare the entry of the Czech Republic and Hungary into the EU will scarcely weaken its internal social cohesion. That these countries are lagging behind with respect to the level of wealth is set off by their relatively good positions in other important life domains. However, this cannot be held to be true for Poland and would be probably even less true for other applicants, especially those from the second group, such as Romania or Bulgaria.

2.2.2 Quality of social ties between EU Member States and candidate countries

Enlargement of the European Union may also change its overall social cohesion in terms of the kind of social ties which exist between the current Member States and the candidate countries. In considering these ties one can distinguish between the relations of the prospective to the present EU Member States and the European Union as a whole on the one hand, and, conversely, the relations of the EU Member States to the applicant countries on the other hand[9]. In the following section, first of all some indicators of people's relations to the European Union will be analysed, focusing on the candidate countries compared with the Member States. These indicators include identification with Europe and feelings of belonging, attitudes towards the country's membership in the European

[9] Of course, relations among candidate countries are a further important component of the quality of social ties within an enlarged European Union, but this aspect will be left out of consideration here.

Union and trust in the European Union. Subsequently, some indicators of the relations of current EU citizens to applicant countries will be investigated, specifically the extent of trust in people from candidate countries and attitudes towards their entry into the EU.

However, before analysing mutual relationships between EU Member States and applicants for membership, in correspondence with section 2.1, it is worth taking a look at language skills as a significant factor for the development of social ties with foreign people. Among the candidate countries included in this investigation, knowledge of the English language is most widespread in the Czech Republic. In 2001, 24% of the Czechs were able to take part in an English conversation, compared to 21% of the Poles and only 14% of the Hungarians[10]. In most of the EU Member States the corresponding percentages of people are considerably higher[11]. However, in the Czech Republic, English language skills are better developed than in Spain (18%) and Portugal (22%). Moreover, in each of the three candidate countries the percentage of people speaking English has nearly doubled within the last five years. In 1996, only 7% of Hungarians, 12% of Poles, and 12.5% of Czechs were able to converse in English[12]. Comparatively good language skills in the Czech Republic can also be found with respect to other foreign languages. In 2001, the percentage of people who could speak - in addition to their mother tongue - at least one of the five major European languages (French, Italian, Spanish, German or English) reached 45% in the Czech Republic, a figure which was higher than in many EU Member States. For example, only 19% of the British, 23% of the Spanish, 33% of the Portuguese and 40% of the Greek people had a similar knowledge of foreign languages. In Poland and in Hungary, one-third and one-quarter of the population respectively possessed these language skills. Thus especially in the Czech Republic the preconditions for developing social relations and ties to people from EU countries are rather good or at least not worse than in some of the current Member States.

The actual attachment of the candidate countries to Europe as a whole can be assessed by means of several indicators (Table 5). In total they reveal that in the candidate countries feelings of belonging and identification with Europe are pronounced at least to the same extent as in the EU Member States. In 1995, the percentage of people who felt close to Europe was higher in each of the candidate countries than in any EU Member State. Especially in Hungary and in the Czech Republic, with percentages of 94% and 79%, a considerably larger part of the population than in the European Union felt close ties to Europe. A rather strong identification of people from candidate countries with Europe is also confirmed by more recent data from the year 2001. The data show for example that overwhelming majorities of Hungarians, Poles and Czechs are proud to be Europeans. In all EU Member States this is true to a lesser extent. Furthermore, the percentage of peo-

[10] These figures have been published by the European Commission in the framework of the first results of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer conducted in 2001 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm).

[11] According to the data of Eurobarometer 55.1, 2001.

[12] These figures result from data of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer conducted in the years 1990-1997.

ple in the candidate countries considering themselves not or not exclusively as nationals of their country but also as citizens of Europe exceeds that in many of the EU Member States.

In comparison with feelings towards Europe, attitudes towards the European Union reflect a less strong attachment. However, in all applicant countries the majority of the population think of the entry of their country in a positive way. In comparison with the views of the Member States on their membership in the EU, the percentage of people in the applicant countries considering membership as a 'good thing' is on a medium level. Another indicator of people's relations to the European Union - trust in the European Union - results in similar findings. As in most of the Member States the majority of the population of the candidate countries tends to trust the European Union. The extent of trust is especially high in Hungary, where 71 % of the population tend to trust it. Only in Luxembourg is this figure even higher. Also, with respect to nearly all of the other indicators considered, Hungary proved to be the candidate country with the strongest attachment to Europe and to the European Union.

As far as the relations of the EU Member States to the countries applying for membership are concerned, two kinds of indicators are available: the extent of trust in people from applicant countries and approval of their entry into the European Union. Trust as an important precondition for developing good relationships to other countries is decisive for the question of social cohesion in Europe. If the current EU Member States had a lower level of trust in the candidate countries than in each other, enlargement of the EU would certainly lower its social cohesion. Data from the year 1996 indeed show that people from all EU countries at that time trusted citizens from other Member States rather than nationals of the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland (Figure 3). Favourable judgements of the candidate countries were made in the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, where trust on the whole prevailed. By way of contrast, people from all other EU Member States expressed distrust more often than trust. The lowest levels of trust in applicant countries can be found in Portugal, Germany, Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Compared to their positive ratings of EU countries, Germans and Austrians especially were rather distrustful of the applicant countries, while citizens of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece showed the least differences in the assessments between future and current EU Member States. The vast majority of the EU countries barely differentiated between candidate countries. Only Finland, Germany and Austria indicated somewhat more positive feelings towards Hungary than towards the Czech Republic or Poland.

It is important to note that in comparison with 1990 trust in the candidate countries declined in nearly all EU countries[13]. This had also been observed with respect to trust in other EU Member States, but in that case the decrease of trust was less pronounced. The result is quite surprising, since one would rather expect an increase of trust in the candidate countries in view of their political transformation and their application for EU mem-

[13] In 1990 the mean ratings on the scale of distrust by the then 12 EU Member States amounted to 2,4 for Czechoslovakia as well as for Hungary and Poland. In 1996 the mean ratings of the same EU Member States amounted to 2,7 for each candidate country.

bership. If one had to interpret this result as indicating a tendency of EU citizens to dissociate from eastward enlargement of the EU, this would be a negative finding with respect to future social cohesion within the EU.

There are more recent data which show the actual degree of approval of an enlargement of the EU (Table 6). Approval of enlargement to include the applicants considered here is highest in Sweden, where nearly three quarters of the population are in favour of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland becoming part of the European Union. Also, in Denmark and in Greece the mass of the population has a positive view of the entry of these countries into the EU, and somewhat more than half of the population in Spain, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg support their accession. In all other EU Member States advocates of enlargement make up a minority. By far the lowest percentage of people in favour of accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland can be found in France. This is the only country where there are many more opponents than advocates with respect to each applicant for accession. The United Kingdom and Belgium also show a rather low extent of support for enlargement. The majority of Austrians are against the entry of the Czech Republic and Poland, but would approve of Hungary joining the European Union. Similar attitudes can be found in Germany, where people mostly approve of the accession of Hungary but not of the Czech Republic or Poland. Also, the Finnish population support the entry of Hungary to a larger extent than in the case of the other two countries. Austria's, Germany's and Finland's rather positive rating of Hungary compared to other candidate countries was also observed with respect to the level of trust in these countries. In the remaining EU Member States people make few distinctions between their attitudes towards the three countries.

Thus, all things considered, there is only limited support of eastward enlargement of the EU. This becomes particularly evident in view of the overwhelming approval the entry of countries like Switzerland or Norway would meet with. While about three quarters of all citizens of the EU would vote in favour of the entry of these countries, less than half of the population would be in favour of the Czech Republic or Poland. There is no EU country which would not prefer Switzerland or Norway over the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland as future Member States, but the contrasts in rates of approval are especially strong in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and France. Worries over potential financial disadvantages as well as rising unemployment and fears of a decrease in importance of their own nations are among the most common reasons for this reluctance towards enlargement, as further analyses of the data reveal. Moreover, there is no evidence that younger generations are stronger advocates of enlargement than middle-aged or elderly people, so the prospects for social cohesion within an enlarged European Union are rather poor considering the attitudes of current towards future Member States.

On the other hand it should be noted that a lack of approval of enlargement does not necessarily mean disapproval, as considerable parts of the population did not form any opinion on this issue. Only about a third of the EU s population are explicit opponents to the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, while about a fifth feels unable to make a judgement. Further analyses prove that attitudes towards enlargement strongly depend on the amount of information people have on this issue. While among EU citizens

who feel very well informed about enlargement there are overwhelming majorities in favour of the entry of the Czech Republic (76%), Hungary (77%) and Poland (65%) and only about 5 % are undecided, less than a third of people who do not feel informed at all advocate the accession of these countries and about a third are undecided. Thus, there is a guarded hope that support for enlargement could be increased in the future through better information among the public.

3. Summary and conclusions

The economic and social cohesion of Europe constitutes a main policy goal of the European Union. It is usually conceived as a reduction of disparities in living conditions between European countries and regions. However, in this article a broader concept of social cohesion has been proposed. It is argued that the concept of social cohesion covers two principal dimensions. In addition to disparities of living conditions, which can be called the inequality dimension of social cohesion, social ties between countries are another important aspect, designated here as the social capital dimension.

Analyses of the development of social cohesion within the European Union revealed that not much progress has been made during the past 15 years. At the end of the 1990s overall disparities in living conditions between EU Member States were nearly as large as about 15 years ago, with Sweden at the top and Greece at the very bottom of the hierarchy of countries. Also, social ties, as measured by trust between nations and identification with Europe, showed hardly any increase in strength.

The prospects for social cohesion within an enlarged European Union are even worse, but this is not so much a result of widening disparities in living conditions, at least as far as the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is concerned. Inequality will primarily rise with respect to the level of wealth, but not with respect to many other welfare aspects which in the candidate countries mentioned here are mostly on at least the same level as in the EU countries in the worst situation. Social cohesion within an enlarged European Union will not be diminished by any weak social ties of the candidate countries to Europe either, since the sense of attachment to Europe and to the European Union is at least as strong as in the Member States. But social cohesion will be endangered by the relative distrust towards people from candidate countries and the low level of approval for their accession to the European Union among the populations of many Member States.

So the question arises of how social cohesion among countries can be strengthened, even in an enlarged European Union. Of course, a multitude of factors must be taken into account and there is no simple answer to this question. At this point some notes on the potential mutual dependence of the two dimensions of social cohesion should be given in order to point out that measures to promote one dimension may also improve the other.

On the one hand it should be taken into consideration that disparities in living conditions may detract from feelings of belonging together. People from countries with comparatively poor living conditions may feel excluded from the high level of welfare in other

countries and therefore cannot view themselves as a part of this community. Thus the sense of attachment to the European Union and the emergence of a European identity could possibly move forward through relative improvements to the living conditions in disadvantaged countries.

On the other hand an upgrade of living conditions in backward countries depends to a certain degree on the solidarity of the other Member States, especially their willingness to provide financial support. This presupposes mutual understanding, trustful relations and a sense of community which - according to Karl W. Deutsch's theory of integration - could be enhanced by increasing communication and interaction among countries [Deutsch et al. 1957]. Of course, knowledge of foreign languages is an important prerequisite for this. Improvements in the amount of information on other countries could also contribute to the development of trust and understanding between them. As far as the relations of EU citizens to the candidate countries are concerned more information on the enlargement of the EU and its benefits even for the current Member States is needed. An awareness of the interrelation between different aspects of social cohesion is crucial to any political measures aimed at strengthening overall social cohesion in the current as well as in an enlarged EU.

REGINA BERGER-SCHMITT *is a sociologist employed in the Social Indicators Department of the Centre of Survey Research and Methodology (ZUMA), Mannheim, Germany. Her fields of research cover social reporting on issues of the quality of life, European integration and comparative European social research. She is working on the development of a European System of Social Indicators (EVSI), covering the dimensions of quality of life, social cohesion, sustainability, and general dimensions of social change.*

References

Amato, G., J. Batt 1999. *Socio-economic Discrepancies in the Enlarged EU.* Report of the Reflection Group on "Long-term Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border". European University Institute, RSC Policy Paper No 99/2. (http://www.iue.it/RSC/Amato992-PP.htm)

Armingeon, K. 1999. "Introduction to Part III: From the Europe of Nations to the European Nation". Pp. 235-242 in *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective,* ed. by H. Kriesi, K. Armingeon, H. Siegrist, A. Wimmer. Zurich: Ruegger.

Beauvais, C., J. Jenson 2002. *Social Cohesion: Updating the State of Research.* CPRN Discussion Paper No. F|22. Ottawa.

Berger-Schmitt, R. 2000. *Social Cohesion as an Aspect of the Quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement.* EuReporting Working Paper No. 14. Mannheim: Centre for Survey Research and Methodology (ZUMA), Social Indicators Department.

Berger-Schmitt, Regina 2002a. *Unterschiede in den Lebensbedingungen innerhalb der Europäischen Union kaum verringert. Indikatoren zur Entwicklung der sozialen Kohäsion in Europa von der Mitte der 80er bis zum Ende der 90er Jahre.* Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren, Nr. 27.

Berger-Schmitt, R. 2002b. *Considering Social Cohesion in Quality of Life Assessments: Concept and Measurement.* Social Indicators Research, Vol. 58, pp. 403-428.

Coleman, J. 1988. *Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.* American Journal of Sociology 94, pp. 95-120.

Council of Europe, European Committee for Social Cohesion (CDCS) and Quality of Life 2000. *Strategy for Social Cohesion.* Strasbourg. (http://www.social.coe.int/en/cohesion/strategy/CDCS/docstrat.htm)

Delhey, J. 2001. *The Prospects of Catching Up for New EU Members. Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from Previous Enlargements.* Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Discussion paper FS III 01 - 403.

Deutsch, Karl W. et al. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience.* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

European Commission 1997. *Agenda 2000 - Volume I - Communication: For a Stronger and Wider Union.* Strasbourg. COM(97)2000. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/dwn/agenda2000/strong/strong-en.pdf)

European Commission 1998. *Social Action Programme 1998-2000.* Brussels. COM(98)259. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/dwn/agenda2000/strong/strong-en.pdf)

European Commission 2000. *Building an Inclusive Europe.* Brussels. COM(2000) 79 final.

European Council 2000. *Presidency Conclusions.* Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/dwn/agenda2000/strong/strong-en.pdf)

Follesdal, A. 2001. Citizenship: European and Global. ARENA Working Papers, WP01/22. Oslo.

Fossum, J. E. 2001. *Identity-politics in the European Union.* ARENA Working Papers WP01/17. Oslo.

Gabriel, O. W. 1999. "Integration durch Institutionenvertrauen? Struktur und Entwicklung des Verhältnisses der Bevölkerung zum Parteienstaat und zum Rechtsstaat im vereinigten Deutschland". Pp. 199-235 in *Soziale Integration,* ed. by J. Friedrichs and W. Jagodzinski. Sonderheft 39/1999, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Garcia, S. 1997. "European Union Identity and Citizenship. Some Challenges". Pp. 201-212 in *European Citizenship and Social Exclusion,* ed. by M. Roche and R.van Berkel. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Habermas, J. 1994. "Staatsbürgerschaft und Nationale Identität. Überlegungen zur europäischen Zukunft". Pp. 11-29 in *Projekt Europa. Postnationale Identität: Grundlage für eine europäische Demokratie,* ed. by N. Dewandre and J. Lenoble. Berlin: Schelzky & Jeep.

Habermas, J. 1998. *Die postnationale Konstellation.* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Hjerppe, R. 1999. "Social Capital and Economic Growth". Pp. 87-105 in *Putting People at the Center of Sustainable Development. Proceedings of the Expert Meeting on the Social Dimension in Sustainable Development. Volume 2: Contributed Papers,* ed. by R. Wiman and T. Partonen. Helsinki: National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES) and Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.

Hörnlein, F. 2000. *Leitbilder im Zielsystem der europäischen Integration.* Berlin: Köster.

Immerfall, S. 1997. "Soziale Integration in den westeuropäischen Gesellschaften: Werte, Mitgliedschaften, Netzwerke". Pp. 139-173 in *Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich*, ed. by S. Hradil and S. Immerfall. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.

Inglehart, R. 1991. "Trust between Nations: Primordial Ties, Societal Learning and Economic Development". Pp. 145-185 *in Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion*, ed. by K. Reif and R. Inglehart. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Jeannotte, S. 2000. *Social Cohesion Around the World: An International Comparison of Definitions and Issues.* Hull: Department of Canadian Heritage, Strategic Research and Analysis, SRA-309.
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/dwn/agenda2000/strong/strong-en.pdf)

Jenson, J. 1998. *Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research.* CPRN Study No. F|03. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks.
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/dwn/agenda2000/strong/strong-en.pdf)

Lepsius, R. M. 1997. *Bildet sich eine kulturelle Identität in der Europäischen Union?* Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 1997, 8: 948-955.

McCracken, M. 1998. *Social Cohesion and Macroeconomic Performance.* Paper presented at the Conference "The State of Living Standards and the Quality of Life", Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS), October 30-31, 1998, Ottawa, Ontario/Canada.

Münch, R. 1999. "Europäische Identitätsbildung. Zwischen globaler Dynamik, nationaler und regionaler Gegenbewegung". Pp. 223-252 in: *Kultur Identität Europa. Über die Schwierigkeiten und Möglichkeiten einer Konstruktion*, ed. by R. Viehoff and R.T. Segers. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

O'Connor, P. 1998. *Mapping Social Cohesion.* CPRN Discussion Paper No. F| 01. Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks.
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/dwn/agenda2000/strong/strong-en.pdf)

OECD 2001. *The Well-Being of Nations. The Role of Human and Social Capital.* Paris: OECD.

Pfetsch, F. R. 1998. *Die Problematik der europäischen Identität.* Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B25-26/98: pp. 3-9.

Putnam, R. 1993. *The Prosperous Community - Social Capital and Public Life.* American Prospect, 13: 35-42.

Putnam, R. 2001. *Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences.* Isuma - Canadian Journal of Policy Research, 2, 1: 41-51.

Reese-Schäfer, W. 1997. *Supranationale und transnationale Identität - zwei Modelle kultureller Integration in Europa.* Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 38, 1997, H. 2: 318-329.

Ritzen, J. 2001. "Social Cohesion, Public Policy and Economic Growth: Implications for OECD Countries". Pp. 291-309 in *The Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained Economic Growth and Well-being: International Symposium Report*, ed. by J.F. Helliwell. Human Resources Development Canada and OECD.
(http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/sp-ps/arb-dgra/publications/books/oecd/en/oecd_e.shtml)

Rose, R. 2000. *How Much Does Social Capital Add to Individual Health? A Survey of Russians.* Social Science and Medicine: pp. 1-15.

Weise, Ch., J. Bachtler, R. Downes, I. McMaster, K. Toepel 2001. *The Impact of EU Enlargement on Cohesion. Background Study for the 2nd Cohesion Report.* Berlin: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW); Glasgow: European Policies Research Centre (EPRC).

Woolley, F. 1998. *Social Cohesion and Voluntary Activity: Making Connections.* Paper presented at the conference "The State of Living Standards and the Quality of Life", Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS), October 30-31, 1998, Ottawa, Ontario/Canada.

Table 1. Selected indicators of living conditions - disparities between

Material Wealth
1) Gross Domestic Product per capita at 1990 Prices and PPS
2) Private Consumption Expenditure per capita at 1990 Prices and PPS
3) Share of Expenditure for Food, Beverages and Tobacco (%)
4) Television Receivers per 1000 Inhabitants
5) Passenger cars per 1000 Inhabitants
Education
6) Public Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of GDP
7) Participation in Upper Secondary or Tertiary Education (%)
8) Population aged 45-49 y. with at least Upper Secondary Education (%)
Employment
9) Labour Force Participation of Women (%)
10) Unemployment Rate (%)
Health
11) Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000)
12) Life Expectancy of Men at Birth (in years)
13) Consumption of Cigarettes per Year and Person aged 15 years+
14) Practising Physicians per 1000 Inhabitants
Social Protection
15) Share of Public Social Protection Expenditure in GDP (%)
16) Public Social Protection Expenditure per capita at 1995 Prices and PPS
Transport
17) Length of Railway Net per 1000 square km (in km)
18) Persons Injured in Road Accidents per 100.000 Inhabitants
Environment
19) Carbon Dioxide Emissions per capita (t)
20) Sulphur Dioxide Emissions per capita (kg)
21) Gross Domestic Consumption of Primary Energy per capita (toe)
22) Population with Few Environmental Problems (%)

Notes and sources:
(a) Indicator value of the country with the worst situation in % of the indicator value of the country with the best situation; in case of indicators 3, 10, 11, 13, 18-21 it is the indicator value of the country with the best situation in % of the indicator value of the country with the worst situation; (b) mean of the indicator values of all countries in % of the best situation; the lower this mean the greater the disparity.
(1) European Commission, National Accounts ESA, Aggregates 1970-1997;
(2) Federal Statistical Office of Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland;
(3) European Commission, National Accounts ESA, Detailed Tables 1970-1994 and 1970-1997;
(4) UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook; (5) European Commission, Transport and Environment;
(6) OECD, Education at a Glance; (7) Pupils and students in upper secondary or tertiary education in % of the population aged 15-24 years; European Commission, Education Across Europe; European Commission, Statistical Yearbook; (8) Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; (9) (10) A, FIN, S: OECD, Labour Force Statistics 1979-1999; otherwise: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; (11) (12) (17) (19) (21) European Commission, Statistical Yearbook; (13) (18) (20) WHO, Health For All Database; (14) OECD, OECD Health Data 2001; (15) 1985: OECD, OECD Health Data 2001; otherwise: European Commission, Statistical Yearbook; (16) OECD, Social Expenditure Database (22) European Commission, Eurobarometer Surveys; percentage of respondents who have "not very much reason" or "no reason at all" to complain with respect to all of the following environmental problems: quality of drinking water, noise, air pollution, waste disposal, damage done to the landscape.

EU Member States 1985/87 and 1997/99

Country with best situation				Country with worst situation				Total Disparity*	
1985/87		1997/99		1985/87		1997/99		1985/87	1997/99
country	value	country	value	country	% of best*	country	% of best	%	%
L	19902	L	25795	P	37,6	GR	36	63,2	59,1
L	10627	L	14014	P	40,6	P	48,1	65,9	63
NL	16,8	D	13,9	IRL	42,1	IRL	45,6	67	73,3
DK	523	FIN	594	P	34	GR	38,6	69,4	75,9
S	458	L	572	GR	27,7	GR	44,4	68	70,7
S	7	DK	8,3	E	51,4	GR	42,2	74,2	64,1
B	58,7	UK	88,2	P	36,9	IRL	54	73,4	73,3
D	69,7	D	81,6	E	15,4	P	20,4	55	68,3
S	78,5	DK	76,1	E	42,9	IRL	59,9	65,5	78,1
L	2,6	L	2,4	E	12,2	E	15,1	37,5	36
FIN	6,3	S	2,9	P	35,4	GR	49,2	69,1	62,2
S, GR	74	S	76,9	L	94,1	P	93,2	97	96,9
NL	1333	S	867	GR	36,8	GR	25,8	62,2	49,4
I	3,8	I	5,8	UK	36,8	UK	29,3	63,5	55,4
S	31,1	S	33,3	P	37,3	IRL	48,3	74,9	79,4
DK	5570	L	8146	P	19,7	P	32,4	69,2	64,3
B	119	B	110	FIN	14,6	FIN	15,8	48	49,9
FIN	206	DK	183	A	25,5	B	25,8	54,7	51,2
P	2,8	P	4,8	L	10,4	L	23,6	38,7	58,3
NL	17,8	S	5,8	FIN	22,8	GR	11,4	50,2	39,1
P	1	P	2,3	L	11,9	L	28	35,5	59,9
DK	74	DK	60,3	IRL	33,8	GR	30,5	62,5	61,8

Table 2. Knowledge of foreign languages[a] (in %)

	English		English, French, Italian, Spanish or Portuguese	
	1987	1999	1987	1999
Austria		51		54
Belgium	30	42	74	57
Germany	35	41	37	43
Denmark	52	76	59	81
Spain	9	17	18	23
France	20	30	31	36
Finland		51		52
Greece	25	39	32	42
Italy	11	28	23	40
Ireland			12	16
Luxembourg	40	53	99	89
Netherlands	60	78	71	85
Portugal	13	23	24	36
Sweden		77		79
UK			25	14

a) Percentage of the population who speak a foreign language well enough to take part in a conversation

Source: *Eurobarometer* 28, 1987 and 52, 1999.

Table 3. Identification with Europe (in %)

	1987	1992a	1992b	1999
Austria				52
Belgium	48	56	61	58
Denmark	56	38	58	51
Germany	42	52	51	44
Spain	62	61	64	67
France	53	53	69	60
Finland				38
Greece	55	61	61	40
Italy	51	58	74	73
Ireland	39	37	47	45
Luxembourg	65	64	72	76
Netherlands	34	42	58	56
Portugal	57	66	61	47
Sweden				38
UK	34	31	44	31

a) Question 1987 and 1992a: 'Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality) but also as European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?' The percentage of respondents answering 'often' or 'sometimes' is indicated. Question 1992b and 1999: In the near future do you see yourself as ... (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European only?' The percentage of respondents choosing one of the last three answers is indicated.

Source: *Eurobarometer* 27, 1987; 37, 1992; 52, 1999.

Table 4. Disparity of living conditions between EU Member States

Material Wealth
1) GDP per Head in PPS at Current Prices, 2000
2) Private Consumption Expenditure/Head at Current Prices and PPS, 1999
3) Share of Expenditure for Food, Beverages and Tobacco (%), 1997
4) Passenger cars per 1000 Inhabitants, 1999

Communication Technology
5) Mobile Telephone Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants, 2000
6) PCs per 100 Inhabitants, 2000
7) Internet Users per 100 Inhabitants, 2000

Education
8) Expenditure per Student in Secondary Education in PPPs, 1998
9) Participation in Upper Secondary or Tertiary Education (%), 1998/99
10) Population aged 45-49 y. with at least Upper Secondary Education (%), 2000
11) Ratio of Pupils to Teaching Staff in Primary Education, 1999
12) Reading Literacy of Pupils Aged 15 Years, 2000

Employment
13) Labour Force Participation of Women (%), 2000
14) Unemployment Rate (%), 2000

Health
15) Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000), 2000
16) Life Expectancy of Men at Birth (in years), 1999
17) Practising Physicians per 1000 Inhabitants, 2000
18) Alcohol Consumption in Litres per Person aged 15 Years+, 2000
19) Consumption of Cigarettes per Year and Person aged 15 Years+, 1999

Social Protection
20) Share of Public Social Protection Expenditure in GDP (%), 1998
21) Public Social Protection Exp./Head at 1995 Prices and PPS (US$), 1997

Transport
22) Length of Railway Net per 1000 square km (in km), 1999
23) Length of Motorways per 1000 square km (in km), 1999
24) Persons Killed or Injured in Road Accidents per 100.000 Inhabitants, 1999

Environment
25) Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Head (t), 1998
26) Sulphur Dioxide Emissions per Head (kg), 1998

Notes and sources:
a) The ratios are calculated in such a way that the higher is the value the better is the situation; b) mean of the indicator values of all countries in % of the best situation; the lower this mean the greater the disparity.
(1) Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 1/2002; 5/2002; (2) OECD, Annual National Accounts; (3) European Commission, National Accounts ESA, Detailed Tables 1970-1997; Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries; (4) Federal Statistical Office of Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland 2001;
(5)-(7) International Telecommunication Union (); (8) (11) OECD, Education at a Glance;
(9)(10) European Commission, Statistical Yearbook; (12) OECD, PISA Study;
(13) (14) OECD, Employment Outlook;
(15)-(18) OECD Health Data;
(19) (24) (26) WHO, Health For All Database; (20) (21) OECD, Social Expenditure Database; (22) (23) Eurostat, Statistics in Focus 4/2002; (25) 1998 or latest available year; OECD, Environmental Data Compendium

and candidate countries

EU countries				CZ	H	PL	Disparity between countries*	
best situation	value	worst situation	% of best*	in % of EU Member State with best situation*			EU	EU+ CZ, H, PL
L	44300	GR	35,2	29,8	26,0	20,1	54,6	49,7
L	17232	P	60,2	41,9	34,1	33,2	75,0	68,6
D	13,9	IRL	45,6	48,1	42,8	35,8	75,0	69,6
L	590	GR	43,1	56,8	40,3	40,7	71,2	67,0
A	77	F	64,1	54,8	39,9	22,7	84,6	77,0
S	50,7	GR	14	24,0	17,2	13,6	61,1	53,9
S	45,6	GR	20,8	21,3	15,6	15,8	55,6	49,3
A	8163	GR	40,3	39,0	26,2	17,6	68,3	61,1
S	93,1	P	53,7	44,4	59,5	70,7	72,2	69,7
D	82,6	P	20,1	100,6	87,7	96,6	71,1	75,1
DK	10,6	UK	47,1	45,3	101,9		70,0	70,5
FIN	546	L	80,8	90,1	87,9	87,7	91,3	90,8
S	76,4	I	60,6	83,4	69,0	78,4	80,5	79,9
L	2,4	E	17,3	27,3	37,5	14,6	44,2	41,3
S	3,4	GR	55,7	82,9	37,0	42,0	70,2	67,5
S	77	P	93,5	92,7	86,1	89,4	97,0	95,8
GR	4,4	UK	40,9	70,5	72,7	50,0	76,2	74,2
S	6,2	L	41,6	52,5	55,9	72,9	60,1	60,1
S	867	GR	25,6	39,0	30,3	28,7	49,4	46,6
S	31	IRL	50,9	62,7		73,7	79,0	77,7
L	8071	P	33,8	31,3		22,0	65,7	61,1
B	110	FIN	15,8	108,9	74,7	66,6	49,9	55,4
NL	57,6	IRL	2,4	11,0	8,4	1,5	36,4	31,5
FIN	183,6	B	25,7	52,2	71,2	94,4	51,8	55,3
P	5,4	L	32,1	46,2	94,7	65,1	63,7	64,5
S	5,5	GR	10,8	12,9	9,5	11,3	40,7	35,8

Table 5. Attachment to Europe and to the European Union (in %)

	Feeling very close/close to Europe[a]	Very/fairly proud to be European[b]	Identification with Europe[c]	Approval of EU Membership[d]	Trust in EU[e]
	1995	2001	2001	2001	2001
Austria	68	76	53	46	45
Belgium		67	53	62	61
Germany	58	56	59	59	48
Denmark		77	59	63	54
Spain	62	80	61	61	66
France		71	65	52	55
Finland		64	40	38	46
Greece		60	42	70	70
Italy	68	82	68	69	65
Ireland	44	81	44	83	63
Luxembourg		76	77	82	73
Netherlands	54	69	54	77	62
Portugal		77	48	67	69
Sweden	39	76	49	44	42
UK	22[f]	55	28	38	31
Czech Republic	79	85	59	54	54
Hungary	94	93	50	66	71
Poland	70	87	65	57	55

a) Question: 'How close do you feel to (continent)?' very close, close, not very close, not close at all; b) Question: 'And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?' c) Question: 'In the near future do you see yourself as ... (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European only?' The percentage of respondents choosing one of the last three answers is indicated. d) Question: 'Generally speaking do you think that (our country's) membership of the European Union is (would be) a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad?'; e) Percentage of respondents who tend to trust the EU vs. tend not to trust it/ don't know; f) Great Britain.

Source: *International Social Survey Programme* 1995; *Eurobarometer* 56.2, 2001; *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer* 2001. (s. http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm)

Table 6. Approval of the enlargement of the European Union on the part of the current Member States[a]

	Czech Republic		Hungary		Poland		Switzerland		Norway	
	for	against	for	against	for	against	for	against	for	against
	in %									
Austria	37	51	65	27	34	54	83	10	81	11
Belgium	44	44	48	38	48	40	79	14	80	13
Germany	46	38	57	29	42	44	82	9	81	10
Denmark	66	26	66	26	72	22	89	8	91	6
Spain	53	18	53	19	53	19	71	8	68	9
France	28	53	33	50	36	48	66	25	64	26
Finland	53	28	60	23	49	31	80	8	84	6
Greece	63	22	66	21	65	23	83	8	79	11
Italy	49	30	55	26	54	28	79	9	79	11
Ireland	47	20	48	19	50	19	71	6	70	7
Luxembourg	54	31	52	32	50	36	81	11	82	8
Netherlands	51	32	53	31	53	31	84	9	84	8
Portugal	49	23	48	24	50	24	68	12	62	16
Sweden	72	16	73	15	75	15	87	7	89	6
UK	40	31	42	30	45	30	66	16	66	15
EU15	45	34	50	30	47	34	75	13	74	13

a) Question: 'For each of the following countries would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?'

Source: *Eurobarometer* 56.2, 2001.

Figure 1. Disparities in living conditions between EU Member States[a]



a) mean percentage relation to the best indicator value across all 22 indicators listed in Table 1.

Figure 2. Mean level of distrust towards other EU Member States and own trustworthiness[a]



a) Question: I would like to ask you about how much trust you have in people from various countries? Response Scale: 1 = a lot of trust, 2 = some trust, 3 = not very much trust, 4 = No trust at all; the figure indicates the mean rating made by each EU Member State with respect to the other 14 countries and the unweighted mean rating received from them.

Source: *Eurobarometer* 46.0, 1996.

Figure 3. Mean level of distrust[a] towards other EU Member States and candidate countries



a) Question: s. Figure 2.

Source: *Eurobarometer* 46.0, 1996.

Globalisation, Political Discourse, and Welfare Systems in a Comparative Perspective: Germany, Japan, and the USA*

MARTIN SEELEIB-KAISER**
Centre for Social Policy Research, Bremen University, Bremen, Germany

Abstract: The welfare state in industrialised countries is being challenged by a number of developments: the globalisation or internationalisation of the economy, changing demographics, a transformation from industrial to post-industrial economies, as well as social and cultural changes. Although all of these variables are important, this paper addresses only the effects of globalisation on social policy arrangements in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the USA. The starting point of the paper is the hypothesis that the specific perception of globalisation and the constructed links to social policy arrangements within the political discourse must be taken into account when analyzing the effects of globalisation. Furthermore, it is argued that focusing solely on the state's activity within the realm of social policy might lead to distorted and misleading results. Finally, the different dynamics of welfare systems in the era of globalisation are discussed in a broader theoretical framework. It is argued that the concept of path dependency underestimates the changes that have taken place in the German, Japanese, and USA-American welfare systems.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6: 749-769

Introduction

Welfare states are currently being challenged by a number of developments: the globalisation or internationalisation of the economy, changing demographics, a transformation from industrial to post-industrial economies, as well as social and cultural changes [Kaufmann 1997]. Although all of these variables could be very important for specific changes in social policy, in this paper I will only address the effects of globalisation on social policy arrangements. It will be argued that the specific perception of globalisation and the constructed links to social policy within the political discourse must be taken into account as a key variable in an analysis of the effects of globalisation. Thus the central ques-

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2nd International Convention of Asia Scholars August 9-12, 2001 in Berlin and at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29 - September 1, 2002. I thank Robert Keohane, Jonas Pontusson, and Herman Schwartz for their comments on earlier drafts. This paper draws heavily on the findings presented in my book *Globalisierung und Sozialpolitik*, Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2001.

