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The Entry of Transition Countries of Central Europe in the European Union: Some Social Protection Issues*

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Abstract: After a brief survey of evidence showing that social security reform in each country of the region now follows its own path, the author reviews some general issues of social protection with special reference to transition countries. He then deals with several questions which preoccupy western observers in relation to EU enlargement: the emergence of a new model in addition to those already in place, the fear of social dumping and the interrogation regarding the possibility of keeping economic and social progress in equilibrium.

On the way to a successful enlargement, the respective protection levels should not create a problem in view of the relatively high standards maintained in this field in the past. The problem is rather on the EU side which finds it difficult to define with some precision the positive content of the European social model and the common goals. In view of their historical experience, the CE countries should be invited from the start to participate in the formulation of new European social policies.

Czech Sociological Review, 2000, Vol. 8 (No. 2: 131-138)

Introduction

The starting point of any meaningful discussion of this subject begins with the realisation that this particular enlargement of the European Union concerns a group of countries whose historical experience in the field of social protection differs fundamentally from that of the EU members, and therefore requires a particular approach to most topics normally raised in this context. Moreover, the developments in recent years seem to indicate that each country in this group follows its own path with regard to social security reform; this will of course further complicate matters in so far that no standard approach will be applicable to individual candidates. We have reviewed elsewhere the historical development of social security in Central Europe and its 'return to reality' [cf. Rys 1995] after the early adventures. However, the last point concerning the recent diversification of trends is important enough to merit a brief comment.

Latest Trends in Pensions and in Health Protection

To illustrate the variety of patterns of social reform prevailing in post-communist societies, it may be useful to concentrate our attention on two main branches of social security i.e. pensions and health protection, in three candidate countries of Central Europe, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In reviewing the recent developments, which cannot be reproduced here in detail, we get the following overall picture of the situation.

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*) This text is based on a paper presented at the Conference on Financing Social Protection in Europe, held in Helsinki on 22-23 November 1999.

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Pensions

General development in the three candidate countries clearly indicates the presence of a trend towards a gradual reduction of the basic pension scheme, mostly supplemented by mandatory fully-funded private pension funds. We may even note a certain radicalisation of the pension reform the more we advance in time. This is due no doubt to the growing urgency of finding a solution to the pension problem and also to the emergence of what are considered to be new pension insurance techniques (cf. the use of the Swedish technique of 'notional individual accounts' in the most recent Polish reform).

Starting from a common basis under the communist regime, represented by state budget financing supported by a 40-50% tax on payrolls of all enterprises, new social insurance schemes gradually introduced employers' and employees' contributions, the former generally assuming a significantly higher part of the cost. In a drive for reducing their economic burden, all countries have abandoned the old principle of satisfaction of social needs in favour of a reinforcement of the insurance principle.

However, different approaches exist within this general trend. Regarding the mandatory nature of funded complementary schemes, the Hungarians and the Poles have followed the recommendation of the World Bank while the Czechs seem to be refusing it for the time being. Their main argument in favour of keeping the second pillar voluntary refers to the underdeveloped state of banking institutions and financial markets of the country. To put it bluntly, the Czechs would gladly accept something like the Swiss model if only they could have at their disposal a comparable level of banking and insurance industry. In this context, they point to the difficulties currently experienced in the implementation of complementary retirement schemes in Hungary, Poland and even in Sweden.[1]

Regarding the total contribution rate, it remained unchanged in Hungary and Poland where the proportion of means diverted to the second pillar represents 25% and 20% respectively (and is considerably higher than the Swedish rate of 14%). The Czech government, which still prefers to keep the second pillar voluntary, is aware of the pressing need for increasing financial resources of the country's basic scheme. However, its proposal to have the contribution rate raised by 2.4% has already been rejected twice by Parliament. Clearly, they will have to look elsewhere for a source of finance.

It is too early to judge whether the cautious Czech approach or the Hungarian and Polish initiatives will provide a more appropriate answer to the pension problem. The performance of the second tier schemes will depend not only on economic and labour market developments, but also and perhaps above all, on the reactions of people to the new concept of security in old age. There is no doubt that these will be determined both by the attitudes common to the post-communist world and by the specific situation in each of the countries concerned.

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[1]) The Polish scheme was supposed to be launched in January 1999 but the starting date had to be postponed by four months. The information technology required to track the individual funds of contributors ran into difficulties even in Sweden, where the launching of the system had to be postponed until mid-2000. In Hungary the original plan to raise the single employee contribution to private pension schemes from 6% to 8% by the year 2000 had to be abandoned by the new government.

Medical Care

The history of health care in the three countries under review provides yet another example of different ways of handling the same issue. Starting from a common platform, i.e. a national health service provided free of charge by the Communist State, each of them followed a specific path. Hungary was the first country to introduce medical care insurance with some precipitation, only to reform it several times in subsequent years. The Czech Republic started implementing its health insurance scheme as of January 1993 and still suffers from the effects of a period of uncontrolled privatisation of health establishments. From the beginning Poland adopted a cautious approach, considering it preferable to improve first the operations of the existing health services before privatising them. The long expected reform was implemented only in January 1999.

Further differences in the provision and finance of health care appear in examining the role of the state and the pattern of cost-sharing by insured persons. Many of the main issues in this field, such as cost containment, remuneration of the medical profession or the financial management of health care establishments will present similarities with the situation in other European countries. Nevertheless, it will be found on close examination that many important aspects of these problems are specific to Central Europe.

Due to the complexity of the transition process there are serious problems in the co-ordination of the whole sector. This can be well observed in the Czech case, which shows how the lack of a clear concept of the health reform, of a transparent decision-making mechanism, and of an appropriate division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Health and the General Health Insurance Fund may for a long time block any legislative advance.

More serious still is the in-built disequilibrium in the economics of health insurance reform, which stems from the very nature of the risk. The maintenance of health represents for every individual, and indeed for every society, such a high value that its economic aspect is easily considered secondary in relation to the objective. Consequently, the medical care standards achieved by the Western world are immediately adopted by the transition countries although, objectively, they may not have the means to afford them. This explains why a patient in Central Europe may obtain under his health insurance a medicament free of charge which is available to his Western colleague on a cost-sharing basis; the problem is that while a single tablet may represent the cost of a cup of coffee in Paris, it will represent the cost of a dinner in Prague. This also explains the nearly permanent agitation of the medical profession demanding higher salaries and the difficulties of economic management of health care centres. For the solution to these problems a specific approach is required in the context of post-communist countries, which may point to the creation of an independent authority able to arbitrate between the conflicting views of different social actors.

Some General Issues of Social Protection with Special Reference to Central Europe

As shown by the above survey, there are different approaches to social security reform depending on the risk and on the country concerned. Latest developments in Central Europe, as indeed those in the rest of the world, fail to provide us with any clear indication as to the possible superiority of one particular *method of financing* over another. In all cases, social protection expenditure represents a charge on the economy (this supportive function being a substantial part of its *raison d'être*) which has to be kept in balance

with its countervalue. This includes the most vital benefit the economy derives from the existence of social protection, now referred to as social cohesion. It used to be known as social peace based on social justice; it would seem, however, that many people no longer understand the meaning of these terms. It could also be described as the absence of social upheavals which are, in the light of past experience, generally unfavourable to economic growth.

As to the *level of social protection expenditure*, i.e. the question of what represents a necessary, tolerable, or equilibrium-preserving charge on the economy, this is a matter of a political consensus of the population – indispensable under a democratic government. To use modern language: "There is simply no hard and fast rule applicable to all societies and all economies as to how much social protection expenditure is financially and economically sustainable. The limits of sustainability can only be tested politically." [Cichon and Hagemejer 1996]

Rather than the financial method itself or any particular level of contributions, it is the *social context* in which the institution functions and the way it is perceived by the population that is of primary importance. One hundred dollars received from social assistance is not the same as one hundred dollars obtained through tax deductions or in the form of a social insurance benefit as of right. The post-communist society will always be highly sensitive to any attempt to reintroduce charity as a principle of social redistribution, even if this may appear to be economically effective. Experience has shown that, even in difficult economic conditions, people are more willing to pay social insurance contributions than taxes, as long as they have confidence in the system.

By definition, all social reforms have as their basic reference the situation in the past. The Central European societies are no exception to this rule, but their present situation is more complex because nobody ever dared to make a thorough *evaluation of the communist welfare state*. No government wished to complicate its life by analysing in detail the financial operations behind the system of social guarantees of the previous regime nor, for that matter, by declaring publicly a programme for the dismantlement of the communist welfare state. Some also preferred to avoid the risk of admitting the need for retaining some elements of the past system on account of their social efficiency. The general double-talk consisted of condemning loudly the paternalistic nature of the communist social protection system while doing everything possible so as to continue to make it work.

This situation has been highly confusing for the population, which has partly accepted the reduction in social benefits as a price to pay for personal freedom, some simply exchanging the old communist dogma for a new belief in the supreme power of the market. But there are also those who for some reason are unable to use the new freedom for the improvement of their personal situation and who, faced with the spectre of mass unemployment and deprived of any *new vision of the future* of the society they live in, will continue to talk about and possibly also work for the return of the 'good old times'. It is in this context that the entry in the European Union should give these populations new perspectives and new hopes.

European Union and Social Protection in Central Europe

Fifth European Social Model?

As we have seen, social protection structures in the post-communist countries of Central Europe are on the move. While the pressure of demographic, economic and social factors behind this process may be considered broadly comparable, national responses to it differ quite significantly. This means that there does not seem to be a fifth European social model (assuming we agree with the existence of the other four). Some common trends are noted in health care, but this does not add up to a special model. In the field of pensions, we are witnessing the application to Central Europe of a conventional approach to social protection in developing countries, advocated in the past few years by the World Bank. Apart from the error which consists in mixing the problems of developing and transition countries under the same heading, we may ask, in these times marked by the pursuit of sustainability, just how sustainable is this conceptual model?

A highly interesting paper was published recently [Orszag and Stiglitz 1999], co-authored by the Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, suggesting that a privately managed defined-contribution system may not always be the best solution for a country and that the second pillar may well consider adopting a public defined-benefit plan. The statement is based on the recognition that a number of factors, including the quality of financial institutions in a country, may determine the outcome of any particular model.

Furthermore, the question of notional individual accounts, applied in Sweden and most recently in Poland, came under scrutiny in a recent issue of the *International Social Security Review* [Cichon 1999]. A leading ILO social security expert analyses the concept of notional defined-contribution schemes and comes to the conclusion that while this is certainly an ingenious policy instrument for making the reduction of pension levels more acceptable, most of its potential financial and distributive effects could also be achieved by a classical defined-benefit scheme. This finding seems to underline the predominance of the political factor in all recent reforms while reinforcing the invitation to a cautious approach to models.

Social Dumping

Coming to the question of social dumping, this is yet another term which has been borrowed from the social protection vocabulary of developing countries, without fitting well into the analysis of the situation in transition societies. One can hardly suspect responsible governments of artificially keeping down the social protection levels of their populations in order to better sell their products; such behaviour would be close to political suicide. But we could no doubt identify a number of external advisors guilty of inciting social dumping when trying to sell their personal or institutional convictions regarding a hypothetical need for a general reduction of social expenditure in the countries concerned.

This could possibly be the case of a statement which is to be attributed to the authors of the most recent World Bank report regarding EU accession of the Czech Republic ["Czech..." 1999: 11]. *"As the country prepares to enter the EU, it is incumbent that its social protection system is in line with the other EU countries. Considerable effort has already been made in that direction. Nonetheless, it is equally important that the Czech Republic not be burdened by some of the problems inherent in the social protection systems of a number of EU countries, since these problems would be magnified in the*

Czech Republic, which lacks the income cushion to support overly expensive social entitlements." The usefulness of general statements such as this is questionable; it is also out of touch with the political reality of the country. Consequently, it cannot but reinforce the position of those who do not really favour a well balanced social and economic development.

The threats of social dumping which may come from the private sector can best be dealt with through appropriate government regulations, making it plain to everybody that transition societies are governed by democratically elected representatives of the population and not by private commercial interests, no matter how global they may be.

Equilibrium between Economic and Social Progress

Any well conceived social protection system must be based on a comprehensive approach to social risks and provide for a full co-ordination of all social measures within the framework of a global concept of social policy. The formulation of social policy objectives, which has to rely on a political consensus, will always imply some degree of redistribution of available resources. Nobody will seriously question the primordial role of governments in this process.

The situation is different when it comes to co-ordinating and fixing objectives in the economic sector. During this exercise, many will start invoking the imperatives of free trade and decrying any government interference with the so-called market forces. The experience has shown that in the long run this position is untenable. The first condition for obtaining equilibrium in social and economic matters is hence the recognition of the duty of governments to regulate not only social but also economic processes. At present, ordinary people in transition countries often find it difficult to see what the real centres of political power in their globalised universe are. The EU authorities stand hence a good chance of finding a receptive audience for most of their social norms, if only they can avoid playing into the hands of those who readily proclaim that "nothing has changed, only the instructions from Moscow have been replaced by those from Brussels".

With regard to the political consensus on which to base a national social policy, and ultimately any convergent moves at the European level, care should be taken to recognise the somewhat deficient nature of the underlying mechanism in transition countries: it is marked by a relatively low level of involvement of civil society in the formulation of social policy. This is due to the long history of perverse abuse of different organisations of civil society by the previous regime, from trade unions to associations for peace or friendship with this or that country. The long-term effects of this collective memory, and in some cases also the influence of recent government policies, have not yet been fully overcome.

In order to arrive at a social and economic equilibrium based on a political consensus supported by civil society, the terms of the deal should be readily understood with respect to both sides of the balance. Admittedly, it is relatively easier to work out economic targets and indicators; the purpose and objectives of social policy are more difficult to define. The consensus which formed the basis of the European welfare state in the post-war years suffered greatly under the attacks of neo-liberal ideology. The populations in transition countries, confused by the use of new and misleading terminology, have no means of falling back on past experience and separating the wheat from the chaff. It would hence seem highly important to go back to the roots of this creation, to reinvent social insurance in its relationship with other social protection measures, and to restate

the ideas of the welfare state in a language adapted to present circumstances. Without a new concept of the welfare state and a new vision of society, any attempt to reach the desired equilibrium will remain a shadow-boxing act.

Lastly, let there be no mistake about it, the search for a social and economic equilibrium is inseparable from the search for an equilibrium between personal freedom and collective constraints; a combination of both is necessary to guarantee the security of individual human existence in society. This has a direct implication for the political system we wish to have. To sacrifice those at the bottom of society for the sake of the better comfort and higher performance of its stronger members is not the sign of a will to build a truly democratic system. It is rather a sign of a regression to our obscurantist past.

What to Expect From Entry into the EU?

It goes without saying that the impact is likely to be different from one country to another, depending on the present state of development of its social protection system. In general, judging from the Commission's regular reports on progress towards accession, with the exception of work safety and social dialogue, this field does not give rise to major preoccupations. After all, the social protection standards of the Communist welfare state were in many respects superior to those of Western Europe and not all of them have disappeared. The immediate consequences of the pre-entry requirements are therefore not likely to be very significant. The question which many people ask themselves is what impact will this step make on the future development of their schemes.