** Direct all correspondence to: Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Bremen University, Zentrum für Sozialpolitik, "Barkhof", Parkallee 39, D-28209 Bremen, Federal Republic of Germany, tel. +49 421 218 4061, fax +49 421 218 7540, e-mail: mseeleib@zes.uni-bremen.de

tions addressed in this paper are: Has globalisation been causally related to changes of welfare systems within the political discourse? Have the constructed links between globalisation and the welfare system become dominant or even hegemonic within the political discourse? Have welfare systems changed in a way consistent with the specific perception of globalisation?

Furthermore, I argue that focusing solely on the *state's* activity within the realm of social policy could lead to distorted and misleading results. As case studies I have chosen Germany, Japan and the United States. These three countries constitute the centres of the current globalisation process, while at the same time they have large domestic markets and therefore seem less vulnerable to external economic developments. Moreover, Germany, Japan, and the USA have three very distinct welfare systems.

In the first part of the paper, I will briefly take up the debate within the social sciences about the economic limits of state social policy and highlight the importance of analysing the political discourse, before going on to discuss the concept of welfare systems in the second part. Third, I will show how various links between globalisation and the welfare system are socially constructed in different welfare systems. Fourth, I will sketch the more recent reform tendencies at the policy level. Finally, I will discuss the different dynamics of welfare systems in the era of globalisation in a broader theoretical framework.

1. Does globalisation limit social policy development?

The discussion concerning the economic limits of welfare states has a long tradition within politics and social sciences. It first received substantial attention, for example, from German social scientists as early as the late 1920s. These scholars argued that state social policy not only constitutes a burden but also a significant benefit for a capitalist economy [Heimann (1929) 1980; Briefs 1930]. In a more recent book published in the 1980s and entitled *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, Offe argues: "The contradiction is that while capitalism cannot coexist *with*, neither can it exist *without*, the welfare state" [Offe (1984) 1993: 153]. In other words, in addition to being a burden for the economy or the individual company, social policy can have various economic benefits, among which are the following: 1. Social policy can retain and enhance the physical ability to work; 2. Social policy can stabilise the demand function in times of economic crisis; 3. Additional benefits can occur as a result of the effects of social policy on the society as a whole, e.g. through its pacifying potential [Vobruba 1991: 49-89]. The extent of these benefits cannot be determined in an absolute and abstract manner and will likely differ among countries.

At the end of the 20th century social policy was once again identified as a burden by a substantial number of (political) economists. It was argued that the global economy increasingly determines the limits of the welfare state and will eventually lead to a transformation of welfare states into competition states [e.g. Jessop 1994]. However, various studies based primarily on quantitative empirical analysis contest these findings. They come to the conclusion that globalisation has not, or at least not yet, had significant effects on welfare state development. Therefore, one cannot speak of a secular transforma-

tion from welfare to (neo-liberal) competition states or even of an outright convergence on the basis of an Anglo-American model. It is argued that primarily domestic variables, especially demographics and party politics, still determine welfare state development [Garrett/Mitchell 1995; Esping-Andersen 1996; Garrett 1998]. Although this research has addressed very important issues, the process of political decision making has largely been treated as a black box. We still do not know empirically in what way globalisation influences social policy in different cultural and political settings. Does social policy constitute an asset or a burden in a global economy?

Furthermore, past research on the effects of globalisation did not address the fact that 'reality' is shaped to a large extent by social construction [Berger/Luckmann 1966] or, in other words, by the outcome of political discourse. Ian Hacking [1999] in his recent work entitled *The Social Construction of What?* has convincingly illuminated the different dimensions and the comprehensive reach of social construction. This is not to say that an increase in international trade or capital flows does not matter at all, but rather that these indicators can frame the political discourse. Hence, no magical, automatic process of functional adjustment and system adaptation exists. Moreover, political discourses define "the norms that determine when certain conditions are to be regarded as policy problems. Objective conditions are seldom so compelling and so unambiguous that they set the policy agenda or dictate the appropriate conceptualization" [Majone 1989: 23 f.]. In other words, for globalisation to influence social policies it has to be acknowledged as a relevant issue by political actors. Actors will generally have to take into account different normative priorities, issues and challenges as well as the various interpretations relating to them before they develop 'interpretive patterns' [*Deutungsmuster*] that make sense and give meaning to social issues [Gerhards 1995: 224]. Accordingly, actors in different countries might interpret globalisation differently and relate their understanding of these processes to social policy arrangements in various ways, depending on past experiences and cognitive focal points. Finally, in democratic political systems policy proposals succeed in the *long run* only if they reflect dominant interpretive patterns.

Although important contributions have been made by political scientists towards advancing the understanding of the influence of ideas in policy making [Goldstein/Keohane 1993: 3-30; Hall 1989,1993], there has been very little systematic empirical work on the influence of globalisation - conceptualised as an idea or political discourse - in the study of comparative social policy (exceptions are [Schmidt 2000; Cox 2001]). Based on these considerations, and building on the argument of Cerny [1997: 256], whereby "[globalisation's] most crucial feature is that it constitutes a *discourse* - and, increasingly, a hegemonic discourse ...", it seems to be more than appropriate to empirically study the effects of globalisation on welfare systems by analysing the political discourse.

2. The concept of welfare systems

As indicated in the introduction, I will not limit my analysis to *state* social policies but intend to take a broader approach. What reasons are there to include other than state social policies in the analysis? State social policies constitute the predominant way of establishing

security against social risks in most (West) European countries. Accordingly, the concept of the state as providing various means to limit social risks has shaped comparative social policy research to a great extent. However, state social policy is only one option for insuring against social risks. Consequently, functional equivalents of state social policy must be included in a comparative analysis, which goes beyond the (West) European welfare states. Hence, I define a welfare system as the sum of all social policy arrangements within a society. In order to give meaning to the concept of the welfare system and to operationalise it in a comparative setting, one needs a well-defined reference point to determine *what* is functionally equivalent, otherwise, the meaning of the concept remains very vague [Schriewer 1999]. In general the concept of the welfare system can be related to the ideal understanding of welfare, put forward by Kaufmann, who defines welfare as a political exercise "to establish or guarantee societal situations in which the individual benefit and the common benefit do not diverge, but reinforce each other in the sense of synergic effects" [Kaufmann 1994: 357 f.; translation msk]. Based on this definition of welfare, the reference point is defined as a social arrangement, which insures against the key social risks of age, sickness and unemployment or poverty in a collective and redistributive manner, with a relatively high degree of certainty for future claims [*Erwartungssicherheit*] [Vobruba 1983: 99-101].

State social policy is commonly defined in a narrow sense, i.e. mainly focusing on nominal social programmes, e.g. old age, sickness, or unemployment insurance provisions. Usually, these programmes are able to meet the above-defined criteria. In my conceptualisation of the welfare system I will keep to this narrow perspective when talking about state social policy. A second very important pillar of the welfare system is *work policy.* Work policy can be defined as the organisation of work and production conditions through the state or industrial relations. Its aims are to promote social integration and stability in order to reduce the risk of unemployment and/or poverty due to market forces. Such a policy encompasses redistribution and can - at least in principle - provide the same level of *Erwartungssicherheit* as state social policy in the narrowly defined sense. In other words, if the state or the industrial relations system guarantee sufficiently paid jobs, there might not be a widely acknowledged 'need' for social transfer programmes, and thereby work policy could effectively substitute state social policy in the narrow sense.

In addition to state social policy and family arrangements, the concepts of the welfare mix and regime theory [Rose 1986; Esping Andersen 1990, 1999] stress the importance of the market in terms of welfare production. Yet the welfare mix approach and the regime theory do not methodologically differentiate between individually bought insurance schemes based on market conditions and fringe benefits negotiated by social partners. It can be argued that there is a great difference between these two forms of providing insurance against social risks. Fringe benefits in general can have redistributive as well as collective elements and are widely regulated by the state to provide a relatively high level of *Erwartungssicherheit.*[1] Based on these considerations, I will regard fringe benefits, or 'private social benefits' [Adema 1999], as functionally equivalent to state social policy.

[1] Insurance against social risks bought in the private market usually has a very low *Erwartungssicherheit*, it is dependent on personal characteristics - such as personal health conditions, income etc. - and therefore, does not entail elements of redistribution [Higgins 1981].

Taken together, fringe benefits, work policies, and state social policies are the three key pillars of the welfare system as defined in my work.[2] Although each of these three pillars will be developed at least to some extent in all industrial societies, their range will differ within the various welfare systems. If we consider Germany, Japan and the United States, it becomes evident that these countries established very different welfare systems during the 'golden era' of post-World War II capitalism. In Germany, state social policy constituted the corner piece of the welfare system. It was based on the concept of social insurance, whose major aim was to secure the standard of living (*Lebensstandardsicherung*) in case a social risk should occur. A regulative work policy emphasising standard employment relationships was the normative precondition of the social insurance system. Fringe benefits only played a negligible role in terms of insuring against the risks of age, sickness and unemployment.[3]

In Japan, work policy has traditionally constituted the corner stone of the welfare system, although fringe benefits have played a significant role in the overall make-up [Shinkawa/Pempel 1996]. Work policy was largely achieved through protectionism and governmental regulation in terms of securing the livelihood of less productive workers through work in sheltered sectors. The institutionalised norms of the 'Japanese employment system' strengthened this approach. Well into the 1980s, workers with unstable and atypical employment very often used their stable income from farming, which was state guaranteed, to secure their standard of living. In addition, the comparatively overextended and highly regulated retail sector offered a huge reservoir of protected jobs. These arrangements not only 'hid' the true employment situation, but offered income to workers who had retired from a regular job and returned to self-employment in order to increase their pension income. For example, in the 1980s "[r]etailing [was] filled with underemployed workers who in other societies might well be unemployed" [Patrick/Rohlen 1987: 350] and would have received unemployment insurance or old-age benefits which would have added to the social spending figures very often used in comparative analysis [cf. Carlile/Tilton 1998: 5f.]. However, these arrangements were for the most part not financed by the state, but through high consumer prices. Furthermore, the 'Japanese employment system' guaranteed so-called lifetime employment for its core work force in large companies by keeping workers employed even in an economic crisis, whereas in Germany as well as in the United States economic considerations would have led to the dismissal of the redundant workers [Ernst 1988]. In the domains of securing income for (less productive) workers and seniors, work policy dominated the Japanese welfare system in the post-World War II era.

In comparative analysis the USA welfare state is often described as liberal or residual, meaning that the market should dominate and state intervention should be minimal. However, this approach is biased because it does not systematically take into account the role of fringe benefits. Up until the early 1970s, one can argue that fringe benefits secured

[2] Although I acknowledge that the family and voluntary associations can play significant roles in securing the social risks of age, sickness, and unemployment, past developments have shown that these social policy arrangements score very low on the dimension of *Erwartungssicherheit*.

[3] For a historical and systematic overview of social policy in Germany see Schmidt [1998] and Frerich/Frey [1996].

a growing portion of the working population and their dependents against the risks of age and sickness. These benefits were largely negotiated collectively between the employers and the unions, and at the same time were highly regulated by the state. From the perspective of the unions fringe benefits were considered to be 'social rights' [Brown 1999: 135-164], similar to the rights guaranteed by the state. In this sense, fringe benefits substituted state social policy [Stevens 1990]. Thus if we consider insurance against social risks as the main indicator, the United States had (by the 1970s) developed a substantial welfare system, in which fringe benefits constituted the main pillar in providing security against the risks of sickness and old age. In addition, if we add the public and private social expenditures, the costs of the USA welfare system were almost identical to the costs of European welfare states in the 1970s [Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 280]. Securing income for workers, however, was largely left to the market.

To summarise, if we include economies outside Western Europe in our comparative welfare state analysis, we have to search for possible social policy arrangements that are beyond the reach of the standard euro-centric approach to social policy. During the golden post-war era, Germany, Japan and the USA developed very different welfare systems with regard to the key institutions that are relied on for providing security against the core social risks of ageing, sickness, and unemployment. Theoretically, analysing only the nominal state social policy dimension can result in a partial and distorted picture of the possible effects of globalisation.

3. Globalisation and welfare systems in political discourse

Before addressing the substantive political discourses within the three welfare systems a few remarks concerning methodology are necessary. In order to identify possible links between the globalisation process and the welfare system a qualitative content analysis was used. I searched the political discourses from the mid-1970s to the late-1990s for statements linking elements of the three welfare systems to the globalisation process, i.e. to the liberalisation of trade, capital flows, and the issues of sovereignty and autonomy.[4] Since the number of political actors participating in a national political discourse is very large, including all of them in the analysis would have made this comparative study impossible. Skocpol and Rueschemeyer have stressed the role of epistemic communities in generating social knowledge [Skocpol/Rueschemeyer 1996], and although this might be a very good approach for identifying the origins of ideas, it does not seem to fit the key problem addressed in this study, i.e. linking the political discourse to policy changes. It is assumed that for ideas to successfully influence the decision-making process in a democratic system they have to evolve into (dominant) interpretive patterns that are persuasive to the political decision-makers. Hence, I focus exclusively on the political discourse as shaped by key political actors [Hall 1989: 376 f.; 1993: 280].[5]

[4] For an overview of the different dimensions of globalisation see Held et al. [1999].

[5] For further methodological details see Seeleib-Kaiser [2001].

Germany

In Germany, the political discourse of globalisation and the welfare system was primarily linked to state social policy. At the centre of the debate were the financing structures of the wage earner-centred social policy, i.e. social insurance contributions. Already in the mid-1970s, the Social Democrats raised the issue of globalisation and the increasing loss of autonomy with regard to pursuing an independent national economic policy. Generally speaking the Social Democrats emphasised the overall economic benefits of state social policy in times of increasing internationalisation, while at the same time arguing that the international economic situation made cuts in social policy programmes a necessity [SPD 1975; 1976].

Although the Christian Democrats initially rejected the argument brought forward by the Social Democrats in the 1970s, they utilised the increasingly global economy and developments in other countries to urge for a reduction of social insurance contributions and to demand cutbacks in state social policies in the early 1980s [CDU 1980: 45-48]. After the Christian Democrats gained power in late 1982 in a coalition with the Free Democrats, the debate about the negative impact of state social policies on the competitiveness of German companies receded, before resurfacing for a brief period in the late 1980s [CDU/CSU 1986: 12-41]. The ensuing unexpected German unification pushed the debate concerning the competitiveness of industry out of the forefront once again [cf. Heinelt/Weck 1998: 131 ff.]. Nevertheless, only three years after the formal unification was completed, and in the midst of a deep economic recession, the conservative coalition government placed the issue of staying competitive in the world market again at the top of its political agenda. It argued that state social policy would have to be consolidated. Reductions in social insurance contributions as well as corporate taxes were said to be imperative for staying competitive globally [Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 1993: 60 f.]. Nonetheless, the governing coalition insisted that it was not its desire to unravel the state social policy and to implement a neo-liberal agenda. Indeed, the coalition argued that state social policy would generally benefit the economy within the global market; however, current arrangements were overextended, and therefore put pressure on the competitiveness of German companies [BMWi 1995: 64].

The opposition parties initially rejected the arguments put forward by the governing parties as an ideologically driven attack on state social policy, with the aim to redistribute from the bottom to the top [cf. SPD 1993]. Nevertheless, as the conservative coalition government continued to forcefully pursue the debate, the opposition parties accepted the general argument, starting around the time of the 1994 federal elections. By 1998, the Social Democrats as well as the Green Party included the demand to reduce social insurance contributions in their election platforms, justified by the argument that such a policy was needed to stay competitive in a global economy [SPD 1994; 1998; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998].

Summarising the political discourse in Germany, one can argue that a strict budget consolidation policy and the need to reduce social insurance contributions in an era of globalisation in order to stay competitive have become the hegemonic interpretive pattern maintained by the political elite in Germany since the mid-1990s. However, arguments of

this kind did not fundamentally challenge the underlying belief that social policy in general promotes social peace and creates a positive climate in which businesses can flourish in the global economy. Moreover, the debate was about the specific structure and extent of state social policy in the era of globalisation and not about social policy per se.

Japan

In an analysis of the political discourse in Japan we can observe that globalisation was not primarily perceived in the past as limiting state social policy, but rather that the cost of work policy was the major issue in the debates of the 1980s and 1990s. Starting in the late 1970s, export-oriented companies - largely in consensus with the enterprise unions of those companies - demanded the liberalisation of agriculture and distribution policies. The high domestic prices, which were a result of protectionism in these sectors - so the argument ran - would increase wage demands, which would negatively affect the competitiveness of Japanese companies on world markets [Nikkeiren 1997: 13 f.; RIALS 1994: 5]. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, companies and unions feared that the United States would use trade policies to retaliate against Japanese protectionism [Rosenbluth 1992: 6; Kume 1997: 224]. Some governmental agencies even argued that an expansion of social provisions could counter accusations by foreign countries that Japan was relying on social dumping as part of its export strategy, and thereby contribute to keep foreign markets open for Japanese products [Kume 1998: 199 f.; Schwartz 1998: 138 ff.]. In the end a consensus was formed within the political elite, whereby it was deemed necessary to slowly open the market to foreign competition [Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony 1986; 1987], while at the same time find new measures to maintain social cohesion. The proposed measures included increased investments in the social infrastructure, even if this meant increasing the government deficit, and a strong emphasis on employment policies [Kume 1998: 171 ff.] to buffer the impact of liberalisation [cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 206-215].

During the 1990s, enterprises were questioning another corner stone of the work policy, namely the Japanese employment system itself. This was based on the perceived need for more flexibility and cost reduction owing to the globalisation process. Against the vehement opposition of the unions, the employers demanded that the employment system be made flexible, which included a reduction in the percentage of lifetime employees [Keidanren 1995; Nikkeiren 1997a]. In order to achieve this aim, Keizai Doyukai [1997], an association of managers and executives, even proposed for example that substantial improvements be made in the unemployment insurance scheme. According to this association, improved access to unemployment insurance benefits would promote the necessary flexibility in the labour market. However, employers were not successful in dominating the political discourse, since the unions and government officials remained adamantly opposed to the proposed strategy [Osawa/Kingston 1996]. For example, Akira Takanashi [1995], the long-time chairman of the Central Employment Security Deliberative Council, argued: "the view of the 'flexible labor market' and that of disintegrating 'Japanese' employment practices are not at all acceptable". Ultimately employers, employees and the government em-

barked on a new project called 'The Third Way' which was intended to avoid the ills of the American and European responses to globalisation (i.e. the phenomena of the working poor and high unemployment rates [cf. Nikkeiren 1997b]).

From the analysis of the political discourse in Japan it is obvious that the key pillar of the Japanese welfare system, i.e. work policy, came under pressure through the process of globalisation. Eventually, a consensus was formed among political actors, who considered a change in the social policy arrangements within the Japanese political economy to be a necessity; nevertheless, it was felt that the proclaimed change should not go as far as to unravel the social fabric of Japanese society.

United States

With the increasing trade deficit during the 1980s, the loss of jobs and the costs of fringe benefits featured prominently in the political discourse [Democratic Party 1984]. Companies exposed to import penetration increasingly perceived fringe benefits as a cost factor, which impinged on their international competitiveness. During the late 1980s, demands by enterprises to reduce fringe benefits were the primary reason for strikes with more than 1000 involved workers [Victor 1990]. Furthermore, during the health care debate of the early 1990s, trade-oriented companies supported a greater role for government regulation in order to reduce their costs [cf. Committee on Ways and Means 1994: 184-192]. According to this view, employer-provided health care benefits had a negative effect on international competitiveness. This reasoning was also reflected in arguments put forward by the Democratic Party [1984: 79-B] starting in the mid-1980s, and culminated in President Clinton's call for national health care reform [Clinton 1994].

Like the debate on health care reform, the process of globalisation was used to justify the expansion of active labour market policies by the Democrats during the 1980s and 1990s. They argued that globalisation demanded increased investments in human capital [cf. Democratic Party 1984: 79-B; Reich 1991; Clinton/Gore 1992]. Alongside these arguments, the justification for an expanded active labour market policy was based on older arguments, which held that those workers who had been displaced by the effects of trade liberalisation policies were entitled to government compensation and training (for a historical perspective see [Frank 1977]).[6] In other words, the expansion of certain sectors of state social and active labour market policies was perceived by parts of the business community, as well as by the Democratic Party, as investments for promoting the competitiveness of the United States. State social policy was increasingly no longer viewed as an instrument primarily for use in the fight against poverty but as an instrument for boosting the economy in a global environment.

The political debates on the changes and reforms to the major public transfer programmes, i.e. AFDC or Social Security, were not explicitly connected to issues of globali-

[6] The interdependence of trade liberalisation and an expansion of active labour market policy resurfaced in all of the major trade debates, during the 1980s and 1990s [cf. Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 288-298].

sation. Even during the Reagan administration, it was conservative ideological demands rather than the 'imperatives' of the global economy that largely drove the debates at the federal level [Seeleib-Kaiser 1993]. Accordingly, demands to expand state social and active labour market policies in the era of globalisation in order to increase competitiveness, as had been put forward by Democrats and segments of the business community since the late 1980s, met with fierce opposition from the Republican Party. Once again, their opposition was rooted in the conservative ideological agenda and not based on any possible economic limits determined by globalisation [Gingrich et al. 1994; House Republicans 1995].

Discourses in a Comparative Perspective

The analysis of the political discourses in the three countries has shown that globalisation was indeed linked to specific social policy arrangements in all three countries. However, the interpretive patterns were quite distinct. According to this analysis, globalisation per se does not constitute a limit to increased *state* social policy, independent of the specific welfare systems, as perhaps some Marxist or neo-liberal analysis stressing the transformation of welfare states into competition states would suggest. Moreover, the specific welfare systems, themselves based on historically rooted interpretive patterns, seem to determine the nature of the debate concerning the relationship between globalisation and social policy. Accordingly, the costs and benefits of the various pillars of the welfare system were interpreted differently. In Germany and Japan one can observe dominant interpretive patterns among the political elites in terms of the links between globalisation and the welfare system, whereas in the United States substantial differences among the elite persisted, owing to the fact that the Republicans for the most part did not perceive the globalisation process in relation to social policy arrangements.

4. The changing nature of welfare systems

Whether or not an overall change occurs in a welfare system is determined by the sum of the various perceived challenges it is facing. However, as has been shown, the challenge presented by globalisation has been *one* more or less continuous justification among political elites in *key* social policy debates over the last two and a half decades. This is not to say that other variables did not contribute to changes in the welfare systems. The point I am trying to make is that the perceived process of globalisation obviously had an impact on the 'need' to reform the three welfare systems. In this section, I will address the major policy changes in social policy within the three welfare systems over the last two and a half decades. This will allow us to evaluate in the conclusion whether the policy changes were consistent with the perceived needs for change due to globalisation.

Germany

Measures to limit the level of social insurance contributions have been a primary aim of the various social policy reforms since the 1970s.[7] One of the major consequences of this policy approach has been that in the case of unemployment and old age the former guarantee of the achieved living standard has become - to say the least - more fragile. The changes since the second half of the 1970s were initially primarily targeted at the unemployment insurance and active labour market policy. According to the Labour Promotion Reform Law enacted in 1997, an unemployed person can no longer reject an offer of work outside his or her occupation or level of qualification as unsuitable. In addition, an unemployed person now must, during the first three months of unemployment, accept a job offer even if it pays up to 20 percent less than the previous job, and up to 30 percent less in the following three months. After six months the unemployed person must accept basically any job offer which pays at least the amount of the unemployment compensation payment [Bieback 1997]. These changes are contradictory to the notion of securing the achieved standard of living through the social insurance scheme, and the state seems to be relying increasingly on a means-tested approach (for a similar argument see [Heinelt/Weck 1998: 48-56]).

Although the institution of old-age social insurance was largely left intact during the social policy changes of the 1980s and early 1990s, this was to change by the mid-1990s. Through the implementation of the *Rentenreformgesetz 1999*, which was legislated in 1997, the replacement rate for the model pensioner [*Eckrentner*] would have been reduced from 70 to 64 percent. Based on this measure, once again a substantial percentage of the elderly would have to depend on means-tested social assistance, according to estimates by the Chairman of the Social Security Council [Schmähl 1999: 417 f.]. However, at the same time, regulations were liberalised to strengthen the incentives for employers to provide fringe benefits [Wirth/Paul 1998]. With this legislation the former government coalition of Christian and Free Democrats implicitly decided to withdraw from the principle of publicly guaranteeing the former achieved standard of living. Although the incoming new red/green coalition government initially suspended the implementation of this law, a return to the *Lebensstandardsicherung* within the statutory old-age insurance was not on their agenda. Like the previous government their goal has been to limit the replacement rate at a considerably lower level and to encourage occupational and private arrangements in securing a larger portion of retirement income. In part this has been accomplished by the pension reform enacted in early 2001, which aims at controlling the future level of social insurance contributions. On the benefit side the implementation of this reform will lead to a reduction of the replacement ratio from 70 to 64 percent [Seeleib-Kaiser 2002].

Finally, if we look at the specific institutions of state social policy over the last 25 years, we can witness a substantial change in the normative underpinnings and institutional design. It becomes obvious that the formerly overarching principle of guaranteeing

[7] This approach was briefly interrupted by the unification process and the transfer of the structures of the West German welfare state to the East, which has resulted in a steep increase of social insurance contributions during the 1990s.

the once achieved standard of living through a wage-centred social insurance system is clearly receding in the effort to stabilise and eventually reduce the social insurance contributions. However, this development cannot be accurately described as a 'neo-liberal' policy approach. Moreover, it reflects a redefinition of the state's role under changed circumstances.

Japan

Analysing the Japanese welfare system, we saw substantial changes in the legislation governing the agricultural and distribution sectors aimed at liberalising the market. At the end of 1993 the government finally agreed to incrementally open the rice market to foreign competition, and in 1994 it lifted the monopoly on the distribution of rice in order to promote market mechanisms. However, a new fiscal programme to counter the possible negative effects - worth 6.1 trillion Yen - accompanied these market liberalisations. About fifty percent of the sum was set aside for public works programmes to improve the infrastructure of rural areas and more importantly to provide employment opportunities for farmers [Foreign Press Center 1996: 45 f.; Vogel 1997: 14]. In the retail sector, the so-called *Large Scale Retail Store Law* was substantially revised in the early 1990s, which made it easier for larger stores to compete in the market [Schoppa 1997: 146 ff.]. These changes have already led to substantial consequences in the retail sector by reducing the overall number of workers in this sector and especially the number employed in small retail shops. Together with the changes in the agricultural sector these changes will reduce the opportunities for less productive workers to be gainfully employed in sheltered sectors. Although the agricultural and the distribution sectors still absorb a substantial number of workers, these numbers are decreasing, and consequently the role of these sectors as functional equivalents to unemployment and pension schemes will diminish [Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 217-220].

While there had also been pressures to liberalise the Japanese employment system, it did not change fundamentally for the insiders throughout the 1990s. In 1998, almost 7 percent of the workforce could be considered as in-house unemployed, i.e. workers who are formally still employed but have become redundant in an economic sense [Bosse 1998]. In addition, the insiders can still rely on the fringe benefit system, which has remained largely unchanged over the last decade. However, the employment system has lost its significance for the younger cohorts, for whom it has become increasingly difficult to enter the labour market on a permanent basis during the last two decades [Genda 2000].

At the same time, the state has extended its role within the welfare system in two ways: First, active labour market policies were expanded during the 1980s and 1990s. One primary focus was to give incentives to employers to keep particularly older workers in their employment [Kume 1998; Ohtake 2000]. Second, the state greatly enhanced public work programmes via massive deficit spending in order to cushion the structural changes - a policy which has been characterised as 'Keynes in the Orient' [Chorney 1996: 371]. At the end of the 1990s, the budget deficit had risen to about 10 percent and the debt to 116 percent of GDP, whereas at the beginning of the decade the Japanese government was still running a budget surplus [WuDunn/Kristof 1999].

If we look finally at the state social policy, we can witness a general consolidation occurring in the early 1980s, affecting in particular the 'able-bodied', prime-aged workers, whose access to social transfers was restricted. Yet these programmes have always played a minimal role within the welfare system, since the Japanese traditionally ascribe work with a very high value. In other areas clear expansions were visible: first, the minimum public pension system was improved through a reform legislated in 1984; second, expansions were enacted later in the 1980s and early 1990s in the areas of social services, including long-term care, and family policy [Seeleib-Kaiser/Thränhardt 2000].

To sum up, the Japanese welfare system is relying less on regulation and protectionism and more on fiscal policy and active labour market policies to reduce the risk of unemployment for less productive workers and provide security against the risk of old age. Although work policy still seems to be at the centre of the Japanese welfare system, there has been a substantial change in terms of the instruments used to achieve social cohesion. The role of direct fiscal intervention has clearly increased. To some extent these policies seem to resemble the stereotypical, orthodox social democratic approach.

United States

Looking at the USA welfare system, we have also witnessed changes that have increased the role of the state, while at the same time the significance of fringe benefits has declined substantially. The latter change can be traced to the restructuring of the workforce, which at least in part is the result of the globalisation process. While in 1979 about 70 percent of the USA population under the age of 65 had health insurance coverage through fringe benefits, the percentage declined to 63 percent in 1996 [Mishel et al. 1999: 146]. Low-skilled workers and those employed in the manufacturing sector, which is much more exposed to fierce international competition than other sectors of the economy, have been most severely affected by this development [EBRI 1997a]. Although we can observe a less dramatic decline within the domain of retirement benefits, workers are increasingly covered by defined contribution plans, whereas in the past they had been covered by defined benefit plans. With this structural change risk is shifted from the employers to the employees [EBRI 1997b; Economist 1999].

Along with this retrenchment in the sector of fringe benefits the government has *expanded* its role in health and active labour market policies through incremental reforms during the second half of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. In 1995, almost 14 percent of the population under the age of 65 were covered through governmental health care programmes, whereas only about 9 percent had been covered a decade earlier [Committee on Ways and Means, 1996: 1031]. Starting in the second half of the 1980s the federal government liberalised the eligibility criteria in the Medicaid programme in order to make access to health care easier for former welfare recipients and children of poor families. In addition, through the legislation of the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996* the state intends to reduce the risk to workers of losing health care coverage automatically when changing employers. One of the goals of this law has been to increase the flexibility of workers in the labour market [Peterson 1998].

Although substantial cuts in active labour market policy were enacted during the first years of the Reagan administration, expenditures rose continuously thereafter until the mid-1990s. If we control for the percentage of the unemployed, the United States spent more on active labour market policies in 1995 than in 1975 [Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 317-324]. Although the Clinton administration with its emphasis on improving human capital was unsuccessful in substantially reforming the active labour market policy, it managed to put greater emphasis on and achieve an increase in funding for programmes aimed at addressing the needs of dislocated workers [President of the United States 1998: 53].

Unemployment insurance and traditional public transfer programmes, such as the old-age retirement programme, did not undergo any substantial changes at the federal level. In the area of public assistance (read AFDC) the federal government transferred the full authority to determine eligibility and benefit standards to state governments and thereby withdrew its responsibility for the non-working poor.[8] At the same time, however, the federal government greatly expanded its support for the working poor through the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programme, which at present covers about 18.5 million families, whereas the AFDC programme at its peak in 1994 supported about 5 million families [Committee on Ways and Means, 1996: 467; 2000: 813].

Contrary to conventional wisdom, we can find an expansion of the role of the federal government in social policy areas it in the past had neglected. An increasing part of the population is insured through the government against the risk of illness, whereas the once dominant fringe benefits are on the wane. In the area of active labor market policy the government is increasingly shifting the focus of programmes towards dislocated workers, who in the past had not been the primary target of its policies.

Policy Developments in a Comparative Perspective

The policy changes that we have witnessed in the three welfare systems during the last two and a half decades indicate that within each of them core elements of the post-World War II social compacts have undergone substantial changes. In Germany, the once dominant normative framework of securing against social risks through social insurance and thereby guaranteeing formerly achieved standards of living has become fragile. Even in the once sacred area of protecting against the risk of old age, we can see new elements of private arrangements. Japanese work policies have undergone substantial changes, leading to a greater reliance upon direct state intervention through active labour market and fiscal policies within the welfare system in order to secure against the risks of unemployment and old age. An increase in state social and work policies has also been the approach followed in the United States in securing against the risks of sickness, unemployment, and low pay, whereas the once dominant role of fringe benefits has been waning. Accordingly, describing these developments through the concept of path dependency would seem to exaggerate the stability of welfare systems. Although the three welfare systems still differ in a whole variety of dimen-

[8] However, compared with other programmes the authority of the federal government in this programme has never been comprehensive.

sions, they are more similar today than they were two and a half decades ago, each losing some of its distinct characteristics. How far these developments will continue into the future and whether they can be generalised is not yet fully clear. However, other recent research that shows a greater emphasis on the 'formal welfare state', i.e. state social policies, in Australia and New Zealand [Schwartz 2000; 2001], as well as a trend towards strengthening 'private' social policy arrangements in some Scandinavian countries [Benner/Vad 2000], corresponds with the evidence presented here. We seem to be witnessing a more widespread development towards convergence among the different welfare systems.

5. Conclusion: some theoretical reflections on comparative social policy

The process of globalisation was linked to 'necessary' changes within the three welfare systems analysed. In Japan and Germany we see dominant interpretive patterns, while in the USA differences within the elite continue to exist. The policy changes implemented in the last two and a half decades largely correspond to the constructed links between the process of globalisation and the welfare system. These findings contradict the analysis, whereby globalisation did not have any significant influence on social policy. In contrast to traditional comparative studies of social policy this analysis did not assume interests or party preferences ex post. Moreover, it systematically studied the justifications on the part of the political elite for policy changes as well as the changes themselves. Demographics and the theory of power resources could be able to explain differences among various countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the USA, but they cannot explain, why the three welfare systems have changed in the way they have. If we want to grasp the meaning of the dynamics and causal relationships behind change, we have to place greater emphasis on the analysis of the political discourse and look beyond nominal state social policy.

The interpretation of globalisation can lead to a redefinition of the economic costs and benefits of state social policy within the various welfare systems. Generally speaking we cannot find any unrestrained development towards pure market solutions, as orthodox neo-liberal or Marxist analysis would suggest. On the one hand, we can observe developments towards a greater emphasis on state social policies in those countries which had previously relied more on 'private' solutions, such as fringe benefits and work policies, owing to the perceived needs of globalisation. On the other hand, Germany, which has relied heavily on state social policy in the past, is increasingly focusing on the introduction of at least some 'private' solutions to secure against the basic risks of modernity. Based on these findings, comparative social policy analysis should move beyond the standard repertoire of analysis, which is still very heavily biased towards analysing public social expenditure data and nominal social policy. Moreover, we should also include functional equivalents of state social policy when comparing social policy developments and welfare systems across cultural boundaries. Only if we take a broad perspective is it possible to understand the causal effects of globalisation on the state's capacity and willingness to intervene in markets, and of the dynamics within the current welfare systems. In this sense we could conceive a welfare system as a space for options, which leaves room for national adjustments that do not necessarily have to lead to a race to the botton.

MARTIN SEELEIB-KAISER *completed his doctorate at Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich [1993], and in 1993-1999 worked as a research fellow at the Centre for Social Policy Research of Bremen University. In 1999-2002 he was the DAAD Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Duke University and since June 2002 is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Social Policy Research of Bremen University. His research interests include party politics, political economy, and comparative welfare state analysis. In addition to the publication of his recent book entitled* Globalisierung und Sozialpolitik. Ein Vergleich der Diskurse und Wohlfahrtssysteme in Deutschland, Japan und den USA *[Frankfurt/M; New York: Campus, 2001].*

References

Adema, Willem 1999. *Net Social Expenditure.* Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers No. 39. Paris: OECD.

Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony 1986. "Maekawa Report". *Japan Economic Journal*, April 19, 7.

Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony 1987. "Action for Economic Restructuring". *Japan Economic Journal*, May 23, 7+21.

Benner, Mats, Torben Bundgaard Vad 2000. "Sweden and Denmark - Defending the Welfare State". Pp. 399-466 in Scharpf/Schmidt (eds.).

Berger, Peter, Thomas Luckmann 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Bieback, Karl-Jürgen 1997. "Der Umbau der Arbeitsförderung". *Kritische Justiz* 30, 1: 15-29.

BMWi [Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft] 1995. *Jahreswirtschaftsbericht* 1995. Bonn: BMWi.

Bosse, Friederike 1998. "Verschlechterung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt". *Japan Aktuell* IV, 5: 438.

Briefs, Götz 1930. "Der wirtschaftliche Wert der Sozialpolitik". Pp. 144-170 in Vorstand der Gesellschaft für Soziale Reform (ed.), *Die Reform des Schlichtungswesens - Der wirtschaftliche Wert der Sozialpolitik* (Bericht über die Verhandlungen der XI. Generalversammlung der Gesellschaft für Soziale Reform in Mannheim am 24. u. 25. Oktober 1929, Jena, 13. Band, H. 3).

Brown, Michael K. 1999. *Race, Money, and the American Welfare State.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998. *Grün ist der Wechsel.* Bonn: Bundesvorstand.

Carlile, Lonny E., Mark C. Tilton 1998. "Regulatory Reform and the Developmental State". Pp. 1-15 Carlile and Tilton (eds.), *Is Japan Really Changing Its Ways? Regulatory Reform and the Japanese Economy.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

CDU 1980. "Für Frieden und Freiheit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Welt". Pp. 45-58 in Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.), *Programme der politischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Supplemental Vol. for the 1983 Election. München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung.

CDU/CSU 1986. "Das Wahlprogramm von CDU und CSU für die Bundestagswahl 1987". Pp. 12-41 in Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.), *Programme der politischen*

Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Supplemental Vol. for the 1987 Election. München: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Cerny, Philip G. 1997. "Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization". *Government and Opposition* 32, 2: 251-274.

Chorney, Harold 1996. "Debits, Deficits and Full Employment". Pp. 357-369 in Boyer, Robert, Daniel Drache (eds.), *States Against Markets - The limits of globalization.* London, New York: Routledge.

Clinton, Bill, Al Gore 1992. *Putting People First.* New York: Times Books.

Clinton, William J. 1994. "Remarks on Presenting Proposed Health Care Reform Legislation to the Congress, October 17, 1993". In *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1993, Book II.* Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Committee on Ways and Means 1994. *The Employer Mandate and Related Provisions in the Administration's Health Security Act,* 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., February 3, 1994, Serial 103-62. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Committee on Ways and Means 1996. *1996 Green Book - Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.* WMCP 104-14. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Committee on Ways and Means 2000: *2000 Green Book - Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.* WMCP: 106-14. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Cox, Robert Henry 2001. "The Social Construction of an Imperative". *World Politics* 15, 3: 463-98.

Democratic Party 1984. "Text of 1984 Democratic Party Platform". *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1984: 73-B-106-B.

EBRI, 1997a. *Trends in Health Insurance Coverage.* EBRI Issue Brief No. 185. Washington, D.C.: EBRI.

EBRI, 1997b. *EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits.* Washington, D.C.: EBRI, 1997.

Economist 1999. "The End of the Company Pension - Passing the Buck". *Economist,* May 15: 85-87.

Ernst, Angelika 1988. *Dauerbeschäftigung und Flexibilität in Japan.* Frankfurt/M.: Campus Verlag.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (ed.) 1996. *Welfare States in Transition.* London: Sage Publications.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foreign Press Center 1996. *Food and Agriculture in Japan.* About Japan Series 18. Tokyo: Foreign Press Center.

Frank, Charles R. 1977. *Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Frerich, Johannes; Martin Frey 1996. *Handbuch der Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland - Band 3.* München, Wien: Oldenbourg Verlag.

Garrett, Geoffrey 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Garrett, Geoffrey; Deborah Mitchell 1995. "Globalization and the Welfare State: Income Transfers in the Industrial Democracies, 1965-1990". Paper to be presented to: Comparative Research on Welfare State Reforms, Pavia September 14-17, 1995;

Genda, Yuji 2000. "Youth Employment and Parasite Singles" *Japan Labour Bulletin* 39, 3. [http://www.mol.go.jp/jil]

Gerhards, Jürgen 1995. "Kultursoziologie und die Theorie rationalen Handelns: Die rationale Verwendung von politischen Deutungsmustern". *Journal für Sozialforschung* 35, 3-4: 219-234.

Gingrich, Newt, Dick Armey, House Republicans to Change the Nation 1994. *Contract with America.* Ed. by Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas. New York: Times Books.

Goldstein, Judith, Robert Keohane 1993. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework". Pp. 3-30 in Goldstein/Keohane (ed.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy - Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change.* Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.

Hacking, Ian 1999. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hall, Peter 1989. "Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas". Pp. 361-391 in Hall, Peter A., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Hall, Peter 1993. "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State. The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain". *Comparative Politics*, April: 275-296.

Heimann, Eduard (1929) 1980. *Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus - Theorie der Sozialpolitik.* Frankfrut/M.: Suhrkamp.

Heinelt, Hubert, Michael Weck 1998. *Arbeitsmarktpolitik - Vom Vereinigungskonsens zur Standortdebatte.* Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton 1999: *Global Transformations - Politics, Economics and Culture.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Higgins, Joan 1981: *States of Welfare - Comparative Analysis in Social Policy.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

House Republicans 1995. *Restoring the Dream - The Bold New Plan by House Republicans. Strengthen the Family, Balance the Budget, Replace the Welfare State.* Ed. by Stephan Moore. New York: Times Books.

Jessop, Bob 1994. "The Transition to Post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian Workfare State". Pp. 13-37 in Burrows, Roger, Brian Loader, *Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State?* London: Routledge.

Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver 1994. "Staat und Wohlfahrtsproduktion". Pp. 357-380 in Hans-Ulrich Derlien, Uta Gerhardt, Fritz W. Scharpf (eds.), *Systemrationalität und Partialinteresse.* Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver 1997. *Herausforderungen des Sozialstaates.* Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Keidanren 1995. *The Medium-Term Forecast for Japanese Industry and the Challenges It Must Face.* Policy Statements, Proposals and Reports 95/10/17_01. [http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol039/p 039-01.html]

Keizai Doyukai 1997. *Structural Reforms to Enhance Initiatives of the Private Sector - Chairman's Address for the 1997 Annual Meeting.* April 24, tentative translation [http://www.doyukai.or.jp/database/ teigen/970424e.htm].

Kume, Ikuo 1997. "Cooptation or New Possibility? Japanese Labor Politics in the Era of Neo-Conservatism". Pp. 221-245 in Muramatsu, Michio, Frieder Naschold (eds.), *State and Administration in Japan and Germany*. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Kume, Ikuo, 1998. *Disparaged Success - Labor Politics in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.

Majone, Giandomenico 1989. *Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, John Schmitt 1999. *The State of Working America 1998-99*. Economic Policy Institute. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Nikkeiren, 1997a. *Structural Reform - The Search for a Third Option. Employment Stability and Improved National Quality of Life. Nikkeiren Position Paper 1997*. Tokyo: Japan Federation of Employers' Associations.

Nikkeiren, 1997b. *A Japanese Model: Searching for a Third Option - Nikkeiren Report on the Bluebird Plan Project (FY 1997-1999)*. Tokyo: Japan Federation of Employers' Assosiations.

Offe, Claus (1984) 1993. *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. Ed. by John Keane, 5th printing. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Ohtake, Fumio 2000: "Special Employment Measures in Japan". *Japan Labour Bulletin* (39) 12.

Osawa, Machiko, Jeff, Kingston 1996. "Flexibility and Inspiration: Restructuring and the Japanese Labor Market". *Japan Labour Bulletin* (35) 1 [http://www.mol.go.jp/jil/].

Patrick, Hugh T., Thomas P. Rohlen 1987. "Small-Scale Family Enterprises", Pp. 331-384 in Yamamura, Kozo, Yasukichi Yasuba (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan* 1: The Domestic Transformation. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Peterson, Mark A. 1998. "The Politics of Health Care Policy - Overreaching in an Age of Polarization". Pp. 181-229 in Weir, Margaret (ed.), *The Social Divide*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

President of the United States 1998. *Budget of the United States Government - Fiscal Year 1999*. Washington, D.C.: GPO.

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 1993. *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Zukunftssicherung des Standortes Deutschland*. Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung.

Reich, Robert 1991. *The Work of Nations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

RIALS 1994. "The Annual Economic Report of RIALS. 1994: Entering New Era beyond Structural Adjustment". In RIALS (ed.), 1995, *Rengo Research Institute Report No. 6*. Tokyo: Rials.

Rose, Richard 1986. "Common Goals but Different Roles: The State's Contribution to the Welfare Mix". Pp. 13-39 in Rose, Richard, Rei Shiratori (eds.), *The Welfare State East and West*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosenbluth, Frances McCall 1992. "The Domestic Politics of Internationalization in Japan: Shifting Coalitions and Institutional Adjustment", prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September.

Scharpf, Fritz, Vivien A. Schmidt (eds.) 2000: *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy*, Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmähl, Winfried 1999. "Rentenversicherung in der Bewährung", Pp. 397-423 in Kaase, Max,

Günther Schmid (eds.), *Eine lernende Demokratie - 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* Berlin: Edition Sigma.

Schmidt, Manfred G. 1998. *Sozialpolitik in Deutschland.* Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

Schmidt, Vivien 2000. "Values and Discourse in the Politics of Adjustment". Pp. 229-309 in Scharpf/Schmidt (eds.).

Schoppa, Leonard J. 1997. *Bargaining with Japan.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Schriewer, Jürgen 1999. "Vergleich und Erklärung zwischen Kausalität und Komplexität". Pp. 53-102 in Kaelble, Hartmut, Jürgen Schriewer (eds.), *Diskurse und Entwicklungspfade.* Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus.

Schwartz, Frank J. 1998. *Advice and Consent.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schwartz, Herman 2000. "Internationalization and Two Liberal Welfare States: Australia and New Zealand". Pp. 69-130 in Scharpf/Schmidt (eds.).

Schwartz, Herman 2001. "Round up the Usual Suspects! Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Welfare State Change". Pp. 17-44 in Pierson, Paul (ed.), *New Politics of the Welfare State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin 1993. *Amerikanische Sozialpolitik.* Opladen: Leske&Budrich.

Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin 2001. *Globalisierung und Sozialpolitik.* Frankfurt/M: Campus.

Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin 2002: *Continuity or Change: Red-Green Social Policy after 16 Years of Christian-Democratic Rule.* ZeS-Arbeitspapier. Bremen: Universität Bremen, forthcoming.

Seeleib-Kaiser, Martin, Anna Maria Thränhardt 2000. "Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft statt Wohlfahrtsstaat in Japan: Zwischen westlichen Vorbildern und eigenständigem Modell". Pp. 283-328 in Obinger, Herbert, Uwe Wagschal (eds.), *Der gezügelte Wohlfahrtsstaat.* Frankfurt/M.; New York: Campus.

Shinkawa, Toshimitsu, T.J. Pempel 1996. "Occupational Welfare and the Japanese Experience". Pp. 280-326 in Shalev, Michael (ed.), *The Privatization of Social Policy.* London: Macmillan.

Skocpol, Theda, Dietrich Rueschemeyer 1996. "Introduction" Pp. 3-14 Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Theda Skocpol (eds.), *States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies.* Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press/Russell Sage Foundation.

SPD 1975: "Ökonomisch-politischer Orientierungsrahmen für die Jahre 1975-1985". Pp. 338-402 in Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.), 1979, *Programme der politischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,* Vol. 2. München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung.

SPD 1976. *Weiter arbeiten am Modell Deutschland.* Bonn: Vorstand der SPD.

SPD 1993. "Sozialpolitik als Standortfaktor". *Fraktion Aktuell,* edition 10/93.

SPD 1994. *Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD. Reformen für Deutschland.* Bonn: Parteivorstand.

SPD 1998. *Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit - SPD-Programm für die Bundestagswahl 1998.* Bonn: Parteivorstand.

Stevens, Beth 1990. "Labor Unions, Employee Benefits, and the Privatization of the American Welfare State". *Journal of Policy History* 2, 3: 233-260.

Takanashi, Akira 1995. "Employment Practices and Unemployment in Contemporary Japan". *Japan Labour Bulletin* 34, 4. [http://www.mol.go.jp/jil]

Victor, Kirk 1990. "Gut Issue". *National Journal,* March 24th: 704-707.

Vobruba, Georg 1983. "Entrechtlichungstendenzen im Wohlfahrtsstaat". Pp. 91-117 in Voigt, Rüdiger (ed.), *Abschied vom Recht?* Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Vobruba, Georg 1991. *Jenseits der sozialen Fragen.* Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Vogel, Steven K. 1997. *Can Japan Disengage? Winners and Losers in Japan's Political Economy, and the Ties That Bind Them.* BRIE Working Paper 111. Berkeley: BRIE.

Wirth, Christian, Susanne Paul 1998. "Bedeutung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung und Reformmaßnahmen des RRG 1999". *DAngVers* 7: 232-240;

WuDunn, Sheryl, Nicholas D. Kristof 1999. "Though Japanese Save Diligently, the Nation Sinks Deeper in Debt". *New York Times,* September 1: A1+A10.

Renewal of the Library of the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic, Prague

During the week of August 12-18, Prague and other parts of the Czech Republic suffered the worst flooding seen in more than a century. The oldest parts of the city, where the Institute of Sociology is located, had prepared in advance for events of this kind but not of this scope: at the height of the flooding the Vltava River was seven meters above its normal level. Many institutions and businesses in the area of the Old Town, such as the National Theatre, the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra, the Municipal Library and the National Library, were inundated.

The storage facilities of the Library of the Institute of Sociology, which it shared with the Institute of Philosophy, are located below ground, and consequently were completely flooded, with the water as high as 2.75 meters in some rooms. By the time the police permitted access to the area again, large parts of the Library's collections were destroyed.

The Library contained numerous volumes dating back over the last two centuries, with more than 120,000 books and other domestic and foreign publications, 90,000 of which were located in the underground storage space. Unfortunately, we managed to remove only a small portion of the collection before the flooding. After, volunteers worked to save the books by removing and preparing them for a cold-storage facility, but what was not frozen within 48 hours was lost. Approximately 25,000 books have been frozen, but we do not know how many of these will ultimately be salvageable once they have been dried. We have certainly lost at least 30,000 volumes, including many series of journals which were often the only copies available in the Czech Republic.

This is a heavy blow to the academic community, and particularly the Institute of Sociology which was only renewed in 1990. Probably the largest source of sociological and related literature in the Czech Republic has been almost completely destroyed. Many books, journals and materials that were obtained with serious difficulty, and often only with international help, have now been lost. It will be difficult for the Institute to overcome this loss, not only for financial reasons but also as the Library's large collection served the needs of so many - researchers at the Institute, its guests, the larger academic community, and students - both through direct access and inter-library loans.

We would welcome and appreciate any assistance from those interested, either through the material contribution of books and journals or through a financial donation to the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, Prague, 1, Czech Republic.

Czech Crown account no.: 18038031/0710

EURO account no.: 478665183/0300

Please address any correspondence to:
Petra Rakušanová
Coordinator of the library renewal
e-mail: rakusan@soc.cas.cz.
telephone: 42 02 2222 0682

Marriage and Cohabitation: Qualitative Differences in Partnership Arrangements*

DANA HAMPLOVÁ**
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Abstract: The article investigates the differences between marriage and non-marital cohabitation. The main perspective stems from the theory of the social exchange. The author concentrates on the narrow question of financial transfers between partners and presents the hypothesis that cohabitation should represent a lesser bond union because it does not protect investments into partnerships, and it should therefore be more egalitarian. However, this hypothesis is not confirmed by the data. Even though cohabitation is indeed a departure from the traditional family pattern, it is not a departure in the direction of greater egalitarianism but rather in the direction of a female breadwinner. The social exchange theory would predict that the shift towards the female breadwinner should be compensated by the greater participation of men in the household chores. This expectation is confirmed by the data.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6: 771-788

1. Introduction

The increase in the number of people who live in the arrangement of non-marital cohabitation is a particularly visible change that has occurred in family life in the recent past. It is a subject that has been the focus of considerable attention in the media and in academic research, too. In these both these spheres cohabitation is often described as a modern alternative to marriage, an alternative that could be considered the logical outcome of the greater autonomy and freedom that individuals enjoy today in the modern society [e.g. Rabušic 1996, 2001]. In the early 1990s some Czech demographers began to predict that cohabitation would soon begin to spread throughout post-revolution, Czech society to a much greater degree [Vereš 1991].

There are two basic questions which relate to cohabitation and which are of particular interest from the sociological perspective. Though the two are tightly intertwined, it is of use, at least analytically, to distinguish between them. The first refers to the socio-demographic differences between those who enter into marriage and those who live in co-

* This research was enabled thanks to the support of grants no. A7-29101/01 and no. A7028101/01 from the Grant Agency Academy of Sciences CR and grant no. 403/02/1500 from the Grant Agency CR.

** Direct all correspondence to: Dana Hamplová, Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences, Jilska 1, 110 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic, tel. +420 222 22 1663, e-mail: hamplova@soc.cas.cz

habitation, and/i.e. the differences between those who enter directly into marriage and those who opt for cohabitation prior to marriage. The question in this case is whether the decision in favour of marriage or cohabitation is the result of relatively arbitrary values and preferences, and whether and how the decision is dependent on more 'objective' realities, e.g. the actual socio-economic standing of the people involved, their social group, class, or position on the 'marriage market', and whether then it is a matter of a relatively rational reaction to the circumstances people are living in [see Manning, Lichter 1996; Blackwell, Lichter 2000; Brown, Booth 1996; Carmichael 1995; Kiernan 2000].

The second question addresses the qualitative differences between marriage and cohabitation, i.e. what types of partnership do both types of union represent and what are their features. Many of the differences between marriage and cohabitation can be attributed to socio-economic differences, because people who live in a marriage arrangement simply differ from people who live in an arrangement of cohabitation. However, from the sociological perspective it is important to ask whether there also exist institutional differences that are intrinsic to the type of union. In essence this is a question of whether marriage or cohabitation lead by definition to different partnership arrangements, and whether and in what way the absence of a legal bond in the case of cohabitation has an effect on the partnership. This article focuses on the second of the two basic questions indicated above, and pays particular attention to examining differences in financial arrangements and economic factors.

2. Qualitative differences between marriage and cohabitation

Cohabitation and marriage have been the subject of comparative studies since the 1970s and 1980s, from which time attention has focused primarily on questions such as the stability of the union [Axinn, Thornton 1992; DeMaris, MacDonald 1993; Thomson, Collela 1992; DeMaris, Rao 1992; Hamplová 2001], satisfaction with the partnership [Brown, Booth 1996; Horwitz, White 1998] and, more recently, the division of labour within the union and economic aspects (financial transfers) [Brines, Joyner 1999; South, Spitze 1994; Rindfuss, VandenHeuvel 1990].

One of the key differences that exist between marriage and cohabitation is considered to be the difference in the division of labour (and the degree of specialisation of human capital) [Brines, Joyner 1999]. This perspective stems essentially from the theories – both sociological [Blau 1964] and economic [Becker 1993] – of social exchange and it assumes that mutual dependency, exchange between partners, and the degree of joint investments they share, are what give the union its strength. The more partners depend on each other, the more they exchange, and the more they invest into the relationship, the stronger the union is.

Analyses of the shared investments of partners have concentrated for the most part on the question of investment into specialised human capital. It is of course clear that shared investment cannot be limited in this way and that it is necessary to also consider emotional involvement, trust, time, and the creation of a commonly shared world of mean-

ing.[1] However, investment into specialised capital draws attention for other reasons, not only because - unlike emotions or trust, for example - it can more easily be operationalised, but also because the basic changes in family and marriage behaviour that occurred in the second half of the 20th century are frequently ascribed to changes in the specialisation of human capital.

Discussions on this subject are based primarily on the work of Gary Becker, who applied economic analysis to the case of the family and household. According to Becker [1993] the division of labour within the household - specialisation in the allocation of time and in the accumulation of human capital - would appear even if all household members were identical and had the same comparative advantages. He argues that specialisation and division of labour is the most rational and efficient way to manage the household. This can be demonstrated through an example: identical members of a household can allocate time to both sectors and have the same investments into human capital. If they spend x hours in the market, the output will be same as if one of them spent twice as much time (2x) in the market and the other specialised completely in the household. However, both would be better off if one invested only in the household capital and the other only in the market capital. Investments into specialised human capital produce increasing returns and thereby provide a strong incentive for a division of labour because each member gains from a costless increase in household output. However, Becker adds that the degree of specialisation in the household will be lower if one of the labours (for example, household labour) is considered to be of less value or more boring.

From the perspective of investments into specialised capital and the division of labour, it is possible to assume that cohabitation and marriage are not identical [Brines, Joyner 1999]. Although the continually high rate of divorce in modern societies breaks down the reliability of marriage as a form of economic protection, there at least exist basic legal guarantees that the joint investments will not come up completely empty. This applies not only to direct financial deposits but also to the investments into non-remunerative human capital, which can only be used within the framework of the household, as persons who focus more on bringing up children may hope that their work will be taken into account when shared property is divided.[2] If there are certain legal guarantees that the in-

[1] Peter L. Berger and Hans Kellner [1979] have pointed out the cognitive aspect of a marital relationship. Berger and Kellner unite the traditions of Weber, Mead and phenomenology and set out from the viewpoint that we live in a world that is founded on meanings mediated by society. Only through contact with others does man discover not only what the things that surround him/her actually are and what kind of place they occupy in the world, but also who he/she actually is. At the same time it is clear that a similarly socially rooted reality is quite fragile and requires continuous renewal and requires that our significant others continuously reassure us that things are as we believe they are. In their view people entering into marriage go through a certain form of re-socialisation, and as two strangers with different pasts stand faced with the task of constructing and maintaining a world that will make sense to both of them. In their view, in modern society the central relationship that participates in the maintenance of our world is marriage.

[2] De Santis and Livi Bacci [2001] emphasise that in societies with a high rate of divorce women can no longer rely on the economic security of marriage as in the past, and it is therefore rational that

vestments into 'domestic capital' will be returned, as in marriage there indeed are, this does not mean that the partners *must* specialise in the different spheres, but space is created to allow for this possibility.[3]

Empirical findings from other countries support this theoretical assumption. In the case of unmarried couples, the difference in income between the partners is lower than that in the case of married couples, people specialise less in the labour or domestic sphere, fewer financial transfers occur between the partners, and there is a lower level of solidarity [Brines, Joyner 1999]. People living in cohabitation are less likely to merge their resources into joint bank accounts or share ownership of their houses [Blumstein, Schwartz 1983; Rindfuss, Vandenheuvel 1990, see Brines, Joyner 1999]. They are also less inclined to accept male and female roles [e.g. Rindfuss, VandenHeuvel 1990], are less concerned with the traditional division of roles in the household [e.g. South, Spitze 1994], and want fewer children (another joint investment). On the whole, the likelihood that they will establish strong and lasting relationships is also lower [e.g. Bumpass, Sweet 1989].

Brines and Joyner argue that cohabitation is an egalitarian type of union which involves a lower level of (financial) solidarity between partners because it is too risky to invest in specialised human capital and generally to invest in a partner. These authors are therefore among those who advocate the 'lesser bound perspective' on cohabitation, and view cohabitation as a union that lies in between marriage and LAT (Living Apart Together).

Even though this theoretical approach anticipates a causal relationship, the direction of influence need not only be one-way. It is equally possible that people choose to cohabit because they do not want to pool their resources and prefer a more individualistic arrangement. That there are fewer transfers between partners in cohabitation may also stem from the fact that it is mostly young people who cohabit. They may not wish to 'invest' in the partner and view cohabitation as a phase prior to 'serious involvement', or they may not have a regular income. However, the fact that we are unable to determine any pos-

---

they would try to develop human capital that they could use on the labour market [ibid., pp. 22-23]. Even though in this regard the strength of marriage is eroding, what is of significance is that in comparison with cohabitation it nonetheless still provides some guarantees. This does not mean that modern marriage provides large guarantees and is the ideal environment for the development of the specialisation of human capital, but cohabitation is even worse than marriage in this regard.

[3] Do marriage and cohabitation differ in the degree of other, for example, emotional investments? The answer to this question is more complicated, as the degree of psychological investment into a relationship, unlike income, the number of children, or the relative stability of the union, is difficult to measure. Equally, with the aid of standard qualitative methods it is difficult to verify whether marriage and cohabitation differ in terms of how much the re-socialisation of partners occurs in both types of union. Some studies could suggest that marriage and cohabitation do differ in the degree of emotional support (see Stack and Eshleman 1998 - a study on professed satisfaction in 17 countries). It is indeed possible to assume that the insecurity that is tied to the future of the union, or the simple fact that cohabitation falls apart more often than marriage, could lead to a lower degree of emotional investment and less mutual accommodation, but more general thoughts on this subject could easily slide into pure speculation.

sible causality (cause and consequence) does not affect the actual connection between marriage, cohabitation and financial transfers. The question is basically whether cohabitation is indeed a 'lesser bond', and not whether people actually choose cohabitation owing to a lower level of commitment.

3. Data and methodology[4]

The question is whether any of these findings can be confirmed in the case of Czech society, whether in the Czech case marriage and cohabitation also differ with respect to financial solidarity, and whether cohabitation represents a union with fewer transfers between partners. Differences between marriage and cohabitation were tested on data from the survey 'Ten Years of Social Transformation' (TYST), conducted in 1999 by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (with 4744 respondents). The first part of the following empirical analysis briefly describes the distribution of cohabitation found in this survey, but the second part of the empirical analysis is the main focus, as it concentrates on the question of the relative financial contribution to the household and division of labour. I have employed log-linear modelling for the purpose of addressing this question.

In the survey, if the respondent indicated another member of the household as his/her partner and at the same time stated that he/she was married, the person was considered to be living in a marriage. If the respondent indicated another member of the household as his/her partner and at the same time stated that he/she was single, divorced, or widowed, the person was considered to be living in cohabitation. Respondents without partners were excluded from the analysis, which reduced the sample to 3104 respondents and their partners (or 3104 couples, of which 280 are living in cohabitation).

3.1 Distribution of the living arrangements - descriptive statistics

The TYST survey indicates that at present 6 per cent of the population[5] in the Czech Republic live in cohabitation; among people aged 30 and under the proportion may be es-

[4] This article is limited in that it cannot take into account the magnitude of the respective transfers, which would be necessary for creating a complete picture. It was possible to work with only a very rough indication of transfers and it is clear that their magnitude is also fundamental, but we are unable to say, for example, whether the transfers in marriage and cohabitation are on more or less the same level, or if the transfers in cohabitations are generally lower than those in marriage. Another limitation to the article is that it cannot take into consideration the duration of the union and how the economics of the household influence the probability that the cohabiting couple will enter marriage or that the union will be dissolved and how the probability of marriage influences the financial transfers among partners.

[5] According to the Family and Fertility Survey, roughly 7 % of women aged 15-44 were living in unmarried cohabitation.

Table 1. Percentage of respondents (men and women) living in non-married cohabitation (%)

Age group	Percentage of respondents in cohabitation
-20	4.5
20-24	10.2
25-29	10.9
30-34	6.8
35-39	4.2
40-44	5.1
45-49	3.3
50-59	4.6
60+	2.1

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation.*

Table 2. Percentage of women living in non-married cohabitation (%)

Age group	Percentage of women in non-married cohabitation
-20	11.2
20-24	10.1
25-29	8.3
30-34	8.2
35-39	5.4
40-44	5.0

Source: *Family and Fertility Survey.*

timated as up to 10 per cent (Table 1). However, the higher proportion of cohabitation among young people aged 25 and under is mainly due to the fact that cohabitation serves as a premarital 'test'. These results correspond with findings from the Family and Fertility Survey data (Table 2). The ISSP 2001 indicates a somewhat higher rate of cohabitation for the population, at 10 per cent, and reports that the proportion of people aged 30 and under who are living in cohabitation is approximately 15 per cent.

3.2 Differences between marriage and cohabitation

A test was made of the basic hypothesis that there is a difference between marriage and cohabitation, and that these two partnership arrangements differ with respect to the degree of financial transfers occurring between partners. Specifically I have sought to determine whether there is a difference between these arrangements or whether cohabitation is simply an informal marriage that differs from a formal marriage only in legal terms: if cohabitation indeed represents a more egalitarian union with fewer transfers, this means that both partners will more often than in marriage contribute to the household in equal part,

Table 3. Economic activity of partners in marriage or in cohabitation

Economic activity		Marriage	Cohabitation
Inactive male, active female	abs.	25	10
	in %	**1.2**	**4.7**
Both active	abs.	1734	167
	in %	**80.9**	**78.8**
Active male, inactive female	abs.	384	35
	in %	**17.9**	**16.5**

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation 1999.*

Statistically significant differences at the level 0.00 (chi-square test of table homogeneity).

Table 4. 'Who in your household ensures the main income?'

Financial support in the household	Marriage		Cohabitation	
	abs.	in %	abs.	in %
Mostly the male	1346	48.2	105	37.8
More the male	363	13.0	43	15.5
Both	900	32.2	101	36.3
More the female	104	3.7	9	3.2
Mostly the female	57	2.0	20	7.2
Someone else	24	0.9	-	-
Total	2794	100.0	278	100.0

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation.*

Statistically significant differences at the level 0.00 (chi-square test of table homogeneity).

and if marriage is more benign towards financial transfers and represents a lower risk in respect to the financial setting, the division of labour within the marriage should be higher than in cohabitation.

Basic descriptive statistics confirm that differences in the division of labour between marriage and cohabitation do exist. Table 3 presents the simple ratio of economically active men and women in marriage and in cohabitation. While this is a rough indicator, even in these basic contours statistically significant differences between marriage and cohabitation appear, though not in the direction of greater egalitarianism but rather towards a model of an economically active woman and inactive man. The difference is small (a 3.5 per cent difference between marriage and cohabitation) but it represents an increase of more than 300 per cent. As we have a large sample, we can rely on a relatively narrow confidence interval and statistical tests, and may expect the difference to be non-random. If we take into consideration how the respondents evaluate the relative financial contribution to the running of the household (see Table 4) the results are even more pronounced.

This adds another interesting aspect to the subject. Oppenheimer and Nelson [1997], Clarberg [1999], and Blackwell and Lichter [2000] have presented the argument that co-

habitation represents an alternative partnership for couples in which the male partner is not sufficiently attractive from the economic viewpoint. Their view thus refers back to the socio-demographic differences between those who enter marriage and those who live in cohabitation. They do not expect that there should be intrinsic differences between marriage and cohabitation, but emphasise that different types of couples choose marriage and cohabitation. If entry into marriage is closely tied to the economic potential of the male as they claim, then cohabitation need not be more egalitarian, but should represent a type of union in which women more often hold the main economic responsibility for the household.

Descriptive statistics of course provide only a very rough picture of things, and it is clear that it is not possible to judge the relative contribution to the family budget only with regard to whether the couple lives in a marriage or in cohabitation. A significant role is played by the objective remunerative potential of the partners, especially with respect to education and educational homogamy, hypergamy or hypogamy. However, it is also likely that the meaning of cohabitation varies among different social groups. Cohabitation among people with higher education can represent a more egalitarian and 'modern' union, while among people with lower education it may be a living arrangement for couples where the man is economically unattractive. For this reason I have created a log-linear model that not only takes into consideration the absolute differences between marriage and cohabitation but also encompasses the education of both partners and the combination of the two.

Log-linear models

Owing to incomplete data on income I started out in the analyses with the question: 'Who in your household ensures the main financial income?' This question does not reflect only the earning potential of the partners but also their promptness in financially contributing to the household. This is especially important when trying to investigate willingness to invest in the partner. Owing to the size of the sample the original five-point scale needed to be re-coded into three basic categories (more the male, both together, more the female). For the same reason it was also necessary to decrease the number of educational categories, and only three basic levels are included in the analyses: without graduation, with graduation, post-secondary (i.e. university or other post-secondary). Also, 25 cases had to be left out owing to missing information on the education of one of the partners, and 79 cases owing to missing information on who secures the financial income of the household.[6]

The saturated model, which serves as the basis for the evaluations of the more parsimonious models, incorporates the interaction of a fourth order between cohabitation, relative contribution to the family budget, the education of the man and the education of

[6] In the table five fields have not been filled in (out of the total 81), and for this reason the sample was expanded by five fictitious couples (with a weight of 0.5).