The simple citizen may experience in due time some negative influence regarding his present 'social comfort'. Comparative tables often present straightforward statistical figures while forgetting to add some highly important footnotes. Thus, for instance, it may not be generally known that income from pensions in most post-communist countries is not taxed. It is quite likely that this kind of arrangement will eventually be adapted to the majority standard within the Union. Similar instances will be found in the field of health care, especially in relation to disabled people. The populations of the countries concerned may not even be aware of a number of these 'residual advantages' which have become part of their everyday life.

But this type of adaptation process is not likely to become the essential issue. As we have already mentioned, what people in Central Europe expect most of the European Union is a new vision of the future, a new set of goals to work for. The first step towards this objective could be made by a renewed effort to give a positive definition to what is referred to as the European social model. It has been identified so far mainly as a concept indicative of what most people are against; time has perhaps come to try to give expression to what it stands for. This would imply the already suggested restatement of the principles of a modern welfare state, the identification of common values and the formulation of basic goals to be shared by all EU members. This could possibly be done along the lines which have been investigated recently by some research studies [Pieters and Nikless 1998].

How far could EU authorities go beyond the formulation of common goals is an open question. What the Central European countries can least afford is social experimentation with models which would not correspond to the realities of their societal environment. We have argued elsewhere [Rys 1999a, b] that it is the political aspect of social reforms which dominates the scene and even the potential impact of demographic and economic factors forming part of this environment is subject to an evaluation by social

actors involved in the decision-making process. It would hence seem meaningful to give these countries the possibility to choose their own means towards the achievement of common objectives and not to try to impose on them any institutional constraints. This should not exclude the use of some normative guidance on condition that it would provide enough room for adaptation.

To the extent that a European social model can only be a dynamic concept capable of further expansion, it would also seem reasonable to associate from the start the new members in its development. As we pointed out at the beginning, these countries have a unique historical experience and, in view of the long break with their own past, a capacity to look at social protection problems with new eyes. The communist approach to the treatment of some fundamental social issues such as mass unemployment was an unqualified failure; in this respect, the present situation can in no way be interpreted as a success of the capitalist approach. The old problem is still there in all its complexity and a new global vision of a democratic society of the year 2000 is needed to pursue the search for more stable conditions of social advancement and economic growth.

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Environmental Protest in the Czech Republic: Three Stages of Post-Communist Development*

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Abstract: The role played by environmental activists in the events leading to the collapse of communist rule in Czechoslovakia has been well documented. With the old order swept aside and a liberal democratic constitutional framework rapidly established, it might be assumed that the environmental movement would have progressed painlessly from clandestine opposition to political prominence. However, for the nascent environmental movement, the post-communist decade has not seen a linear progression towards greater access and political efficacy. Though certain Prague-based organisations are currently enjoying a degree of relative influence within a renewed policy process, the movement was politically isolated and starved of resources throughout the Klaus period, thereby delaying their development. It is only now, more than a decade since the onset of democratic reform that environmental organisations are beginning to resemble their western counterparts. Even so, the resource issue remains a critical constraint and is tied to more fundamental problems relating to the development of civil society which directly impact upon the environmental movement at a time when critical decisions are being taken regarding nuclear energy and transport policy.

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Introduction

Environmental protest in the Czech Republic[1] has changed quite considerably over the past decade.[2] In terms of the political influence and capacity of environmental NGOs, there has not been a linear progression towards increased efficacy and pluralisation. Rather, it is possible to discern three distinct stages: an initial phase of political prominence and apparent radicalism (1990 – mid-1991); a period of political marginalisation and de-radicalisation (mid-1991 – 1996); and the current phase (1996 onwards) in which a cluster of large professional environmental NGOs have regained a degree of influence within a more open and consensual political opportunity structure. In trying to explain such variation in the nature and efficacy of environmental protest in the Czech Republic, a number of determinants can be identified. The political opportunity structure in which

*) Paper presented for the Workshop on "Environmental Protest in Comparative Perspective" at the 27th Joint Sessions of ECPR Workshops in Mannheim, 26-31 March, 1999.

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1) 'The Czech Republic' is used to cover the period after 1993, though the information up until the demise of the federation obviously relates to Czechoslovakia as a whole.

2) I would like to acknowledge the help of Hana Pernicová, formally Executive Director of Greenpeace ČR, who has during lengthy interviews provided me with information and data on development in the environmental NGO sector over the past five years. I would also like to acknowledge the particular help of Dan Vondrouš (Duha), Jindřich Petrlík (Děti Země), Prof. Bedřich Moldan (ČSOP), Marie Hasiová and Zuzana Drhová (Zelený Kruh).

NGOs operate is widely acknowledged to be a critical determinant of influence [Kriesi et al. 1995]. In the Czech case the political context has certainly fluctuated since the early 1990s and, as demonstrated in the discussion below, this has clearly had an impact on the capacity of the environmental movement. However, it is the lack of resources available to NGOs which has had the most profound impact on their capacity to gain political influence. Despite recent political changes that have ushered in a more consensual and non-combative arena for NGOs, their political capacity remains constrained by the absence of resources and a developed civil society capable of nurturing and resourcing associational activity. This is largely due to the legacy of four decades of soviet-style communism plus the political, social and economic turbulence of the ensuing transition process which in conjunction constitute a unique context in which fledgling NGOs are to operate.

Various theoretical approaches to the study of social protest, used in conjunction, offer a set of analytical tools for considering aspects of environmental protest in the Czech Republic since the end of the 1980s [Della Porta and Diani 1999, ch. 1]. The role of environmental groups as a catch-all political opposition during the final months of the communist regime seems to lend credence to the structuralist-functionalist school, which depicts social movements as a conglomeration of the dispossessed and marginalised in a rapidly changing, crisis-ridden system [Smelser 1962]. The role of clandestine environmentalists engaging in confrontational protest against the state during the 1980s, then gaining political influence and, in some cases, power after the revolution appears to endorse a life-cycle trajectory whereby all social movements pass through radical confrontational opposition to a phase of de-radicalisation in response to accommodation with the political elite [Offe 1990]. Indeed, the involvement of certain environmental NGOs in drafting new anti-pollution legislation immediately after the revolution, plus the gradual change in organisational structures and strategies suggests a more micro analytical approach based on resource availability and rational choice as a means of understanding the development of the environmental movement [Zald and McCarthy 1987].

However, the appropriateness of the various theoretical interpretations to the Czech case is somewhat superficial. Analysis of environmental protest cannot be extrapolated from the wider context of democratic consolidation. It is important, particularly with regard to the cyclic trajectory, to resist deterministic and reductionist interpretations regarding the eventual course of environmental protest. There has not been a linear progression whereby environmental NGOs have moved from a radical opposition movement to political inclusion within the new democratic political system. In fact, the fledgling environmental NGOs that emerged after the revolution lacked the experience, resources and cohesion to use the new political opportunity structure that was briefly made available to them. Moreover, the brief period of political inclusion after the revolution was eclipsed by a period of reactionary hostility, and within the space of three years the environmental movement found itself as excluded as it had been during the communist era. Although the period of flagrant hostility between the environmental movement and the government came to an end with the replacement of František Benda as minister of the environment after the 1996 election, and the relationship has subsequently improved quite considerably, to suggest that by virtue of having regained a measure of political influence the environmental movement has now completed the 'cycle' ignores the host of constraints that continue to limit their political capacity.

To analyse the development of the environmental movement in the Czech Republic from the perspective of strategies and patterns of protest in Western Europe can serve to

misrepresent the post-communist political context and obscure a number of quite critical and specific constraints. For example, in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution the recently 'liberated' environmentalists appeared to be rejecting conventional pressure group activity in favour of strategies and organisational forms characterised by western social scientists as a new form of social protest [Melucci 1985; Eder 1985; Dalton, Kuechler and Burklin 1990; Touraine 1981, 1988]. However, such radical tactics and approaches were more a reflection of environmental protest having emerged within the authoritarian political setting of communist rule and of young activists lacking any political experience than an outright rejection of more conventional forms of protest and organisation. Similarly the abandonment of radicalism and the emergence of more conventional lobby-based strategies after 1992 was not, as might be assumed, a sign that environmental NGOs had gained greater access or inclusion within the policy process. Indeed, despite adopting less confrontational and more conciliatory tactics, NGOs were being squeezed out of the political fray at this time due to the absence of resources and the lack of any political patronage. The former dissidents had virtually all left formal politics, and the fragmented opposition seemed largely disinterested in the environmental issue.

What will become evident from the analysis of environmental protest in the Czech Republic over the past decade is that while the relationship between the environmental sector and the political elite has certainly been important in determining strategy choice and influence, the issue of resources and the broader context of establishing civil society is paramount in terms of analysing the capacity of the environmental movement.

1989-1991: A Halcyon Era of Political Inclusion?

In the months prior to the Velvet Revolution the number of environmental organisations increased dramatically. Though there is a long tradition of conservation and ecological consciousness in the Czech lands [Tickle and Vavroušek 1998: 122-124], by the 1980s the deteriorating state of the environment and its impact upon public health provoked a political response among intellectuals, conservationists, dissidents and the general public. Spontaneous public demonstrations over the levels of smog in north Bohemia, the formation of groups, such as Prague Mothers, and the politicisation of academics and conservationists within state organisations provided a fertile base for the development of environmental associations. In the months prior to the revolution the environmental issue had attracted an array of political dissidents who recognised its potential to further embarrass the embattled regime. The involvement of such activists served to link the nascent environmental movement to the larger clandestine dissident movement.

In the aftermath of the revolution a host of new organisations emerged. By early 1990 an estimated 800 groups existed [Šilhanová et al. 1994, 1996]. The new environmental NGOs consisted typically of young students who had been drawn to the environmental issue during the months prior to the Velvet Revolution via state organisations such as the Czechoslovak Union of Nature Conservationists (Český svaz ochránců přírody – ČSOP), which had been established in 1979, or *Brontosaurus*, the conservation branch of the Socialist Youth Union [Tickle and Vavroušek 1998: 125, Waller 1989]. These new NGOs were small amorphous organisations that lacked cohesive internal structures. There was also a great deal of overlap between groups in terms of the campaign issues and the activists involved. NGOs were offered practical and financial assistance from a variety of external agencies, including the Swedish environmental organisation Secretariat on Acid Rain, philanthropic foundations such as USAID, the German Marshall Fund (committed

to economic restructuring in eastern Europe), the British Know-How Fund, and from 1991 EU funding via the Phare Programme. NGOs received virtually no money from Czech citizens, nor did they seek to establish a fee-paying membership, preferring a handful of active members to passive supporters.

The organisation *Hnutí Duha* (Rainbow Movement), though it became one of the largest and most prominent NGOs, typified the nature of environmental protest at this time.[3] *Duha* activists rejected a formal hierarchic organisational structure and the notion of non-active supporters, preferring activists to work independently on particular issues that were broadly defined by the 'centre of operations' in Brno. Though *Duha* has subsequently become one of the most politically prominent environmental lobbying groups, in the early 1990s it rejected a 'parliamentary' strategy and a hierarchic internal organisational structure in favour of direct action based on a global agenda and an amorphous cell-like internal structure.

Despite their global rather than national focus and a reluctance to embrace 'formal' politics, the larger Prague-based NGOs did enjoy close links with the newly established environmental agencies, and their opinions on policy were widely canvassed. This can be attributed largely to the collectivist attitude of the new dissident-based political elite. The first post-communist Czech environmental minister, Bedřich Moldan, and the new federal minister, Josef Vavroušek, had both been active in the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Ecological Section before 1989, and had been critical of government policy [Waller and Millard 1992: 170]. In their new governmental roles they sought close co-operation with the environmental NGOs and activists who they had campaigned alongside months before. This sentiment of co-operation and consensus found its most explicit institutional expression in the formation of the Green Parliament in early 1990. The objective of the Parliament was to create a discursive forum in which a wide array of environmental NGOs and officials could co-operate in the formation of a programme for environmental regeneration. The role and function of the Green Parliament were outlined in a document drawn up by the Czech Ministry of the Environment in 1990. The Parliament was described as 'an assembly of NGO representatives, to whom all the Ministry's significant plans shall be submitted for consultation and opinions' [Moldan 1990: 22]. The Parliament was to meet regularly at the Czech Ministry of the Environment in Prague, and although its recommendations were not prescribed as binding on the Ministry, there was a sense in which the new officials, lacking experience in policy-making and administration, were keen to consult interested parties. In the early months of the Green Parliament, the larger Prague-based groups such as Greenpeace, *Děti Země* (Children of the Earth), *Hnutí Duha* benefited most from the Green Parliament, and through it enjoyed close access to the policy process.

However, the seemingly ideal relationship between the various strands of the environmental sector concealed a number of underlying tensions. The greatest problem distracting the environmental movement until the mid-1990s was that the false unity of the environmental movement during the final months of communism had been fractured by the collapse of the old regime in November 1989. Mirroring wider political developments within Civic Forum, environmental activists had now to confront ideological differences

[3]) Information on *Hnutí Duha* was obtained from a series of interviews with Daniel Vondrouš between 1994-1999. Vondrouš has been a key figure in the organisation since its inception and is now its main lobbyist.

and degrees of 'greenness' that had previously been eclipsed by their unifying opposition to Soviet-style communism. In addition, the environmental movement lost its upper-tier of activists as a result of political change. Many key figures at the time of the Velvet Revolution were now either engaged in government or on the fringes of formal political power (for example, Bedřich Moldan, Josef Vavroušek and Ivan Dejmal, who had been key figures within the movement, were now part of the new state environmental agencies). Although co-operation between the new elite and NGOs was close, their involvement and expertise within the protest movement was difficult to replace. Other former activists had retreated into academia, science or apolitical conservation; others simply left the political arena for the newly reclaimed private sphere, or indeed the new private sector.

Though certain environmental NGOs did exert a degree of influence on the new policy process via the Green Parliament and through close personal links with officials, the climate of co-operation and consensus was hindered by the fact that the NGOs needed to adjust to the changed political circumstances. Environmental protest had emerged as illegal or semi-legal clandestine opposition movements under authoritarian rule, enmeshed within a submerged and highly politicised 'parallel *polis*' [Havel 1985, Tismaneanu 1993: 153-174]. Environmental protest had occupied a uniquely political position during 1988-1989. An alliance of scientists, intellectuals, conservationists and sections of the general public had formed under the environmental banner. As a semi-legal activity apparently encouraged by the Communist Party, conservation had political potential as a means of lambasting the regime from a relatively safe quarter. The degradation of the natural environment also seemed to reflect and encapsulate all that was wrong with the political and economic system. In conjunction with other activists and dissidents (e.g. musicians, artists, peace campaigners) the clandestine environmental movement became a de facto opposition force within the closed and non-pluralistic Soviet-style political system. But after 1989, the environmental NGOs were required to enter the formal political sphere and co-operate and negotiate with the new democratic regime. They were being invited to sit round a table and help draw up a concrete policy framework; they needed to deal in facts and realistic strategies in order to help ameliorate the ecological degradation of the preceding decades. Though in the period just prior to the revolution environmentalists had deployed more overtly political tactics which included organising public meetings, leaking information to journalists and more open confrontation with the regime [Tickle and Vavroušek 1998: 127-129], the Czech communist leadership's authoritarian response and refusal to embrace the slightest liberalisation contrasted with events in Poland and Hungary and had not enabled environmentalists to gain the political experience that they now required. That the nascent NGOs lacked internal structures, cohesive ideological platforms on domestic issues, and appeared to shun the formal political policy process in favour of remaining enmeshed within a nascent civil society was a reflection of the circumstances in which they had emerged and operated during the final months of communist rule rather than a wholesale rejection of conventional Western-style activity.