Table 5. Overview of log-linear models used (with the variable *finan* - relative financial contribution to the running of the household)

Model	Effects used:	G	Df	P
Saturated model (includes all possible effects and interactions)	cohabitation*finan*edu_f*edu_m; + all effects of a lower class			
Model 1 (includes only interaction between the type of union and financial contribution)	cohabitation*finan; cohabitation, edu_f, edu_m, finan	1167.49	44	0.00
Model 2 (Model 1 + interaction between female education and financial contribution)	edu_f*finan, cohabitation*finan; cohabitation, edu_f, edu_m, finan	1143.18	40	0.00
Model 3 (Model 2 + interaction between male education and financial contribution)	edu_m*finan,edu_f*finan, cohabitation*finan; cohabitation, edu_f, edu_m, finan	1132.14	36	0.00
Model 4 (Model 3 + interaction between male and female education)	**edu_m*edu_f,edu_m*finan,edu_f*finan, cohabitation*finan; cohabitation, edu_f, edu_m, finan**	**22.37**	**32**	**.8972**

G - likelihood ratio chi-square, Df - degree of freedom, P - statistical significance
edu_m - education of the man, edu_f - education of the woman, finan - relative contribution to the family budget, cohabitation - living in a marriage or in cohabitation
Source: Ten Years of Social Transformation

the woman. I have chosen to include into all tested models the interaction between relative financial contribution to the family budget and type of the union since this is the question of main interest. The most parsimonious model, Model 1, assumes that the contribution to the family budget depends only on the type of partnership, while the other factors are independent, which would mean that the financial setting of the household depends only on the partnership arrangement and no other influence plays a role. Model 2 considers in addition the connection between the education of the woman and the contribution to the family budget, which would make sense if the earning potential of women were the key factor, without regard to the education level of the man. Model 3 adds the influence of the education of the man, which would mean that the financial contribution depends on the type of union, the education of the woman, and the education of the man. None of these three models is statistically acceptable (see Table 5).

Only Model 4, which also includes the educational homogamy of the couple, cannot on the basis of the chi-square and likelihood ratio test be rejected. This model takes into consideration the education of the man, the education of the woman, and whether they live in a marriage, and the impact of these factors on the relative contribution to the family bud-

Table 6. Expected count from Model 4 with the variable *finan* (relative financial contribution to the household)

type of cohabitation	relative financial contribution	education of the man	education of the woman		
			without grad.	with grad.	higher
marriage	more the male	without grad.	721.1	248.37	16.2
		with grad.	119.85	280.1	40.64
		higher	28.92	125.61	105.03
	both together	without grad.	403.25	130.34	16.04
		with grad.	60.63	132.98	36.39
		higher	9.36	38.14	60.14
	more the female	without grad.	55.48	33.24	5.91
		with grad.	7.62	30.97	12.25
		higher	0.61	4.6	10.49
non-married cohabitation	more the male	without grad.	61.61	21.22	1.38
		with grad.	10.24	23.93	3.47
		higher	2.47	10.37	8.97
	both together	without grad.	42.96	13.89	1.71
		with grad.	6.46	14.17	3.88
		higher	1.0	4.06	6.41
	more the female	without grad.	9.91	5.94	1.06
		with grad.	1.36	5.53	2.19
		higher	0.11	0.82	1.87

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation.*

get. The expected counts of Model 4 are presented in Table 6. The interaction of the higher order does not improve the model in any statistically significant way, which in other words means that the influence of the living arrangement does not vary among educational groups and the trends are the same for all three educational categories. This is an important finding as it means that cohabitation does not from the financial viewpoint represent a different type of union for people with different educational backgrounds. The claim that cohabitation may represent a 'modern egalitarian' type of union among the more educated, and a 'union with a financially unattractive man' among the less educated, is not supported in the data, and trends connected with cohabitation seem to be general. This does not mean that the concept of cohabitation is identical among well and less educated people; our data does however indicate that the financial arrangements do not differ.

Interpretation of the selected model

As we have now selected the model that fits the data, we can turn to the main question of whether there is any difference between marriage and cohabitation in the relative financial contribution to the family budget ('Who in your household ensures the main financial income?'), and if so, what the difference is. The expected counts and parameters estimates

Table 7. Parameter estimates from Model 4 with the variable *finan* (relative financial contribution to the household)

main effect and two-way effects			parameter estimate	Z-value	asymptotic 95% CI lower	upper
constant			2,1942			
marriage			2,46	28,34	2,29	2,63
female educ. - without grad.			-1,2829	-7,28	-1,64	-0,94
female educ. - grad.			0,1789	1,57	-0,04	0,4
male educ. - without grad.			-1,8689	-10,01	-2,23	-1,5
male educ. - grad.			-0,9495	-6,64	-1,23	-0,67
finan - more the woman			-1,5665	-4,92	-2,19	-0,94
finan - equall			-0,3369	-1,85	-0,69	0,02
female educ. - without grad.	*	male educ. - without grad.	5,0851	21,61	4,62	5,55
female educ. - without grad.	*	male educ. - grad.	2,3711	11,15	1,95	2,79
female educ.- grad.	*	male educ. - without grad.	2,5507	13,04	2,17	2,93
female educ. - grad	*	male educ. - grad.	1,7515	11,27	1,45	2,06
finan - more the woman	*	male educ. - without grad.	1,2961	4,25	0,7	1,89
finan - more the woman	*	male educ. - grad.	1,1053	3,73	0,52	1,69
finan - equally	*	male educ. - without grad.	0,5472	3,7	0,26	0,84
finan - equally	*	male educ. - grad.	0,447	3,06	0,16	0,73
finan - more the woman	*	female educ. - without grad.	-1,5567	-5,77	-2,09	-1,03
finan - more the woman	*	female educ. - grad.	-1,0033	-4,1	-1,48	-0,52
finan - equally	*	female educ. - without grad.	-0,5708	-3,61	-0,88	-0,26
finan - equally	*	female educ. - grad.	-0,6344	-4,27	-0,93	-0,34
finan - more the woman	*	marriage	-0,7376	-3,35	-1,17	-0,31
finan - equally	*	marriage	-0,2207	-1,59	-0,49	0,05

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation.*

from Model 4 confirm a difference. However, it is not egalitarianism that is typical for cohabitation; the odds that partners will equally contribute to the household budget do not differ according to the living arrangements (z-score=1.59). The data do not indicate that people in cohabitation are less willing to transfer financial resources to the partner because it is a riskier partnership arrangement that does not protect (financial) investments in the partner. Our main hypothesis regarding cohabitation has therefore not been confirmed.

However, living in cohabitation does increase the odds that the main contributor to the family budget is a woman. A simple odds ratio based on the expected counts is 1.93 (z-score: 3.35). This means that the chance that the woman will be the 'breadwinner' is nearly twice as high as for those living in cohabitation. Such a result strongly confirms the tendency that has already been revealed in the cross-tables and shows that cohabitation is often connected with a departure from the traditional family; the shift is not however in the direction of egalitarianism, but rather towards a larger number of female breadwinners.

We have already stated that trends connected with cohabitation do not differ among various educational groups. It is also true that education does not express itself differently

in marriage and cohabitation. In other words, educational attainments are connected with identical trends regardless of whether the person lives in marriage or cohabitation. Education behaves essentially according to expectations: men with a university (or post-secondary) degree have the highest odds of being the breadwinners in the family, and women with lower education have higher odds that they will be supported by men. The odds ratio of being the breadwinner for men with post-secondary education in comparison with men without high school is 1,39 (z-score: -4.25). This basically means that men with post-secondary education have a 40 per cent higher chance of being the breadwinner than men without high school. The probability of being the breadwinner in the case of men with post-secondary education, in comparison with high-school graduates, is 1,36 (z-score: -3.73).

The data thus indicate that cohabitation is really a departure from the family characterised by a traditional division of labour, and not necessarily in the direction of greater equality, but rather towards an arrangment in which the female is the breadwinner. This would seem to agree with the hypothesis that cohabitation is a type of union in which the male is economically less attractive (or is unwilling to contribute to the household) and consequently would seem to correspond more to the results of some foreign studies, e.g. those of Clarberg [1999] or Blackwell and Lichter [2000].

3.3 Trade-offs in the division of labour

The question that arises in this case is whether the shift towards a union with a female breadwinner also holds consequences for the division of labour in the household. Social exchange theories would indicate a positive answer to this question. I have therefore tested for differences leading either towards greater egalitarianism (neither of the partners is willing to invest more into labour in the household) or towards a hypothesis that some men compensate their lower financial contribution through a greater share in household chores. According to Blackwell and Lichter [2000] homogamy is the social norm in partner selection. If, however, the rule of homogamy is broken, it happens that people compensate a lack in one sphere by offering their partner upward mobility in another sphere.[7]

The models agree with those in the preceding section. The variable of relative financial contribution (*finan*) has however been replaced with the variable of who runs the household (*househ*),[8] and the original five-point scale has been re-coded into a three-point scale (more the male, both together, more the female). The first three models correspond to the first three from the previous section and again are not statistically acceptable. Only Model 4A, which adds the interaction between the education of the male and the female, is suitable (see Table 8).

[7] As a specific example they cite the combination of educational and racial hypergamie and hypogamie, in which people with a lower level of education substitute their relative 'insufficiency' with a higher status from the perspective of race.

[8] Also in this table five fields have not been filled in (out of the total 81), and for this reason the sample was expanded by five fictitious couples (with a weight of 0.5).

Table 8. Overview of log-linear models used (with the variable *househ* - the relative share in the running of the household)

Model	Effects used:	G	Df	P
Model 4A	**edu_m*edu_f,edu_m*househ,edu_f*household, cohabitation*household; cohabitation, edu_f, edu_m, household**	37.6764	32	0.2255
Model 5A	**edu_m*edu_f, cohabitation*household; cohabitation, edu_f, edu_m, household**	42.8680	40	0.3492
Model 6A	edu_m*edu_f,edu_m*household,edu_f*household, cohabitation, edu_f, edu_m, household	56.2111	34	0.0097

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation.*

Surprisingly, parameter estimates show no statistical significance between the division of the household chores and education. This conclusion is true for both the education of the male and the female. As the data indicate that education does not have any explanatory strength, in the next step the interaction between education and the division of labour has been removed (Model 5A). This model saves 8 degrees of freedom and and the statistical test shows that it fits the data even better. Model 6A uses an opposite perspective and eliminates the interaction between the running of the household and the living arrangement, but it includes the interaction between household responsibility and education. It therefore tests whether the difference between marriage and cohabitation is not based only on the different educational composition of the unions. However, it is not satisfactory from the point of view of the statistical test and therefore it may be concluded that the data do not reveal any connection between household chores and education. Model 4A and Model 5A could both be used for the interpretation since they both fit the data well, but I have chosen Model 4A because it corresponds to Model 4 used in the analyses on financial responsibility for the household.

Interpretation of the selected model

Even in this case, the data confirm a basic difference between the marriage and cohabitation: cohabitation appears to be slightly more egalitarian. The odds ratio that the division of household chores in cohabitation will be egalitarian is 1.26 (z-score 4.33). This means that the chance of sharing the household chores equally is around 26 percent higher for people living in cohabitation than for married people. However, the most profound difference is found in the odds that the man will be responsible for the running of the household (odds ratio is 2,63; z-score 4.33). No other interactions in the division of household responsibility were revealed in the interpreted models.

It should be added with regard to both models (Model 4 and Model 4A) interpreted here that these are relative differences between marriage and cohabitation. In no case then does this mean that among unmarried pairs the dominant type of couples are those

Table 9. Expected frequencies in Model 4A with the variable *household* (the relative share in the running of the household)

	who looks after the running of the household	education of the man	education of the woman: without grad.	with grad.	higher
marriage	more the male	without grad.	42.99	11.21	0.9
		with grad.	8.13	14.15	2.40
		higher	2.12	6.88	6.35
	both together	without grad.	325.07	117.91	12.39
		with grad.	53.05	128.45	28.56
		higher	9.77	44.06	53.21
	more the female	without grad.	817.93	286.03	25.33
		with grad.	128.11	299.06	56.05
		higher	26.31	114.40	116.49
cohabitation	more the male	without grad.	10.28	2.68	0.22
		with grad.	1.94	3.39	0.58
		higher	0.51	1.65	1.52
	both together	without grad.	36.86	13.37	1.40
		with grad.	6.02	14.57	3.24
		higher.	1.11	5.00	6.03
	more the female	without grad.	66.82	23.37	2.07
		with grad.	10.47	24.43	4.58
		higher	2.15	9.35	9.52

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation*.

in which the woman is the main breadwinner in the family and the man looks after the household. Analyses only show that among unmarried couples it occurs with somewhat greater frequency that the woman financially looks after the household and the man participates more in the housework. It must also be mentioned that these analyses were done on aggregate data.

Results and conclusion

In the previous analyses I tried to test a hypothesis that cohabitation and marriage are not identical from the point of social exchange, especially as regards financial transfers, division of labour and investments in specialised human capital. The hypothesis was that cohabitation does not protect investments as well as marriage and thus should lead to fewer finan-

Table 10. Parameter estimates from Model 4A with the variable *household* (the relative share in the running of the household)

main effect and two-way effects			parameter estimate	Z-value	asymptotic 95% CI lower	upper
constant			4,7578			
cohabitation			-2,5048	-29,76	-2,67	-2,34
female educ. - without grad.			-1,4878	-8,36	-1,84	-1,14
female educ. - grad.			-0,0180	-0,16	-0,24	0,21
male educ. - without grad.			-1,5257	-8,63	-1,87	-1,18
male educ. - grad.			-0,7314	-5,44	-1,00	-0,47
household - more the man			-2,9088	-9,14	-3,53	-2,28
household - equal			-0,7835	-5,87	-1,04	-0,52
female educ. - without grad.	*	male educ. - without grad.	4,9626	21,44	4,51	5,42
female educ. - without grad.	*	male educ. - grad.	2,3144	10,98	1,90	2,73
female educ. - grad.	*	male educ. - without grad.	2,4421	12,76	2,07	2,82
female educ. - grad	*	male educ. - grad.	1,6923	11,09	1,39	1,99
household - more the man	*	male educ. - without grad.	-0,4288	-1,32	-1,06	0,21
household - more the man	*	male educ. - grad.	-0,2401	-0,75	-0,87	0,39
household - equal	*	male educ. - without grad.	0,0679	0,47	-0,22	0,35
household - equal	*	male educ. - grad.	0,1090	0,75	-0,17	0,39
household - more the man	*	w - without grad.	0,3917	1,02	-0,60	1,15
household - more the man	*	w - grad.	0,0983	0,27	-0,61	0,81
household - equal	*	female educ. - without grad.	-0,2072	-1,31	-0,52	0,10
household - equal	*	female educ. - grad	-0,1706	-1,15	-0,46	0,12
household - more the man	*	cohabitation	1,0743	4,33	0,59	1,56
household - equal	*	cohabitation	0,3279	2,33	0,05	0,60

Source: *Ten Years of Social Transformation.*

cial transfers between the partners and less specialisation of roles. Specialisation requires security and the certainty that the contract will not be broken, especially if we are speaking of the long-term specialisation of human capital. Since cohabitation provides less legal security and less of a possibility to enforce the contract it can be expected that the partners will be less willing to invest in the relationship and in the capital that cannot be used in the labour market. Therefore, it could be expected that cohabitation would operate in a more egalitarian modus. This hypothesis was not confirmed by the data. Cohabitation does not appear to be more egalitarian than marriage with respect to the financial support of the household and financial transfers among the partners. However, data showed a significant difference among the marriage and cohabitation in the shift towards the female breadwinner. Cohabitation thus does seem to represent a departure from the traditional pattern, but more towards a female breadwinner than towards an egalitarian arrangement.

We cannot discern from the data whether the significant shift towards the female breadwinner is voluntary or involuntary, and we are also unable to say whether cohabitation is in such cases opted for by women, men or both. It could be expected that women

are less willing to marry men who are not able to support the family, and thus choose to live in cohabitation, as it is easier to dissolve the partnership should they meet a 'better match'. This would agree with the theories of Oppenheimer, Nelson, or Clarberg, and generally with Anglo-American research showing that cohabitation represents an alternative partnership for couples in which the male partner is not sufficiently attractive from the economic viewpoint. However, to make such a conclusion would not be apt since the data do not answer the questions of motivation and causality. It may also be possible that cohabitation in these cases is the choice of men who feel inadequate and expect that they should not marry until they are able to meet the societal expectations of being able to support their families. Advocates of cohabitation as the 'modern' way of life would also probably object to both these explanations and would present the argument that cohabitation is more often chosen by non-conformist couples who have made a decision to abandon the traditional pattern, both in the sense of the legal recognition of the union and in terms of gender roles. In such cases the shift towards the female breadwinner would be the voluntary and sought-after mode of organisation in the household.

It could be expected that the meaning of cohabitation would vary in different social strata and that the 'non-conformist' and 'economically less attractive male' theories might be applicable for different social groups. However, the data do not confirm this. It is not possible to conclude that among people with higher education cohabitation represents a more egalitarian and 'modern' union, while among people with lower education it may be a living arrangement for couples where the man is economically unattractive. There are no significant differences in trends connected with cohabitation among different educational groups in the data. This does not mean that the conceptual idea of cohabitation is identical for all educational groups, but the trends connected with the household economics of cohabitation are the same. Thus it cannot be said that cohabitation is an 'egalitarian' partnership among well-educated people.

Social exchange theories also predict that lower earning potential or less of a willingness to contribute to the household should be compensated in a different sphere. From the perspective of household economics the expectation is that this compensation should occur in the sphere of housework and that the lower relative financial benefit should be compensated by higher participation in household chores. The data did in fact confirm this expectation, and on the aggregate level the shift towards a female breadwinner in the arrangement of cohabitation was accompanied by a higher proportion of men taking the main responsibility for running the household. Again, how much this is a voluntary move and how much it is a result of on-going negotiations within the partnership cannot be said.

Significantly, alongside the higher proportion of men responsible for running the household, the data for cohabitation also indicated a shift towards egalitarianism. This would confirm our basic hypothesis about less investment and less specialisation within cohabitation. However, the shift towards egalitarianism is not as strong as the shift towards male responsibility for the household, and thus the increased presence of a 'non-traditional' female breadwinner in cohabitation is stronger than the increase in egalitarianism in the partnership.

DANA HAMPLOVÁ *graduated from the Faculty of Arts of Charles University with a degree in Sociology and Czech Linguistics and Literature. At present she is enrolled in post-graduate studies in Sociology at the same faculty. She works as a researcher at the Institute of Sociology of Academy of Sciences (Prague) and participates in the Globlife project of the University of Bamberg. Her main research interests are the sociology of the family and the sociology of religion.*

References

Axinn, W., A. Thornton 1992. "The Relationship Between Cohabitation and Divorce: Selectivity or Casual Influence?" *Demography* 29: 357-374.

Becker, G.S. 1993. *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press.

Berger, P. L., H. Kellner 1979. *Facing up to Modernity*. Harmondworth: Penguin Books.

Blackwell, D. L., D.T. Lichter 2000. "Mate Selection among Married and Cohabiting Couples". *Journal of Family Issues* Vol. 21 (3): 275-303.

Blau, P. 1964. *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. New York: Jon Wiley and Sons.

Blumstein, P., P. Schwartz 1983. *American Couples: Money, Work, and Sex*. New York: Morrow.

Brines, J., K. Joyner 1999. "The Ties That Bind: Principles of Cohesion in Cohabitation and Marriage". *American Sociological Review* 64: 333-355.

Brown, S., A. Booth 1996. "Cohabitation versus Marriage: A Comparison of Relationship Quality". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 5, 3: 668-679.

Bumpass, L. L., J. A. Sweet 1989. "National Estimates of Cohabitation". *Demography* 26: 615-625.

Carmichael, G. 1995. "Consensual Partnering in the More Developed Countries". *Journal of the Australian Population Association* 121: 51-86.

Clarberg, M. 1999. "The Price of Partnering: The Role of Economic Well-being in Young Adults' First Union Experiences". *Social Forces* 77, 3: 945-969.

DeMaris, A., W. MacDonald 1993. "Premarital Cohabitation and Marital Instability : A Test of the Unconventionality Hypothesis". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 55, 2: 399-408.

DeMaris, A., K.V. Rao 1992. "Premarital Cohabitation and Subsequent Marital Stability in the United States: A Reassessment". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 54, 1: 178-201.

De Santis, Livi Bacci. 2001. "Reflections on the Economics of the Fertility Decline in Europe". Euresco Conference, The Second Demographic Transition in Europe, Bad Herrenalb, Germany, 23-28 June 2001.

Hamplová, D., S. Pikálková, J. Rychtaříková 2001. "Diferenciace reprodukčního a rodinného chování v evropských populacích" ["Differentiation of Reproductive and Family Behaviour in the Populations of Europe"]. *Sociological Papers* 01:10, Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR.

Horwitz, A.V., White, H.R. 1998. "The Relationship of Cohabitation and Mental Health: A Study of a Young Adult Cohort". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 60, 2: 505-515

Kiernan, K. 2000. "European Perspectives on Union Formation". Pp. 54-78 in *The Ties that Bind. Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation*, edited by L.J. Waite. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Kučera, M. 1994. *Populace České republiky 1918-1991. (The Population of the Czech Republic 1918-1991).* Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR.

Manning W.D., D.T. Lichter 1996. "Parental Cohabitation and Children's Economic Well-being". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 58: 998-1010.

Oppenheimer, V. K., L. Nelson 1997. "Men's Career Development and Marriage Timing During a Period of Rising Inequality". *Demography* 34: 311-330.

Rabušic, L. 2001. *Kde ty všechny děti jsou? (Where Have All the Kids Gone?)* Praha: Sociologické nakladatelstvi.

Rabušic, L. 1996. "O současném vývoji manželského a rodinného chování v České republice" (On Current Developments in Marriage and Family Behaviour in the Czech Republic). *Demografie* 38, 3: 173-180.

Rindfuss, R.R., A. VandenHeuvel 1990. "Cohabitation: Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single?" *Population and Development Review* 16: 703-726.

Schoen R., Weinick, R. 1993. "Partner Choices in Marriage and Cohabitations". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 55: 408-414.

South, S.J., G. Spitze 1994. "Housework in Marital and Nonmarital Households". *American Sociological Review* 59, 327-347.

Stack, S., J.R. Eshleman 1998. "Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nations Study". *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 60, 2: 527-537.

Thomson, E., U. Collela 1992. "Cohabitation and Marital Stability: Quality or Commitment?" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 54, 2: 259-268

Vereš, P. 1991. "Několik úvah o současném a budoucím populačním vývoji" [Some Thoughts on the Present and Future Population Development]. *Demografie* 33, 2: 97-104.

The Disappointed and Disgruntled: A Study of the Return in the 1990s of Czech Emigrants from the Communist Era*

ZDENĚK R. NEŠPOR**
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Abstract: Any in-depth research on Czech emigration to the West in the communist era, and on the return of these emigrants in the 1990s, has until now been almost non-existent, although it could provide a deeper comprehension of present Czech society and its cultural values. The article provides a strong theoretical basis for this kind of study, which starts out from P. Berger's and T. Luckmann's theory of socialisation, and compares it with the socio-economic point of view, considered the most useful research method for this particular field. After a brief description of former developments, the article concentrates on a more detailed analysis of the recent process of the emigrants' return, which is described on the basis of qualitative biographical research. The author attempts to explain why the emigrants decided to return, including the factors of their prosperity abroad and their attitudes to modern capitalism and analyses the process of their (re-)integration into Czech society. The main conclusion is that economic and work characteristics have played the most important role in the decision, although some other factors (especially time) must also be taken into account. The emigrants who have returned to the Czech Republic have found above-average employment positions in the country. However, their social adaptation contrasts sharply with this prosperity, partly owing to the envy of other people, and partly as a result of the significant difference in attitudes towards individual-collective relations.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6: 789-808

In the light of Schütz's famous analogy of the sociologist as stranger [1944; see also 1945], it is clear that an important research field of qualitative sociology must be emigration studies. Regardless of contingent general agreement with the analogy, emigrants and those who return after emigrating, or re-emigrants, have special personal experience with two different social identities, two culturally settled value frameworks, and even two symbolic universes. They recall the cultural values and social roles of the former homeland society, but they must also adapt to new values and roles in a relatively short period of time. A differ-

* This research was supported by the internal grant no. Z7028912-2002 'Reemigrace zahraničních Čechů, především emigrantů z vyspělých zemí, do ČR v 90. letech 20. století' [Re-emigration of Czechs from Abroad, Especially Emigrants from Advanced Countries, to the Czech Republic in the 1990s] from the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. The funding is gratefully acknowledged.

** Direct all correspondence to: Zdeněk R. Nešpor, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, 110 00 Prague 1, e-mail: nespor@soc.cas.cz

ence in values, or even a struggle between two identities, is inevitable in this situation; the only solution is in the careful and usually rational evaluation and daily re-thinking of the cultural value basis. It is this rational understanding of the fundamental elements of culture, or at least the struggle towards it, that the emigrants are able to provide us with.

An historical opportunity is presented in the fact that the political and economic transformation of the Czech Republic after November 1989 has led to the return of many Czechs who used to live abroad.[1] A major specificity that contrasts with the experience of practically all other post-communist countries is that the migration flow from Western countries to the Czech Republic (and also Slovenia) in the 1990s is stronger than the flow in the other direction [see below; Hoenekopp 2000: 7-10]. This strong migration flow has in part been comprised of Westerners who have decided to live (mostly temporarily) in the Czech lands, but the majority is constituted by re-emigrants, i.e. people with double emigration experience in the mentioned sense.[2]

There are two main social groups of emigrant Czechs who have been part of the re-emigration process in the 1990s. The first group - about ten times smaller than the second but already the subject of study[3] - was comprised of Czechs from Romania and the former USSR, who had been unable to leave the location they were living in during the state-backed re-emigration that took place after the Second World War. The second group, one much larger but thus far almost entirely neglected by sociologists and anthropologists (with the exception of marginal references to the subject in two works: [Hrubý - Brouček 2000; Brouček et al. 2001]), is formed of Czechs who left Czechoslovakia during the communist era (1948-1989) and their descendants. There are some important differences between these two groups. Although only a certain part of the first type of re-emigration was backed by the state, it usually had a deep social basis and reflected the institutional structures of the emigrant groups. In contrast, the second type has been strictly individual in character. Another important difference lies in the fact that in the former case the re-emigration process affected all (or almost all) members of the Czech enclaves abroad, while in the latter case it has involved only a small minority. The research in this paper is dedicated to the second group.

1. A theoretical basis

When studying any kind of (re-)emigration process one must take into account the fact of societal change and the consequent shift in values among those involved; that is, one must study not only the specific causes and reasons for emigration (which often are, unfortunately, only postulated), but also and especially the personal value shifts that have oc-

[1] In Czech, the process is usually called 're-emigration'; I use the term of 're-emigrant' as a synonymum to a returnee.

[2] It seems to be true that this difference between the Czech Republic and all other post-communist countries is of a qualitative nature, and not only numerical, but this assumption must be sustained by wider comparative research in the future.

[3] See, for example, [Češi 1992; Secká 1993, 1996; Nešpor et al. 1999-2002].

curred and which are inevitable during the process. This general rule is of special importance in this case owing to the fact that the great majority of Czech re-emigrants of the 1990s have experienced two different value shifts - first during their emigration to the West, and second during their return to a Czech society which had changed during their absence, but which had also become idealised in their eyes.

1.1 Institutional areas of study

It is only theoretically possible to conduct any 'absolute' in-depth analysis of the differences in terms of cultural values and symbols between the homeland society and the society of the 'host' country, and between the idealised image of the homeland and current reality. Therefore, it is important to uncover the specific symbolic and institutional areas of value differences (*eo ipso* of later value shifts) relevant to the study, while others must be considered as only related or of no importance. I have identified certain areas of political and civic behaviour and economic and work relations that are the most important institutional spheres, and there are three reasons that led to their being designated as such.

First, in the selected spheres there existed a fundamental value and ideological difference between the Western and the so-called socialist societies, which has also affected all their related aspects (e.g. gender relations, job structures). Second, this very difference led to the subjective motivations for emigration and *ipso facto* created its most important value frame. Other differences, including family and kin relations, although not entirely marginal, played only a secondary role, except in the area of work and economic relations (i.e. 'kin jobs', the help of family and friends in the search for employment and in entrepreneurial activities, art as an area of employment in the case of artists etc.). Finally, the process of the political, economic, and social transformation of the Czech Republic after 1989 is the process in which the economic transition has been (at least rhetorically) favoured for so long that it modified and/or eliminated structural shifts in other areas.

For these reasons the re-emigrants to the Czech Republic, who are to some extent the bearers of three different cultural identities, are also able to provide deeper insight into the transition process and its prospective success. An evaluation of this kind must be rooted not only in common Czech social norms and values, but also in the past development of these norms and values, and in the mentality, norms, and values of the former host society. The study must concentrate primarily on the reciprocal influence of the economic, social, political, and legal spheres, including informal, semi-legal and illegal practices (the new business elite, networks, reciprocity, corruption etc.), and should focus on analysing personal values, which are the main motivation factors in social behaviour (including, for example, prejudices and attitudes to public and civic spheres, and their impact on work flexibility, risk-taking, creativity, competitiveness, self-reliance etc.).

Given the fundamental role of the economic and employment spheres, the subjective measure of prosperity[4] should be set as a key classification aspect. This prosperi-

[4] It is possible to set an objective measure of economic and work prosperity. However, this would be counterproductive due to the relative lack of data and to the fact the (re-)emigration is always

ty (u)[5] can be defined as the outcome of the mutual interaction of subjective personal economic and work factors and social and environmental factors, for which not only the difference from the postulated mean prosperity is important, but also the difference from the idealised maximum expected personal prosperity is of primary significance, regardless of the social, political, and economic context. In the case of subjective prosperity in socialist Czechoslovakia, two ideal contingencies of eventual emigration could be observed:

1. Achieved prosperity was higher than or equal to the maximum expected level ($u_a \geq i_a$) and had an anti-emigration influence; or
2. Achieved prosperity was less than the maximum expected level ($u_a < i_a$), which in certain cases was a pro-emigrational factor.

If the subject did then emigrate, his/her ensuing economic and employment development directed him/her into two other contingencies:

2a. Achieved prosperity was higher than or equal to the expected level ($u_b \geq i_b$), which led to self-satisfaction and the wish to stay in the host society; or

2b. Achieved prosperity was less than expected ($u_b < i_b$), which led to a yearning for change, either through a second migration or by returning to the homeland.[6]

With respect to the subjects' attitudes to potential re-emigration after 1989, and to the important social, political, and economic transformation within the homeland, the following consequences were observed:[7]

In the case of contingency 2a:

1. The subject decided to remain in emigration; or
2. The subject decided to re-emigrate
   a. owing to reasons outside the sphere of the subject's economic and employment situation; or
   b. owing to an expected increase in earnings in the economic and work spheres, or its equality in case of an earnings increase in other cultural spheres ($i_{a1} \geq u_b$).

---

voluntary, i.e. depends on the subjective assessment of prosperity. Conversely, it is important to say first that this assessment was not the only motivation factor in migration decisions, and second, its sociological and anthropological study must not proceed only from its 'emic' definition, but also from the 'ethic' evaluation, mediated by some kind of a 'thick description'; it is clear that later personal evaluations of one's own behaviour are quite different from the temporal ones.

[5] Index 'a' is used for the homeland society in the time of emigration, while 'a1' for the time of re-emigration, and 'b' for a host society, whose temporal change was *ipso facto* not visible to the participants (that is why I do not use index 'b1').

[6] The same factors (u_{a1} and i_{a1} relation) were (later) applied in the post-return adaptation to Czech society; this situation is clear enough so I will not schematise it extensively.

[7] This typology is made only on an idealised assumption of economic-work sphere domination; it takes no account of other important motivation factors (e.g. age of subject, kin relations, friendships, religious and some special-interest groups etc.).

Table 1. A typology of emigrants' attitudes to re-emigration according to the theory of social values and a socio-economic model - a comparison (stylisation)

	2a.1	2a.2.1	2a.2.2	2b.1	2b.2
Ia	++	--	--	++	-
Ib	-	+	+	--	++
Ic	-	++	+	-	++
IIa	--	+	+	--	++
IIb	++	--	--	++	-

Occurence: ++ high probability; + possible; - low probability; – impossible.

In the case of contingency 2b:

1. The subject decided to remain in emigration owing to reasons outside the sphere of the subject's economic and employment situation; or
2. The subject decided to re-emigrate, primarily owing to an expected earnings increase in the economic and work spheres, or its equality in case of an earnings increase in other cultural spheres ($i_{a1} \geq u_b$).

Both in the cases of re-emigration (2a.2.a and b; 2b.2) and in the cases of remaining in emigration (2a.1; 2b.1) it is possible to compare the voluntary decisions the subjects have made in this respect with a measure of the degree to which they had become integrated in the host society:[8]

I. The subject has been re-socialised and his/her personal identity has altered in the host society, which has led to the assumption of an attitude comparable to that of the so-called 'God's grandchildren', as conceptualised in the social psychology of religions [Holm 1998: 138-139]. The subject will then:
   I.a. deeply identify him/herself with a new identity (of the host country), and resist any temptation to re-emigrate; or
   I.b. attempt to live on the borderline between the old (Czech) and the new (host country) identities, but without any subjective satisfaction; or
   I.c. fully resume the old (Czech) identity, which has obviously become idealised.

II. The identity of the subject has only partially changed in the host society in the process of secondary socialisation (which means the new social values and roles exist only in relation to the old ones), which has led to a comparison of the symbolic universes and value frameworks of both societies. The subject will then:
   II.a. re-emigrate, i.e. accept the old (Czech) social values and roles, but with strong signs of having been integrated into the host society; or

[8] In this description I follow P. Berger's and T. Luckman's conception of socialisation [1966: chap. 3.1.) although with a certain shift: the authors defined the secondary socialisation just as an internalisation of institutionalised particular symbolic universes on the basis of the division of labour, while I use the term for any '*Überbau*' of primary socialisation.

II.b. refuse to return, i.e. remain in the new society, with its values, but with strong signs of having been previously socialised in the Czech society.

At this point it is possible to present a comparison of the possible consequences of both theoretical conceptions of re-emigration and subjective motivations (see Table 1).

1.2 Typology of re-emigrants

Out of this typology of motivation factors for eventual re-emigration, which is based on socio-economics and the theory of social values, the following possible (ideal) types of emigrant behaviour in relation to re-emigration can be defined:

The *radical new-settler* is a person who has come to fully identify with the host society, who has been re-socialised there and has fully accepted the new cultural values. The new-settler has completely forgotten (or at least has tried to) his/her 'former homeland' and his/her evaluation of the new society is 'holier than Thou' in character. This type of emigrant rejects any prospective return regardless of personal, economic and work success; in some rather exceptional cases re-emigration may occur, but only for economic reasons (pressure from an employer, strong positive incentives, i.e. property restitution etc.).

The *uncertain fluctuant* is a person who has been re-socialised in the host society, but owing to structural changes in the homeland, the outcome of this process has been weakened in favour of the former (usually idealised) identity. This situation has led to strong internal pressure, which the emigrant tries to deal with either in one of the two societies or through a fast switch between the two societies, but with no real consciousness of any subjective satisfaction. In the case of economic success in the host society, the possibilities of staying or returning are almost equal, although returning is slightly more probable owing to a strong sense of self-confidence on the part of this person; in the other case re-emigration is also highly probable.

The *radical patriot* is a person who has been re-socialised into the host society, but structural changes in the homeland have radically negated the results of the process. The person maintains an idealised view of the old-and-new homeland and tries to 'help' it as much as possible, though this sometimes leads to a value clash with the majority of the homeland population. In the case of economic success in the host country, re-emigration is highly probable (its motivation factors lie in areas outside the sphere of economics, though re-emigration is inevitably connected with a struggle for the valorisation of property of foreign origin, including human property), as in the other case, although in this situation re-emigration should be a shield from feelings of personal faults.

The *diligent re-emigrant* is a person who has been secondarily socialised (but not re-socialised) in the host society, and who has always compared the cultural values of both societies. Consequently, this person is regarded as being discontented and is viewed as a complainer by his/her neighbours. The diligent re-emigrant returns *ex definitione,* regardless of how successful he or she has been in the host country; this type is nonetheless more common among emigrants who are dissatisfied economically and in terms of work. How-

ever, their socialisation into Czech society is not easy owing to their reserved character and even shyness.

The *diligent immigrant* is just the opposite of the previous type. Neighbours in the host society regard this person purely as an immigrant and unable to integrate into the society, even though to some extent s/he does try. The second generation of the diligent immigrants usually no longer have such problems and are fully socialised in the 'new' society. Emigrants of this type do not return to the 'old homeland', and if in exceptional cases they do, it is for economic reasons (as in the case of the radical new-settlers).

2. Research methodology

The value attitudes of Czech, Western re-emigrants of the 1990s, and the influence of these attitudes on their social behaviour, are the subject of a qualitative sociological study that began in April 2002 within the framework of a research programme of the Department of Economic Sociology of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences. The following parts of this paper present the first results of the research.

2.1 Research methods

The theoretical and methodological background of the research lies primarily in economic sociology, social anthropology, and the sociology of knowledge. The essential research method is a combination of historical, biographical, sociological, and anthropological analysis, i.e. a qualitative analysis of subjective biographical narratives and other relevant data sources, in order to better understand the 'value background' of Czech re-emigration and its developments at the end of the 20th century.

2.2 Data acquisition

For the purpose of acquiring data two main techniques were used: open (non-standardised) in-depth interviews, and written-source analysis. The latter proceeds from an analysis of many published and unpublished autobiographical works of emigrants or re-emigrants, including their attempts at making a professional historical and sociological analysis. As the authors themselves have been much affected by a change in values as a consequence of their migration, their analysis is obviously biased. The studies of Pavel Tigrid [1990] and Jan Filipek [1999], although among the most valuable examples of such sources, are good examples of this point, as are other works, for instance, by the historian Bořivoj Čelovský, the singers Jaroslav Hutka and Karel Kryl, the physicist František Janouch, the reverend (and new MP) Svatopluk Karásek, the publicist Jožka Pejskar, the anthropologists Ladislav Holý and Petr Skalník, the physician Karel Steinbach, the economist and politician Ota Šik, and others.

Written sources, along with the interviews, which I will discuss further on, are used

to provide biographical data and statements on six main topics: (1) *emigration analysis* - the timing of emigration, its contextual and biographical situation, subjective motivation and aims, the course it took in reality, economic assets, work, qualification assets, social integration into the host society etc.; (2) *re-emigration analysis* - the same questions, but applied to re-emigration, the subjective assessment of relations to the society and vice versa, and the means of (re-)socialisation, including the influence of different social groups etc.; (3) *analysis of the subjective evaluation of Czech society* - the persistence of communist power structures and social mechanisms, new elites, lobbies, social networks and how they work in all kinds of institutional spheres, political and civic involvement of the societal majority, the relation between business and politics etc.; (4) *analysis of personal development in economic and work areas* - changes in these areas during and due to migrations, social networks, the subjective evaluation of the Czech social environment (area of work, ways of working, responsibility, risk-taking, creativity, mobility, flexibility, self-exploitation, corruption and other illegal practices, the validity of informal agreements, interpersonal relations, attitudes to money, wealth, voluntary activities etc); (5) *analysis of kin and social relations* - including their value background, and the questions of raising children and education; (6) *general information* - a subjective characterisation according to ascribed and acquired qualities, the verification of data through a comparison of statements and cross-question analysis etc.

2.3 The construction of the research group

The most important method of data acquisition is the open (non-standardised) in-depth interview conducted with the re-emigrants. However, the construction of the group to be studied is complicated for several reasons. There is no (available) central register of re-emigrants, and the emigrants in general harbour suspicions towards the police and the state. Another problem is the relative heterogeneity of the population of re-emigrants, and their dispersion throughout the Czech Republic (although Prague hosts most of them; Hrubý-Brouček 2000: 28]. For these reasons I have used the snowball technique of research group construction, and occasionally also a purposeful selection of firms which typically employ re-emigrants.

The validity and reliability of the research lies in the sufficiently heterogeneous nature of the population; Western re-emigrants do not form large groups (each of them has usually only two or three friends with similar experiences), while they usually know more re-emigrants (but not friends) on other grounds (former schoolmates and peers, people with similar special interests, co-workers etc.). For this reason, the sampling has no systematic error. In addition, the response rate so far has been 100 per cent.

An extension of the field is planned for the near future, which will also include the majority of emigrants - i.e. those who refused to return to the Czech Republic in the 1990s, or returned, but later left again (usually to their former host societies) - and a reference group of the re-emigrants' neighbours, co-workers, friends, relatives etc.

3. Historical and social backgrounds

The Czech lands have experienced many political, religious, and economic migration waves from the end of the Middle Ages up to the present time. These have included the emigration of the Czech non-Catholics during the period of re-catholicisation, the immigration of Germans up until the 18th century, Czech economic emigration to the USA and some other countries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and other migration waves. Generally speaking, Czech emigrants usually settled successfully in the host countries and after a time, usually with the second generation, they lost their relationship to their homeland country and their relatives. However, some of the emigrants came to constitute ethnically based groups and social structures in the host countries; groups which endured over time and occasionally played an important role in the relationship to Czech society and to later emigrants.

3.1 Former Czech emigration and its relationship to emigrants of the communist era

The lands that comprise the Czech Republic today produced in the past, like other European countries in the late 19th and the early 20th century, large emigration waves that moved in the direction of the United States and other countries, motivated by the public perception of there being greater opportunities for personal development elsewhere. Although Czech emigrants formed strong social networks and organisations based on ethnicity, religion, work, and special interests in the period before 1939 [Chada 1981; Filipek 1999], these organisations operated only on an institutional, 'folkloric' basis. The relations between the relatively strong Czech community in the USA and the homeland were quite poor, as were the genuine, reciprocal ties within the group owing to the more or less wholesale adoption of the social and cultural norms of the host country. Their 'Czech national awareness' played only a marginal role. For this reason, the great majority of the Western-based Czechs, in contrast to the ones based in Eastern Europe [Češi 1992: 52], rejected the re-emigration calls that went out at the end of both world wars. When they wanted to help the old homeland, they did so by providing some professional advice or through financial support. In fact, they felt themselves to be primarily American or French etc., and not as members of a 'great Czech nation', in L. Holý's [1996] sense.

Given the fact that the first emigrants during the communist era, i.e. politicians, businessmen and civil servants, fled the country because of the political changes and usually expected an early change in the political map of Europe, their relationships to the emigrants who had preceded them (and who had 'betrayed the nation' through their lack of interest) were quite poor and/or even hostile.

3.2 The extent and structure of communist era emigration

Emigrants during the communist era wanted to escape communism for a number of different reasons; politicians and public officials feared the possibility of being persecuted, as

did businessmen, who in addition were unable to engage in entrepreneurial activities. All the emigrants had a strong sense of a lack of opportunities for personal and professional progress. On the other hand, there were important differences among them, which led to the deep fragmentation of the Czech emigrant community and to the above-mentioned mutual hostility.

Pavel Tigrid [1990: 55, 92] and other authors divided this emigration into two different waves; the first one was the so-called 'February 1948 emigration', which started just after the communist take-over and continued up until the Prague Spring of 1968. This migration wave resulted from strong opposition to the communists, whereas the next wave, the 'August 1968 emigration' was to a large extent comprised of the former Communist Party members or regime supporters of the 1950s and 1960s. Members of the latter emigration wave, which continued up until 1989, were either communist reformers who became the object of persecutions in the 'normalisation' period, or professionals who felt discriminated against by the communist personal and professional politics and who expected positive personal, social, and financial progress in the West. The last type of emigrants can be considered to be economic migrants, quite similar to those who had migrated much earlier in the pre-war period [Filipek 1999: 23]. In conjunction with the need for help among the August 1968 emigrants, this similarity led to the formation of positive relations among the members of these two groups, and to their opposition to earlier post-war emigrants [ibid.: 23; Tigrid 1990: 102-103].

The size of the February 1948 emigration wave is usually estimated at about 60 000 people [Tigrid 1990: 43; Filipek 1990: 13], while the August 1968 emigration was two or three times larger. It could include from 100 000 [Tigrid 1990: 92] to some 200 000 people [Hrubý-Brouček 2000: 27]. There are also important differences between the selected host countries: the earlier groups of emigrants wanted to go to the USA, and after some peripeteias the majority of them indeed succeeded in doing so [Filipek 1999: 20, 56], whereas the August 1968 emigrants usually stayed in Western Europe. The USA, Australia, and other overseas destinations became popular (or, due to immigration laws, in some cases the only possibility) again in the 1980s.

In general, one may also see the distinction between the two later emigration waves in the opinions emigrants had about integration into the host societies. The February 1948 migrants formed certain political and civic organisations in the host societies aimed at maintaining Czech national feeling, which were similar but until the 1960s usually parallel to (i.e. separate from) the organisations of their pre-war fellow-countrymen in the host society. However, these social groups did not constitute any kind of ethnic economy [Light-Karegeorgis 1994], they functioned only as structures for the preservation of folklore. The work, economic, social, cultural, and political values of the Czech February 1948 emigrants became 'Americanised' in a relatively short time - usually by the second generation - so that their 'Czech origins' served merely as a thin label of sentimental memories, in some circles adjusted by a deliberate cultivation of archaic rituals and the Czech language, along with a nostalgic longing for the revival of the Czech pre-war democracy. But such circles, usually connected with political parties in exile, were in fact quite marginal.

Whereas the post-war emigration did not want to assimilate but in fact had to do so, the majority of the August 1968 migrants represented a different case. They usually wished for a rapid integration into the host societies, even though in some cases they also formed Czech emigrant groups or joined the existing ones. These organisations and informal social networks helped them fundamentally in the sphere of work, while most of them lost any interest in developments in Czechoslovakia and worked only on their own social integration [Brouček et al. 2001: 34-35].

3.3 Possibilities for re-emigration

A small number of Czech emigrants decided to return to communist Czechoslovakia even before 1989, usually due to a combination of homesickness and personal economic and employment failure in the West. Their fate was usually bad, and although many of them took advantage of presidential amnesties to move back, some were imprisoned immediately [Koudelka et al. 1993: 20], while others were forced to make humiliating self-

Table 2. Immigration to Czechoslovakia (until 1992) and the Czech Republic from selected countries

Country of origin	persons	per cent
Australia	1 657	4.7
Austria	2 491	7.1
Belgium	287	0.8
Brazil	18	0.1
Canada	3 598	10.2
Denmark	98	0.3
Finland	28	0.1
France	722	2.0
Germany*	14 043	40.0
Greece	887	2.5
Italy	1 370	3.9
Izrael	130	0.4
Netherlands	536	1.0
Norway	52	0.2
South Africa	254	0.7
Spain	130	0.4
Sweden	727	2.1
Switzerland	2 992	8.5
UK	1 184	3.4
USA	3 959	11.3
Total	*35 144*	*100*

Source: *Czech Statistical Yearbooks 1991-2001, author's calculation.*

* Until 1990 without former East Germany.

critical declarations and to ideologically condemn emigrants [Filipek 1999: 81-83]. It is consequently of no surprise that the number of those who followed them back was very small.

But even after 1989 only a small portion of the emigrants have returned to the Czech Republic. No exact figures on the number of re-emigrants are available; estimations can only be based on some statistical data relating to international migrations (see Table 2). There were at least 35 000 immigrants to the Czech Republic from the West in the period of 1989-2000, over 75 per cent of whom were from Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the USA (the countries with the highest numbers of Czech emigrants). It is commonly assumed that the majority of the immigrants were re-emigrants [Hoenekopp 2000: 7]. But even if all these immigrants were re-emigrants, this is still only a small part (13-22 per cent according to different estimations) of the total number of emigrants from the communist era. In most cases the emigrants had already become assimilated into the Western societies, and thus usually did not want to disrupt their personal, family, economic, and work relations in the new society [Filipek 1999: 134; Hrubý - Brouček 2000: 104].[9]

One can also clearly understand that re-emigration is much more attractive or even possible for relatively recent migrants than for the large majority of the post-February emigrants. Although some of them, mostly associated with exile political structures (the best example of which is Pavel Tigrid, who became the Minister of Culture after his return), have returned to the Czech Republic, re-emigration from the West in the 1990s has been comprised mostly of the August 1968 emigrants, and even by later members of that wave.

4. The western emigrants' return in the 1990s

As mentioned above, the pilot study included 20 respondents who live in Prague or in its suburbs. The gender structure of the group (16 men, 4 women) corresponded to the assumed structure of emigrants [Hrubý-Brouček 2000: 28], and also reflected the higher integration of women into the host society, due to their family and social relations. In general, women usually return only in couples/families, while many male emigrants return alone or soon after a divorce.[10] The former host countries of the respondents are the USA (50 per cent of cases), Great Britain (20 per cent), Australia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany (with a secondary migration to Austria); all of the re-emigrants were members of the August 1968 emigration wave who had been abroad for 4 to 26 years.

[9] In some cases an important factor is the ambivalent perception of themselves and/or the hostility of the Czech majority, along with the unhelpful attitude of the Czech government (refusal of dual citizenship till 1999, negative support for the emigrants' struggle for property restitution, etc.). Holý 1996: 66-69.

[10] At the time of return (or due to the impact of returning) some two-thirds of male returnees of the group were divorced. Most of them responded that searching for a new life-partner had been among their re-emigration motives (3 of them have already married again).

4.1 Reasons for emigration, anticipations, and host-society integration

There were usually a variety of quite different reasons for emigration cited by the respondents; in the case of emigrants who left Czechoslovakia soon after August 1968, the reasons included religious faith, interpersonal relations ('everyone left at the same time ... and my friends needed someone who spoke English', one respondent said), but even pure individualism, which led to a strong 'Western yearning' at any cost. All these emigrants were granted political asylum within a short period of time[11] and contacted existing Czech organisations in the host country. With the help of these kinds of networks (and in Europe also with the help of the executive of the host country) they acquired their first job, a place to stay, and other necessary assistance. Not wanting to be limited to these opportunities alone, the emigrants therefore tried to become independent as soon as possible, especially in the sphere of work and social relations. On the other hand, emigration usually led to a considerable decline in the emigrants' social status. An important reason for this was their education, as in contrast with the later emigrants they usually had only elementary or secondary levels of education in Czechoslovakia, which was incomparable to Western education. In addition, they did not wish to be integrated fully into the host society, and with the exception of the two above-mentioned areas, they maintained strong inter-emigrant relations, while their relationship with the February 1948 emigrants was difficult. Most of them were diligent immigrants who lived in ethnically endogamous marriages, educated their children not only in the host country values but also in the above-mentioned Czech folklore. Consequently, a significant number of the second generation returned to the Czech Republic in the 1990s or could currently be characterised as uncertain fluctuants.

Emigrants of the 1970s formed a different group. The reasons that led them to emigrate were mostly based on their disappointment with the Czech political situation, especially with the onset of 'normalisation', stagnation and even denunciation in civic activities, and widespread persecution of dissent. Unsurprisingly, this emigration wave was comprised mostly of artists, musicians and others engaged in similar professions, who were able also to later obtain positions in their professional field abroad. These were exceptional individuals, which is evident in the fact that, although at the beginning they also received help from Czech emigrant networks, they left them quite soon, and eventually acquired an above-average status. But this did not necessarily lead to their full satisfaction either. Given their exceptional characters, emigrants of this kind were not able to accept the standard values of the host country or those of the emigrant groups and they remained voluntarily alone (a situation they found themselves in both prior to emigration and after re-emigration).

The emigrants of the 1980s included the group of politically motivated migrants of the 1970s who had been unable to leave Czechoslovakia earlier. But much more often the emigrants during this period were motivated by economic reasons, or reasons of personal and professional development. A number of these emigrants had worked as programmers

[11] The only problem was that they usually wanted to get to the USA, which was difficult at the end of the 1960s; one respondent solved this by transitory emigration to Canada, another by marriage.

or other highly educated professionals, with direct personal contacts in the West, which later helped them considerably during their integration into the host society. These emigrants had usually prepared their departure long in advance (studying the language, professional know-how, social relations etc.). But once they had crossed the border the situation was not as good as they had imagined it to be: they had to stay in refugee camps for several months or even years; nobody was waiting for them with open arms. They had to accept inferior occupations, at least temporarily, and most of them tried to change the situation as quickly as possible. In some cases they studied at universities for a second time (most of the emigrants of the 1980s were university educated). In contrast with the Czech post-war emigrants, who usually became members of the lower class, these people were pure *homines novi*, who integrated into the host society quickly and even acquired an above-average status. Similarly, it is of significance that most of the re-emigration in the case of this group was due to the wishes of the emigrants' employers, or in response to the opportunity to obtain an increase in earnings. The most common kind of re-emigration attitude traced among this group[12] was that of the radical new-settler (with *ipso facto* zero concern for returning home).

4.2 Reasons for re-emigration and anticipations

A general overview of re-emigration is presented in Table 3, which divides the re-emigrants according to the period of their emigration.

The majority of the emigrants of the 1960s and 1970s never fully accepted the cultural values of the host societies, which contributed to their decision to return after November 1989. After crossing the border again, albeit in the opposite direction, they tried to re-establish broken social relations. This effort was usually successful only on the level of kin relations, and sometimes also with neighbours (although only a small number of re-emigrants actually returned to the same place of residence), but not usually in employment-related spheres. This was due to the different historical experience of the re-emigrants and the majority of the population, and also to negative feelings felt by the majority towards re-emigrants.

In spite of the fact that they tried to assimilate into a different society, the situation of the re-emigrants who emigrated in the 1980s was quite different. They have usually become easily integrated back into the Czech society given their relatively short period of absence.

One-half of the re-emigrants in the sample had hoped for positive changes to occur in their economic and professional status as a result of their re-emigration. Most of them were indeed successful (70 per cent), and in several cases even far beyond their expectations. But not all the re-emigrants were so lucky: five (25 per cent) have felt failure as they obtained the same (only the same!) position as abroad. The re-emigrants who had expect-

[12] The relatively high level of their re-emigration does not deny this finding; it is due to the effect of time. As I mentioned above, in many cases also economic or work causes played an important role.

Table 3. Frequency of types of reemigration behaviour among the respondents

Type	frequency 1968-1969	frequency 1970-1979	frequency 1980-1989	Total
radical new-settler	0	0	4	4
uncertain fluctuant	3	1	0	4
radical patriot	1	0	0	1
diligent reemigrant	3	4	2	9
diligent immigrant	0	1	1	2
Total	*7*	*6*	*7*	*20*

ed no changes in this sphere, or who had not thought about it given that they had different reasons for returning, were positively surprised, and most of them (75 per cent) have found a better position, primarily owing to their knowledge of foreign languages and their professional experience. Especially right after 1989 their only advantage was their language (usually English) skills, which in many cases led to them being enviously evaluated negatively by other people. Among the re-emigrants we can find translators, physicians, musicians, ministers, and especially high-positioned bank managers, and rich entrepreneurs.

Society's adoption of the re-emigrants contrasts sharply with their prosperity. Almost nobody was interested in any deeper information on their Western economic and work know-how, and if someone were it was due to their position in the firm hierarchy. Conversely, the re-emigrants arrived with the conviction that they could become the best practitioners or even the opinion leaders in the economic sphere (and sometimes also in politics), and consequently they felt that they had been double-crossed. They had similar feelings of dissatisfaction with respect to the work ethic and the habits of their Czech partners, collaborators, and civil servants. All of them have repeatedly complained of poor work attitudes, non-observance of informal agreements, poor risk-taking abilities, and little real team work, and of deep individualism in the material sense, dysfunctional social net-working, corruption, and distrust in practically all areas. Some respondents who work in international or foreign firms believe things are improving, while those who have to collaborate with the state administration disagree. In their view, the situation is a result of the persistent influence of the communist regime on ethics. However, the re-emigrants from the USA emphasise that similar problems (though to a lesser degree) are also evident in Western Europe, typically among their Austrians partners.

Whereas many re-emigrants came to the Czech Republic with the conviction that they intended to help the country, they have not only met with a lack of interest, but also with the clearly negative reaction of the majority. Their former contacts did not help them either, with the exception of family and close friends (and sometimes also relations on a religious basis); in some cases they were even counterproductive. Above all, it was the aversion of the majority to any adjustment to Western, and especially American standards of work and economic behaviour that have led to this negativity. The only area of adjustment seen by the respondents is in the area of consumption.

Given the limited size of the group of respondents there are some questions that could not be solved here, but I would at least like to mention that the return of some emigrants was in fact a flight from the current (Anglo)-American flexible capitalism and its negative externalities, which are described by R. Sennett [1998]. The majority of the re-emigrants from the USA and the United Kingdom (57 per cent) used to work under flexible conditions. It is quite clear that for most of them their return led to a decrease in this kind of work flexibility; any other development was a consequence of their decisions usually accompanied by a considerable increase in their status. One can conclude that re-emigration was in some cases a personal defence against the new capitalism and a struggle for a better job, although these were not the only reasons for return.

Now I would like to discuss some important differences in values that exist between the re-emigrants and the Czech majority.

4.3 Fundamental individualism vs. consumption individualism

Clearly the most important difference in values lies in the attitudes towards relations between the individual and the collective, which affect all institutional spheres. The attitude of the re-emigrants, which has its origin in their personal experience and also in Western social values, can be called 'fundamental individualism'. It is a conviction that any social group, regardless of its size, is primarily a collection of its members, who maintain a certain kind of social behaviour. The group is characterised by this behaviour and by it alone, while this behaviour also determines the position of the person in the social hierarchy. According to this conviction, nothing comes 'for free', and everything that is done by someone else needs to be paid for. A typical example is a statement made by the singer Karel Kryl, that 'except for a scholarship, which I later paid off, I got nothing for free. *I owe no [German] Mark to the German state.* And I am proud of this fact'.

On the other hand, if any social behaviour is a cause of status differences, it is also their result and manifestation. As a result of this statement, which *ipso facto* stems from their fundamental individualism, many of the re-emigrants were accused of showing off, even though this kind of individualism certainly did not indicate a lack of interest in civic and public affairs. In fact, the very opposite was true, because as mentioned above, the majority of the re-emigrants came back with the hope of helping Czech society and they later took part in many civic and/or cultural activities. However, they wanted some 'payment' for this activity, at least in the form of social acceptance. Whereas especially the 1960s and 1970s emigrants felt a 'great, incommunicable homesickness', they felt it to be their own affair and did not expect any 'compensation'. On the other hand, they did expect positive adoption and collective work in setting up local, interest, national, etc. communities, which would lead to the benefit of everyone.

According to the re-emigrants, the perception the majority has of the relations between the individual and the collective is fundamentally different from their own. Whereas they sometimes also refer to it as 'individualistic', it is in a pejorative sense [Brouček et al. 2001: 44]. It should be called 'consumption individualism', given that those who partake

of it endeavour to obtain the maximum from the collective for their own (or their families') consumption, and with no payment. In the words of L. Holý [1996: 24, 17-27], which describe the situation under communist rule but are still valid afterward: "charity [and moral behaviour] ... did not begin at home, it ended there". For example, the attitude of the majority to corruption can be seen as fundamentally positive according to the slogan 'all of us stole [during the communist period], so they [the new elites] may steal now'.

Consumption individualism also affects status demonstration. The Czech majority, unlike the re-emigrants, try to maintain a false egalitarian appearance, conceal their own achievements, or give the consumption free run, in the sense of Veblen's demonstrative consumption [1899: chap. 4.]. The same difference can be found also in relation to property, which is often seen by the re-emigrants as a Weberian 'calling'. For example, it is difficult for them to comprehend the lack of maintenance devoted to houses and roads during the communist era, as is the present way of dealing with some of the property returned in restitution when it is used for direct consumption, sometimes demonstratively, and with no care for the future. This way of using property seems also to influence its acquisition: "many of the Czechs whom I have to deal with in my business", says the Dutch husband of one re-emigrant, "do not have any experience with business, they just want to become rich, even through fraud ... They do not understand that a good name and reliability are the basis of business" [Brouček et al. 2001: 42].

After entering the Czech social environment, re-emigrants were usually surprised by the poor observance of informal agreements [Brouček et al. 2001: 43], and by the consequent mistrust and formalism of (mainly administrative) actions. They met with this at every step - from frequent certification of personal identity to written conclusions for all agreements and strong demands for formal work qualifications. One typical example of this behaviour is that of a university professor, a former translator of one American best-seller, who has obstructed the recent publication of its new translation, as the translator (a re-emigrant) is not a university graduate; or the case of judge E. Wagnerová, whose appointment as the Supreme Court member was obstructed by former prime minister, Václav Klaus, because she had earlier worked as a dentist for one year (!) during her emigration period [Navara-Wagnerová 2002]. In both cases, the problem was of course the interpersonal competitive fight, but even the possibility of this kind of argumentation existing is significant.

This formalism and consumption individualism, based on a collectivistic understanding of the nation [Holý 1996: 61-65], leads to a relatively low level of self-esteem among the Czechs, which is compensated through the envy directed at the re-emigrants. All of them, and especially the USA re-emigrants, think that high self-esteem is the necessary condition for success in work. 'When you do something, you do it in the best possible way. This is what I have learned in the States', says one re-emigrant, who without any former education became an art designer and later a movie director there. Usual Czech behaviour is just the opposite.

5. In conclusion: cultural values in the re-emigration process

The topic of Czech (re-)emigration studies, which I have briefly introduced in this paper, would seem to be very important for sociological research; it reveals some highly interesting findings not only on the nature and reasons for migration, but also on contemporary Czech society, and its comparison with Western societies, whose (usually idealised) level of development most Czechs want to achieve. While the direct comparison is often not very convincing as it reveals rather cultural distance or even divergence, some conditional cross-country comparisons can still be quite revealing.

As discussed above, the key interpretational scheme of a value struggle between Western re-emigrants and the Czech majority, which affect all other institutional spheres, is the different concept of individualism and its relation to collective entities. While the Czech population still inclines towards the older collectivistic concept of the nation, and its relations to institutions have emerged out of consumption individualism, as a result of their Western experience the re-emigrants have come up with liberal fundamental individualism, which is eventually more beneficial. The former leads to selfishness, and to the 'to have' life-attitude of E. Fromm's concept [1976], while the latter positively changes society by changing individuals and leads to a deepening of moral dimensions (the 'to be' attitude). The emigrants' flight from flexibility can also be seen as an escape from the corrosion of their character, which can be brought about by some forms of modern capitalism. The other reasons for returning included traditional liberal values, admiration for the 'velvet revolution', and the will to participate in the structural change of Czech society, while private benefits were usually also a factor. The social attitudes of the Czech majority are in sharp contrast (to those of the re-emigrants). Although they have temporarily (and mostly only rhetorically) accepted liberal values, in fact they have preserved their consumption individualism, which respects only private, familial, or other narrow interests.

On the other hand, it is clear that the re-emigrants form only a small minority of all emigrants. While the February 1948 emigrants have for the most part not returned, given the passage of more time and the presence of established social links, a significant part of the August 1968 emigrants, who left the country for economic and professional reasons, have become the radical new-settlers in their host countries and there are no incentives for them to return. People of this kind, as well as uncertain fluctuants and diligent immigrants who feel their economic and labour dependence in the host countries, formed a large majority of this (1968) emigration wave. Only a small part have returned, and these are either the radical patriots, who ostentatively parade Czech cultural champions, or (more frequently) they are diligent re-emigrants, who carefully balance the cultural values of both societies and a real observance of these values; the people for whom their migration life-experience has become a real personal benefit. It is only they who can be the real contributors to Czech society as a whole, as they are able to apply their foreign experience to cultivation in the social, political, economic, cultural, and other spheres.

ZDENĚK R. NEŠPOR *graduated in the humanities and social anthropology from the Faculty of Humanities, and in history of religions from the Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague. At present he is a PhD. candidate in history at the Faculty of Arts. He works as a researcher in the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and lectures at the Faculty of Humanities. His research focuses on pre-modern and modern Czech history, religious and cultural studies, and sociological and anthropological analyses of institutions. He has published approximately twenty papers.*

References

Berger, Peter L., Thomas Luckmann 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.* New York: Doubleday.

Brouček, Stanislav, Karel Hrubý, Antonín Měšťan (eds.) 2001. *Emigrace a exil jako způsob života.* [Emigration and Exile. As a Way of Life]. Praha: Karolinum + EÚ AV ČR.

Češi v cizině 1992. *Češi v cizině 6.* [Czechs Abroad 6.] Praha: Ústav etnologie a folkloristiky ČSAV.

Chada, Joseph 1981. *The Czechs in the United States.* [Washington D.C.]: SVU Press.

Filipek, Jan 1999. *Odlesky dějin československého exilu.* [Reflections on the History of the Czechoslovak Exile].

Fromm, Erich 1976. *To Have or To Be?* New York: Harper & Row.

Hoenekopp, Elmar 2000. "Central and Eastern Europeans in the Member Countries of the European Union since 1990: Development and Structure of Migration, Population and Employment". In: *OECD Seminar on Recent Developments in Migration and the Labour Market in Central and Eastern Europe in the Context of EU Enlargement,* Bratislava 2.-3. 5. 2000. Unpublished paper, pp. 1-43.

Holm, Nils G. [1993] 1998: *Úvod do psychologie náboženství.* [A Prolegomena to the Psychology of Religions]. Praha: Portál.

Holý, Ladislav 1996. *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation: National Identity and Post-Communist Social Transformation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hrubý, Karel, Stanislav Brouček (eds.) 2000. *Češi za hranicemi na přelomu 20. a 21. století.* [Czechs Beyond the Borders at the Turn of the 21st Century]. Praha: Karolinum + EÚ AV ČR.

Koudelka, František et al. 1993. *Soudní perzekuce politické povahy v Československu v letech 1948-1989: Statistické údaje.* [Judicial Persecutions in Czechoslovakia in 1948-1989: Statistical data]. Praha: ÚSD AV ČR.

Light, Ivan, Stavros Karageorgis 1994. "The Ethnic Economy". Pp. 647-671 in Smelser, Neil J., Richard Swedberg (eds.). *The Handbook of Economic Sociology.* Princeton - New York: Princeton University Press + Russel Sage Foundation.

Navara, L., E. Wagnerová 2002. "Češi někdy až příliš projevují závist" [Czechs Are Sometimes Too Envious; an interview]. *Mladá Fronta Dnes* 1. 7. 2002: C/10.

Nešpor, Zdeněk R., Martina Hornofová, Marek Jakoubek 1999-2002. "Čeští nekatolici v rumunském Banátě a v Bulharsku I.-IV". [Czech Non-Catholics in Romanian Banat and Bulgaria I. - IV.]. *Lidé města* 2/1999: 66-88, 4/2000: 112-141, 5/2001: 62-86, 6/2002 (forthcomming).

Schütz, Alfred 1944. "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology". *American Journal of Sociology* 49: 499-507.

Schütz, Alfred 1945. "The Homecomer". *American Journal of Sociology* 50: 369-376.

Secká, Milena 1992. "Migrace Čechů z Rumunska do České republiky (bývalé ČSFR) a vývojové aspekty jejich adaptačního procesu" [The Migration of Romanian Czechs to the Czech Republic (Former ČSFR) and Development Aspects of Their Adaptation Process]. *Český lid* 80, 1993, 3: 177-184.

Secká, Milena 1993. "Češi v Rumunsku" [Czechs in Romania]. Pp. 96-104 in *Češi v cizině 9.* Praha: Ústav etnologie a folkloristiky ČSAV.

Sennett, Richard 1998. *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism.* New York - London: Norton.

Tigrid, Pavel [1974] 1990. *Politická emigrace v atomovém věku* [Political Emigration in the Atomic Era]. Praha: Prostor.

Veblen, Thorstein 1899. *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions.* New York: Macmillan.

Access to Czech Social Survey Data*

JINDŘICH KREJČÍ**
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

Abstract: The article presents practical information on the sources of Czech social survey data for both researchers interested in data on Czech society and data professionals interested in the state of the art of data services. Czech survey research was deeply affected by the communist regime, but underwent intense development in 1960s and after the revolution in 1989. In the field of official statistics, data services are provided by the Czech Statistical Office. The Sociological Data Archive (SDA) of the Institute of Sociology provides data from quantitative sociological surveys, promotes data dissemination and secondary analysis and supports large research projects (e.g. ISSP, ESS). The Czech Archive of Qualitative Data and Documents at the Masaryk University and Soft Data Archive MEDARD at the Virtual Institute provide data services for qualitative social research. A number of public domain data sets remain under the responsibility of academic and governmental research institutions. It is also possible to access the data of private research agencies. Czech data are accessible also via international data services.

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 6: 809-826

The organising of services specialising in disseminating and archiving computerised social science data first started out in the United States in the late 1950s and in Western Europe in the 1960s[1]. Today, social science data archives have become a standard and international requisite part of the infrastructure for social research.

The benefits are clear. The archive increases the effect of the investment into social research many times over. It is a source of data, scientific information and related services. Simultaneously, it enables the continued use of the outcome of research projects. At present large collections of data located in many data organisations around the world are easily available to social researchers via any computer connected to the Web. National data services are integrated into networks and thus support international co-operation and com-

* Work on this article was supported by grant No. K9058117 'Current Czech Society and Questions of European Integration' from the Programme for the Development of Basic Science Research of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, and the TSER Project 'Towards a European System of Social Reporting and Welfare Measurement' financed by the European Commission.