One of the most fundamental considerations at this time was the question of what role NGOs should play in the new political order. Some environmentalists who had become politically involved during the last months of the communist regime now argued that the creation of new environmental agencies plus the ascendancy of the new pro-environment elite deemed the role of NGOs unnecessary. Others stressed the continued importance of environmental protest within democratic politics and were concerned by

the apparent apathy of others with regard to critical issues such as nuclear energy that were being debated at this time. Those advocating a continued role for independent environmental NGOs were further divided over the nature of protest. Fearful of destabilising the new regime, some activists urged restraint and were unwilling to counter the notion of radical direct action within the new democratic system. Other more radical elements were reluctant to become enmeshed within formal politics at the national level and rejected conventional strategies in favour of more radical symbolic protest (e.g. the blockade of the proposed nuclear plant at Temelín). The need to adapt, to carve out a new role within post-communist politics and to alter patterns of internal organisation and strategy led to bitter rifts within the environmental movement which essentially paralysed effective mobilisation. Ideological disagreement over the nuclear energy issue and opposition to the Temelín plant in southern Bohemia led to the demise of the Green Parliament as NGOs fragmented, reformed, argued and, in many cases, folded.

There was something unusual in the fact that during the eighteen-month period after the revolution the environmental regeneration of the country was being propelled by the new ministers and state officials rather than by pressure from NGOs, who were distracted by internal ideological disputes and the need to adapt to the changed political context. Indeed, despite the ambitions of the Green Parliament, the rapidly constructed framework of environmental legislation was principally established by those within the new agencies with the help of certain activists and experts from the non-governmental green movement. Reluctant to work with each other, to widen their support base, or contemplate more mundane issues, the NGOs became increasingly detached from the formal policy process. In this sense the spirit of co-operation of the new political elite had come too early for NGOs who could not take advantage of the political climate. What was missing at this time was a sphere of environmental NGOs with the aptitude and expertise to co-operate at an elite level and to take advantage of the political climate of consensus. There was a sense in which the political elite were waiting for environmental NGOs to adapt and take up positions around the negotiating table. Unfortunately, elite-level political change towards the end of 1991 – the fragmentation of Civic Forum and the emergence of competitive political parties – ended this spirit of consensus, and by the time the NGOs had adapted and reformed their involvement was no longer sought.

Political Marginalisation: 1992-1996

That the fledgling Czech environmental movement was beset by ideological rifts after the revolution is hardly surprising. A polarisation between more moderate NGOs willing to engage with the political elite, and more radical elements that would pursue alternative strategies from within civil society typifies environmental politics across Europe [Young 1992]. However, what in fact occurred in the Czech case was that the radical protest and ideology of the immediate post-revolutionary period all but vanished. Although there emerged a core of Prague-based NGOs which gradually pursued a more moderate and increasingly state-focused strategy (e.g. Greenpeace, *Duha* and *Děti Země*), they were not co-opted within the political process and were in fact politically ostracised and castigated throughout the 1992-1996 period.

The role of environmental NGOs within post-communist politics had begun to change during the second half of 1991, largely as a result of the break-up of Civic Forum and the political demise of the dissident-based elite. However, it was the election of Václav Klaus and the centre-right coalition in June 1992 that contributed most to the po-

litical marginalisation of environmental NGOs. As a broad-based movement, Civic Forum had tried to establish a political climate of consensus that was poignantly reflected in the Green Parliament initiative. The fragmentation of Civic Forum in 1991 and the subsequent emergence of western-style adversarial party politics profoundly altered the political framework in which environmental NGOs were to operate. The environmental issue became engulfed in the emerging ideological rift between forces on the political right advocating neo-liberal shock-therapy, rapid wealth creation and a deregulated society, and the non-communist centre-left who emphasised a more gradualist approach, civic rights and environmental protection [Jehlička and Kára 1994: 159]. Public concern over the environment had already begun to decline as the impact of economic restructuring took hold. The victory of Václav Klaus and his right-of-centre coalition in the June 1992 election signified the end of consensus politics and ushered in a climate of hedonistic individualism in which concern for the environment was suddenly politically unfashionable.

The political and economic reforms of the Klaus era had an impact on environmental protest in a number of ways. The most obvious impact was the political marginalisation of the environmental movement. Instead of dealing with an environmental minister and set of officials who had themselves been activists and who sought to establish a progressive policy framework through consultation with the environmental movement, NGOs had now to face a political elite whose main objective was to curtail the regulatory role of the state in order to ensure rapid economic liberalisation. As opponents of untempered, unregulated growth, environmental NGOs were immediately identified as political enemies. Further environmental regulation was viewed as an impediment to the economic agenda and dismissed as the 'icing on the cake' – something to be dealt with in the future once a prosperous market economy had been established [Klaus 1994]. In a move designed to further marginalise the environment as a political issue, the ministerial portfolio was handed to František Benda who, as a member of ODA (*Občanská demokratická aliance* – Civic Democratic Alliance), was politically weak within a coalition government dominated by ODS (*Občanská demokratická strana* – Civic Democratic Party).[4] Far from there being any consultation between government and the environmental movement, Benda simply refused to meet NGOs and to set up any formal dialogue throughout his term of office. Such antipathy towards the environmental sector reached a nadir in early 1995 when three leading environmental NGOs were included on a security services' list of 'subversive organisations' which were to be the target of surveillance. The fact that the three environmental associations included on this list were committed to non-violent protest and to working within the democratic process, and that the other groups on the list were far-right neo-fascist organisations, provoked political outrage. President Havel intervened, as did a number of journalists and prominent figures in Czech society. As a result, two out of the three groups were eventually removed from the list [Fagin and Jehlicka 1998].

[4]) Initially, Benda remained loyal to Klaus and was keen to demonstrate his neo-liberal credentials by cutting funding to NGOs and to endorse the 'icing-on the cake' rhetoric of the prime minister However, as ODA's relationship with Prime Minister Klaus deteriorated Benda used the environment as a political tool: towards the end of his tenure he attempted to court environmental NGOs in a blatant attempt to humiliate the leadership.

Not only were environmental NGOs politically marginalised and pilloried during this period, the environmental policy process that had been vigorously established in 1990 essentially ceased to exist. Apart from the odd amendment, virtually no new environmental laws were prepared or enacted between 1992 and 1996. Indeed, for much of this period there did not exist a long-term environmental plan or a set of future objectives. The prepared draft 'State Environmental Policy' was rejected by the government three times and was only finally passed in August 1995 after the withdrawal of any reference to sustainable development, a concept bitterly contested by Václav Klaus [Slocock 1996, Fagin and Jehlička 1998: 118]. The absence of a policy framework essentially removed the formal political stage on which the interaction between NGOs and the state occurred.

Not only environmental policy was halted during this period, the development of a legal and constitutional framework for associational activity in general also stagnated. The delay in establishing a coherent legal and fiscal framework for civil associations affected environmental NGOs. Though the Law on Associations had been included in the 1991 Civil Code and Constitution, subsequent legislation was required to clarify the legal position of foundations, civic associations, and non-profit organisations with regard to their basic right to exist and their fiscal rights with regard to tax exemption on donations. Under pressure from sections of the non-profit sector the Klaus government did finally enact the Law on Public Benefit Societies in 1995, though the act failed to clarify the legal position of civil associations such as environmental groups that do not ostensibly exist to provide public benefit, own property, or distribute grants. There was a certain irony in the fact that until recently environmental NGOs claimed the legal right to operate and raise funds on the strength of antiquated communist legislation. Klaus's often-expressed ideological antipathy towards such collectivist emblems as non-profit organisations, NGOs and civil associations explains the delay in establishing such a legal framework.[5]

The first dissident-led administration after 1990 had identified the importance of information relating to the environment being widely available [Moldan 1990]. It was recognised that environmental regeneration depended upon openness and co-operation based on the free flow of information between the new state agencies, NGOs, and the public. However, somewhat reminiscent of the later communist period, information relating to the environment became a political weapon in the adversarial and confrontational exchanges between the ministry and NGOs after 1992. It was thus not until 1997, after the political demise of both Klaus and Benda, that a freedom of information act relating to environmental information was enacted.[6]

The inertia of the Klaus government with regard to implementing the wide-ranging local government reform enshrined in the constitution also served to weaken the political capacity of local environmental NGOs. The success of the new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, which had been introduced during the 1990-1991 period but only came into effect after the 1992 election, depended on administrative reform and the

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[5]) For an insight into Klaus's vision of civil society see [Havel, Klaus and Pithart 1996].

[6]) It was during the brief period of Martin Bursík's tenure at the Ministry of the Environment that information became freely available (on the Internet) and all files were opened and made available to NGOs (interview with Petr Štěpánek, former spokesperson for Martin Bursík, and Director of Public Relations at the Ministry). The Social Democratic government finally enacted a general Freedom of Information Act in May 1999.

devolvement of power and responsibility to local government and planners. In the absence of such reform the process was thwarted by a combination of the lack of authority and prolonged tenure of communist officials reluctant to facilitate NGO and public involvement within the EIA process.

It was during the Klaus era that environmental NGOs began to experience a financial crisis that was to have a profound impact on their activities. The crisis was precipitated partly by changes in patterns of state funding on which environmental NGOs relied in the absence of sufficient levels of donations to NGOs from sections of Czech society (sections of the middle classes who typically fund environmental organisations elsewhere still lack sufficient levels of disposable income to make substantial donations), environmental NGOs have had to rely in the short term on the provision of state support and on donations from external agencies.

In recognition of the need for the state to support nascent civil associations, the first post-communist administration had established the State Fund for the Environment. This was to consist of the revenue from fines and licences paid by polluters. Half of the proceeds were to be made available, via the Ministry of Environment, to environmental NGOs and in particular to help establish an infrastructure within the sector. Thus organisations such as *Zelený kruh* (Green Circle), established to help co-ordinate the activities of NGOs and to strengthen the representation of environmental issues within the policy process, were to benefit. However, from 1992 onward, grants from the Ministry of the Environment were directed away from the more politically oriented NGOs and from projects seeking to strengthen the sector as a whole (e.g. information flow, resources, campaign expertise etc.) towards apolitical conservation projects. Thus *Zelený kruh* was denied funding for much of the period on the basis that it was not actually involved in conservation work. It has since been revealed that a sizeable amount of the funds supposedly available to NGOs from the State Fund for the Environment was actually directed towards private sector projects such as the building of incinerators, the environmental value of which is widely disputed.[7] NGOs were also supposed to benefit from the *Fond národního majetku* – Fund of National Property, which is essentially a small proportion of the revenue from privatisation. However, the distribution of this money was continually delayed throughout the Klaus period and was only allocated to NGOs in early 1999.

Although the environmental movement had begun to fragment shortly after the Velvet Revolution, the lack of adequate funding augmented divisions within the sector and effectively narrowed ideological diversity. As state grants were rationalised, NGOs became locked in a competitive struggle over the small grants that were still available. The political effect of such competition was a reluctance to co-operate with each other which further weakened the political efficacy of the environmental movement. But perhaps the most critical dimension of the financial crisis was that NGOs reacted to the political and economic climate and the apparent decline in support for the environment among the general public by rejecting their radical strategies and ideological platforms. The only visible occurrence of mild direct action was an annual blockade of the Temelín power plant. By 1996 Greenpeace no longer participated in the event and increasingly opposition to the nuclear energy issue was down-played in favour of less controversial issues or was approached from a less radical angle. For example, *Duha* worked with local

[7]) Interview with Petr Štěpánek, November 1998.

groups opposing the building of nuclear waste storage sites in various areas across the country, but did not openly campaign against Temelín during this period. The NGOs did face a difficult task in campaigning against nuclear power as there had seemingly emerged a consensus which regarded nuclear energy as a 'clean' alternative to brown-coal power plants. Though *Děti Země* and other NGOs did present alternative scenarios in their publications and reports, their lack of political access and inadequate resources made it difficult to stage an effective campaign. The only viable strategy seemed to be taking up local NIMBY campaigns against less controversial issues oriented around conservation.

The fact that the political and economic context encouraged environmental NGOs to adopt a more professional and less radical approach during this period can be viewed as a positive long-term development. In the sense that a stratum of NGOs willing to operate within the policy process was clearly missing in the earlier period, the emergence of less radical more state-oriented NGOs prepared to co-operate at an elite level seems an encouraging development. Yet the strategy bore little or no political dividend for NGOs during this period. Indeed, the three environmental NGOs included on the security services list of 'subversive groups' had all rejected direct action, and had sought to promote their professional image.

As state grants dwindled and the prospect of receiving donations from the Czech public and organisations was thwarted by the effects of economic restructuring, environmental NGOs became almost entirely reliant on the funding provided by external agencies. However, in light of the relative success of the political and economic transition in the Czech Republic, donations to Czech NGOs were rationalised and donors began to target their assistance elsewhere. The focus of attention began to shift from the relatively stable and prosperous Central Europe to areas of south-east Europe and parts of the former Yugoslavia. This was a period of recession across Europe and America, and international foundations and donors were forced to rationalise their support for Eastern European NGOs. Even Czech Greenpeace, which receives the bulk of its income from its international parent organisation and has never sought nor accepted state funding, also experienced funding difficulties as a result of financial constraints within the international organisation at this time. Unable to rely on substantial public donations, the Czech branch suffered more than Greenpeace branches elsewhere and the director was at one point forced to consider, against the wishes of Greenpeace International, corporate sponsorship.[8] Levels of foreign donations to Czech NGOs have never recovered and the threat of further cuts and withdrawals continues to cast a shadow over the future of many environmental NGOs that remain dependent on external funding. By 1996 the American Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the US Peace Corps and USAID had completely withdrawn from the Czech Republic; C.S. Mott (US) had rationalised its assistance and EU money (through the PHARE programme) is increasingly being targeted towards projects that strengthen the economic infrastructure in view of possible Czech accession in the next decade.

By the mid-1990s environmental NGOs were essentially locked in a situation whereby their main sources of funding were in decline. There was a need to develop a base of fee-paying supporters from among Czech society. As noted above, this strategy

[8]) Interview with Hana Pernicová, Director of Greenpeace ČR, June 1995.

was hindered by the fact that levels of disposable income amongst citizens inclined to support environmental NGOs were not high enough to enable sizeable donations, and also by the fact that the NGOs themselves were only gradually coming round to the idea of non-active fee-paying members. For instance, in 1995 Czech Greenpeace had barely 400 listed supporters, despite the commitment of the organisation internationally to accept passive fee-paying supporters [Rucht 1995]. Apart from the fact that most NGOs lacked the resources to invest in fund-raising expertise, there was (and remains) a distinct lack of fund-raising expertise in the country available to those NGOs willing to venture down this path. While the larger NGOs with international links (such as Greenpeace) were able to create a more professional image and develop their expertise during the 1992-1996 period, smaller groups were hindered by a lack of resources to acquire trained staff, accountants, legal advisers and even premises from which to operate.

The 1992-1996 period was the nadir for the environmental movement in the Czech Republic and a stark contrast to the immediate post-revolutionary period. In addition to the lack of resources and political marginalisation, the environmental movement now faced a public who were less sympathetic to its cause. Although environmental activists in the earlier period had made little attempt to court public support or establish a constituency of supporters from a wider section of the community, the climate of concern about pollution and its effects on health at the time of the Velvet Revolution created a positive backdrop to their activities [Ivan Dejmal in Lamper, Macháček a Petráček 1993: 9].[9] The impact of economic restructuring was now being felt, and public attention was focused on such 'material' issues as housing and employment. There was also little public support for radical tactics. The legacy of four decades of communist rule on political attitudes and values was a deferential political culture and a fear of radicalism. Environmentalists were seen by many as attempting to rock the political boat and thus a threat to democracy. The Klaus government undoubtedly pandered to this viewpoint by portraying environmentalists as enemies of reform.

If during the early period the environmental movement consisted of too many radical organisations and lacked more conventional groups willing to lobby parliament and focus on domestic issues, the legacy of the 1992-1996 period was precisely the reverse. By the end of 1995 the environmental NGOs that had survived had responded to the financial crisis and political exclusion by jettisoning radical strategies and ideological platforms. In fear of public reaction and government recrimination, the main NGOs were reluctant to contemplate any degree of direct action.

However, it has to be recognised that while the period 1992-1996 was generally a low point in terms of political influence and the development of the environmental movement in general, a small number of the larger NGOs who had links to large global organisations did manage to become more professional and began to focus on national issues and to lobbying parliament as a strategy. Though such attempts initially bore little fruit, by 1996 a small core of environmental NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace, *Duha*, *Děti Země*,

[9]) During 1990 the environment remained a key political issue. When one public opinion poll conducted by sociologists from Charles University asked respondents to name the most important issues for the new government to deal with, 83% named the environment as the most important issue [Jehlička and Kára 1994].

Society for Sustainable Living) were well informed, were prepared to work closely at an elite level, and were adept at producing well-researched reports and proposals.[10]

A Political Renaissance?

Just as the fragmentation of Civic Forum in 1991 and the change of government in June 1992 had had a direct impact on the environmental sector, so the loss of an overall majority for Klaus's ODS-led coalition in the 1996 election marked the first tentative steps towards a new era for the environmental movement. The replacement of František Benda as environmental minister with Jiří Skalický, a respected politician and fierce critic of Klaus, ushered in what might be termed a normalisation of relations between environmental NGOs and the ministry. The climate of outright hostility was replaced by a period of tentative co-operation between the more prominent Prague-based NGOs and a tactical politician. One of Skalický's first actions was to invite representatives of NGOs to a meeting at the ministry at which he expressed a desire for open dialogue. There was now also mounting pressure on the Czech Republic from the EU and the OECD to improve environmental regulation. The original framework of laws and instruments enacted after the Velvet Revolution had not been improved or extended, and future entry to both organisations depended on tighter and more extensive environmental regulation. In addition to opening up a new political opportunity structure for NGOs, the accession of Skalický also broke the legislative deadlock of the Benda years by drafting new legislation on waste. One of his first actions was to reduce energy subsidies, a policy that Greenpeace had been advocating for a considerable time. Whether out of a real commitment by Skalický to incorporate NGOs within the drafting of the legislation, or simply due to the fact that he became increasingly distracted by political tensions within the embattled coalition, Greenpeace was able to exert a significant influence over the new waste law, inserting a clause banning the import of goods containing PVC by the year 2001. This clause represented the most radical aspect of the legislation and extended the legislation beyond norms elsewhere in Europe. There was also contact between NGOs and the ministry on issues such as motorway development and energy policy.

As political events rapidly changed in the ensuing months, the political influence and position of environmental NGOs was to improve quite dramatically. The crisis which finally engulfed Klaus's embattled coalition towards the end of 1997 resulted in the formation of a caretaker government prior to the elections to be held in June 1998. Under the brief tenure of Martin Bursík as minister of the environment, NGOs enjoyed an unprecedented degree of influence and were granted unrestricted access to the process of beginning to draft and update existing environmental legislation.[11] The temporary government

[10]) The role played by Greenpeace at the time of the floods in Moravia in early 1997 provides a good illustration of how far environmental NGOs had travelled towards becoming professional organisations. Greenpeace established the Phoenix Project urging the incorporation of solar energy within the re-building of all the destroyed villages. The project received wide-spread support from politicians, ministers, local politicians and notably the president (Interview with Hana Pernicová, former Director of Greenpeace ČR, November 1998).

[11]) In terms of actual new legislation this period produced very little. This is largely because Bursík's four month tenure made it impossible for him to draft new laws and get them through parliament – indeed, his first day in office was the last opportunity for the submission of draft legislation to parliament. However, the foundations of a new policy agenda were laid during this brief period.

to which Bursík belonged was not bound by party discipline nor ideological rift (Bursík himself was politically and financially independent). His approach was to work with other ministries and to portray the environment as an integral part of all policy issues rather than trying to get more power for the Ministry of the Environment. This marked a significant departure from the approach of his predecessors (and even his successor, Miloš Kužvart) in the sense that, regardless of the political complexion of successive governments, there had always been a power battle between the environmental ministry, seen as insignificant and politically marginal, and other ministries such as industry. This erects a further barrier to the political influence of the environmental movement. Bursík's accession also marked the return of former dissidents to environmental politics. Involved with the human rights group HOS (Movement for Unjustly Pursued People), Bursík had forged links with environmental campaigners such as Ivan Dejmal and other prominent members of the clandestine Ecological Society in the 1980s. Some of those environmentalists were now involved with the Society for Sustainable Living and, not surprisingly, were invited to assist in up-dating environmental policy. Unfortunately, as part of a caretaker government, Bursík was in office for less than three months and was therefore unable to enact much new legislation (his third day in office was actually the last day for submitting policy to the parliament).

Since the election in June 1998 of a Social Democratic minority government, the political prominence of environmental NGOs established during the Bursík period has been maintained. There are clearly parallels with the early post-revolutionary period in the sense that a network of pro-environment politicians, lawyers and NGO activists has emerged, and there is once again an overlap between the NGO sector and state agencies and officials. The new minister, Miloš Kužvart, is a geologist and former member of the pre-1989 dissident environmental association, the Ecological Society. More recently he has been involved with the non-governmental sector, having worked for NROS (*Nadace rozvoje občanské společnosti* – Civil Society Development Foundation), the Czech organisation that distributes PHARE money to NGOs, and he is still a member of the highly influential Society for Sustainable Living. The Green Parliament has been re-established as a forum for consultation between the ministry and NGOs, and a new Legislative Group of environmental NGOs has also been established, which is sent draft copies of new laws and is asked to return comments and suggestions.

How has the environmental movement changed? The most visible dimension of the environmental movement is a core of Prague-based political NGOs (Greenpeace, *Duha*, *Děti Země*, Society for Sustainable Living). After four years in the political wilderness, these groups now enjoy a degree of influence and access to the policy process. Most of the prominent groups have now adopted a more conventional organisational structure and are directed by older (aged thirty plus) people who typically possess specialised higher-education qualifications in the natural sciences, management or the social sciences. Though this new management elite has been recruited quite recently in an attempt to inject more professionalism into NGOs, some of the current activists have remained within their organisations since the early 1990s. This marks a distinct contrast with the early 1990s when, after the older generation of activists had moved into government or elsewhere, the environmental movement consisted of a transient core of students under twenty-five.

In addition to political NGOs, the long established conservation groups such as ČSOP and *Brontosaurus* remain active. Although such groups became politicised at the

time of the revolution they have largely moved away from political involvement in the post-communist period.[12] Indeed, as restrictions were placed on the availability of state funding during the 1992-1996 period, ČSOP sought to emphasise its conservationist apolitical nature and, perhaps as a result, was the recipient of a sizeable proportion of the total amount of funding available to NGOs. The organisation has also received funding from the Czech National Savings Bank.[13] Other NGOs that were once more radical and appeared to be following a political path have subsequently fallen into the ranks of the apolitical conservationists. For example, the environmental NGO *Tereza*, one of the most prominent organisations in the 1989-1991 period, established to promote environmental awareness among children, now prides itself on its apolitical position and seeks to distance itself from environmental issues within the political sphere (such as nuclear energy, transport etc.). The director of the organisation sees no contradiction in the recent decision to accept financial support form ČEZ (the Czech energy company) and Coca-Cola. It received payment from the latter for advising the multinational corporation on a green strategy for its advertising campaigns in the Czech Republic.[14]

Although Prague-based groups remain prominent, there exists a network of active local environmental NGOs has emerged focusing on specific local issues. An example of such activity is *Přátelé přírody* (Friends of Nature) in Ústí nad Labem which has mounted a campaign against the building of dams on the Elbe. The Prague-based NGOs have begun to work with such groups as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, providing resources, advice and a link to the national political arena. Although even the larger local groups tend to rely on unpaid active volunteers, there is a recognition of the importance of public relations and successful media campaigns.[15]

There would also appear to be a renewed willingness by the larger NGOs to combine lobbying with carefully orchestrated direct action, reflecting the campaign strategies currently being pursued by environmental campaigners across Europe. After a period during which Czech Greenpeace and other NGOs were unsure about the value and appropriateness of publicity campaigns and were reluctant to use even mild direct action, more radical tactics directed at mobilising the public and humiliating polluters have recently been pursued: a Greenpeace campaign in 1997 against the Syntesia chemical plant in Pardubice was successful in winning widespread public support for the issue of tighter regulation of industrial effluent. Invited on a river 'tour', the public were offered foul smelling polluted water in wine glasses which had been discharged directly from the chemical plant.

This change of strategy is clearly linked to an apparent alteration in the attitude of the public towards the environment. When asked about environmental organisations in a national opinion poll survey towards the end of 1996, 87% of respondents said they were useful and important.[16] More significantly, recent evidence suggests that the public may be better placed to offer financial support to NGOs. On a recent fund-raising campaign,

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[12]) There are still radical elements within both these organisations, for example, the Brno branch of ČSOP.

[13]) Interview with Bedřich Moldan, 15 July, 1997.

[14]) Interview with Jana Ledvunová, Director of *Tereza*, 17 July, 1997.

[15]) Interview with Hana Konvalinková, *Duha* (Olomouc), 11 May, 1999.

[16]) The survey was conducted in November 1996 by the Institute for Public Opinion Research.

Greenpeace more than tripled its donations from the public. For the first time some of the larger NGOs are now starting to keep lists of supporters and are targeting their fund raising accordingly. Apart from Greenpeace, other NGOs are still quite reluctant to accept subscription-paying passive members. Although low levels of disposable income amongst potential donors remains an obstacle to NGOs obtaining the sort of funding received by organisations elsewhere, the environmental movement clearly needs to consider the issue of fund-raising and to develop greater expertise.

The political circumstances surrounding the government's decision in May 1999 to continue with the Temelín nuclear power plant reveals a great deal about the changed relationship between NGOs and the government. It also provides an illustration of how the strategies of NGOs have also altered since the early 1990s. On one level the government's decision to continue subsidising the ill-fated scheme suggests that despite the more consensual and open political climate and the renewed influence of NGOs, the movement remains weak in the face of powerful political and economic interests. However, in conjunction with Greenpeace and other smaller NGOs, *Duha* orchestrated a high-profile campaign which coherently challenged the efficiency and economic rationale behind the pro-Temelín lobby. Indeed in the days before the decision was announced, *Duha* were actually briefing President Havel, who had decided to openly oppose the completion of the plant.[17] Moreover, the NGO campaign, which focused almost entirely on the economic cost and inefficiencies involved if the government were to continue with the project, was arguably an appropriate response to the government's apparent determination to base the final decision on such considerations. The NGO campaign was well informed and highly professional.

However, NGOs are still adversely affected by inadequate levels of funding. Though apparently committed to working with NGOs, the new government has yet to alter the basis on which ministry funds are allocated. It has been declared that funding received by NGOs as part of the recently released proceeds from privatisation cannot be used to pay salaries but must be used for projects related to conservation. As a result, the more politically oriented organisations such as the Prague-based NGO *Zelený kruh*, which exists to strengthen the infrastructure of the environmental sector, cannot benefit.

Although smaller NGOs operating outside of Prague and other main cities are all affected by the absence of sustainable and sufficient levels of funding, it would appear that the specific political opportunity structure at the municipal level accounts for a great deal. Political attitudes within the locality is also a critical factor. For example, the České Budějovice-based NGO *Jihočeské matky* (South-Bohemian Mothers) has remained radical in terms of its campaigns and has not adopted a more formal and 'professional' internal organisational structure. The organisation is one of the few remaining NGOs in the Czech Republic to have actively opposed the completion of the Temelín power plant in Southern Bohemia throughout the past decade. The situative context in which the organisation has pursued its anti-Temelín campaign has been a major constraint. The local political elite plus a substantial proportion of people in the area remain in favour of the completion of the Temelín plant largely for reasons of employment opportunities. Having

[17]) Interview with Vojtěch Kotecký, *Hnutí Duha*, 14 May, 1999.

failed in recent attempts to attract funding from any of the foreign foundations or from the state, *Jihočeské matky* now faces severe financial difficulties.[18]

The difficulties faced by *Jihočeské matky* can be contrasted with the experience of other NGOs operating at the local level. The Olomouc branch of *Duha* is similarly a small operation which depends almost entirely on volunteers from the local student community. However, reflecting developments within the *Hnutí Duha* generally, the Olomouc branch has become adept at holding press conferences and in dealing with the local administration. The local political context is also more conducive to NGO activity. The recently elected Social Democrat council campaigned against the previous centre-right government on a pro-environment agenda, and are keen to involve NGOs in the local policy process. The *Duha* campaign to reduce municipal waste has won them the support of the environmental department of the municipal authorities and in particular the local mayor. The NGO also benefits greatly from the fact that the town is heavily dominated by students from Palacký University, which provides a largely sympathetic background for their activities. Though funding remains an issue, the NGO benefits from a situation in which the local authority provides subsidised office space for which NGOs can apply.[19]

Conclusion

The fluctuating political efficacy of the environmental movement in the Czech Republic during the past decade can be attributed to a number of interlinked factors, most of which have been identified in the theoretical discourse on social movements in western democracies [Kriesi et al. 1995]. The political opportunity structure at both the national and local level and the political disposition of the incumbent government has clearly had an impact on the ability of the environmental movement to gain political influence. The election of a centre-right administration in 1992, and then a centre-left government in June 1998, had a direct impact on the political influence of the environmental movement. Though the ideological persuasion of a particular government clearly shapes the situative context in which environmental NGOs operate, the balance of power between ministries within that government also greatly affects political access. While the current centre-left administration contains a number of pro-environmental ministers, much rests on the ability of the environment minister, Kužvart, to overcome opposition from within his own minority government and party. The recent decision on the future of the Temelín nuclear plant illustrated that despite a pro-environmental core of younger ministers within the Social Democratic government, the old guard politicians who favour industrial interests over the environment are well placed (industry, transport) to overturn policy initiatives put forward by Kužvart.

The availability of resources for NGOs has long been recognised as a factor in the empowerment and mobilisation of interest associations within the political arena [Zald and McCarthy 1987]. In the case of funding NGOs in the Czech Republic, the resource issue is particularly significant in the sense that as a consequence of the communist legacy and subsequent economic restructuring, NGOs cannot rely on sufficient levels of public donation, as is the case elsewhere in Europe. Though the recent experience of Greenpeace, discussed above, suggests that in fact the Czech public are now more in-

[18]) Interview with Jaroslava Brožová, November 1998. I am also grateful to Petr Jehlička for information obtained on this NGO as part of his as yet unpublished research.