** Direct all correspondence to: Jindřich Krejčí, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, 110 00 Prague 1, e-mail: krejci@soc.cas.cz

[1] The oldest publicly accessible archive was founded in the Roper Center in the USA in the late 1950s. The oldest European archive is the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) in Cologne, Germany, which was established in 1960.

parative research in the social sciences [see Mochmann 1998 and 1999, Lane 1990]. Another important benefit stems from the provision of easy access to research materials for educational purposes.

This article is devoted to the situation in the development of social science data services in the Czech Republic. The main objective is to give an account and brief description of the existing sources of Czech survey research data which are available for secondary analysis in sociology. It should provide practical information for both researchers interested in Czech social data and data professionals interested in the state of the art of Czech data services.

To prepare this text I have drawn on and summarised previous work I have done tracing the establishment of the Sociological Data Archive of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences and the formation of the institutional infrastructure of the Czech social sciences [Krejčí 2001, 2002a, 2002b], and taking stock of publicly available cross-sectional databases in the Czech Republic (technical reports on surveys made within the project EuReporting).[2] Information in the article is closely tied to and extends Večerník's state-of-the-art report on Czech social reporting, survey research and data on transformation, which was published in the Czech Sociological Review 38/3 [Večerník 2002]. The information on data sources in this article also includes a number of Web links, which for technical reasons are not presented directly in the text but can be found in the Web References section at the end of the article.

The history of Czech social survey research

Czech empirical social research has a long tradition. The first empirical surveys were conducted in the 1930s. Questionnaire surveys were organised particularly as a part of case studies, e.g. the sociological survey of the village Velké or the survey of citizens of the city of Brno (both organised by I. A. Bláha). The first programme for a systematic survey of attitudes was created in 1946 at the Czechoslovak Institute for Public Opinion Research, the foundation of which was inspired by the existence of the American Gallup Institute.

Unfortunately, the impact of the communist regime on the social sciences was disastrous. In the 1950s sociology was considered a bourgeois pseudo-science and anything reminiscent of sociological research was abolished, though sample surveys continued to be conducted in the field of socio-economic research as part of the official statistics of the *Statistical Office*.

During the years of the political 'thaw' in the 1960s, empirical research underwent intense development, particularly in the second half of the decade. The Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences was established in 1965. In 1967 the

[2] TSER Project 'Towards a European System of Social Reporting and Welfare Measurement' was internationally directed by Dr. Heinz-Herbert Noll from ZUMA, Mannheim, and the national coordinator was Jiří Večerník from the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague.

Institute for Public Opinion Research was re-established, which revived the post-war research tradition. Applied research projects were launched in the field of the sociology of enterprise and work. The development culminated in a large-scale project (13,215 interviews) called the *Survey on Social Differentiation and Mobility*, carried out in 1967 by a team of researchers from the Institute of Social and Political Sciences, led by Professor Pavel Machonin in co-operation with a number of Czech and Slovak sociologists from many other institutions [Machonin et. al 1969]. This project established the tradition of Czech social mobility and stratification surveys, which continues to date.

After the Soviet occupation in 1968, the period of 'normalisation' put a halt to the promising development of the social sciences. Some research activities were placed under the direct control of the communist party (e.g. the research programme of the Institute for Public Opinion Research), while others were banned altogether. Some topics of research simply were not needed in the conditions of 'really existing socialism'. The Institute of Sociology was abolished and only a small department of sociology was set up within the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology. In contrast to Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia, Czech sociologists were not allowed to participate in international comparative surveys. Nonetheless, socio-economic surveys continued to be conducted, including official statistics (Federal Statistical Office) and economic opinion polling (Research Institute of Trade, University of Economics in Prague etc.). There were also several studies on the family, leisure time activities and culture, and two large-scale stratification surveys (*Class and Social Structure 1978 and 1984*), following up on the research from 1967.

After the political change in 1989, empirical social research underwent another sharp change in development. A large number of projects in academic research, public opinion polling and also in commerce were implemented. The Czech Republic also became involved in international research activities. The development of survey research primarily resulted from the liberalisation of what had been a restricted environment and from

Table 1. Structure of intramural R&D expenditures and R&D personnel in the Czech Republic in 2000

	Intramural expenditures		Personnel in FTE[2] in thousands			
	in thousands of EUR[1]	%	researchers	researchers in %	employees total	employees in %
Natural sc.	185 928	25.0	4 429	32.0	6 926	28.6
Technical sc.	438 793	59.0	6 202	44.8	11 864	49.0
Medical sc.	51 546	6.9	909	6.6	1 596	6.6
Agricult.sc.	34 905	4.7	929	6.7	1 785	7.4
Humanities	24 024	3.2	1 072	7.7	1 552	6.4
Social sc.	**8 828**	**1.2**	**311**	**2.2**	**475**	**2.0**
TOTAL	744 024	100.0	13 852	100.0	24 198	100.0

Notes: 1) 1 EUR = 35,6 CZK (average rate in 2000)
2) full time equivalent (FTE) work in R&D

Source: *Czech Statistical Office [Ukazatele..., 2000].*

an increase in the public need for research information. This need has continued to grow as Czech democracy and economic growth has gradually stabilised and the country has come to be included in European and global structures. On the other hand, Czech social sciences are generally still quite small in scale. During the communist regime, this field was impoverished more than the technical and natural sciences were, and it has not yet succeeded in re-establishing for itself an appropriate position. This may be gleaned also from Table 1, which contains data about investments and the number of employees in the fields of research and development. Expenditures for the social sciences in 2000 amounted to only 1.2% of the total R&D expenses, and the proportion of employees working in the social sciences is 2% of the total.

Available data

The outcome of the pre-war and early post-war research can be found in some publications dating from that time, e.g. in two sociological journals: *Sociologická revue* [The Sociological Review] and *Sociální problémy* [Social Problems]. Machine-readable data files have been produced since the 1960s. Unfortunately much of the data, which were usually stored on punch cards, did not survive the ensuing period of neglect. An exception is the survey *Attitudes of Citizens to Politics* from 1968, which was keyed again from original questionnaires [see Seidlová 2000]. The Sociological Data Archive (see below) provides access to several files from the 1970s and 1980s. There are stratification surveys - *Class and Social Structure 1978 and 1984* (also known as *Social Structure and Mobility Surveys*) - and the first survey of a longitudinal panel study on the professional careers of primary-school students - *Family* (1988-1998). Some other surveys of the Institute of Public Opinion Research and the Institute for Philosophy and Sociology from that period are also stored in the SDA, but the quality of their documentation and formats are problematic. The results of a number of surveys, including works of the Institute of Public Opinion Research, socio-economic research of the Research Institute of Trade, and other institutions, are available in survey reports and publications stored in archives (CVVM, Central State Archive; see References on the Web).

In comparison with the past Czech survey research after 1989 has produced a great deal of data, but unfortunately not very systematically. Regular social reporting and social indicator research has not yet become well established [see Večerník 2002]. No national general social survey or similar project has been organised in the Czech Republic and cross-sectional surveys are exceptional.

In addition to the official statistics there are only a few national studies, which have been repeated at least three times and their data are publicly available: *Economic Expectations and Attitudes* were surveyed biannually in 1990-1992 and annually in 1993-1998, the survey on *Social Justice* was repeated three times in the Czech Republic (1991, 1995, 1999), the programme of *Social Structure and Mobility Surveys* (see above) continued as a part of the large international project *Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989* from 1993, the longitudinal panel study *Family* (also mentioned above) was conducted again in 1992, 1993/1994 and 1998. The largest collection of regularly measured attitudes of Czechs to-

wards political, economic and social issues comes from the programme of monthly quota, sample-based surveys of the *Institute of Public Opinion Research* (1990-2000) and the *Centre of Public Opinion Research* (since 2001).

The lack of local systematic and regular surveys has been partially overcome by Czech participation in international programmes. Since 1990 the Czech Republic has taken part in most of the existing programmes of continual comparative research, i.e. the *ISSP - International Social Survey Programme* (annually since 1992), *European and World Values Surveys* (1990, 1991, 1995, 1999), *NDB - New Democracies Barometer* (1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1998), *Central-East Eurobarometer* (annually 1990-1997), *Candidate Countries Barometer* (since 2001), and *CSES - Comparative Study of Electoral System* (1996, 2002). A new project, the *European Social Survey*, has just been launched. Unfortunately, the Czech Republic has not taken part in any international household panel projects.

In addition to the above-mentioned titles of cross-sectional research there have also been many one-shot studies, both local and international, official statistical surveys, as well as of course official statistical surveys. Information on available data is provided by the data archives and other organisations, a description of which follows below.

Data services in the Czech Republic

In the field of official statistics, data services are provided by the Czech Statistical Office (ČSÚ). Statistics services concentrate in particular on the distribution of research results, but under certain conditions primary data from sample surveys are made available.

In the field of academic research, data services were slow in arriving. Projects for the systematic archiving of data have been rare even within individual institutes. Most data remained in possession of individual research teams. Nevertheless, the idea of archiving data has a long tradition. The need and the technical resources necessary to store and distribute electronic data files through a data archive first appeared at the end of the 1960s [see Illner 1968]. The period of normalisation, however, affected this promising development: social research was suppressed and there was also fear that the communist regime might abuse the archived data. Nonetheless, at the end of the 1970s a thematic archive was established, which focused on stratification surveys conducted in 1978 and 1984 [see Matějovský et al. 1979]. In 1990 this archive was destroyed during the re-structuralisation of the former Institute of Philosophy and Sociology. Some of the materials were preserved by users of the archive and are today stored in the *Sociological Data Archive*.

After 1989 the idea of a national data archive again became popular and several projects were considered in this regard. In September 1998 the Sociological Data Archive (SDA) was opened at the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Its foundation was realised within the large-scale project *Social Trends (Research - Archives - Publication - Graduate Training)*. Recently, two qualitative data archives were also established. The Czech Qualitative Data and Documents Archive at Masaryk University in Brno was created in 1999. The MEDARD Soft Data Digital Archive was founded in 2000 and is part of the Virtual Institute in Prague.

The date of establishment put the SDA at the end of first wave of development of data services in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.[3] In 2001 the Czech archive became a member of the Council of European Social Sciences Data Archives (CESSDA) and has participated in the international co-operation of data organisations and the system of data transfers. The establishment of the Czech qualitative data archives was inspired by the Qualidata Archive in the UK and was connected to the recent rapid development of this internationally, relatively new activity in social data archiving.

Unfortunately, since Czech data services are young many data files which could be made publicly available still remain under the responsibility of research teams and institutions. The academic, governmental and commercial research institutions as sources of data available for academic research are mentioned hereafter.

Official statistics

The Czech Statistical Office (see References on the Web) provides three regular statistical sample surveys:

- The *Microcensus* is a regular income survey conducted since 1958. Until 1989 the survey was repeated every 3-5 years on a 1-2 % random sample of households. The *Microcensus 1992* was organised in March 1993, when a 0.5 % sample of Czech households was queried. The *Microcensus 1996* surveyed 1 % of Czech households in March 1997. The next survey is planned for early 2003.
- The *Family Expenditure Survey* has also been conducted since 1958. The selection of about 2000-3500 of Czech households is based on quota sampling (economic activity). Respondent households provide daily records of incomes and expenditures.
- The *Labour Force Survey* is a quarterly survey of approximately 0.7 % of Czech households. Regular surveying started in 1993 and is based on EUROSTAT standards.

Results of the surveys are published in periodicals and specialised publications of the ČSÚ. The complete list of publications and selected tables and analysis are available via the Internet. It is also possible to access Czech Statistical Office microdatabases but it must be negotiated on an individual basis after contacting the Office. Several data modules from the surveys organised by the ČSÚ are parts of the international programmes of EUROSTAT and CEPS/INSTEAD and are available via international data services of these organisations (see References on the Web).

[3] The first social data archive in Central and Eastern Europe was the Hungarian data archive of consortium TÁRKI, which was established in 1985, i.e. during the socialist era. In the 1990s archives were organised in Estonia (1996), Slovenia (1997), and the Czech Republic (1998). Now the networks of data archives and data archiving activities cover nearly all of Europe - both East and West [see Hausstein 2001, Web pages of EDAN and CESSDA].

Sociological Data Archive (SDA)

The main objective of the SDA (see References on the Web) is to make Czech sociological data publicly available for academic, educational and other non-commercial purposes. There are three main areas of activities of the Archive:

- acquiring, archiving and providing data files
- promoting data dissemination and secondary analyses
- supporting special research projects

The SDA collects computerised files of data from quantitative sociological surveys. Its holdings include public domain data collected by the Institute of Sociology and other Czech organisations conducting state-financed sociological research, data from Czech public opinion polls and from international surveys with Czech participation. For an example of available data see the Table 2.

An electronic data catalogue and access to services is provided via the Internet. Selected data files can be downloaded on-line (Czech data from the *ISSP 1992-1997* and international *Social Stratification in Eastern Europe After 1989*). Other data are available after ordering and undertaking conditions of usage (both can be made via the Internet and fax). Data are free of charge, but only for non-commercial research or educational purposes. Many of the materials are in two language versions - Czech and English. Data is offered in SPSS format and it may also be transferred to several other formats on request.

Archived data remains the property of the depositor and their secondary users are required to uphold relevant copyrights. In the Czech Republic all activities in survey research are based on strict legislation concerning the protection of personal data. The Act on the Protection of Personal Data [Act No. 101/2000] is based on and fully compliant with the European Commission's Regulation 95/46/EC. Therefore all data offered by the Archive are anonymous and users must refrain from any attempts to identify respondents.

The following specifics of the Czech environment are crucial for the development of data services:

- the tradition of using data services is underdeveloped,
- in some fields there is basically no accompanying social research infrastructure (information services, methodological centres).

The problem of how to increase the use of secondary data analysis is not only a problem of the data services being offered, but also of demand. Researchers are not really aware of existing possibilities. Data services, whether domestic or international, are used less than they should be. Few projects include secondary data analysis as an important element of their research strategy. The comparison of investments into surveys and the number of published analyses therefore often gives evidence on inefficiency. If, for example, we browse through the archived data sets, we discover that in some cases there are only two or three publications related to a particular data file and that portions of several surveys have not been processed at all. The SDA therefore pays close attention to the dissemination of information on data services and to generally supporting secondary data analysis. It publishes information in periodicals, participates in teaching programmes at universi-

Table 2. Examples from the data holdings of the Sociological Data Archive, Prague

Czech data sets from the ISSP 1992-2001	Complete versions of Czech data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP): Social Inequality - Czechoslovakia 1992 (ISSP 1992), Attitudes towards Environment and Local Politics (ISSP 1993), Family (ISSP 1994), National Identity (ISSP 1995), Role of the Government (ISSP 1996), Work Orientations 1997 (ISSP 1997), Religion (ISSP 1998, in Czechia fielded in 1999), Social Inequality and Justice (ISSP 1999), Environment (ISSP 2000), and Social Networks (ISSP 2001). Data sets include ISSP modules as well as Czech national specific sections. (Czech and English versions) **International data sets from the ISSP 1985- 1996** including merged national modules ISSP from participating countries are provided by the SDA only for local users. (English versions)
Social Consequences of Transition 1995 (SOCO)	Database of comparative household survey created under the aegis of Social Costs of Economic transformation in Central Europe (SOCO) initiated and co-ordinated by the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. The survey was conducted in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the new federal states of Germany in 1995. It is focused to the main aspects of economic and social transformation - job changes, housing, income, social securities and attitudes towards the economic situation, the expected role of the state, social inequalities, etc. (English version)
Economic Expectations and Attitudes 1990-1998 (EEA)	A semi-annual (1990-1992) and annual (1993-1997) survey of the Institute of Sociology. Between 1990 and 1994 it was conducted in both the Czech and Slovak Republics, since 1995 only in Czechia. The survey focuses on opinions about the economic situation on the macro- and micro level. (Czech and English versions)
Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989	The SSEE General Population Survey was conducted in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia in 1993 (approx. 5,000 respondents) and in Poland in 1994 (approx. 3,500 respondents). Over-samples (about 1,500) were carried out in Prague and Warsaw for purposes of specialised urban research. It is focused to social stratification and mobility change after 1989.
Czech Election Data	**Exit Poll 1992 and 1996** (Czech and English versions) **24 Hours before the Elections - The Chamber of Deputies 1996:** Conducted during the 24 hours before the elections, organised by the SC&C, commissioned by the Czech Television. (Czech and English versions) **24 Hours before the Elections - Senate 1996:** Three surveys conducted on a panel of respondents before the first and second round and after election to the Senate. The survey was conducted by the SC&C and commissioned by the Czech Television. (Czech and English versions) **Trends 04/98 and Trends 05/98:** Data from two modules of questions fielded for the party Union of Freedom. They were attached to periodical survey organised by the STEM and focused on political parties and their pre-election campaigns. (Czech and English versions)

IVVM/CVVM 1990-2001	Data from the programme of regular monthly surveys organised by the IVVM (Institute for Public Opinion Research) in 1990-2000 and CVVM (Centre for the Public Opinion Research] since 2001 and focused on attitudes to political, economical and social issues in Czech society. (Czech versions)
Czechoslovak Social Structure and Mobility Surveys 1978 and 1984	The social stratification and mobility surveys focused on economic and social positions of the head of the household and other active members, basic mobility data of all adult persons, income, housing conditions, leisure time, attitudes and value orientations. (1978: Czech version; 1984: Czech and English version)
Ten Years of Social Transformation in the Czech Republic, 1999-2000	Large stratification and mobility study. It also focused on opinions about social change and the process of transformation. Among the topics addressed are the evaluation of social changes, education and skills, social position and job career, household composition and level of living, lifestyle and social networks, political attitudes and attitudes to the transformation and modernisation process. (Czech and English versions)
Family '89-'98	The longitudinal panel survey. The original intention was to observe life and professional career of children leaving the primary school. The main waves of the interviewing occurred in 1989 (children and parents), 1992 (parents), 1993-1994 (children finishing the secondary school) and 1998 (children and parents). (Czech version)

Source: *SDA, Institute of Sociology.*

ties, and organises presentations and workshops. The Archive also publishes a quarterly information bulletin entitled *SDA Info* (in Czech only).

Since its launch the SDA has often been queried about things not directly concerned with the provision of data. Therefore, on-line services were expanded to include: 1) a directory of links to sources of social data, Czech and foreign centres of social research, and general information on the Czech Republic, and 2) on-line access to analytical publications of the Institute of Sociology.

The Archive also contributes to the creation of support for organising some research projects. This involves, in particular, Czech surveys of the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) and the just-launched *European Social Survey* (ESS). It also contributed to the Czech part of other projects, such as the *International Social Justice Project* (ISJP), *Second International Adult Literacy Survey* (SIALS) and the *European Values Study* (EVS), though to a lesser extent.

Qualitative data

The basic aim of qualitative data archives is the systematisation, digital processing and preservation of available materials in the field of qualitative social research [see Corti, Foster and Thompson 1995]. Internationally the development of qualitative data archiv-

ing started in the second half of the 1990s. It was connected to technological development and the rapid decrease of the price of computer memory. In addition to past technological difficulties, qualitative data also requires a greater effort with respect to the protection of personal data, and for this reason the control over access to the data is stricter. Many materials stored in the qualitative archives are usually made available only when permission is given by the author of the materials. Often, only systematically processed information on existing materials and not the data themselves are gathered. Another problem is the documentation of the context of surveys. For the purposes of archiving, the modification of research plans and additional expenses are often necessary during fieldwork and the processing of materials. Given the difficulties mentioned here the interest of researchers in data services and deposition is less than in the case of quantitative data.

The organisation of both Czech qualitative data archives was inspired by Qualidata at the University of Essex in the UK. The first such archive, the Czech Archive of Qualitative Data and Documents (see References on the Web), is more ambitiously conceived, and its principal aim is to preserve Czech qualitative data in the field of sociological and socio-psychological research, and to gather information on their availability in the Czech Republic [Katrňák 1999]. Its mission also includes archiving incidentally occurring data. The archive has been active for four years, states the number of materials stored, and includes a register of information on the availability of organised materials. On the other hand, access to the information on the content of the archive is somewhat complicated, because it requires personal contact. The Archive's Internet pages include only general information.

The MEDARD Archive (see References on the Web) seems to be more active. Its foundation originally resulted from the research activities of the Virtual Institute and should also serve its programme of on-line education in the social sciences. Nevertheless the archive is also open to the general public and seeks acquisitions outside the programmes of the Institute. The on-line accessible catalogue includes information on materials from several research projects. There are also Web links to the archives of the Czech press, other available materials for qualitative social research, and a database of on-line accessible literature. A good deal of information is devoted to methods of digitalisation of materials for social research and their preservation. Also specialised software for digitalisation and processing of qualitative data is accessible via MEDARD's pages. Unfortunately, most of the materials are available only in the Czech language.

Academic and governmental research institutions

Most state-financed research is organised within the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (see References on the Web). The Academy of Sciences was established by the state and its activities are largely financed from the state budget; nevertheless, it is not a service organisation for the government. The objective of the Academy is to create an independent environment for basic research. Elected bodies confirm individual research programmes. The Academy of Sciences now consists of 60 research and 7 service institutions. Unfortunately this system results also in the separation of most research from higher education.

Five institutions, the Institute of Sociology, the Economics Institute/CERGE, Masaryk Institute, the Institute of Psychology and the Institute of State and Law belong to the socio-economic division of the Academy of Sciences. The first two organisations are crucial to the production of survey data. The Institute of Sociology (see References on the Web) is one of the main centres of empirical sociology in the Czech Republic and probably the largest producer of public domain survey data. The research programme includes a number of topics.[4] The Institute is the Czech representative in the ISSP and ESS and is a member of the international organisations ECSR, IPSA, ECPR. Since 2001 it has also included a survey organisation, the CVVM - Centre for Public Opinion Research (see References on the Web). A joint institute of the Academy of Sciences and Charles University, CERGE (Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education; see References on the Web), is active in the field of socio-economic research. CERGE also plans to establish its own archive of socio-economic data in the near future.

In the Czech Republic there are three main centres of higher education in empirical sociology. The Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University (see References on the Web) in Brno continues its long tradition as an important centre of both theoretical and empirical sociological studies. Despite the above-mentioned division of research and education it has organised and participated in many important surveys. The Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University (see References on the Web) is much younger. It was founded in 1990, but it specialises more in empirical research. Another centre is the Department of Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy of Charles University in Prague. In addition to these three schools, sociological and socio-economic surveys are organised also in many other faculties and universities, especially in departments of sociology, economics and political science. Specialised social research is developed also, for example, at the Czech University of Agriculture or the Faculty of Science of Charles University, and there also exist specialised centres such as the already mentioned Virtual Institute (see References on the Web), which has intensively cultivated qualitative social research. A complete list of Czech institutions of higher education is available on the Internet (see References on the Web).

The Czech government and its ministries established a number of specialised analytical centres and councils, which are active in organising surveys for decision-making purposes in politics. There also exist large governmental research institutions, such as the Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs (RILSA; see References on the Web), which deals with research on the labour market and welfare, and the Institute for Information on Education (see References on the Web), which specialises in research on education and participates in large-scale international surveys comparing the efficiency of education (PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS, etc.).

[4] Research departments: Centre for Public Opinion Research, Czech Border Regions, Economic Sociology, Gender and Sociology, Local and Regional Politics, Public Opinion as a Social Phenomenon, Social Stratification, Sociological Data Archive, Sociology of Politics, Transformation of the Social Structure, Value Orientations in Society.

Private research agencies

However much most of the private research activities are oriented primarily towards marketing, there are also projects of use and accessible to academic research. Several agencies have launched their own social-survey projects and provide results for publication in the media, while a number of private subjects have actively participated in academic research projects and many agencies collaborate in academic and state-funded projects as fieldwork sub-contractors. The possibilities for using data from originally commercially oriented surveys in academic research have resulted in the collaboration of marketing and academic institutions. Table 3 includes the list of agencies and their Web addresses.

In the Czech Republic the largest research agency is AISA. In the 1990s it collaborated on a number of important social research projects, e.g. *World Values Survey*, *New Democracies Barometer*, *Central-East Eurobarometer* etc., but it now concentrates nearly entirely on market research.

STEM and Taylor Nelson Sofres Factum (TNS Factum) together with the abovementioned, state-financed CVVM are probably the best-known opinion polling agencies. This is because the results of their polls are published regularly in the media. In 1993 STEM launched a programme called *Trends*, which conducts regular monthly public opinion polls on 'hot issues'. The survey focuses on party preferences, and political and economic opinions and it facilitates research on social trends with respect to numerous questions. In addition to regular publication in the media, two books have also been published: *Czech Society in 1998* [Hartl, Huk and Haberlová 1999] and *Where to Now?* [Hartl et al. 2000]. In 1994 a similar programme of regular polls was launched by Factum-non Fabula, a predecessor of TNS Factum. In 1994 the survey was conducted monthly, in 1997 biweekly, and at present it is conducted on a weekly basis. Data from both surveys have also been used in a number of academic publications and have become an important source for the analysis of social trends in the Czech Republic.

Another company, SC&C, has established close co-operation with academic institutions and has taken an active part in several important projects: e.g. *Secondary International Adult Literacy Survey* (SIALS) and *European Values Study* (EVS, in 1999). With regard to the EVS the agency has also provided its own data services on the Internet (in the Czech language, URL: see SC&C in Table 3).

The *MML - TGI (Market & Media & Lifestyle - Target Group Index)* is one of the largest commercial research projects in the Czech Republic. It is co-ordinated by MEDIAN. The co-operation between MEDIAN and the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences resulted in the publication of an analysis of lifestyle during the economic transformation [Friedlanderová, Tuček and MEDIAN 2000].

The results of election studies are among the more popular topics published in the media. In addition to regularly surveying party preferences (regular polls by STEM, TNS Factum and CVVM), special studies are also organised on every public election. STEM, TNS Factum, SC&C, MEDIAN, and the state-founded CVVM are particularly active in the organisation of pre- and post-election surveys. Several data files from election studies are available from the SDA (see Table 2).

Table 3. Social research, public opinion polling and marketing research agencies in the Czech Republic

Name Web	address
AC Nielsen ČR	http://www.acnielsen.com/cz/
AGMA	http://www.agma.cz
AISA	http://www.nfoaisa.cz
AMAR Marketing	http://www.amar.cz
Amasia	-
AVE Marketing	http://www.ave.cz
Consumer Data	http://www.consumerdata.cz
FOCUS - Center for Social and Marketing Analysis	http://www.focus-agency.cz
Gallup Organization ČR	http://www.gallup.cz
GfK Praha	http://www.gfk.cz
IBRS - International Business and Research Services	http://www.ibrs.cz/
In Line	http://www.inline.cz
INCOMA Research	http://www.incoma.cz
INRA Praha	http://www.inra.cz
Kleffman a Partner ČR	http://www.kleffmann.cz
Marcom	http://www.marcom-praha.cz/
Mareco	http://www.mareco.cz
Markent	http://www.markent.cz
Median	http://www.median.cz
Millward Brown	http://www.millwardbrown.com
Network Media Services	http://www.nms.cz
Opinion Window	http://www.research-int.com/
RCA Research	http://www.rca-research.com
SC&C	http://www.scac.cz
STEM	http://www.stem.cz
STEM/MARK	http://www.stemmark.cz
Tambor	http://www.tambor.cz
Taylor Nelson Sofres Factum Taylor Nelson Sofres Media	http://www.tnsofres.cz
TIMA Liberec	http://www.tima-liberec.cz
Universitas	http://www.universitas.cz/
Ultex	http://www.ultex.cz
XUXA	http://www.xuxa.cz

Sources: *Database of the project Quality of Surveys of Voting Preferences, Institute of Sociology; Strategie* [Marketingový výzkum 2001]; SIMAR.

Notes: The list includes selected agencies concerned with social research, public opinion polling or market research. Small and specialised research agencies are not listed. In addition to the Czech branch office of the Gallup Organisation, all companies reported disposing of their own network of inquirers.

Listed Web addresses were active in December 2002.

International data services and Czech data

The SDA is a member of the pan-European organisation CESSDA. Thus the Archive is integrated into a system of international data transfers and can provide its clients with data stored in other member organisations. In the same way, researchers from abroad also have improved access to Czech data. Unfortunately this system is not very user friendly and lacks any data catalogue shared by all participating archives and any standardised documentation of data.

The idea to launch a single pan-European data archive appeared in the 1960s,[5] but it was not successful. In pre-Internet times national archives had the advantage of closer contact with both data users and data producers. The *International Data Catalogue* (IDC, see References on the Web) was launched by CESSDA in 1996 and it represented a large step forward towards the international integration of data services. At present it includes information on the data holdings of 10 archives[6]. The SDA's data library is not referred. Nevertheless, using the IDC it is possible to obtain information on a variety of Czech data from international surveys which are stored in archives abroad. Unfortunately the information included in the IDC is not standardised and the older technology behind the catalogue does not offer the convenience of current tools.

NESSTAR (see References on the Web) is a new Internet tool providing a networked infrastructure for social data dissemination. It was just recently launched and it is a tool that makes it possible to search, access control, analyse and download data and other materials via the Internet (see Ryssevik 1999, Lach 2002). At present only five data archives provide services via NESSTAR: UK Data Archive, NSD - Norway, DDA - Denmark, ADP - Slovenia, and RODA - Romania. For inclusion in NESSTAR it is necessary to uphold the documentation standard DDI (Data Documentation Initiative, see Ryssevik 1999) and to adopt new XML technology. Several other data archives, including Czech SDA, intend to do this and join the project in the near future.

International data sets with Czech data are also available in many other international and national data organisations. The largest data library in the world is in the ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, see References on the Web) at the University of Michigan. CESSDA membership organisations as well as several non-European archives can be accessed via a map located on CESSDA's Web page (see References on the Web). The information on available or emerging data services in Central and Eastern Europe is provided on the Web pages of the East European Data Archives Network (EDAN; see References on the Web).

In addition to the data archives, several international research projects have organised their own data services, and Czech data are also available through these sources. The Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde (see References on the Web),

[5] The 'Central Archive' ZA in Germany was originally intended to become an international, pan-European data archive.

[6] BDSP - France, DDA - Denmark, UK Data, SSD - Sweden, SSDA - Israel, Steinmetz - Netherlands, TÁRKI - Hungary, ZA - Germany, and ICPSR - USA.

in co-operation with Hungarian TÁRKI, have launched services which allow for the on-line analysis of data from the *New Democracies Barometer* surveys from 1990-1995. Data from the *Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 (SSEE)* are available on the project pages, which are located on the sites of the ISSR in Los Angeles and the SDA (see References on the Web). The data from the questionnaire surveys of the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)*, together with the macro-data, are available on the special project pages (see References on the Web). The *Family and Fertility Survey* can be ordered through the on-line system of the PAU UNECE (see References on the Web). The CEPS/INSTEAD (see References on the Web) provides remote access via e-mail into otherwise confidential and protected data from sample surveys of statistical offices. It is possible to order an analysis of Czech data from the *Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)* and the *Luxembourg Employment Study (LES)*. The Czech data provided for the use of the European Commission are accessible through the services of EUROSTAT (see References on the Web).

Some services do not offer direct access to data but only to 'meta-data'. The meta-data are 'data on data', i.e. they include information on the character of the data sets and their availability. The very useful idea behind these services is to put order into a large quantum of data sources and offered information. They usually arrange information in a different way than data archives do and thus extend the possibilities for their use in research. The project *EuReporting* (see References on the Web) offers thematic information about European comparative official micro-data and academic cross-national and cross-sectional databases. The arrangement of meta-data is based on social indicators, i.e. the system can search for available social indicators across different databases. The World Database of Happiness (see References on the Web) presents available information concerning surveys on the subjective appreciation of life, including distributions of responses to questions. The recently launched project *NESSIE* (*Network of Economic and Social Sciences in Europe*; see References on the Web) plans to establish a service for easy and effective access to European comparative survey research data.

Conclusion

The importance of the social research infrastructure has risen significantly in recent years. On the one hand, the extensive development of social research and international co-operation and the general demand for social data require an adequate background. On the other hand, new technology brings services closer to researchers and increases its contribution to the efficiency of social research. Archives have also become a basis for international networking and concentration in the social sciences.

In the European Union the promotion of infrastructure including data archives is considered to be one of the effective tools for implementing R&D policy [see Warner 2001]. The situation in the Czech Republic is different. Official support programmes pay only a small amount of attention to the development of the social research infrastructure and there is a lack of local sources for the continued financing of projects focusing on infrastructure. The establishment of data services resulted out of the demand from researchers and pressure from abroad. Nevertheless, in the future we can expect the gradual

development of data services and other infrastructures in connection with international trends. Full-scale involvement in international networks will be a new, qualitative step forward with respect to the range, comfort and efficiency of services. The main benefit of international co-operation lies in data exchange, the gradual interconnection of data services, joint work in developing IT technologies and the possibilities of sharing results, standardisation, and joint policy concerning the further development of services and gathering of support. At the same time, this also opens new channels for co-operation in social research.