[19]) Interview with Hana Konvalinková, *Duha* (Olomouc), 14 May, 1999.

clined and able to support NGOs, levels of disposable income remain low and most NGOs lack the resources to invest in fund-raising. While it is assumed that in the long term this situation will alter, NGOs are currently dependent on limited state funding, on donations from foreign philanthropic organisations, and on aid from the EU. Such sources of funding are unsustainable and not the basis for the long-term development of NGOs. Though Czech NGOs have developed considerably over the past decade in terms of their internal organisation and interaction with the media and the public, smaller groups still lack basic resources and know-how. Post-communist societies lack the developed infrastructure of civil society that so benefits civil associations in more established democracies. This infrastructure is somewhat intangible: on a basic level it includes such practical assistance to NGOs as access to information (on other groups, new laws, foreign organisations), and to resources such as photocopiers, computers, and fax machines. Organisations such as the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) in the UK provide training programmes ranging from effective public relations, fund-raising, and accounting practices, to legal advice.[20] Though agencies and foundations exist in the Czech Republic offering such assistance (for example, the British Know-How Fund provides training as does the EU through the Phare Programme, and also the Soros-backed Open Society), the dissemination of resources and know-how is limited and often fails to extend to smaller organisations outside of Prague.

The funding and resource issue has had the greatest impact on the capacity of environmental NGOs. The political exclusion of the environmental movement during the Klaus period was exacerbated because of the lack of a robust and resourced civil society. The constraints on the development of such a western-style civil society include the legacy of four decades of communist rule which essentially destroyed the historic tradition of civic associations in the Czech lands, plus the impact of rapid and extensive economic restructuring since 1990, which has led to social fragmentation and displacement and does not lend itself to the development of cohesive and stable associations.

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[20]) The NCVO receives financial support from the British Home Office as well as from charities and foundations.

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Four Milestones in the Social and Economic Development of Czech Agriculture

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Abstract: The development of agriculture in Czechoslovakia has a rich history. Some authors talk about two discontinuities (collectivisation and decollectivisation). However, in the almost hundred-year long evolution, at least four major turnarounds can be registered: the agrarian crisis at the turn of the century; the 1919 land reform; collectivisation after 1949; and transformation after 1989. The events of this century that acted as the most important impulses of social change are evidently WWI and WWII. Outside these events, the political-administrative form changed seven times during one hundred years (the Austro-Hungarian Empire to 1918, the First Republic 1918-1938, the Second Republic 1938-1939, the Protectorate Böhmen and Mähren under German occupational direction 1939-1945, the Czechoslovak Republic 1945-1960, the Czechoslovak Socialistic Republic 1960-1968, the Czechoslovak Federative Republic 1968-1993, the Czech Republic from 1993. In this enumeration is included the connection with Slovakia in 1918 and the separation of Slovakia on two occasions, in 1939 and 1993. Agriculture went through a rise as well as a deep fall in prestige in this history. Agricultural workers as a social group have gone through major ups and downs, and the present situation is not prosperous for them. The key problem of Czech agriculture is a parallelism of high indebtedness and a low rate of enterprise profit. The problem in rural areas is related to the high rate of unemployment and growing migration. The development of agriculture within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe remains an open question.
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The economic importance of farming in the Czech Republic is on the decline. In spite of this, farming remains tied to the Czech countryside. It is a part of its past, present and European future. In the almost hundred-year long development of agriculture in the Czech lands and Slovakia some authors refer to two discontinuities – collectivisation and decollectivisation [Petráňová 1996: 69, Slavkovský 1995, Leščák 1995, Danglová 1995].

Reflecting deeper on farming's historical development in the Czech lands, and later in Czechoslovakia, at least four major turnarounds can be registered, which have shaped its position within the national economy, and influenced farmers' living conditions and subsequently the rural population's social structure: the agrarian crisis at the turn of the century; the 1919 land reform; collectivisation after 1949; and transformation after 1989.

The events of this century that acted as the most important impulses of social changes are evidently World War I and World War II. Outside these events, the political-administrative form was changed seven times over a hundred-year period: the Austro-Hungarian Empire to 1918, the First Republic 1918-1938, the Second Republic 1938-1939, the Protectorate Böhmen und Mähren under German occupational direction 1939-1945, the Czechoslovak Republic 1945-1960, the Czechoslovak Socialistic Republic

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1960-1968, the Czechoslovak Federative Republic 1968-1993, and the Czech Republic from 1993. This enumeration includes the connection with Slovakia in 1918, and the separation of Slovakia both in 1939 and 1993.

Historical Preface

To understand some of the contexts of this development, we need to look into a more distant past. The rule of Empress Maria Theresa can be viewed through a nationalistic prism, as expressed by Pekař: "...she was the first to renege on the commitments whereby she had pledged to see to the independence of the Czech state, and laid the foundations for merging the Czech and Austrian lands into a single state" [Pekař 1991: 136]. The 1753 census revealed the Czech lands (with a population of 4.4 million) as making up roughly one fifth of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy's population of 21 million. The Czech lands' political importance and influence was rather marginal within the union of the Czech state, the Hungarian state and the Alpine countries.

Economic and Social Reforms in Austria-Hungary

Leaving aside the nationalist level, we can trace the economic logic along which extensive economic, educational, administrative and ecclesiastical reforms were started. The Theresian and later Josephian Cadasters gradually brought order into land ownership, primarily for tax reasons. The reform effort was also intended to stabilise rural settlement, start new villages in places of by that time extinct manors, and divide large farmsteads to increase the number of settled farming families. An important milestone was the abolition of serfdom in 1781. Historical importance can also be ascribed to the Tax and Levies Patent promulgated in 1789 which, based on the Josephian Cadasters, regulated the manors' profits and obligations to land rulers and the Church, although it was subsequently abolished in 1790 during Leopold II's rule.

The rural population was understood to be an important social group, and farming ranked among the major structural components of the national economy. The state's organised care began in those years through the setting up of farming organisations (associations in economic terms) that served for the propagation of progress in farming (by disseminating information about novel concepts, such as crop rotation, fodder and industrial crop growing and fertilisation). One of the goals pursued by farmers through association was economic defence, i.e. influence over the sale of farm produce and market protection. One of the first such associations was the 'Society for Tillage and Liberal Arts in the Czech Kingdom' (transformed into the 'Patriotic-Economic Society in the Czech Kingdom' by Joseph II's patent in 1788). Its economic and social importance is also borne out by the fact that prominent personalities from aristocratic ranks alternated at the helm of this association, for example Prokop, Count Lažanský, Josef, Count Canal, Kašpar, Count Šternberk and Prince Jan Adolf Schwarzenberg [Kubačák 1994: 144-163]. Considerable attention was devoted to agricultural education and enlightenment from the end of the 18th century, as there was no doubt that an educated farming estate was a guarantee of the monarchy's economic development.

The wars with France and Napoleon in the first half of the 19th century placed a massive economic burden on the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, the importance of farming as a stockroom of strategic war potential (food, draught animals, fodder, and raw materials) increased.

The revolutionary year of 1848 brought a positive change to the countryside – the abolition of manorial labour and other tributary obligations. The boom in agricultural production, related to a distinct post-war increase in the population, and therefore a sufficiently large marketplace within the Austro-Hungarian empire, further stimulated technical and technological development in agriculture. Productivity went up, and soil fertility and farming intensity increased. The market gradually became saturated and the mounting sales difficulties passed in the last quarter of the 19th century on to the second[1] of the great European agrarian crises.

Warnings of Agricultural Overproduction

The agrarian crisis towards the end of the 19th century had both an economic and a social dimension. Social differentiation had already begun during the extensive changes in land and property ownership, when property was acquired by foreign aristocracy in the period following the battle of White Mountain. The legal position of the foreign aristocracy was irrefutable, and the upward mobility of the settled rural (mostly Czech) population through the social structure was relatively difficult. The countryside's economic and social difficulties were tackled in various ways and means, one of which was co-operative farming at the end of the 19th century – at first credit unions – later assuming the form of production and processing co-operatives.

The widening gap in property possessions and the deterioration of living conditions in villages at the end of the 19th century drove out a part of the poor population to seek work in both near and distant countries, including America. In contrast to the stagnation in Europe, the American countryside was experiencing a dramatic period of growth. The initially bloodstained drama of settling the American plains gradually took on the contours of a certain economic and social order. Not only the austerity and resilience of the new settler, but also the education and experience he brought with him from the former homeland played a role in this. Settlement policy employed various means, including knowledge of the then nascent rural sociology, and was directed towards a targeted construction of rural society. It was recognised that "...a farmer is not only characterised by the money-making function, whereas he is a whole complex of social functions because he is also a husband, father, neighbour, republican, the main social problem of the countryside therefore is not how to make a lot of money by plant and animal production but that a number of other issues, equally important in personal, national and human terms are at stake..." [Gillete 1928: 5]. The movement and importance of capital in American farming was at that time comparable with that of industrial capital. On the world's grain market the high quality produce of American farming, imported to Europe using relatively inexpensive ocean shipping and railway transport, started to become a factor. Soon, the European market became over-saturated, and dropping prices caused the social conditions in the Czech countryside to deteriorate even further. Small farmsteads were afflicted the hardest.

The Tragedy of World War One

Mounting social and property-related inequality marked the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Data on property suggests that 37.6% of all soil was held by

[1]) The first agrarian crisis in 1818 was relatively short and was followed by a rapid growth in agricultural production.

large-estate owners, mainly the aristocracy from the period following the battle of the White Mountain. This, however, made up a mere 0.2% of all farms. On the other hand, 68.4% of farms covered less than 2 hectares, while their owners worked a mere 5.6% of the soil [Franěk 1967]. Social inequality increasingly accentuated nationalistic undertones. Small peasants incurred debts and all too easily fell among the most impoverished strata made up of the landless and day labourers. World War One made these differences even more acute. Agriculture sent supplies to the war, but labour was scarce on small farms because village men in their active years, if they returned from the war at all, suffered from the consequences of injuries and hardship for a long time afterward. The war caused food prices to skyrocket, while profiteers of various types enjoyed fat margins from them. Malnutrition was endemic throughout the population, and poverty descended upon both the urban and the rural areas.

The 1919 Land Reform

The rather confusing process of a political coup marked the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic on 28 October 1918. Despite this, the act itself of establishing an independent republic represented for the Czech patriotic public the ultimate in political efforts. One facet of reality was that of the hopes raised by the newly acquired national freedom, another was the threat of hunger. Ferdinand Peroutka wrote of those times: "...fear of hunger disturbed National Committee members out of complacence over the freedom acquired. They were not mistaken in seeing a danger. They feared that wildness, spawned by hunger, would spill out of houses onto the streets." [Peroutka 1933: 241].

Land reform offered a relatively logical solution to the deepening property-related inequality in the countryside, which compounded not only economic but also social and national problems. Land reform was contained in the programme pursued by both the domestic politicians and the exile government that had been preparing Czechoslovakia's establishment with the help of the Allies. The Washington Declaration stated that "large estates will be given up for the purposes of domestic colonisation". Therefore the new Czechoslovak government, in one of its first steps, passed a law on the 'impoundment of large estates' (9 November 1918), intended to prevent land and property machinations before the former would be at the disposal of the State. Czech political representation was in a situation in which it had to speedily provide food and other supplies to the population, while building the system of the new republic's economic self-sufficiency.

The impoundment of estates was not easy in political or economic terms. The largest land owners were the Schwarzenbergs, the Černíns of Chudenice, the Coloredo-Mansfelds, the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine, the Kinsky family of Vohnice, the Lobkovic family, and the Wallensteins etc. [Stočes 1958: 309]. A large acreage of soil was also owned by the Church, among which the Prague Archdiocese, the St. Vitus Chapter and the German monastery at Teplá were the largest owners. Economic power was logically tied to factual power. However, the extensive property rights enjoyed by foreigners elicited nation-wide indignation, and the slogan 'undo [the battle of] the White Mountain' was attractive to all the political parties [Peroutka 1933: 244].

Land Reform – A Tool of Political Struggle

Naturally, political parties differed in their views of how to effect land reform. The Agrarian Party was the strongest advocate of the reform. Thanks to its programme, which proposed the allocation of large estates into small holdings that would be made available

to rural workers, cottiers, small farmers, rural tradesmen and the landless, the party won sizeable support among the poorer but significantly populous strata of rural people. Socialist parties pushed, in line with their ideology, for the nationalisation of large estates or their transformation into socialist co-operatives.

In mid-April 1919 the Land Appropriation Act was passed, and two months later, a law on the establishment of the National Land Office, which was put in charge of implementing the land reform. The Appropriation Act was relatively radical. The holding limits it stipulated liquidated for all practical purposes the aristocratic large estate of the type it had evolved into up to that time, with all of its economic and social pluses and minuses. Appropriation of farmland over 150 ha and any land over 250 ha was allowed. Exemptions from appropriation up to 500 ha were allowed when the aspect of 'general benefit' could be proved, while in areas where an acute shortage of soil was felt the threshold was lowered to 50 ha. Legionnaires, agricultural workers, so-called land reform victims (allowanced labourers and hands on large estates slated for parcelling) and small peasants were preferred. Large estate land was appropriated in return for handsome financial compensation, and the recipients paid in instalments for the plots they obtained in small or residual allotments.

The implementation of land reform and its results turned out to be substantially different from the original script. This reflected a number of circumstances: the radicalism of drafting the law constituted political capital which promised fast electoral gains; however, reform implementation itself was impeded by the unwillingness of those who were to be divested of huge possessions. These individuals certainly had enough economic and political tools available to hinder the reform. The power relationships and ties in the society created a dense web of barriers, against which the newly codified rights of those who hitherto had virtually no property rights could offer adequate countermoves with only great difficulty. Reform implementation dragged on until 1936, when almost one third of the appropriated land was returned to the original owners. Completion of the reform was deferred, and earmarked for after 1955.

Nevertheless, the economic and social influence of large proprietors and the foreign aristocracy was weakened considerably. The extinction of prerogatives in the emperor's court and the abolition of aristocratic titles in the country's republican organisation caused the nobility's social prestige and political influence to decline. The Catholic Church – one of the largest landowners before 1919 – retained almost all of its land, contrary to the original plans. However, its social influence also plunged.

Through strengthening small and middle farmers, the rural population's social structure changed, with acute property and social contrasts being somewhat blunted. Despite all of the above problems, land reform helped to stabilise the political and economic conditions in the First Republic; in particular, it enhanced the influence of the Agrarian Party which was the most consistent of all in reform implementation.

Rising Prestige of Agricultural Specialists as a Guarantee of the Country's Stability

Farm-produce marketing completely changed when an independent Czechoslovak republic came into being. In the first years of its existence, the new government's key task was to provide enough food to the hunger-stricken population decimated by the consequences of wartime austerity measures, shortages of food supplies which had been exported by Austria towards the end of the war, and substandard harvests from exhausted fields. Agri-

culture was recovering slowly; for its further development investments were needed and, above all, opportunities created for farm-produce exports. However, the Austro-Hungarian market was lost when the republic gained independence, and it was not easy to find new outlets within accessible regions. On the other hand, the monopolistic position of Austrian-German and Hungarian capital was weakened, and Czech capital, supported by the allied countries' capital, was thus given an economic chance.