JINDŘICH KREJČÍ *graduated in sociology from the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague in 1996 (MA). He is head of the Sociological Data Archive (SDA) of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences, Prague and participates in international surveys of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and European Social Survey (ESS). His research focuses on social inequalities, political participation and the assessment of the quality of survey data. In 1999 and 2001 he taught a course on sources of social data and data management at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague.*

References on the Web

Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (AV ČR, Akademie věd České republiky): http://www.cas.cz (Czech, English)

Centre for Public Opinion Research (CVVM, Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění): http://www.cvvm.cas.cz (Czech)

Central State Archive (Ústřední státní archiv): http://www.mvcr.cz/archivy/index.htm (Czech)

CEPS/INSTEAD (Centre d'Études de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Économiques / International Networks for Studies in Technology): http://www.ceps.lu/ (English)

CERGE - EI (Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute): http://www.cerge-ei.cz/ (English)

CESSDA - Council of European Social Science Data Archives: http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/ (English)

CSES - Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: http://www.umich.edu/~nes/cses/ (English)

CSPP - Centre for the Study of Public Policy: http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/ (English)

Czech Archive of Qualitative Data and Documents (Český archiv kvalitativních dat a dokumentů): http://www.fss.muni.cz/qarchiv/ (Czech, English)

Czech Statistical Office (ČSÚ, Český statistický úřad): http://www.czso.cz/ (Czech, English, German, French)

East European Data Archive Network (EDAN): http://www.gesis.org/en/cooperation/data_service/eastern_europe (English)

EuReporting project: http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/EU_Reporting/ (English)

EUROSTAT: http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ (English, French, German)

Faculty of Social Sciences of the Charles University in Prague (FSV UK, Fakulta sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy v Praze): http://www.fsv.cuni.cz/ (Czech, English)

ICPSR - Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (English)

Institut for Information on Education (ÚIV, Ústav pro informace ve vzdělávání): http://www.uiv.cz (Czech, basic information also in English)

Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (SoÚ AV ČR, Sociologický ústav Akademie věd České republiky): http://www.soc.cas.cz (Czech, English)

International Data Catalogue (IDC): http://dasun3.essex.ac.uk/Cessda/IDC/ (English)

ISSR - Institute for Social Science Research at the University of California in Los Angeles: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/da/index.html (English)

List of Czech higher education institutions: http://www.education.cz/vs/ (Czech)

MEDARD (Soft Data Digital Archive, Digitální archiv měkkých dat): http://www.soc.cas.cz/trends/ (Czech, parts also in English)

NESSIE - Network of Economic and Social Sciences in Europe: http://nessie.essex.ac.uk/ (English)

NESSTAR - Networked Social Science Tools and Resources: http://www.nesstar.org (English)

PAU - Population Activities Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe: http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/

Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs (RILSA - VÚPSV, Výzkumný ústav práce a sociálních věcí): http://www.vupsv.cz/ (Czech, English)

Faculty of Social Studies of the Masaryk University in Brno (FSS MU, Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykovy univerzity v Brně): http://www.fss.muni.cz/ (Czech, English)

Sociological Data Archive (SDA, Sociologický datový archiv): http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/ (Czech, English)

Virtual Institute (Virtuální institut): http://virtualni.institut.cz/ (Czech, English)

World Database of Happiness (Continuous register of scientific research on subjective appreciation of life): http://www.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness/ (English)

References

Act No. 101 of April 4, 2000 on the Protection of Personal Data and on Amendments to Some Related Acts. Version translated for the Office for Personal Data Protection. URL: http://www.uoou.cz/eng/index.php3

Alan, Josef, Tomáš Bitrich, Zdeněk Konopásek. 2000. "Digitalní archiv měkkých dat MEDARD" [The Digital Archive of Soft Data MEDARD]. *SDA Info* 3/2000.

Friendlanderová, Hana, Milan Tuček and MEDIAN. 2000. *Češi na prahu nového tisíciletí* [Czechs on the Threshold of a New Millenium]. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství.

Hartl, Jan et al. 2000. *Kudy kam? Deset let po listopadu v průzkumech STEM* [Where to Now? Ten Years after November 1989 in the Surveys of STEM]. Praha: STEM.

Hartl, Jan, Jan Huk,, Věra Haberlová. 1999. *Česká společnost 1998* [Czech Society in 1998]. Praha: Management Press.

Hausstein, Brigitte (ed.). 2001. *Social Science Data Archives in Eastern Europe.* Köln: ZA. URL: http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eastern_europe/news/NAF2001.pdf

Illner, Michal. 1968. "Archiv společensko vědních informací - nový pomocník empirické sociologie" [Archive of Social Science Information - the New Assistant of Empirical Sociology]. *Sociologický časopis* 4: 507-510.

Katrňák, Tomáš. 1999. "Český archiv kvalitativních dat a dokumentů" [The Czech Archive of Qualitative Data and Documents]. *SDA Info* 3/1999.

Krejčí, Jindřich. 2001. "The Czech Sociological Data Archive". *IASSIST Quarterly* 25, No. 2: 6-8. On-line version: http://datalib.library.ualberta.ca/publications/iq/iqvol25.html

Krejčí, Jindřich. 2002. "Datové služby pro českou sociologii" [Data Services for Czech Sociology]. *Sociologický časopis* 38: 125-138.

Krejčí, Jindřich. 2002. Establishing the Sociological Data Archive in the Czech Republic. In *Social Science Data Archives in Eastern Europe*, ed. by Brigitte Hausstein and Paul de Guchteneire. Berlin, Cologne, Paris: Ferger Verlag.
On-line version: http://www.unesco.org/most/SSDAEEbook.pdf

Lach, Jiří. 2002. "NESSTAR: operace s daty přes internet" [NESSTAR: Operations with Data via the Internet]. *SDA Info* 2002/1-2: 10-12.

Lane, Jan-Erik. 1990. "Data Archives as en Instrument for Comparative Research".
In: *Comparative Methodology. Theory and Practice in International Social Research.* Ed. by Else Øyen. SAGE Publications.

Machonin, Pavel et al. 1969. *Československá společnost* [Czechoslovak Society]. Bratislava: Epocha.

Marketingový výzkum [Marketing Research]. 2001. Special supplement of *Strategie* 17. 9. 2001.

Matějovský, Antonín, J. Hudeček, H. Jeřábek, J. Ježek, V. Stupka, M. Tuček, A. Vodáková, J. Voženílek. 1979. *Metodika výzkumu třídní a sociální struktury ČSSR 1978* [The Methodics of the Class and Social Structure Survey, CSSR 1978]. Praha: Filozofický a sociologický ústav ČSAV.

Mochmann, Ekkehart. 1998. European Cooperation in Social Science Data Dissemination. IFDO Net: http://www.ifdo.org/archiving_distribution/index_bfr.htm

Mochmann, Ekkehart. 1999. European Infrastructure Needs for Comparative Socio-economic Research. Paper presented on the European Socio-economic Research Conference in Bussels, 28-30 April 1999.

Ryssevik, Jostein. 1999. "Providing Global Access to Distributed Data Through Metadatata Standardisation - The Paralel Stories of NESSTAR and the DDI." Paper given at the UN/ECE Work Session on Statistical Metadata, Geneva, September 1999.
URL: http://www.nesstar.org/papers/

Seidlová, Adéla. 2000. "Postoj občanů k politice v roce 1968" [An Attitude of Citizens to Politics in 1968]. *SDA Info* 1/2000: 6-8.

Ukazatele výzkumu a vývoje za rok 2000 [Indicators of Research and Development for the year 2000]. 2001. Praha: Český statistický ústav.

Večerník, Jiří. 2002. "Monitoring the Transition in the Czech Republic: Data, Surveys and Studies". *Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review* 38: 365-379.

Warden, Campbell (ed.). 2001. *Reflections on the role of Research Infrastructures in the European Research Area.* Luxembourg: European Commision, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

On the 70th Birthday of Professor Ivo Možný

Ivo Možný is an outstanding personality of contemporary Czech sociology. Forged as a sociologist/journalist in a courageous radio station in the city of Brno during the happy period of the late 1960s, he survived honestly - and yet actively - as a lecturer in sociology at the University of Brno. With full energy he began after 1989 to write and teach, and to build what would become an important institution - the current Faculty of Social Studies of the University of Brno. His book, *Why So Easy... On Some Family Roots of the Velvet Revolution* is probably the most quoted work since 1989, and 'his' Faculty (of which he is still Dean) appeals even to young people living in Prague, who leave the capital to go and study in Brno.

Among other events, Možný's birthday was commemorated in a special issue of 'Social Studies', a journal published by the Faculty of Social Studies, which on this occasion was sub-titled 'Sociology as the Art of the Possible'. This title is a play on the meaning of Možný's name in Czech, which means 'possible' - one can thus read it as 'the art of the possible' and 'the art of Možný' at the same time. One can also find in this special issue a full biography and other details of Možný's rich life and work.

The brief interview below features a slightly rhetorical tone, which follows from the close cooperation and friendship between the CSR Editor-in-Chief and the jubilant. This is also why the old title for the autonomous Moravian Viceroy - *markrabě* - is jovially employed here. To conclude the celebration on a more serious note, we have added a list of Možný's main books, all of which have been published in Czech only - which is certainly a pity.

J.V. In jest you refer to yourself as the Viceroy of Moravia, a title that is certainly your due. I'd like to ask you to comment, from your noble heights, on some basic questions. Before the war, two schools of sociology evolved in this country, each with its own luminary and its own periodical, one in Prague, one in Brno. What about today? Are there still two schools of sociology? Or at least one nursery school?

I.M. One might be inclined to say that the less coffee there is in the cup, the easier it is to mix. But! Each of these two schools reproduces incestuously. I have discovered that in this country you cannot even pursue doctoral studies at a different school, which everywhere else is quite the norm. German universities, if I am not mistaken, are forbidden to accept their own doctoral students as assistants. We could of course make a similar arrangement, but just try suggesting something like that! Prague students don't apply to doctoral programmes in Brno because, well, Brno's just not Prague, and Brno students...well, Prague's just not the right quality. There are of course exceptions, those studying for their doctorates at foreign universities. And thank god, otherwise we'd have at best two nursery schools.

J.V. In the entry on modern Czech sociology in the Unabridged Dictionary of Sociology, you wrote of the little use that was made of the space that was opening up in the 1980s.

The space that opened up in the 1990s was understandably incomparably larger. Now, ten years after the dictionary was completed, has enough time passed to assess how this space was used? What's your view?

I.M. The 1990s will, I'm afraid, be cited as an example of intellectual inertia. The void of ideas has been filling up more slowly than a fully loaded oil tanker moves. But I see things in an optimistic light, the crisis has, I think, already peaked. For now, it rests on the growing resolve of the younger generation not to let things go on as they are.

J.V. Your distinctive publications include an explanation of the enigma of the 'velvet revolution' of the early 1990s, and a qualitative assessment of the state of Czech society in recent times in a work reviewed in this issue. I don't want to ask what you intend to surprise us with next, because then it wouldn't be a surprise. But more generally put, what do you consider to be the biggest shortcoming in Czech sociology?

I.M. Above all I feel the lack of a more significant number of specialised monographs, even ones of average or poorer quality. We haven't been able to get over the basic reflex of historical materialism: subconsciously we continue to be drawn to the big screen. And the misguided decision to publish only great works. It was I think in '53, when the ever brilliant Soviet leader Stalin decided that it was unnecessary for Mosfilm to make two hundred films annually, when one hundred and fifty of them would turn out to be grey, dull, and average. Instead, they're only going to make great films! So, the next year, only five films were selected for filming - and of course all nothing but bullshit. It wants a little more humility: Work on it, complete it, publish it! Not clips but a book, even if it's a short one. Let the context of changing public discourse decide what good it was - let's leave the recognition of quality to it. It needn't happen right away: Marcuse lived until he retired as an unsuccessful author, at times I think even on welfare benefits, and in the end Norbert Elias only discovered that his writing had been of some good because he lived into his nineties.

J.V. The Viceroy of Moravia, which indeed you are, has founded a new faculty, and it must be said that it's a richly diversified, full-blooded and active one. What about your successors - and I don't mean only formally in terms of your position? Won't the Viceroy's active charge turn to dust in the hands of the Diadochi? You devote a good deal of attention to the family and generational problems, so tell me, has the next generation matured yet, so that the 'lost' generation can quietly close the door behind itself?

I.M. Naturally it's not going to be the same without me as it was with me; at least for me it won't! That generation hasn't matured yet, but they're stomping at the door; that's the way things are. I would be thrilled to live to my nineties just to see whether today I've correctly picked out who among the current protagonists will be the future princes and kings of our sociology, beaten for so long!

Thank you for your responses. My warmest wishes on your birthday.

Jiří Večerník

Bibliography of the main books of Ivo Možný

Rodina vysokoškolsky vzdělaných manželů [*The Families of Post-Secondary Educated Spouses*]. Brno, Spisy FF UJEP, G 26/1982, pp. 43-67.

Moderní rodina: mýty a skutečnost [*The Modern Family: Myths and Reality*]. Brno, BLOK 1990.

Proč tak snadno... Některé rodinné důvody sametové revoluce [*Why So Easy... On Some Family Roots of the Velvet Revolution*]. Praha, Sociologické nakladatelství 1991.

Sociologie rodiny: její vývoj, teorie a základní problémy [*The Sociology of the Family: Its Evolution, Theory, and Basic Problems*]. Praha, Sociologické nakladatelství 1999.

Česká společnost: nejdůležitější fakta o kvalitě našeho života [*Czech Society: The Most Important Facts on the Quality of Our Life*]. Praha, Portál 2002.

Political Parties after Communism Developments in East-Central Europe

TOMÁŠ KOSTELECKÝ

Woodrow Wilson Center Press
and The John Hopkins University Press 2002, 213 p.

Political Parties after Communism reviews the development of political parties during the post-communist period in four Central and Eastern European countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The book looks at historical and cultural factors and their underlying role in the development of the present-day party systems and studies the relationship between the party system, social cleavages, and electoral rules. The author also searches for general patterns in the evolution towards party politics and in the current political culture in these four countries and presents his hypothesis on the move towards more rational and interest-based voter choices and towards greater political stability.

Tomáš Kostelecký is head of the Department of Local and Regional Problems at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague. He was a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars from 1996 to 1997 and a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science fellow at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, in 1999.

Ivo Možný: ***Česká společnost: nejdůležitější fakta o kvalitě našeho života (Czech Society: The Most Important Facts about the Quality of Our Life)***
Praha, Portál 2002, 206 p.

Since the revolutions of 1989, there have been countless analyses of the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. Particular attention has naturally focused on the development of democracy and capitalism, surely two of the most significant changes from the old regime. Less attention, however, has been devoted to way that everyday life has changed for citizens of the region.

Ivo Možný's *Czech Society: The Most Important Facts about the Quality of Our Life* tries to fill this gap. The work gathers statistical data on Czech life in areas such as family, health, leisure, and criminality and presents it in a reader friendly format. Except for brief introductory essays, the book mainly consists of graphs and tabloid-style factoids. Možný chose this style, he tells us, in an effort to allow readers to draw their own conclusions about Czech society. In this review, I take Možný at his word and ask the question: Was 1989 a watershed for the Czech people?

Even if a future demographer did not know what happened politically in 1989, it would not be hard for him to deduce that some earth-shattering event took place. In the ten years since the revolution, childbirths dropped by one-third, teenage marriages fell dramatically (in 1990 19% of brides were 19 or younger - among the highest percentages in Europe - today just 2% are that young), abortions plummeted, and the number of children born out of wedlock tripled.

These trends appear to be caused on the one hand by new opportunities (young people can now travel, start their own businesses, and have easier access to contraception) and on the other by state policies (single mothers receive higher social benefits than married couples). Možný even speculates that people value their own lives more highly today than they used to. Consider, for example, that the frequency of accidents and injuries has dropped by one-third.

By far the most dramatic changes are in environmental quality. Just about every indicator of quality has spiked. Nitrous oxides are 42% of their 1989 level, sulfur oxides 14%, and particulates just 10%. Air quality has improved in just about every town where it is measured and heavy metal emissions are down 40%. Natural waterways have become substantially cleaner and species of fish decimated under communism have returned to the country's rivers and streams. This is not to say that the Czech Republic does not still have work ahead of it - the rise in car use is especially disturbing - but the progress made in cleaning up smokestacks and treating waste water deserves notice.

Možný also overturns a number of myths about the baleful consequences of the transition. Throughout the 1990s, commentators lamented the death of Czech culture as state funding dried up and American imports overwhelmed the airwaves. Yet, these predictions were not fulfilled. There are more theatres and twice as many performances as there were in 1989. Czechs are still among the most devoted readers in Europe and they now have more than three times as many titles to choose from. While some worry about quality, Možný interestingly compares a newspaper from 1989 (8 pages, 1.5 pages of advertisements) with the same paper in 1999 (56 pages, 21 pages of advertisements). There are even twice as many museums - it would be interesting to know what kind, one would have expected there to be fewer - as under the old regime.

On other measures, 1989 is not so much a turning point as an extension (though at a faster rate) of previous trends. Life expectancy has increased dramatically (men today live about four years longer on average) and suicides have dropped. What makes these two indicators particularly interesting is that among post-communist countries they are unique to the Czech Republic. In every other transforming country life expectancy has dropped and suicides have increased.

There are of course areas of either stagnation or negative trends. As a former university dean, Možný devotes considerable attention to the educational system, especially in terms of how it compares to other countries. Among OECD members the Czech Republic is among

the worst off (down with Mexico and Turkey and even behind Hungary and Poland) with regard to the chances of being admitted to a university and the average number of years of university education completed.

As Možný points out, the legacy of the Czechs' brutal normalisation regime of the 1970s and 1980s weighs heavy on the country's system of higher education. The communist-era emphasis on technical and agricultural education has remained even as students prefer a Western-style liberal-arts education. Paradoxically, though the government has been reluctant to devote resources to education (it remains the only OECD country where teachers have wages below the national average), Czech students continue to perform extremely well in international comparisons.

If education is an area of stagnation, then criminality is by far the most negative trend. While the twenty years before 1989 saw approximately 100,000 crimes reported annually, by 1993 the number had jumped to 400,000, while the percentage of cases solved dropped from 77% to 44%. Moreover, deterrence does not seem to be working. Like most of the countries of Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic imprisons two to three times more of its citizens than a typical Western European country. (Možný misleadingly reports that the number of prisoners rose by 180% between 1990 and 1999, while neglecting to mention that the country's jails were virtually emptied by a general amnesty in 1990. According to his own graph there are fewer prisoners today than in 1987.)

Česká společnost provides a useful picture of what has happened in the Czech Republic since 1989, as well as interesting comparisons with the rest of the world. Možný has a talent for interesting and revealing factoids. (His biography tells us that he has worked as a radio commentator.) The range of subjects is broad, though there are some areas where Možný could have captured additional turning points in Czech lifestyles. Changes in consumption (e.g. shopping and eating habits) and travel - for many the most important benefits - would attest to the 'revolutionary' impact of 1989.

The book's style makes it an appealing companion for the general public, journalists, and even to students looking for research topics. Scholars, however, will probably miss a deeper analysis of the problems covered. One particularly wants to know how Možný would explain Czech 'exceptionalism': why Czechs managed to avoid some of the more fatal consequences of transition. Was it its lower unemployment rate that made life better for Czechs than for its neighbours, or was some other factor at work?

As for Czech society itself, the book provides eloquent testimony to the ground that has been covered in the last ten years. If we judge a society by the degree to which people are both free to make their own choices and have a wide set of options to choose from, Czech society today is incomparably better than it was in 1989. And it is so, even if these choices are to have fewer babies, marry less, or commit more crimes. On this score Czechs have voted with their feet. From being a land of emigration the Czech Republic has become a land of immigration. For the first time in living memory, more Czechs - not just foreigners - are choosing to return to the country than leave.

Andrew Roberts

Peter Skalník (ed.): ***The Transition to Democracy. The Czech Republic and South Africa Compared***
Praha, Set Out 1999, 92 p.

Between the Czech Republic and South Africa there exist vast differences - in geography, history, population, industrialisation, the system of government, the economy and the development of civil rights. Therefore, the idea of a comparison of the Czech Republic and South Africa would appear to be a courageous undertaking. The authors of the book - Peter Skalník, Jan K. Coetzee, Otakar Hulec, Vishnu Padayachee and Luboš Kropáček - agree that it is perhaps an unusual exercise to make a number of fairly detailed comparisons between the Czech Republic and South Africa. However, they find this unusual comparison attractive to many people these days.

Luboš Kropáček highlights the similarities of both societies. South Africa and Czechoslovakia both experienced non-democratic regimes in the past 51 years. In both countries, the large majority of people were deprived of freedom and human rights by an oppressive system of government established in 1948. Both regimes followed the paths of false ideologies - apartheid and communism. Both regimes were subject to interference from the influence of the Soviet Union. The communist regime in Czechoslovakia was sustained by the Soviet Union, and in South Africa, communist sympathisers mixed with black resistance movements, while the ANC was a former instrument of Russian expansionism there. Gorbachev's *perestroika* brought about the disintegration of these regimes and the triumph of liberal democracy. In both countries the change has come about by peaceful means and both nations have decided to look to the West, but the process of transformation has been specific in each case.

Jan K. Coetzee outlines the events of the beginning of democratisation in the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and, of course, South Africa. He mentions the many changes influenced by democratisation - economic, political and social changes, and changes in the perceptions of people. Readers outside South Africa will find interesting how blacks advanced within the state thanks to new labour laws and training programmes. Also informative are the sections dealing with the role of mass action and trade unions, political parties and electoral results, state intervention in the economy, and criminality in the era of South African democratisation.

Otakar Hulec writes about the cruel authoritarian past in the two countries. In South Africa, racial segregation, a violent army and police force, and political rivals on both sides - the apartheid regime and the national movements - inflicting gross human rights violations, formed a part of the country's modern history. Interracial co-operation and the attempt to apply human rights led to more peaceful development, and in 1994 the first non-racial parliamentary elections in South Africa took place. They were won by the African National Congress, headed by Nelson Mandela, who became president in 1995. The new South Africa decided to come to terms with the cruel past without violence and consequently created the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (the head of the TRC was Archbishop Desmond Tutu). Every South African, regardless of colour, could appear before the TRC, and many crimes and wrongdoings - political murders, long-term imprisonment and the pursuit of political opponents - were to be clarified.

In the Czech Republic, the breakdown of the totalitarian (in fact, post-totalitarian) regime occurred in November 1989. The process of democratisation started immediately, but the new society has not fully reckoned with the totalitarian past. Political rehabilitation and the restitution of property represented only part of the compensation necessary for coping with the past. People expected that those who served the communist regime and committed humanitarian crimes against political prisoners would be sentenced (though not imprisoned) and that communist officials would apologise for the regime's violation of human rights and its own laws. The Office for Documenting and Investigating the Crimes of Communism was established and affiliated to the Ministry of the Interior with the purpose of investigating these crimes.

In Czechoslovakia the communist regime had nationalised almost all economic activities, from the big industries and banks down to small enterprises, and created an economic system known as state socialism. Therefore, transformation was understood not only as a change of the whole political system, but also as a change of the economic system. While the movers in political change restored the principles of democracy and established a parliamentary system of government, the movers in the economic transformation initiated the restitution of property, the rapid privatisation of state enterprises, and trade liberalisation. In South Africa, the regime was not fully democratic, but the economy was more or less market oriented. Vishnu Padayachee describes the South African economy be-

tween 1948 and 1970 as more regulated and after 1970 as less regulated. Nevertheless, we can see one similar feature in the economic policy debate after 1990 in both countries - the emergence of opposing views. In the 1990s there were tensions between the defenders of the supply-side and the demand-side reforms within the African National Congress, along with contradictory economic visions of NEM (minimal state) and MERG/ISP (expanding public sector) in South Africa. In the Czech Republic, there arose two conceptions of economic reform and policy, too. The first conception - the liberal attempt - originated at the level of the federal Czechoslovak government and was drafted by right-wing economists, led by the Minister of Finance at that time, Václav Klaus. The second conception - the social democratic attempt - originated at the level of the national Czech government and was drafted by left-wing economists (Komárek, Zeman, Matějka).

While economic topics are featured quite extensively in the book, political topics would have merited more space. South Africa and the Czech Republic have, for example, a more or less comparable system of government at the present time. Luboš Kropáček notes that both countries are characterised by multi-party parliamentarism. More precisely, both countries have a parliamentary system of government and an electoral system that favours multi-partyism. In South Africa and the Czech Republic there are two-chamber parliaments. The lower chambers (the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic and the National Assembly in South Africa) are elected through a system of proportional representation, which favours multipartyism in both countries. The South African upper chamber - the National Council of Provinces - is a representative body of provinces and is elected by the provincial parliaments. The Czech upper chamber - the Senate - is an anomaly. It does not represent any regions, provinces or states and is elected through an absolute majority system with an inversely proportional effect. In both countries there is a parliamentary system of government, the executive is not fully disconnected from the legislative, and the president is elected by parliament. Moreover, in South Africa, the president is the head of state and the head of the national executive (and he has the power of a prime minister, as well).

Even though Peter Skalník has promised a comparison of the Czech Republic and South Africa with special emphasis on political culture during the 1990s, both the description of the political system and the description of the political culture are missing. Readers will not find any section systematically dedicated to the political values, attitudes and preferences (i.e. political culture) of South African and Czech citizens (i.e. political nations). While 'political culture' is a clearly defined term in the social sciences, during the 1990s the term was often used in the Czech Republic incorrectly as a synonym for the human behaviour of politicians. Skalník demonstrates an inclination towards the incorrect definition and pays no attention to the political values, attitudes and preferences of the people.

The 'hegemony' of a political party is another term that may confuse readers. Skalník writes that during the first years of existence of the new Czech Republic, the 'hegemony' of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Prime Minister Klaus seemed unchallenged, but in fact, ODS never acted as hegemonic party. According to Jerzy Wiatr a hegemonic party is the term applied to a non-democratic system of government, in which other parties exist but party competition is not allowed. A hegemonic party plays the lead in the political system, and other parties act as satellites and do not challenge its position. The position of ODS in the party system of the Czech Republic corresponded to the position of a predominant party (Sartori) for six years, and for that period it was the strongest party in the party system and the strongest member of the government coalition, but it never attempted to suppress party competition in the country nor did it embrace this idea. It acted as a party with a majority role and was permanently challenged, not only by the opposition parties, but also by the other two members of the government coalition - ODA and KDU-ČSL. The blackmail potential of these two parties has

been described many times in political science literature in the Czech Republic.

Another important term that may confuse readers is 'civil society'. Skalnik writes that for ODS, civil society smacked of direct democracy and populism. In the Czech Republic, after 1989 a big debate was initiated over the term 'civil society'. ODS (Klaus and his supporters) have taken the liberal view of civil society. Liberals locate many associations in a civil society (interest groups, churches, trade unions, political parties, trade companies) and perceive them as equal, while corporativists, social liberals and certain influential intellectuals, have a narrower scope of the associations within it (they exclude trade companies and even political parties) and perceive some of them as privileged in governmental relations (and especially privileged over political parties). While liberals, according to the Czech constitution, agree that the "political system is based on the free and voluntary creation and free competition of political parties ..." (article no. 5), their opponents label this stance as a rejection of civil society. Those who defend the corporativist approach to civil society maintain that the election results should be corrected (by the president) and that the influence of the parties in the public sphere should be minimised (by 'independent' organisations and intellectuals). Peter Skalnik probably shares the non-liberal view of civil society. In this respect readers will find interesting the short reference to civil society in Coetzee's article. He writes that governmental, state, semi-state and parastal organisations (i.e. privileged organisations of corporativist civil society) represent a substantial source of growing apathy in society.

In the editorial chapter we find the incorrect usage of the above-mentioned terms and many simplifications of complex problems. In short, I think it is dubious to simply describe, for example, pre-war Czechoslovakia as 'one of the exemplary democracies', privatisation as a 'Marxist experiment', the division of the Czechoslovak federacy as the arrogant decision of the victorious parties in the Czech and Slovak parts of the republic and the result of ignoring calls for a referendum, the position of Slovakia in access to the EU as a motive for Klaus' politics, and citizenship laws containing the condition of criminal probity as the cause behind Czech xenophobia. The comparison of virtually similar processes in two different countries is indeed a challenging but difficult task, and the prerequisite for doing so is broader knowledge of the compared societies and more analytical access. This book, though it presents a great deal of interesting information, has not completely satisfied this task.

Klára Vlachová

Georg Vobruba: ***Integration + Erweiterung. Europa in Globalisierungsdilemma***
Wien, Passagen Verlag 2000, 195 p.

Georg Vobruba, currently Professor and Dean of the Social Science Faculty of the University of Leipzig, is well known through his writings about the labour market and social policy. For many years he has been concentrating on European integration issues viewed from a comprehensive socio-political perspective. In a series of books, he has presented insightful observations and often also revelatory optics, featured mostly in terms of dialectics, dilemmas and conflicts. This is also the prevailing vocabulary of the book reviewed here, which is devoted to the 'dilemma of globalisation'.

The main thesis of the study is that it is because of globalisation that the European welfare state - which is a precondition of the successful development of Europe - is falling into trouble. More concretely, a 'viscious circle' is produced when increasing social-political problems lead to higher labour costs, which aggravate competition abilities and, consequently, bring about even more unemployment (p. 97). However, not only social policy based on employment status, but also universal systems are vulnerable, albeit somewhat less. In any case, the European welfare state is being seriously challenged by the globalisation process.

The book is divided into two grand sections. The first is about the self-accomplishment

of politics in the globalisation dilemma and the second is about the dialectics of European integration and enlargement. In conclusion, the author assesses the perspectives of the eastern enlargement of the European Union.

In the first section, Vobruba presents a basically optimistic view regarding the interplay between globalisation and the European style of welfare state. He is convinced that social policy is a precondition of successfully coping with globalisation. The development of the welfare state within globalisation is even desirable in the sense of the *self-accomplishment* of politics. The globalisation dilemma can be solved if globalisation is supported by social policy. Because globalisation pushes economic growth, it leads to higher state revenue. The author rejects the arguments that globalisation requires tax reductions and that it involves additional social costs.

One very important observation is that social change in modern times becomes reflexive and thus politics itself arranges advantageous conditions for social change. Politics is obliged to create opportunity structures and appropriate situational contexts that enable individuals to cope with social change and adapt to it. Social policy is necessary in the process of globalisation and its accomplishment is a condition of the self-accomplishment of politics as such. The only alternative to this is the self-destruction of politics. In brief, this is how Vobruba's message may be understood.

In the last part of the first section, the author compares the US and European social system. In a stylised form, the first is presented as short-term oriented, clearly separated from the labour market, with distributional conflicts solved as a zero-sum game. The low level of social protection is *displayed* in low labour costs and, eventually, in low hourly productivity. In contrast, the second is observed as long-term oriented, with strong and even increasing (during European integration) links between social protection and the labour market, with corporatist arrangements enabling the solution of distributional conflicts as a positive-sum game.

Contrasting pictures of the US and European social systems continue in the author's distinguishing of two types of flexibility: the first is only adaptive, imposed on individuals, with the dominance of numerical flexibility; the second is innovative, initiated, with the dominance of the functional flexibility. In the latter case, social protection enables people to adapt, involving their participation and not endangering their quality of life. Instead of liberty *from* the welfare state, the aim is to reach the liberty *through* the welfare state, which makes economic and life-quality possible in parallel, but in a wider horizon. Not only is the globalisation challenge more relevant for Europe than for the US, Europe is also more ready to cope with it in the long term.

The second section is focused on the 'dialectics of integration and expansion'. By integrating the formerly poor periphery of countries step by step into an affluent centre, the welfare gap shifts outwards. The outer regions are able to protect the centre only if they have no serious political and economic problems themselves. Consequently the progressing integration of the EU is an important reason for its expansion. The author calls this 'expansion by extended integration'. Calculated inclusion operates according to the logic of 'self-interested aid', which is based on the concern for solving problems at their origin in order to prevent negative spill-over effects. Taken as a forerunner of the EU eastern enlargement, German unification provides a good example of the mode of operation of 'expansion by extended integration'.

Moreover, there is also 'expansion by deepened integration', which in concrete terms is outlined by borderless territory (Schengen-countries) and by the common currency (Euro-countries). On the one hand, deepened integration led to the shared interest of the richest EU members in maintaining high standards of control at the outer EU border, triggering attempts to intervene in the practices of control of those members with the outer borders. On the other hand, ongoing European integration led to the interest of the rich centre in improving the economy and stabilising the political situation in the EU neighbour regions.

The enlargement has important limits: first external, i.e. territorial limits, and second inner,

distributional limits, which are again twofold - the institutional problems of the organisation of consensus-building and the material problem consisting in raising and distributing EU finances. The fact that eastern enlargement will include relatively poor and small new members goes beyond the financial capacities of the EU. The Convent, launched in 2001 as a forum for solving inner obstacles to further integration and enlargement, is in fact dominated by the political representatives of individual states, and thus offers political room for defending national interests rather than overcoming them.

Eastern enlargement also unleashes the problem of legitimacy, which includes two arguments: pacification (no wars) and prosperity (positive sum game). Both arguments are weak, argues Vobruba - the pacification argument is too inclusive (it holds true for everybody) while the prosperity argument is not inclusive enough (costs and gains are unequally distributed across time as well as between different social groups). The integration of Europe is actually a project of the elites. However much people agree with further integration in general terms, with regard to their living circumstances, scepticism prevails. The result is thus an entanglement of interests.

In such a constellation the risk arises that attitudes towards eastern enlargement in both the member and candidate states will lead to diverging and mutually incompatible elite strategies. As long as the candidates are willing to join, there is not enough inclusion capacity in the West; and as soon as the necessary inclusion capacity arrives, the willingness to join vanishes. This is the scenario of the greatest possible misfortune, which will probably not come true. However, the lengthy process of enlargement tends to jeopardise the possibilities of an encompassing deepening of the integration.

Georg Vobruba's oeuvre is very condensed and thus often not easy to read. He does not work with simple numbers and shop-floor arguments, but considers problems on a higher level and in their complexity. He does not introduce concrete political recipes either. As a true researcher, he mostly works with stylised facts and reflects on possible scenarios. Only one thing is certain: actual economic integration should also be politically framed. The question remains open as to whether the EU of tomorrow will be the Europe of today, and whether its institutions and habits are strong enough to include the communist legacy of the East.

Jiří Večerník

Mitchell A. Orenstein: ***Out of the Red. Building Capitalism and Democracy in the Postcommunist Europe***

Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press 2001, 166 p.

The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe seem for many to represent great political and economical laboratories for studying exceptional social development and for testing different theoretical models of transformation from the state-owned economy to the capitalist one, and from the near-totalitarian state to democratic society. For this reason literature on the post-communist transition is not too rare, although it is usually only concerned with clarifying the different theoretical models of economic and policy development, and on evaluating radical strategies of market reform. Unfortunately, the applicability of such theories, models, and advice to Central European reality is obviously poor; at best these are good-will-without-knowledge tips. Orenstein's *Out of the Red* seems to be another case. The author has deeply immersed himself in the history of the transformation and the struggle to build capitalism and democracy in two post-communist countries, Poland and the Czech Republic, and has made some general assertions about the relationship between capitalism and democracy in the present world.