Agriculture was regarded as a very important sector of the national economy. First-hand experience with food shortages pointed to the political and social dimension of hunger. Training specialists in agriculture, who would be able to use the country's political and relative economic independence, appeared as a priority task. The number of publications that, based on more or less extensive theoretical knowledge, treated agrarian problems was increasing. At the same time, the scientific community began to take shape, oriented towards not only the technical and technological aspects of agricultural production but also towards social issues related to the evolution of the countryside. This period also saw the development of rural and agricultural sociology, which found its domain at the Brno College of Agriculture; it was later also taught in Prague and Bratislava. Student societies, journals and movements emerged, expressing and promoting young specialists' views of life at that time, and the countryside's future. The natural radicalism of youths was fed from left-wing political directions and from the echoes of Marxism and the international workers' movement.

An important milestone was the establishment of the Czechoslovak Academy of Agriculture (28 December 1924) which immediately after its foundation initiated a number of research projects and theoretical studies focused on the economic and social problems of agriculture and the countryside. Agrarian ideology looked for and collected scientifically justifiable assumptions for argumentation in the political fight.

Agrarianism – The Right and Left Wings

Naturally, the views on the further development of agriculture and the countryside differed substantially. In the 1920s and 1930s agrarianism gradually split into two wings. The right wing was represented by Professor V. Brdlík, the left wing by E. Reich. Reich and his colleagues in the Czechoslovak Academy of Agriculture, who relied primarily on the work of the Swiss economist Laur, expounded a theory of the stability of medium-sized and small agricultural enterprises. At that time, this was quite an advanced way of thinking, which moreover matched the requirements of the 1919 land reform [Tauber 1968: 258]. Despite the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s – which also paralysed agriculture's development and caused massive indebtedness particularly among small producers – a certain diversification of agricultural enterprises in terms of size and ownership prevented output from slumping and helped to maintain a certain level of food self-sufficiency.

In Czechoslovak agriculture, such an economic-political orientation was the consequence of developments to that time. The economic and ideological dispute over the size and character of the agricultural enterprise has in fact never been closed. The question remains as to what degree the right-wing, idealised picture of the 'Czech farmer' corresponded to historical reality; however, we cannot but see that this image was a politically pivotal ideology also for the small peasantry. In a Czechoslovak village, really large property was usually not Czech. Literary renditions of rural heroes as patriots and of wise landlords enhancing and enlarging inherited property are often marked by signs of artistic

fiction, which helped to overcome the recurring impacts of crises and supported hope and confidence in a better future. The farmer's and the peasant's mentality was certainly individualistic, and a feature of certain reserve and familial self-sufficiency can still be observed in the village today. However, along with this individualistic approach, the principle of the self-help co-operative began to evolve and was particularly strong in this country. Co-operatives provided that dose of economic and social co-operation which was absolutely essential for small producers to survive, while being a useful complement to the existing institutional structure for larger agricultural enterprises.

Beginnings of Czechoslovak Co-operatives

The roots of the co-operative movement date back to the 1890s. The intensification of agricultural production, which began in the mid-18th century, contributed to the significant development of the countryside. Crop rotation replaced fallow land, economical sowing in rows replaced broadcast sowing, and inorganic fertilisers started to be used in addition to organic manure. The introduction of new crops, mainly sugar beet, fodder crops, and fodder root-crops, broadened the feedstock base and improved the productivity of animal production. Cattle and pig head counts went up. The improved health of farm animals was reflected in the higher average weight and yield of animals. Ever more frequently, menial work was being replaced by agricultural machines. Large farmsteads flourished, and agricultural production generated good profits for their owners. Czech agrarian capital began to centralise and emancipate itself at the turn of the century. The Agrarian Party was founded in 1899 and became, particularly after Czechoslovakia was established, the most influential Czech power.

Small farms barely survived and tried to avoid debt. Their productivity was incomparably lower. Their market staples included sheepswool and grains. Storage facilities were limited, and grains were therefore often sold immediately after harvest rather than before sowing when their price peaked. When the local market was saturated, farm-produce sales depended mainly on middlemen, who pushed purchase prices down to a minimum. The agrarian crisis thus eradicated small farms one by one.

The above economic difficulties prompted the peasantry to set up various self-help societies. Raising loans was very difficult for the less affluent strata of farmers. Co-operative credit unions therefore met with a strong response in rural areas and expanded rapidly. They were initially set up on the *Raiffeisen* system, but soon the Czech name *Kampelička* took root, after the first Czech promoter of civic self-help, Dr. Cyril Kampelík. In the 1890s, there were several dozen such *Kampeličkas*, several thousand at the turn of the century, and almost 4,500 in 1933. In addition to *Kampeličkas* (unlimited liability co-operatives), limited liability co-operatives (trustee savings banks) started emerging.

The co-operative sector reached a period of great boom within a short time. Other types of co-operatives emerged: marketing co-operatives (which facilitated the sale of farm produce and the purchase of industrial goods for farmers); warehousing co-operatives; production and processing co-operatives (e.g. dairies, distillers, starch makers, linen and flax breaking shops, flour mills, bakeries, engineering, power generation), pastoral and fisheries co-operatives etc.

The co-operative idea attracted almost all of the rural social strata. For small peasants, raising a loan was the greatest problem. *Kampeličkas* were the most accessible type

of self-help, non-profit co-operatives for them because they addressed fundraising difficulties, required lower membership shares, and each member had only one ballot in voting at general meetings. Besides accepting deposits and providing loans, *Kampeličkas* also facilitated the conversion of mortgage debts, joint procurement, and the marketing of members' products. Profit co-operatives (production, processing etc.) were mainly set up by medium and large farmers, and the state also was in favour of them. These co-operatives required high membership shares and extensive obligations, for their main purpose was to collect sufficient capital for investments. Decision making at general meetings was very often related to the member's equity stake. The variability of co-operatives made it possible to draw on the most suitable sources of raw materials and adjust co-operatives' operations to the conditions prevailing in each particular part of Czechoslovakia.

Agriculture is a Strategic Sector in Wartime

The German occupational forces focused on maintaining the productivity of Czechoslovak agriculture. Credit unions and production and consumption co-operatives represented concentrated capital, while offering a clear and functional system of farm-produce production and distribution. Through a relatively simple reorganisation (abolishing general meetings, implanting their own trustees and commissioners into all key positions in co-operatives and their associations) the Germans won control and insight. Food and raw materials were redistributed (mostly to Germany), and the financial centres of co-operatives were linked directly to the Reichsbank. Agriculture supplied the army and the civilian population, and it would not have been effective to destroy this background. Development in torn-away border areas took a different course than in the occupied inland, but overall Czechoslovak agriculture was not damaged by World War II in any significant way.

The moral damage was much greater: the collaboration of many large landowners and businessmen with the Germans; the discrediting of the Agrarian Party; and, above all, flagrant usury and profiteering – a phenomenon associated with every period of material want and social instability. People associated the long-awaited end of the war with hopes for a return to pre-war values, including the recovery of the co-operatives' democratic principles [Špirk 1959: 5-15].

Post-War Agriculture

War-inflicted damage was gradually removed in the first months after the war. The consequences of bombing were remedied in the large cities and industrial areas, production was resumed, neighbours and relatives were reunited, and families sought for their missing members. Prisoners returned home from concentration and forced labour camps, and soldiers came back from their foreign resistance units. The post-war formation of Czechoslovak political and power structures was distinctly marked by agreements signed between the superpowers before the end of the war. Czechoslovakia fell within the Soviet Union's sphere of control, with all the consequences that were to stem from this soon after.

Although the manner and results of international political talks at the last stage of the war did signal the direction in which the country's future development would be headed, not even the heaviest sceptics could fathom its future reaches. Only those who had come into personal contact with this ideology in the Soviet Union knew what com-

munism, or its ideological precursor, socialism, actually meant. Their fates varied, but they were almost always dramatic and tragic. Some intellectuals of the First Republic identified with the notions of 'the people's government' and accepted and defended them quite, uncritically. It is difficult to identify today the role played in these attitudes by naivete, political blindness, fear, speculation or genuine enthusiasm and belief. Some individuals made attempts, usually unsuccessful, at critical reviews. However, in the pre-war climate of the acute threat of German fascism, they were neither listened to nor supported, because a pessimistic statement that deadly danger was imminent from *both* west and east sounded so hopeless that even rationally thinking people refused, perhaps due to their self-preservation instinct, to take notice of it.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took over political initiative, including the formulation of the objectives of agricultural policy. The promise of soil and confiscated-property allocation met with a favourable response on the part of other political parties – Social Democrats, the People's Party and the National Socialists. Reservations were not even raised by the rationally thinking agrarian experts of the 1930s, or the London exile of 1940-1945.

The Košice Governmental Policy Statement did include formulations that – with the passage of time and with knowledge of the subsequent developments in retrospect – might have rung a warning sound.[2] However, they were justifiable in a way at that time: a certain radicalism was perceived as a legitimate effort to make right the wrongs of war, and matched the thinking of the peasantry's middle and lower strata with their experience of the 1930s agrarian crisis and the occupation regime. For the time being, collectivisation did not appear on the agenda declared in the Party's agricultural policy.

The German Expulsion Trauma. Newcomers Settling in Border Zones

It is to be agreed that the expulsion of almost 3 million Germans from Czech border zones is one of those political decisions that are reflected in the entire lives of the actors and their descendants. Assessment is up to historians and political scientists; mutual making-up for the wrongs is up to political representatives, civic groups and other insti-

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[2]) "Responding to the calls of Czech and Slovak peasants and the landless for a consistent implementation of a new land reform, and motivated by efforts to, first of all, tear Czech and Slovak land once and for all from the hands of foreign German-Hungarian aristocracy, as well as from the hands of the traitors of the nation, and place it in the hands of the Czech and Slovak peasantry and the landless, (...) the National Land Fund shall be established. The National Land Fund will include all land, buildings, livestock and dead stock if these have been owned by: German and Hungarian aristocrats and large estate owners, irrespective of citizenship; German and Hungarian citizens of Czechoslovakia who actively helped to break up and occupy Czechoslovakia, who betrayed the nation and actively supported German and Hungarian occupants; shareholding and other companies that were managed by persons as above categorised. The above land fund and the property connected therewith shall be confiscated without compensation. The relevant national committees assisted by peasantry commissions shall carry out the confiscation and temporary management of the confiscated property pending the implementation of the land reform. Farmland found at the disposal of the National Land Fund shall be allocated in Czech lands to Czech cottiers, and in Slovakia to Slovak and Ukrainian cottiers, small and medium-sized peasants as also to agricultural workers, with preference to be given to those who have merit for the national liberation struggle..." [*Košický*... 1945].

tutions. In this text, this event is included as a mere statement of a historical fact that changed the character of large rural parts of the Czechoslovak republic.

From the purely economic point of view, the expulsion of the Germans, and the confiscation of their land and real and personal property caused a distinct change in the national cadaster of farmland. This land and property could then be allocated to applicants. However, this act was an extremely unfortunate one from a moral point of view. Although history gives evidence of the defeated being treated by the victors in this way, it in no case justifies such solutions. From the social perspective, a period of dramatic vertical and horizontal movements in the rural population's social structure, and of changes in the population's ethnic pattern, was opened up.

The newcomers included Czech and Slovak citizens and repatriates from other countries (Rumania, Bulgaria, Volhynia in Russia. etc.). Settling in the border zone meant a considerable, socially upward step for many of them. Maximum land allocation was 13 ha, which could suffice for an average family's living. Interest in land and confiscated property was substantial. The Ministry of Agriculture made use of this situation to strengthen the Communist Party's position, and rushed to issue ownership deeds for the allocated soil. In this way, the communists wanted to gain as much influence in the countryside as possible – influence they would be able to capitalise on in elections.

This massive social mobility was wrought with negatives. Besides honest and genuinely needy people, easy property acquisitions attracted many adventurers who had no intention to toil the acquired soil or to appreciate property – their aim was to make as much money as possible as quickly as possible, and then to vanish. Border areas were being settled and devastated at the same time, and people's fates mixed and intertwined. Primarily agricultural workers and small peasants benefited from farmland confiscation between 1945 and 1948. The social groups of the most impoverished agricultural workers of the pre-war countryside – the farm hands and servants, the landless, the allowanced labourers – virtually disappeared. The group of middle peasants was reinforced and became the strongest economic and social group in the Czechoslovak countryside. However, their satisfaction was not to last long, and rural life was to be switched over onto a different course.

Nationalisation in 1948

Very soon after the war, in early 1946, the communists laid down at their 8th Congress a guideline concerning the co-operative sector in general, and co-operative farming in particular.[3] The communists pushed for the co-operative sector's unification as early as before the war without success. They succeeded in July 1945 when the Central Council of Co-operatives was established as an umbrella organisation controlling nine separate co-operative unions.[4]

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[3]) The key policy of co-operative farming was formulated as follows: "To provide for effective support to co-operative farming and its full democratisation and simplification so that co-operative farming can become an effective tool in the restructuring of the entire distribution system, as well as for production cost cutting in agriculture." [*Protokol...*: 145].

[4]) Association of Co-operatives for the Elevation of Agricultural Production; Association of Warehousing and Related Agricultural Co-operatives; Association of Agricultural Engineering Co-operatives; Association of Co-operative Credit Unions; Association of Production and Labour

The party's agricultural policy was launched by extensive purges, particularly at the managerial level. Most directors and senior executives of the Union of Agricultural Co-operatives and of the co-operatives' federations were dismissed, and replacements in middle-level executive positions were initiated.

The country's Constitution of 9 May 1948 declared the democratisation of co-operatives. However, democratisation was meant in the communist interpretation of this word.[5] The Constitution explicitly prohibited money-making activities in the capitalist way, while failing to specify the sources of general welfare. Unification of the co-operative sector (workers', artisans', trade and farming co-operatives) was effected through a law on the Central Council of Co-operatives passed in July 1948. In December that same year, the operations of all the previously existing co-operative marketing institutions (particularly Kooperativa, Moragra, Zemka, Peruť and other marketing societies) were terminated; the entire purchase of farm produce and its processing were subjected to monopoly. Co-operative credit unions were made directly connected to the State Bank of Czechoslovakia, and became part of the state's financial sector. The existence of self-help co-operatives thus lost both *raison d'être* and room for operations.

After February 1948, the gradual nationalisation of industry, the financial sector, and foreign and domestic wholesale trade continued. Part of the transport system was also nationalised. Still, private small-scale production, larger farmsteads in the village, and some private factories and trades in the city continued to hold out.

Collectivisation: Purpose and Punishment

It was obvious that the village would not be spared the changes brought about by the communist regime for too long. However, it was not so easy to appropriate and nationalise farmsteads in the village. The post-war land allocations did meet the need of a considerable number of small peasants, but tens of thousands of hectares remained uncultivated and unsettled in border areas. Alongside the inflow of people into the village, an outflow of village people into towns also continued, and agriculture began to feel a shortage of skilled labour. It was untenable at that time in both political and economic terms to launch collectivisation because eradicating large and well-performing farming units would undermine supplies to the population.

The approach of stepped-up pressure was taken, mainly through increasing the obligatory deliveries, taxes, price disadvantages etc., to an extent that would become unbearable for the farmers and that would force them into a different solution – joint farming. The possibility of harsh penalties became a programme, and the state's highest representatives made no secret of that.[6] In February 1949, the National Assembly passed

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Co-operatives; Association of Small Trades Co-operatives; Association of Housing Co-operatives; Association of Community and Cultural Houses.