Orenstein starts with an evaluative description of the different (by the West) recommended strategies of post-communist transformation, mainly neo-classical (which he calls 'neo-liberal', see below) and social-democratic. He chronicles the central conflict between those who feared that democracy would pose obstacles to radical economic reform - belonging to the former view - and those who feared that rapid eco-

nomic reform would pose dangers to democracy - usually of the second, mentioned view. But in fact he pregnantly describes the degree to which the authors of both perspectives have feared the eventual 'bolshevic backlash' as a result of reform uncertainty and 'transition costs', and concludes that such pessimistic predictions were completely wrong, mainly given the public will for a 'return to Europe'. There are three other main chapters in Orenstein's book: the first is dedicated to a deep description of Poland's radical neo-classical strategy of economic reform from the end of the 1980s, its quick fall in the early 1990s, and the development of its alternatives, oriented more towards social cohesion, and at the same time its inheritors (p. 25-60). Another large chapter is dedicated to the Czech way of transformation, which Orenstein calls 'social liberalism' (p. 7), as it held many social-democratic elements beyond the shell of radical neo-classical and pro-market rhetoric. Unlike Poland, Czech economic reformers, and especially Václav Klaus, persisted in power for the long uninterrupted period of 1989-1997. But in the end the Klaus government also fell owing to a string of bank failures, and a concurrent series of scandals over the Civic Democratic Party's finances (p. 61-95). A deep analysis of the different privatisation policies for state-owned property and their difficulties, especially in the case of mass (voucher) privatisation which today is viewed by the majority as having been a great mistake, forms the most important part of Orenstein's book (p. 96-127). In these pages the author elucidates his theory that no economic orthodoxy *per se* is adequate for wide transformation development, but the process of policy learning made by their democratic alternation corrects their particular errors and mistakes. In his own words, "by contrasting the positive outcomes of policy change in Poland with the relatively poor results of policy stability in the Czech Republic, this study suggests that democratic policy alternation has been surprisingly effective at facilitating transition process ... policy change and alternation between distinct policy portfolios proved to foster the process of economic reform" (p. 129).

Due to the unexpected victory of Solidarity in the summer 1989 elections, the deep crisis in the Polish economy in the late 1980s, and the election of L. Balcerowicz - described as a technocrat in Dominguez's typology of policy and economy leaders - as the finance minister, Orenstein argues that Poland adopted the 'shock therapy' of economic reform, which ought to have been faster than the evantual backlash. But almost at the same time the popularity of Solidarity had fallen, which was unsuccessfully solved by trying to establish the authoritarian government of President Walesa, and which led to instability on the Polish political scene, the fragmentation of the Solidarity camp, the exclusion of radical neo-classicism, a shift from technocratic to social pact strategies, a slow-down of privatisation, and the adoption of other, different methods for it. When the regrouped right won the elections in 1997, Balcerowicz was no longer a technocrat but a technopol (in Dominguez's sense, another type of politician alongside the technocrat: technopols are individuals with technocratic training who are not affraid of the political game but instead realise normal political engagement and pragmatism to be the best methods for creating a stable basis for long-term structural change and personal power), and began to implement a new set of reforms, which were no longer 'shocking' but rather pragmatic, though not completely deideologised or opportunistic. Due to frequent alternations of policy, between 'radicals' and 'gradualists', and the call for necessary compromises, Orenstein argues, that Poland was able to achieve a high level of economic performance. On the other hand, the Czech economic performance was much worse from 1993, primarily owing to many reform mistakes, which were inevitable in occurring but which could not be corrected due to the fact that Klaus remained in power for eight long years. The Czech financial minister and later prime minister was, unlike Balcerowicz, a technopol from the outset, which can be clearly seen (though at times is not seen even now in the Czech Republic) in the difference between his speeches and his actions. "[He] was a committed neoliberal who often spoke of

creating a 'market without adjectives'," writes Orenstein, "however ... accept a social liberal compromise" (p. 62). The pragmatic mixture of some radical reforms inspired by neo-classical economics, mainly the mass privatisation, with the unconfessed extensive social-democratic compensation measures concealed in liberal rhetoric won for Klaus long-term domestic popularity and temporary international fame as a hero of liberal market capitalism. Unfortunately, this situation, which was ultimately changed by Tošovský's caretaker government and the partial turn to the left after the 1998 elections, prolonged the errors of the Czech economic reform, mainly the absence of its legal framework, allowing mass corruption and tunneling which almost destroyed the state budget and threatened the health of the economy. Orenstein argues that it was the persistance of a single group of reformers, not some surplus of social-cohesive practices in Klaus' reform as some neo-classical economists believe, that was responsible for the errors and general weakness of Czech economic growth in the 1990s (p. 94-95). Another important finding, almost unknown in the West and radically denied in the Czech Republic, is that Czech reform was full of appeals to historic traditions and high levels of a certain kind of economic nationalism (p. 76nn.). It seems a pity that Orenstein, and of course the large majority of other political scientists and economists, is not too interested in the closely related subjects of social and economical anthropology. In this particular case many important findings about the 'historicism' of Czech culture and the embeddedness of social behaviour, including economic behaviour, were made even before Orenstein by the British anthropologist of Czech origin Ladislav Holý in his famous study *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation* (1996).

This is not the only reproof to Orenstein's study. In addition to his really good analysis of Polish and Czech political and economic transformations in the 1990s and deep knowledge of many social processes, which should be highly appreciated, there are some mistakes in his book, beginning with the incorrect transcription of some local names and terms, and continuing to certain historical errors. For example, Gustav Husák, the Czech president of the so-called 'normalisation era', was not installed in office in 1968 (p. 66) but in 1975 (from April 1969 he was the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party), the Czech Agrarian politician and a minister in the First Republic, Antonín Švehla, was not named Martin and did not publish any autobiography (p. 147), and so on. Orenstein's description of the leftist wing of the former Civic Forum as 'social democrats' also seems confusing given the parallel existence of the Czech Social Democratic Party (re-founded in 1990, though until the midle of the 1990s politically unimportant), which ultimately won the elections in 1998. But I am sure that these rather marginal errors do not reduce the analytic value of the study; two other areas however are more serious.

Orenstein's analysis is deeply concerned with policy and the description of economic development, but leaves behind the social and cultural level in a broad sense, including values and ethical standards, which affect all kinds of behaviour in every other institutional sphere. In other words, one could (and should) ask, for example, whether it was not primarily the public moral disappointment of Balcerowicz's former reform policy in Poland, in the sense of its significant difference from the pre-election rhetoric, that resulted in the fall of public support for radical reform, contrary to Orenstein's description of the situation as a result of wide public economic disappointment and Balcerowicz's lack of political impact (p. 42-43)? Similarly, in the Czech case, although most research would agree with the description that it was just pragmatic policy goals that led to Czechoslovakia's split into two countries, did the background of public opinions about the 'velvet divorce' lie only in such a selfish (= nationalistic) pragmatism, as the author emphasises (p. 84-85)? It seems to me that these and some other important questions could not be solved in a narrow economic and polical framework and must be asked in a broader historical, social, and cultural context, with special emphasis on trans-subjective values and symbolic universes.

The second problem, though not entirely separate, rests in Orenstein's (ab)use of the term 'neo-liberalism'. He occasionaly uses it as a description of Klaus' policy, which was in fact 'social liberal', and primarily for Balcerowicz's neoclassical policy, which eventually led to *ipso facto* anti-liberal authoritarian temptations (to be correct, Orenstein knows about the differences and describes such policies as *neo*-liberal in opposition to classic liberal thought (*cf.* p. 13). Unfortunately, through such a description the analyst prolongs, mainly in the Czech political context, Klaus' own rhetoric and self-designation as the only liberal and pro-market politician, which led to deep public dissatisfaction with so-called liberalism, associated for many with a high level of corruption, economic fraud, and unhealthy social nets among the in-groups in the Czech economy and policy. This rhetorically embedded the widespread social discredit of liberalism, which may also include democratic policy and which will take quite some time to address; a modest example of the misunderstanding of the term is an interview with the youngest Czech MP (for the unreformed Czech Communist Party) after the last elections, who said her political model is Margaret Thatcher! I would prefer to describe Klaus' policy as a mixture of neo-classical and social democratic acts with only rhetorically liberal frames. L. Balcerowicz's radical reform in Poland and its social consequences, although quite different, would seem to be similar.

Nevertheless, to conclude, this book provides the essential analysis of recent economic and political development in two post-communist countries, affords the backgrounds necessary for understanding the present-day problems of the region, and also tries to solve some more general problems of co-existence and mutual relationship between policy and the economy, and their particular ideological universes, in the democratic Western societies. Alongside its importance as a good source of information about this field of research, it may also serve anyone interested in the relationship between capitalism and democracy in the contemporary world.

Zdeněk R. Nešpor

Toshio Yamagishi: The Structure of Trust. An Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society. ***Hokkaido behavioral science report*****, No. SP-13** Sapporo, Japan, Hokkaido University 2002, 157 p. (translation of Toshio Yamagishi: *Shinraino Kozo: Kokoroto Shakaino Shinka Gemu.* Tokyo: Tokyo University Press 1998. Translated by Feixue Wang)

This book is written around the central message that collectivist society produces security but destroys trust (p. 9, 140). The Japanese social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi challenges the widely shared understanding that an environment of a lasting and stable community is the most favourable environment for fostering trust. He distinguishes between the assurance of security among compatriots on the one hand, and the trust in the human nature of other people, a trust that goes beyond one's own group, on the other (p. 10). In contrast to past research on trust, which has emphasised the relation fortification aspect of trust, Yamagishi directs the reader's attention to its relation extension aspect: trust emancipates people from closed relations and leads them to form spontaneous relations with new partners (p. 11).

In the first chapter Yamagishi describes 'three paradoxes of trust', which show the conflicting premises of the common sense idea of trust. For example the first paradox is that, on the one hand, trust is most needed in situations of high social uncertainty, situations where 'trust' is most difficult to produce. On the other hand, trust is not needed in stable relations, where 'trust' is the most easily produced (p. 19). Chapter two provides conceptual clarifications and definitions of the different aspects of trust. Yamagishi divides trust into character-based trust and relational trust. Character-based trust is based on a judgment of trustworthiness as a general character trait. In contrast, relational trust is based on a judgment of a person's attitudes and feelings towards the ego. According to the type of information, character-based trust is divided further into personal trust, category-based trust, and general trust (p. 41n).

Key parts of the book explain Yamagishi's

original approach - the emancipation theory of trust - and its current theoretical appendix - the 'investment of a cognitive resources model of trust development'. The emancipation theory of trust consists of six propositions: 1) Trust is meaningful only in situations where social uncertainty exists. Trust is not needed in situations where there is no possibility of being deceived or exploited by others. 2) People tend to form commitment relations to deal with the problems caused by social uncertainty. 3) Commitment relations incur opportunity costs. 4) In a social situation in which the level of opportunity cost is high, it is more advantageous to leave commitment relations rather than to remain in them. 5) Compared to 'high-trusters' (whose level of general trust, or trust in other people in general is higher), 'low-trusters' have a stronger tendency to form and maintain commitment relations with specific partners when they face high social uncertainty. 6) Under high social uncertainty and high opportunity costs, 'high-trusters' will have a better chance of making more profits than 'low-trusters'.

In chapters four and five Yamagishi presents the whole range of experiments, computer simulations, and surveys which support the different parts of his theory. The laboratory experiments (e.g. different prisoner's dilemma games) tested the internal validity of the causal propositions. The Japan-US, comparative questionnaire studies proved the external validity or the generalisation potential of the theory. This combination of various research methodologies, which served to avoid the limits of each one of them, is an interesting example that is worth following.

According to the emancipation theory general trust is advantageous in an environment in which high levels of social uncertainty and opportunity costs co-exist, but it does not mean that high-trusters cannot be exploited when they leave commitment relations. This raises the question of trust acquisition. Yamagishi states that in contrast to the assurance of security, it is difficult to explain trust as the production of rational decision-making or other conscious activity; nor can trust be explained genetically. He has realised that general trust may be acquired as a by-product of social intelligence. This is cultivated through the investment of cognitive resources, such as paying attention to other people's trustworthiness. It is consistent with the results of a series of experiments and other studies which Yamagishi and others have conducted. They indicate that high-trusters are more sensitive to information about the trustworthiness of others, and that they distinguish trustworthy people from untrustworthy ones more accurately than low-trusters. In other words, socially intelligent people will not suffer serious damage even if they assume (by default) that all people are trustworthy.

When socially intelligent high-trusters leave commitment relations to seek new opportunities they need to be chosen by new partners. In this case trustworthiness improves one's chances of being chosen. These three traits (trust, trustworthiness and social intelligence), when they exist as a set, are advantageous to one's self-interest, especially in the more open society. (Sociologists may ask if these psychological traits are associated with individual social status.) In contrast, Yamagishi sees the core of collectivist society in the equilibrium between the closed nature of social relations and in-group favouritism.

During recent years warning prophecies about trust crises have been heard in different countries (e.g. Putnam in the U.S., Sztompka in Poland, Možný in the Czech Republic). According to Yamagishi, the breakdown not of trust but of the assurance of security constitutes an urgent problem of Japanese society (p. 148). Japanese society has for a long time successfully reduced opportunity costs through extending networks of commitment relations. The Japanese style of management (*keiretsu* relations, lifetime employment) has come under critical scrutiny recently. In the future the strategy of extending networks may yield to the alternative strategy of utilising open-market relations and this can evoke the problem of the breakdown of the assurance of security. Yamagishi states that more extreme examples are found in the former Eastern bloc countries, where the assurance of security collapsed owing to the weakening of the central authority (p. 148). These countries need

to establish networks of commitment relations among legitimate businesses and organisations in order to restrain Mafia activities and to build the foundations for economic development (p. 151).

Yamagishi's book offers many inspirations. We can agree with Yamagishi's diagnosis that the post-communist countries are not endangered by a lack of trust but by the lack of assurance of security. His view explains the nostalgia for the past political regime and the current wave of nationalistic rhetoric, which has appeared even in countries that avoided violent ethnic conflicts after 1989.

In conceptual clarifications (chapter two) Yamagishi surprisingly rejects all of Luhmann's trust theory. But I think that, for example, Luhmann's proposition about the trust surrounding *Kontrollempfindlichkeiten* meets Yamagishi's statement that socially intelligent high-trusters are not naive or gullible. The reason for the rejection may lie in the different starting points of both authors. For Luhmann it is the theoretical situation of double contingency, while Yamagishi is thinking about a real entity - collectivist Japanese society.

In 1998 Toshio Yamagishi won the Nikkei Prize for Excellent Books in Economic Science on the basis of the Japanese original of the book reviewed here. Using economic terms (transaction costs, opportunity costs, investment) seems to be helpful in the development of trust theory, but their application to real societies poses the problem of their presumable normative neutrality or objectivity. How can we measure the opportunity costs of staying in commitment relations? Who decides what functioning of society is successful or effective? Is deregulation the road to so-called open society? Yamagishi leaves these and other questions unanswered.

Dan Ryšavý

Zygmunt Bauman in Prague - a New Impulse for Czech Sociology

If the middle of August signified a blow to the Czech sociological community (the flooding of the sociological library in the Czech Academy of Science), the middle of October could, conversely, be seen as an impulse for its revival. From October 15 to 17, the internationally renowned sociologist Zygmunt Bauman visited Prague for the purpose of being awarded an honorary doctorate from Charles University. But although he came to *receive* the honour, and he himself said it was an honour very special and close to his heart, one would dare say that it was he who during his stay provided the Czech sociological community with a tremendous gift.

Professor Bauman, together with his wife Janina Bauman, came to Prague on the personal invitation of Professor Petrusek, who along with his wife, were accompanying Mr. and Mrs. Bauman during their visit.

On October 16, Professor Bauman gave a lecture at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Jinonice, which according to his wishes was particularly dedicated to students and young scholars. The lecture was therefore advertised among the students of the Faculty of Social Sciences, the Faculty of Arts, and the Faculty of Humanities, and was chaired by two young sociologists, Markéta Sedláčková and Jan Balon. The hall in which the lecture took place was filled with students, professors and other guests.

The main goal of Professor Bauman's lecture was to introduce and elaborate one of his most recent contributions to the discussion of the contemporary world: the numerous changes in the conditions of the everyday life of modern man. In his works, Professor Bauman concentrates on and attempts to understand these processes, and he reflects upon them, for it is reflection that is, according to Professor Bauman, the greatest power given to us by God. In fact, reflection is what we nowadays lack most - we do not have time for it. Professor Bauman attempts to apply this kind of reflection in his recent books: *Globalisation: The Human Consequences* (1998, in Czech 1999), *In Search of Politics* (1999) and *Liquid Modernity* (2000).

In the first part of the lecture, Professor Bauman characterised his notion of contemporary society. By using several examples of the life of young people around the globe, he outlined a major move from delayed to immediate gratification and from post-war consumerism to post-consumerism, as experienced especially in the United States. The fact that today young people do not want to be bound to one place anymore is very well reflected in their lifestyles - they hold no stable jobs and refuse any stable property or even further any property as such. But not everyone has decided to live according to these values. On the other side of the continuum are those who cumulate property. But they have changed, too. Bauman demonstrated the changing mode of property commutation through an example provided by the sociologist Richard Sennett, who compared the ideals of a wealthy person: while in the nineteenth century it was John D. Rockefeller who represented the ideal of wealth, in the twentieth century it is Bill Gates. While the former invested in concrete and solid property, such as rails and land, the latter prefers a liquid or, in a sense, virtual possession - money, for money can easily, without batting an eye (or PC monitor), be transferred to a different space or use. For Professor Bauman, this is a sign of the recent growing significance of the phenomenon of forgetting. What else could the term flexible mean, if not the ability to forget old habits as soon as the particular goal is reached and to cultivate new ones as they emerge? What was understood as pathology in the past - to live for the purpose of contest and new sensation - has become the norm. Nowadays life is composed of episodes - short stories with no consequences. Bauman asks, in the same way Kundera does, how do we know that a certain event was just an episode, as life *per se* is a continuous and holistic process.

Professor Bauman then concentrated on another aspect of today's world - deterioration of trust. He defines three categories of trust: trust in oneself, trust in others, and trust in institutions. He then goes on to reason that it was the decline of trust in institutions which caused all the other types of trust to wither. In the past people recognised institutions as rational and

eternal in comparison with their own short lives; recently, however, like the hero of Kafka's *Castle*, they have come to understand that even institutions can be and are irrational and ephemeral. This change also concerns the issue of identity - it becomes harder to maintain the continuity of one's own identity vis a vis the discontinuity of the external institutions. According to Bauman, the evaporation of trust, as well as the crisis of personal identity, is the drama of current society.

The lecture was followed by a very vibrant discussion. The problem of the need for certainty and solidity in an uncertain and liquid world arose as the first question. According to Professor Bauman, money and networks play this role more and more and are viewed as the only appreciated solids. As uncertainty penetrates our whole world, even the basic questions of human life - such as morality or love - become uncertain. For Bauman, love means desiring the best for a loved one, but it requires that one have an image of what is the best for the person. Here a discrepancy or gap occurs between the image of the best as understood by the loved and the loving. This can lead to coercion and violence, but the other option is indifference. Solidarity is outdated, for we tend to lead our solitary lives towards individual salvation. We can ask ourselves if this traumatic diagnosis in which the world is experiencing the end of humanity was Bauman's goal. We don't think so, and remembering Bauman's basic premise on reflection, we can adopt his call for critical and reflective thinking about our times and lives, without falling into deep depression.

The discussion was followed by the signing of his two books, recently published in the Czech language. The first book - the second edition of *Úvahy o postmoderní době* [*Reflections on Postmodernity*] is a unique collection of Bauman's essays gathered especially for the Czech edition. The second book is the new translation of Bauman's recent book *Liquid Modernity* (2000), just published by Mladá Fronta Press on the occasion of Bauman's visit. Professor Bauman was deeply moved when he realised that some people had brought for his signature even the old edition of *Sociology for Every Day* from the 1960s.

Later, Professor Bauman departed to view the empty shelves prepared for the real sociological treasure - the endowment of Bauman's personal sociological library. This generous gift was Professor Bauman's spontaneous reaction to the news (mediated by Professor Petrusek) of the flooding of the sociological library of the Academy of Sciences.

The morning session, dedicated to students, was followed by a more official, diplomatic afternoon - a reception at the Polish embassy, where Bauman had the opportunity to also meet with the larger Czech sociological community. Mr. and Mrs. Bauman were received by His Excellency, the Polish Ambassador Andrzej Krawczyk, who made a very personal welcoming speech, recalling his school years at Warsaw University where he first encountered Bauman's work. During that time Bauman was already in exile in England at the University of Leeds, where he emigrated in 1968. This, however, did not stop some professors of sociology in Poland from continuing to recommend his books as the best introduction to sociology. At the reception Bauman was welcomed to the Czech Republic by Petr Pithart, the Chairman of the Czech Senate, who also mentioned his personal school experiences with Bauman's work. The whole event became very informal as Bauman met with some of his old friends from the Czech sociological community.

After the reception Bauman headed to the Prague Castle where he was invited to meet the President. During a very pleasant talk it turned out that President Havel is familiar with Bauman's writings and is specifically very familiar with the book *Globalisation* (1998). In his own words, President Havel considers it to be a 'useful guide book to today's world'. Professor Bauman presented the new edition of *Liquid Modernity* with a personal dedication as a gift to Václav Havel and expressed his great admiration for him as an exceptional president - a politician and an intellectual in one person. His talk with the President, and the visit to his office and the recently renovated representative rooms of the Castle were a highlight of the entire day.

On October 17, the ceremony to award the

honorary doctorate was held in the Great Hall of the Carolinum. According to his personal wishes, Bauman's entrance into the ceremony hall was accompanied by the sounds of Ode to Joy, as an expression of his European identity.

On the occasion of being awarded the honorary doctorate by Charles University Bauman made an acceptance speech, in which he contemplated one of the crucial dilemmas of our times. He opened the speech by expressing the special value the honour bestowed upon him by Charles University held for him. He said he admired it not only for biographical reasons, because this University offered him shelter in a time of troubles, but also for its unique role in the cultural and intellectual development in the Central European region. He recalled also the connection between Czech and Polish sociology, comparing it to a long and happy love affair. Furthermore he referred to the common past and future of the Czech and Polish nations and raised the question of their role in a united Europe. He pointed out that at the time of entry into a common European home the need for new ideas and the re-examination of old concepts is particularly urgent and that these two nations should take an active role in the process of rebuilding the European intellectual and ethical space.

According to Bauman, the main question of the human race lies in the dilemma between the interests of self-preservation and the ethical command to 'love thy neighbour'. Throughout all of human history no philosophical system has been able to resolve this question, however hard it tried. What Bauman suggests is that 'we have now entered the times of convergence between the interest in self-preservation and the obedience to the ethical command'. In today's globalised and *stretched* world, where territory no longer guarantees security for its inhabitants and where we all find ourselves in the same boat, self-preservation and morality dictate the same policies and strategies. Bauman assumes that the end of the era of space was already foreseen in the 18th century by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and that we have been witnessing the death symptoms of that period for a considerable period of time. Even though evidence of the new situation human kind faces was not revealed until September 11, as Bauman said: 'The events of September 11 made obvious that no one, however resourceful, distant or aloof, can cut oneself off from the rest of the world'. We are all now an integral part of one human community and the act of shutting off against others can no longer be seen as an option for survival in the global *polis*. The only chance to overcome all the barriers and divisions among people and to aim towards the ideal of a common humanity in this pluralistic world is through openness towards others. As Hannah Arendt has already suggested, a truly human dialogue 'is entirely permitted by pleasure in another person and in what he says'. According to Bauman the impulse for such a dialogue and for the defence of tolerance and respect for all differences should come primarily from the universities, the centres of wisdom.

With this closing speech Professor Bauman crowned his visit in Prague. He has proved himself to be one of the great thinkers of our time, an example of a 'dialoguing man', whose main goal is not to provide us with answers, but rather to present us with provocative questions and thus make us think and reflect upon our lives.

Petra Rakušanová, Markéta Sedláčková

Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth

The economics of income and wealth is based not only on plausible theories but also on gathering good quality data and their empirical treatment. The latter aspect is even more important in transition countries working to match the living standards common in more developed countries and thus in need of comparative statistics on welfare. It is therefore surprising that the researchers from these countries do not take more advantage of sharing their ideas with colleagues from the USA, East Asia, the EU and elsewhere. To illustrate, only eleven participants from Eastern Europe attended the 27th gener-

al conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW), which took place in August in the Swedish town of Djurönäset. All papers presented at the conference are placed on the IARIW web site (www.iariw.org).

The IARIW was founded in 1947 and its members include statistical offices, central banks, academic institutes, governmental bodies and international agencies, such as the IMF or the Luxembourg Income Study. The IARIW has four major objectives: furthering research on economic and social accounting; the use of the accounting for budgeting and policy analysis; the integration of economic and social statistics; and the development of concepts and definitions for the measurement of welfare. Its aim is to encourage countries to share experiences in this area. The IARIW pursues these objectives by facilitating communication and interchange on these topics and by bringing together academic and government scholars from many countries. This is mainly achieved through the publication of the quarterly journal the *Review of Income and Wealth* and by holding biennial general conferences.

The last conference presented contributions on very topical issues. First, in the plenary session participants discussed certain aspects of the 'New Economy' and pointed out the need for a more universal definition of this phenomenon. The discussion was co-ordinated by Per Ericson, from Statistics Sweden, and attempted to shed some light on two paradoxes: a productivity paradox, pointed out by Solow, which states that 'computers are everywhere visible, except in productivity statistics'; and a second paradox stating that even if all the objective requisites, such as technology, are in place, no shift onto a faster growth path may follow. The participants concluded that in the new environment, with the rapid diffusion of technological knowledge we must re-consider the adequacy of the current statistical indicator, in particular price indices. Moreover, as the ability to take advantage of the new economy depends on the competence of the local receiver not all industrial economies will necessarily participate successfully in its introduction.

The second issue also discussed in a plenary meeting, organised by Barbara Fraumeni from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Thesia Garner from the Bureau of Labour Statistics, was devoted to measuring savings, assets and liabilities from both a macro- and micro-economic perspective. With regard to the more sociological aspects precautionary saving was discussed. Arthur Kennickell from FED and Annamaria Lusardi from Dartmouth College argued that the precautionary-saving motive affects almost every type of household - elderly households and business owners in particular. They emphasised the need to take the precautionary-saving motive into account when modelling saving behaviour.

Finally, the third plenary session by Bart van Ark from the University of Cronigen in Canada was more technical and focused on the comparability of price indices of various countries across time and space, reflecting the differences in consumption baskets. It also looked at the consistency between the purchasing power parity benchmark and national price and volume indices.

Alongside the plenary sessions the conference offered smaller parallel meetings on more specific problems, such as the quarterly national account and the role and measurement of government. Most topics were attractive from the sociological viewpoint as they discussed the analysis of micro-data on households and individuals in areas such as poverty, the size distribution of wealth; income mobility and poverty dynamics or more methodological problems such as microsimulation. The participants raised several challenges to some of the main conclusions in these parallel debates.

First, the effort to find a better measure of poverty continues, even after Amartya Sen has been awarded the Nobel Prize. Andrew S. Harvey, A. Mukhopdhyay and Jordan Hunt from Saint Mary's University in Canada suggest families need both time and money to meet their everyday needs. While they may have sufficient income to reach the poverty line, they can be short on the time needed to do the everyday tasks required to maintain a household. Thus

they can be money-poor, time-poor, or both. To construct a new measure they employ time-use data that is not available in every country and whose comparability given the different cultural and institutional background in different countries is questionable.

Thesia I. Garner and Kathleen S. Short attempted to re-specify the poverty threshold for the USA. They tried to add the value of certain in-kind benefits and subtract certain 'necessary expenditures', especially the expenditures for necessary health care, and also to recommend paying particular attention to the treatment of owner-occupied housing.

Rather than specifying the poverty threshold directly, Conchita D'Abrosio together with her colleagues from Universita Bocconi argued that the poverty line is endogenous and cannot be determined without information on the underlying income distribution. They proposed a new method of setting the poverty line based on the change-point problem. They assume that the underlying mechanism generating the distribution differs for different income classes. If the income is distributed according to Pareto, then whenever there is an abrupt change in the generating mechanism the parameters of the Pareto distribution vary. Therefore, researchers should estimate the income thresholds where the changes happen. The thresholds indicate the degree of heterogeneity in the total income distribution and generate the income classes endogenously. The lowest threshold can be considered a poverty line.

Second, many contributions were devoted to the income mobility and poverty dynamics that are important for studying the changes in welfare over the life cycle and for identifying the poverty traps and their determinants. Asghar Zaidi from the London School of Economics and Klaas de Vos from Tilburg University emphasised the importance of measuring the income dynamics of the elderly given increasing human longevity, resulting in more time spent in retirement. Moreover they called for studies analysing panel rather than cross-sectional data, whose use for year-to-year comparisons has a distorting effect because it is based on different populations of pensioners every year. Zaidi and De Vos followed the absolute concept of mobility as they focused on the changes in individuals' own incomes. This needs to be distinguished from the relative mobility concept that tracks changes in the relative ranking of individuals or households within a population.

Third, the research on the availability, reliability, and coverage of data sets is the first step in the investigation of welfare and inequality. For this purpose, we need micro-data that is usually collected in surveys. Unfortunately, respondents often refuse to disclose the information about their earning activities and wealth and underestimate their real income. Kavonius and Tormälethö from Statistics Finland attempted to compare data on wages, salaries, entrepreneurial income and property income obtained from the Finnish Income Distribution Survey 2000 (IDS), which includes registered data on wages and salaries, to data on primary income in National Accounts (NA). In particular, they investigated the differences stemming from different definitions, different population coverage and measurement errors. The NAs in other countries may be different than Finnish ones, but the exploration of the comparability of macro and micro statistics deserves our attention, as the former provides the information used for correcting the less reliable micro-data set in many statistical offices.

Fourth, the conference assembled scientists that use specific methods like microsimulation, a technique used in tax-benefit models that employ data on individuals or households to simulate the effect of changes in social and tax policy and in the economic environment. However, the conference has shown that microsimulation models may be used by policy makers in broader areas. The National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling at the University of Canberra is developing a model to improve the effectiveness of the state agency delivering state social benefits to the recipients. The agency is looking for the best ways to improve its services, expecting changes in regional unemployment and other factors. The microsimulation model aims at tuning its infrastructure under alternative scenarios of customer num-

bers, customer characteristics, and access preferences (the Internet, phone, regional office).

For the flourishing of science, discourse on the existing achievements and ongoing research is essential. The research that is being done in isolation will not generate the critical and necessary feedback that would lead to making arguments more plausible. Therefore, we must welcome any meeting that assembles open-minded researchers, and the conferences organised by the IARIW rank among the best. This report has shown only a few examples from the rich bouquet of economic and sociological topics encountered there and proves that scientists in the field of income and wealth have recently risen to many challenges. However, there is a challenge left for researchers from transition countries. Should we not stay in touch with the world of science rather than focusing on local problems? Contact with the international community brings about a certain synergy effect in helping to spread both methodological and scientific knowledge.

Petra Štěpánková

Recenzenti statí za rok 2002
Reviewers of Articles in the Year 2002

Alois Andrle - Atelier regionálního rozvoje a bydlení URS, Praha/Atelier of Regional Development and Housing URS
Tomáš Bitrich - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
Alain Blum - Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED), Paris
Lubomír Brokl - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology AS CR
Ivo T. Budil - Fakulta humanitních studií ZČU, Plzeň/Faculty of Humanities, University of Western Bohemia
Jiří Buriánek - Filozofická fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University
Aleš Burjanek - Fakulta sociálních studií MU, Brno/Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University
Petr Daněk - Přírodovědecká fakulta MU, Brno/Faculty of Science, Masaryk University
Petr Dostál - Přírodovědecká fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Science, Charles University
Dušan Drbohlav - Přírodovědecká fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Science, Charles University
Joseph Drew - Anglo-American College, Praha
Jana Duffková - Filozofická fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University
Vladimíra Dvořáková - Vysoká škola ekonomická, Praha/University of Economics
Martin Fafejta - Filozofická fakulta UP, Olomouc/Philosophical Faculty, Palacký University
Josef Fulka - Fakulta humanitních studií UK, Praha/Faculty of Humanities, Charles University
Martin Hampl - Přírodovědecká fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Science, Charles University
Jan Hartl - STEM, Praha
Hana Havelková - Fakulta humanitních studií UK, Praha/Faculty of Humanities, Charles University
Michal Illner - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology AS CR
Jan Jandourek - MF Dnes, Praha
Helena Jarošová - Filozofická fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University
Petr Jehlička - Přírodovědecká fakulta UK, Praha/Faculty of Science, Charles University
Jiří Kabele - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
Josef Kotek - muzikolog, Praha/ Musicologist
Vladimír Krivý - Sociologický ústav SAV, Bratislava/Institute of Sociology SAS
Pavel Kuchař - Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha/Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
Věra Kuchařová - Výzkumný ústav práce a sociálních věcí MPSV, Praha/Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs MLSA
Ivana Loučková - Filozofická fakulta UP, Olomouc/Philosophical Faculty, Palacký University
Dušan Lužný - Filozofická fakulta MU, Brno/Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University
Hana Malinová - Občanské sdružení R-R, Praha/Civic Association R-R
Alena Marešová - Institut pro kriminologii a sociální prevenci, Praha/Institute for Criminology and Social Prevention
Hana Maříková - Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha/Institute of Sociology AS CR

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The *Sociologický časopis*/CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is issued twice yearly in English and contains original articles from both Czech and foreign sociologists dedicated to the transformation in the Central European countries. It offers interesting insights into such issues as features of Czech society, problems of nationalism, new forms of inequality, political changes, and other topical subjects.

The *Sociologický časopis*/CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is published by the Institute of Sociology of Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague. One issue costs 14 €, yearly subscriptions cost 84 €, and can be ordered at the following address:

Czech Sociological Review
Jilská 1
110 00 Praha 1
Czech Republic

Please detach this form and return to the above address.

. . . . . .

ORDER FORM

Please indicate the number of copies required, placing your address on the reverse side.

I would like to subscribe to

☐ *Sociologický časopis*/CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

☐ Only English issues

Please send me ..... copies.

. . . . . .

Name: _____

Institution: _____

Address: _____

_____

Date: _____ Signature: _____

Sociologický časopis
CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

ROČNÍK (VOLUME) XXXVIII - 2002

Adresa:
Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha1, Česká republika
Telefon: (+420) 222 221 761
Fax: (+420) 222 220 143
E-mail: sreview@soc.cas.cz

ISSN 0038-0288

STATI / ARTICLES

KULATÝ STŮL

ESEJ

POHLEDY NA ČESKOU SOCIOLOGII

VÝVOJ SOCIOLOGICKÝCH OBORŮ

ZE SOCIOLOGICKÝCH VÝZKUMŮ / EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

INTERVIEW

STUDENTI PÍŠÍ

PROFILY

STATE-OF-THE-ART REPORT

RECENZNÍ STAŤ / REVIEW ARTICLE

RECENZE / REVIEWS

ANOTACE

ZPRÁVY / INFORMATION

Sociologický časopis
CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

6

OBSAH

Sociologický časopis

SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

6

CONTENTS

ISSN 0038-0288

12

9 770038 028000

Cena 44 Kč / Price 14 €/14 $