[5]) Co-operatives are defined as "...an association of the working people for joint activities, the purpose of which is to improve the standard of living of the members and other working people, but not to achieve the greatest profits possible from the capital invested. The state supports the people's co-operative sector in the interest of the development of the national economy and general welfare." [*Ústava...* 1948].

[6]) "We must push hard for the meeting of all state and public obligations on the part of the residuals of the capitalist strata in the city and the countryside, and in case of any anti-state and unlawful

Act No. 69 on Standard Agricultural Co-operatives, whereby all the co-operatives hitherto existing in a village were amalgamated or transformed into a single co-operative, while the formation of additional Standard Agricultural Co-operatives (SAC) was launched. These newly formed SACs did not operate according to the pre-war principles of co-operative farming; instead the 'Standard Statutes' of 1949 were imposed on them. The Standard Statutes had been approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and regulated in detail the terms of reference of co-operatives' bodies and the way of their management.

Thereafter, an intensive campaign was launched which emphasised the advantages of joint soil-working and concentrated animal production. In parallel with the first wave of collectivisation the project of exporting the class struggle to the countryside was continued. Owners of more than 20 ha, and later 15 ha, were labelled as the 'village rich men'. Experts were instructed to find "other criteria to define capitalist elements in the countryside than soil acreage" [Kaplan 1993: 224-225]. The principal tools deployed in the rural class differentiation policy included class-based scheduling of produce supplies and purchase; the forced sale of machines; a ban on employing labour; forced threshing and sale of grains; forced leasehold; forced land swaps; the seizure of textile and footwear rationing vouchers; a ban on killing one's own hog for one's own needs; and other restrictions. The economic and social pressure exerted on peasants mounted, inspired by the brutality of the Soviet model of collectivisation.

The rural élite of able and industrious agricultural workers was systematically liquidated in economic and social terms; at the same time, the process of devastating the cultural and social heritage of village co-operation continued. Mass-scale unlawful actions and court trials, plus existential and legal uncertainty hit agricultural workers on the most sensitive point – the peasant was deprived of the ability to make decisions about his own land, which was taken from or allocated to him, he was not allowed to buy machinery or make decisions about his products. Civil freedoms were lost, officials were not elected but appointed, and all organisations that defended farmers' interests ceased to exist. Communist functionaries and the Ministry of Agriculture – the principal promoters of collectivisation [Kaplan 1993: 228-231] – proclaimed themselves to be representatives of peasant interests.

Not only the owners themselves but also their families were hurt. The children of the afflicted peasants, and also of tradesmen and other enemies of the state, were denied access to education. They were often forced to remain in agriculture as menial workers, and were not allowed to look for any other job in the city or try to acquire other qualifications. Never before and never again were agricultural workers exposed to such strong pressure and degradation.

Loss of Prestige

In the 1950s, disillusion flooded the countryside, hand in hand with fear and uncertainty. Forcibly established SACs failed to report good results for a long time. A number of SACs were wound up due to bad management, and their land and property were taken over by state farms. The co-operative peasant's standard of living was very low. Remuneration based on the 'labour unit' did not reach the average of fixed remuneration at state farms and other state-owned companies, and so the croft, although always labelled

activities of such elements, even for the imposition of property-related penalties." [*Klement...* 1949: 287].

as a 'private-capitalist anachronism', was preserved in the village to compensate for the low income and to provide food to village households.

The consequences of collectivisation as a violent intervention in human fate and the country's economic mechanism remained manifest for a long time. The agricultural profession's social prestige dropped to a historical low. After a period of a ban on education for children of *kulaks* and other class enemies, the conditions relaxed somewhat at the end of the 1950s in that they were permitted agricultural education; however, for some of them, the ban on any other type of education remained. Studying agricultural sciences thus represented punishment for the parents' alleged guilt. Paradoxically, however, a college degree in agriculture was grounded on a good standard in this country, and many émigrés after 1968 applied it successfully outside Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the loss of free choice, whether of education or vocation, heavily deformed the relationship of agricultural workers to other social groups, and that of the majority population to them.

SACs slowly consolidated at the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s, and underwent four stages of unification.[7] In the early 1960s, a transition to fixed financial remuneration was prepared (to replace remuneration based on labour units), conditions of social consumption gradually levelled, and the principles of corporate consumption were adjusted. By this time, the first generation of violently collectivised farmers was being substituted by a second generation, less burdened by painful memories and injustices. Individuals who did not succumb to the pressure of collectivisation and worked their holdings independently (only a very small percentage of the total number of workers in agriculture) served as living examples of the way resistance to the state's power wound up; they more or less vegetated, and their children usually did not follow suit.

The social dimension of collectivisation in agriculture consisted in a violent breakdown of the until then existing social structure, and through various limitations erected railings within which a different social structure would form, adjusted to the needs of carrying out the idea of socialist large-production farming. As time went by, the differences originally spawned by ownership gradually blended. The generational rollover of agricultural workers caused the existence of private land and production means ownership to be almost forgotten. Such an existence had no practical meaning, and did not fit into the value system of the socialist way of work and life [Majerová 1997: 111].

The short episode of the 1968 Prague Spring did not influence the Czechoslovak village too much. Although efforts appeared to create alternative types of economic entities, as well as attempts at returning to private farming, the period of relaxation was too short for any marked changes to occur. Besides, political turmoil was taking place in the cities; the countryside watched it at a distance, with moderate interest and mistrust. The subsequent invasion by Warsaw Pact troops hit the cities dramatically, while the villages only registered massive military movements and listened to the fire in the distance.

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[7]) Co-operatives of the first type did not differ too much from other, for example engineering or warehousing, co-operatives. All private property remained preserved, but some operations in plant production were carried out jointly, such as sowing and harvesting. Co-operatives of the second type operated joint plant production on fused plots while animal production remained private. Co-operatives of the third and fourth type already had joint plant and animal production, and differed only in the size of private property (croft) which had been left to members for their own needs.

Normalisation in the Countryside

The Soviet occupation and the subsequent 'normalisation' of economic, political and social life were something of a shock at first. Another strong wave of defections swept away prominent personalities from all areas of economic, political and social life. The countryside was, however, less primarily afflicted than urban communities, as there were no centres of intellectual resistance there that had to be broken.

In respect to further development, an important aspect was that of the massive subsidies to agriculture and the structural changes in the early 1970s, oriented towards enlarging the original agricultural enterprises, co-operatives and state farms.[8] There were multiple reasons for enlarging agricultural enterprises. In addition to confirming the embarking on the road of socialist large-scale production agriculture and precluding any alternative types of farming entities, extensive replacements took place in the controlling apparatus of agriculture, in line with the course taken towards filling most positions by nomenclature Party members. Mergers and amalgamations constituted strong interference in the social structure of agricultural workers because their position changed in larger terms.

This period, generally considered in our society as the one with the lowest degree of freedom, probably did not imply such a meaning for the rural population, or at least not so strongly. The dissent movement's influence was not felt in any marked way in the village, and if so, then usually in relation to urban communities. The transparency of social ties and social control precluded any other manner of social behaviour and conduct than the ones that were connected with meeting work and family related responsibilities. Most leisure time was devoted to home improvement and household upgrading, and care for gardens and private plots. On the other hand, the urban population began to gradually discover the charm of spending their leisure time in nature, working on their own little house or cottage. That period saw a surge of interest in weekend 'cottaging' (a terminological coinage to express what has become a deep-rooted, virtually second life). Its significance obviously did not rest, in the mere possibility of owning private property, but lay also in the opportunity of having one's own world in which one's own life could be lived, frequently with an emotional undertone of a return to the familial roots of rural ancestors.

It is to be noted for the sake of impartiality that amalgamated undertakings posted good economic results for a certain period of time. In fact, a similar trend of the concentration of and specialisation in agricultural production was then underway in advanced capitalist countries, only the ways and means of fusing agricultural units to form large farms differed – they were based on free competition in free-market economies. The capitalist state stepped into this process as a regulator in cases when social impacts on small farmers were too drastic, mainly by supporting their retraining for other professions in areas where they could not survive economically as small agricultural producers. How-

[8]) At the beginning of collectivisation in 1950, an average SAC had 359 ha of farmland and still in 1960, by when average acreage had increased to 420 ha of farmland, an average SAC equalled in size one community's area (there were 10,816 SACs for 19,343 settlements in Czechoslovakia). Before 1970, amalgamations went on relatively slowly (farmland area averaged at 625 ha per SAC). The figures are 1,325 ha in 1975; 2,476 ha in 1980; and 2,507 ha in 1982 remaining so until 1990 (2,504 ha).

ever, Czechoslovakia's socialist, mass-producing agriculture passed its zenith in the second half of the 1980s, at which time its economic decline began, accompanied by the disintegration of the state's political power.

Transformation of Agriculture

The end of the 1980s was marked by the Party's and the Czechoslovak government's tenacious efforts to preserve the status quo. The unwillingness to adopt an economic or social reform was understandable, for even slight changes would pose a threat to most of the power positions based on the Party's leading role. New fashionable buzzwords started appearing in agricultural planning: 'effective intensification', 'development of motivation', 'incentive', 'optimum use of human potential', 'looking for reserves', 'activation of the human factor'. The process of controlling large agricultural enterprises, with limited possibilities for change and independent decision making, was bound to be marked by degeneration. Remuneration was heavily levelled out; on-job promotion depended on neither objective factors nor subjective qualities, but on the Party bodies' decisions. Opportunities for increasing the standard of living were restricted if connected with a spirit of enterprise or private initiative. On the other hand, low quality or incomplete work was tolerated and silently overlooked, and theft was penalised relatively moderately. The most serious defect that for almost forty years arrested the natural evolution of corporate structures was a personnel policy based on classifying people into nomenclature ranks. This situation was no longer satisfactory even for those who had originally profited from it because an economic downfall started assuming all too clear contours.

Renewal of Private Farming

The political, economic and social changes after 1989 were anticipated with hope in the rural areas. However, nobody knew clearly what they would imply. Attitudes to property restitution and privatisation were very positive in general, but considerable reserve persisted in specific cases. A media campaign in early 1990 for the recovery of private farming missed the mark completely, because its vagueness, and the ideologically fuzzy term 'Czech farmer', did not find a response in the countryside. Nobody was able to explain exactly what traditions skilled secondary and college educated people, with experience in modern agricultural production, should return to. Quite the contrary – these people knew how to orient themselves in the maze of legislation and regulations, they were capable of sober economic thinking, and if they mustered up courage for private farming, then it was based on the concept of an intensive agricultural undertaking equipped with up-to-date technology and leased land. In contrast to them, a stratum of private peasants emerged, working small, up to 1 ha holdings, with a low level of mechanisation and a purely extensive character of farming lacking any market aspect. The village society started differentiating.

First Steps of Transformation

The first half of 1990 was marked by symptoms of a preparatory period. The economic reform scenario, prepared by the Czechoslovak government and approved by the Federal Assembly, was published in September; it did contain parts of a social reform script, but devoted only marginal attention to the agri-food complex and its labour resources. Undertakings (agricultural co-operatives and state farms) therefore continued their operations in the original extent, structure and orientation, but started preparations for

systematic changes. These preparations were of an official (drafting the procedures for disintegrating enterprises into smaller units; collecting and preparing documentation and accounting statements for privatisation; settling restitution claims, etc.) as well as unofficial (drafting legal and economic documents for transactions involving transfers of state-owned and co-operative property into private hands) nature. The absence of laws protecting the legality and transparency of the privatisation process, inefficient overseeing, networking, well-oiled organisation and the unscrupulousness of the former power wielders, all made it possible to permit steps which helped such individuals to enrich themselves while depriving the country's economy overall [Majerová 1997: 126].

People with low qualifications experienced the greatest disappointment. They were compelled, some of them for the first time in their lives, to make decisions on their professional and personal future. If they intended to stay in the same enterprise, they had to reckon with transformation consequences, i.e. much greater requirements on employees, less certainty about keeping the job, and sometimes lower wages. If they intended to start their own business they would have to assume responsibilities related not only to changing their job but also their lifestyle. If they decided for private business or private farming during the transformation period, when legislation and virtually all external relationships were undergoing change, they faced a difficult task.

Status of the Rural Society

Agricultural workers did not nurture too many illusions about the destiny of their enterprises, but at the same time could not rid themselves of the notion that it would be desirable to preserve most of the social certainties and advantages awarded to them so far (on-the-job catering, contributions to children's and adult recreation, certain advantages for retirees, social assistance, contributions to kindergarten operation, stabilisation and recruitment benefits, contributions to workers' training etc.). The transformation reality was, alas, different.

Agricultural enterprises and state farms were turning into different types of legal entities or businesses run by individuals – private farmers, trading companies, co-operatives, state-owned companies and other legal forms. As a result of property transformations, the agricultural active-age population had by 1995 differentiated into four major social groups:

1. Owners of interests in trading companies;
2. Owners of interests in co-operatives;
3. Owners and tenants of agricultural land and property;
4. Employees of companies, run by both legal entities and individuals [*Report...* 1996: 15].

Transformed undertakings started improving productivity and reducing work force numbers. The first waves of reductions included people of retirement age and problematic workers with low work moral. At the same time, those who could easily find a better placement elsewhere – artisans, construction crew workers, drivers, repairmen, able office workers, and middle and upper management people – left voluntarily. Subsequently, dismissals were compelled by the company's economic standing, and jobs were lost by those who really wanted them but failed to meet qualification or other requirements (for example mothers of young children, senior citizens, handicapped and less adaptable per-

sons). The threat of unemployment in agrarian areas turned into reality, and the rate of unemployment of agricultural workers, or rural people earlier tied to work linked to agriculture, started markedly exceeding the national average.

Changes in social status and extensive vertical and horizontal social mobility have distinctly influenced the countryside. Since the properties returned in the restitution process were usually not too large (middle and lower peasantry was the single strongest group in the pre-war Czechoslovak countryside in terms of numbers), the number of outright rich people has not in fact increased in villages. Claimants often received their land and property back in a state that did not make it easily saleable, and considerable investments were needed to start intensive production. If after all they made investments, they incurred debt and used the revenues to cover loans.

Just as prior to 1989, employees who had stayed in transformed undertakings now devote a considerable proportion of their leisure time to working their personal plots, which, given inflationary food prices, have resumed their basic importance as a source of cheap and quality food. However, marketed products yielded by personal plots rarely help to increase the family's standard of living in any discernible way.

Those who had lost their farming jobs found themselves in an unenviable situation. More or less successful job hunting in the same or similar profession, switching professions, retraining, resignation of a skilled job, commuting or moving house could be considered. But ties to the family's house and personal plot, growing transport service prices, and obligations to other family members (mainly women), all meant that the above alternatives offered more minuses than pluses. A hard differentiation of social groups has come into being, and horizontal as well as vertical mobility have accelerated. The most endangered groups of the rural population are: private farmers with the main income from agriculture managing on a small acreage of land (to 10 ha), seasonal labourers (seasonally unemployed), women (poorly qualified, about 50 years, mothers of small children, lonely women), long-time unemployed agricultural workers with low qualifications, family members (without qualifications) employed in private farms, disabled persons.

Present Situation

The key problem of Czech agriculture is the parallel of high indebtedness and a low rate of enterprise profit. The indebtedness of agricultural enterprises is permanently growing, and has its origin in the course of the transformation process. A major part of the indebtedness arose from the leasing of the agricultural assets and unsettled liabilities of co-operatives and their legal successors, with respect to eligible persons pursuant to the Act of the Transformation of Co-operatives. Indebtedness has increased the downfall of agriculture. Since 1991 losses have reached 37,1 billion CZK.

Table 1. Economic results of agriculture in the Czech Republic in 1991-1997 (CZK billion)

Economic result	1991	1992	1993	1994[1]	1995	1996	1997	Total
Profit (+), loss (-)	-9.1	-12.9	-9.7	-4.1	+0.5	-0.5	+1.3	-37.1

Note: [1]) 1994 state farm losses amounting to CZK 3.7 billion not included
Source: Results of VÚZE surveys for a set of agricultural businesses [*Green...* 1997: 1]

Work productivity is growing quickly, but earnings still lag behind the average for the national economy (the relation is 79.4%). The main reason for the low earnings of agricultural workers are the 'price scissors' between prices of agricultural products, which grew about 52% from 1989-1997, and prices of inputs to agriculture, which grew about 231.9% in the same period.

Agriculture has been undergoing a very radical process of transition during the last ten years. However, the sector is still experiencing serious economic difficulties, arising in particular as a result of:

- inconsistent implementation of the restitution and privatisation process in which a substantial portion of the assets of legal entities was not returned to the original owners, and subsequently operators in primary agriculture were separated from downstream industries;
- low level of farmer integration, especially in the area of the marketing and sale of their products;
- long term disproportion between the growth rates of farm input prices and farmgate prices;
- growth of internal indebtedness when farmers have to save on development and reproductive investments due to unfavourable business conditions;
- significant decline of state intervention in the area of financial support, especially in comparison with our major trade partners;
- low level of market protection, which is especially obvious in comparison with the EU, our dominant partner in agrarian trade;
- restrictions of agricultural production due to public interests which for a number of years have not been compensated;
- application of the Competition Act, which is economically disadvantageous for agriculture as it places the fragmented and less organised farmers on the same level as the financially strong, integrated retail chains. [*Report...* 1997: 2].

Growing inflation has lowered the living standard of rural inhabitants. Unemployment is significantly higher in agrarian regions than the average for the entire republic (8.2% in May 1999). Some trends which have existed in rural areas in the past are continuing with growing intensity.

Through Education to a Civic Society

At the moment, studies dealing in more detail with the transformation's impact on the life of agricultural workers and rural population are still at the stage of preparations for field research.[9] Competition on the labour market is known to be keen, and the prestige attached to education is clearly on the rise. This means, however, education not only in agricultural subjects – the decline in the number of people active in Czech agriculture on a regular basis indicates that larger numbers of graduates with a narrow specialisation in solely plant or animal production might not find work in rural areas. Young people's in-

[9]) See e.g. Majerová, V. et al., *Social Trends in Agriculture and the Countryside* (grant of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Physical Education for 1997-2000) and *Social Change of the Czech Village* (grant of the Grant Agency of Czech Academy of Sciences for 1998-2000).

terests are therefore focused on professions involving knowledge of economics, marketing, management and information technology. Should these young people desire to apply their skills to farming, they will find opportunities in intensive large-scale operations and in medium-sized agricultural undertakings, or in services related to primary agricultural production. Partial findings collected to date suggest that the farming profession's prestige is increasing, particularly when combined with the producer's independence and when the good performance and prospects of the agricultural undertaking in question can be demonstrated.

Agricultural workers as a social group have gone through major ups and downs. Inaccurate and distorted information has formed the public opinion on them – but without them. Their lives unfold outside media policies even today. In addition, agricultural workers lack a mainstay ideology, influential political representation and a functional structure of societies and associations in villages.

The countryside's long-term development is unthinkable without upgrading the level of education. However, not all young people can become successful managers or large-scale producers. The Czech countryside will either become depopulated, or a broad range of various complementary professions and social classes intertwined through civic groups, special-interest associations and political organisations will slowly start emerging within it, and they will keep the countryside viable and liveable. I believe that agriculture can play an important role as a sector providing some degree of security in food supplies and a living for a part of the rural population, solely in certain fertile areas. The fate of the remaining regions will probably be tied to the fate of the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe; this, however, can only be mentioned in the conditional.

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Housing and Its Influence on the Development of Social Inequalities in the Post-Communist Czech Republic

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Abstract: The article deals with the development of the housing market and its influence on the development of social inequalities in the post-communist Czech Republic. It originated within the framework of the project 'The Housing Market, its Regional Differentiation and Social Circumstances', sponsored by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic. The different position of households in the housing market is understood not only as a consequence of social inequalities but also as an important source of them. The paper identifies two basic features of housing market development that have profoundly influenced social inequalities in the Czech Republic in the 1990s: the large and rapid increase of regional differences in market prices, and the division of the housing market into several sectors operating under different legal and financial conditions. Special attention is paid to the situation of households renting at market prices and the consequences of the privatisation of municipal houses.

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The study of housing has been attracting the attention of social scientists for many years. Research has predominantly focused on the failures in housing, and there have been three traditional spheres of interest: the overcrowding of flats, the poor sanitation of flats, and the lack of flats [Kemeny 1992]. In connection with post-war economic development in Western Europe and North America, interest in the first two research themes mentioned here has declined and attention has become focused predominantly on the broader socio-economic context of housing. In 1967, Rex and Moore [1967] published the book *Race, Community and Conflict*, which introduced the concept of 'housing classes' into the theory. The authors, inspired by Marxist class theory, studied the functioning of the individual segments of the housing markets and the behaviour of the actors in these markets. They attempted to prove that unequal access to housing is gradually becoming a mechanism through which the ruling class tries to preserve its economic dominance. In the debate initiated on the publication of this book, the views of adherents of the 'housing classes' theory, who were from among the Marxists [e.g. Castels 1977], clashed with the views of adversaries of this theory, who were from among the neo-Weberians [e.g. Dunleavy 1981], and who saw the inequalities in the housing market as predominantly a result of the different power positions of individual social groups and influential individuals. Regardless of the attitude towards the conclusions of the work of Rex and Moore, the basic idea of their book – that inequalities in the housing market are worth studying when one is trying to understand social inequalities – has been generally accepted.

However, the relationship between housing inequalities and social inequalities in general can be seen from radically different positions. On the one hand, inequalities in

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housing are interpreted as a 'product' of the inequalities in household incomes (the higher the income, the better the position in the housing market). On the other hand, housing inequalities can be understood as one of the sources of social inequalities. Some authors even consider, in the context of western post-industrial society, privileges in access to housing and the different position towards the individual segments of the housing market as the main factors which determine social inequalities [e.g. Saunders 1978].

It is not possible to generally decide which approach mentioned above is 'the right one', as the relationship between social inequalities and housing essentially depends on the specific situation in each society studied, and in particular the way the individual housing markets function. The situation in the post-communist Czech Republic is even more complicated by the widespread presence of status inconsistency among both individuals and households [Machonin, Tuček et al. 1996]. During communist rule, there were many people with a high level of education and a low income, and people with low employment status and a high income etc. Similarly, the mutual relation between a household's income and wealth (as measured either by the possession of valuables or the value of real estate) was typically weak under the communist regime [Večerník 1997: 106]. The same was true for the relation between household income and housing. In this article, we start with the hypothesis that inequalities in the housing market, partly inherited and partly generated by post-communist development in the Czech Republic, form one of the most important sources of social inequalities.

Before the results of the analysis will be presented it is necessary to make a short excursion into the history of housing in the Czech Republic, and to describe in brief the changes on the housing market after the fall of communism. Under the communist regime, development of housing was subject to the tight control of the state. All privately owned housing stock was nationalised (with the exception of family houses), and most new housing construction was either directly planned or strictly controlled by the state authority. Housing co-operatives fell under the state administration, rents were subject to state regulation, market prices in housing were abolished and substituted with 'administrative' prices. From the legal point of view, four statuses with regard to housing were dominant. There were state-owned blocks of flats, blocks of flats owned by different (state) companies, co-operative blocks of flats, and privately owned family homes. The state flats used to be assigned to applicants from a waiting list, and the company flats were assigned to company employees. Residents of both state and company flats had neither ownership rights nor duties, but they had a 'decree' claiming their right to stay in the flat as tenants for an 'unlimited time', and furthermore, they had automatic right to transfer the 'decree rights' to their children. Both state and company flats were provided to applicants for free on the basis of need and availability. Usually the rents did not even cover the maintenance costs. Given for free (if corruption practices are not taken into account), the state and company flats had officially a zero market price. Due to the long-term housing shortage, however, 'possession of a decree' itself has become tradable property, and many ways, both the semi-legal and illegal 'sale or purchase of' a state or company flat (that is a decree) have developed over time.

Co-operative housing, which had even a pre-communist tradition in the Czech lands, was based on the idea of 'collective self-help' of the members of housing co-operatives. Each citizen could become a member of one of the co-operatives by paying a membership fee. Although the construction of co-operative houses was partly subsidised by the state, residents of co-operative houses had to cover a substantial part of construc-

tion costs (in some cases simply by paying the money, in other cases through unpaid work during the construction of the houses). The rents paid by tenants in co-operative flats had to fully cover the maintenance costs, and also included the repayment of state loans. It was legally possible to buy membership in the co-operative, and thus to gain the right to use a co-operative flat. In reality, the real prices in such deals greatly exceeded the membership fees, since they included an unofficial 'bonus' calculated on market principles of supply and demand.

The last legal status on the housing market during communism was represented by privately owned family houses, in which the residents were also the owners. Although this sector was formerly considered to be only a residue of the pre-communist period, as the incapability of the state to fulfil people's housing needs was more evident, the regime cautiously allowed people to built their own houses. Later, self-construction of family houses was even partially supported through cheaper loans or subsidies. Despite this fact, however, the owners of family houses had to finance the construction (either mostly or completely) and pay all maintenance costs. It was possible to buy or sell a house for an official 'valuation price', but in practice market prices were used, including an unofficial extra bonus.

Since the fall of the communist regime, several important changes in the field of housing have been observable. The termination of state-financed housing construction, combined with the decrease in real wages, brought about a deep decline in housing construction after 1991. This fact is evident from the figures showing the number of apartment constructions initiated, which was typically in between 55 and 60 thousand annually up until 1990, and which dropped to only 10,899 in 1991, 8429 in 1992 and even to 7454 in 1993 [for detailed information see Andrle 1994 and Andrle and Vlášek 1998]. At the same time, the rapid development of new private companies highly increased the pressure to change flats into offices and, especially in the most attractive cities, like Prague or Karlovy Vary, a considerable number of foreigners entered into the demand side of local housing markets. All this, together with the increasing need of housing for newly emerging families founded by young people born during the population boom in the 1970s, resulted in a sharp increase in prices.

Although some changes on the housing market affected everybody, some development was specific to individual sectors of the housing market. Many state-owned blocks of flats have been returned to the previous owners or their descendants, while the majority of the remainder has been transferred from state to municipal ownership. An overwhelming majority of company houses have been sold to private owners in the process of privatisation, together with factories. Thus the sectors of private and municipal rental houses have come into existence, while company-owned housing has practically ceased to exist, and the scope of state-owned housing has been substantially reduced. Later, some municipal houses were sold to companies or co-operatives made up of tenants, or individual flats were sold directly to tenants. However, despite the substantial shifts in the ownership structure and the many changes to legislature, the basic principles of the housing market functioning in post-communist Czech Republic remain rather similar to those used in the communist period. In an effort to maintain social peace and to help families to survive the first phases of economic reforms, the government has decided to maintain the system of state regulation of rents, not only in municipal flats but also in houses returned to their former owners. Thus the change of ownership did not affect the status of tenants living in the flats at the time of the change in ownership, as far as the

rent they have to pay is concerned. Consequently, the 'possession of a decree' has remained transferable to family members, exchangeable with some other 'owner of a decree' and, of course, tradable on the black market. In addition to the above mentioned sector of the rental housing market which has remained under careful state control, a quite new sector of rental housing based on free market principles has been gradually developing. The legislature allowed for setting up market rents if the tenant was not a citizen of the Czech Republic, if the flat had been vacant prior to renting (this does not apply to the exchange of flats) or if a privately owned family house was being rented. Moreover, due to the fact that there was basically no price regulation on sublease contracts, a growing number of people had the status of 'subtenants' and paid a market rent while living in flats of various ownership types.

Methodological Remarks

The methodology of the research follows the idea that the key information necessary for understanding the role housing plays in the development of social inequalities in the post-communist Czech Republic is information about prices. That is why the data from general statistics, even census data, could not be a main source of information, as official housing statistics focus on the physical aspect of housing (the size of the flats, technical standards...). Therefore, we have decided to conduct our own field research to search for relevant information about the market prices of both rents and purchases. A network of co-operators from among university students was set up to cover all regions in the Czech Republic. We decided not to depend on the only source of information on prices in the housing market. On the contrary, we have tried to avoid any systematic bias by using diversified sources. Thus our basic source of information was of two types: newspaper advertisements and information collected and posted by local real estate companies. As far as advertisements in the press are concerned, a total of 23 different titles were observed. Four of them (*Mladá Fronta Dnes*, *Lidové noviny*, *Hospodářské noviny* and *Zemědělské noviny*) were national newspapers, and another eleven newspapers were the most relevant regional ones. The bulk of information, however, came from specialised 'advertisement newspapers', of which three titles (*Annonce*, *Inzert Express*, *Inzertspoj*) have a dominant position in this respect. Most such advertisement newspapers use the same system of financing – the companies gain their income from those who buy the newspaper but not from those who advertise. From the point of view of our research, the particular advantage of this system lies in the easy access of potential advertisers to the newspaper and consequently the vast number of advertisements being published. The main disadvantage is the easy possibility of multiple advertising, and therefore the need for careful control of the data and the subsequent replacement of duplicated advertisements. Data from all kinds of newspapers was collected every week for a period of six months. As for real estate companies, we identified several of the largest ones in each region (avoiding those mutually interconnected and thus presenting the same offers), and then we collected information on a month-to-month basis, also for a period of six months (September 1996-February 1997).

Several different types of data have been obtained. We distinguished flats and family houses, renting and sales, and supply and demand. Each of the particular data sets has a similar structure, which includes as many of the following as available: flat or house; locality (municipality and district); number of rooms; floor space (m^2); legal status of the flat (house); purchase price (or monthly rent); the source of information (newspa-

per advertisement or real estate company); month in which data were collected. In spite of the fact that the 'offers' in newspaper advertisements or real estate agencies are generally more specific than the 'demands' (and consequently files with data about flats or houses on offer contain more information), it seems useful to maintain the same structure for both types of files. It allows for merging files for some specific purposes, such as analysing price levels (we believe that real prices lie somewhere between the prices asked by owners and the prices offered by buyers/tenants).

The problem of the representativeness of the obtained data must also be mentioned here. Theoretically, the best option would be to collect all information about both supply and demand on the respective housing markets available to the public, that is to record all individual advertisements in the newspapers as well as all offers made public by the real estate agencies in the respective regions. It is clear, however, that this goal is unrealistic – at least due to the limited financial resources and capacity of the research team. But the problem is that even the use of probability sampling is not possible, because there are many published advertisements containing either no or only a little specific information. To give an example, advertisements with texts such as *'We want to buy a flat. Good price.'* or *'Large co-operative flat for sale. Price negotiable.'* are generally not usable. That is why we have concentrated on recording advertisements that contained as much relevant information as possible. Therefore, strictly speaking, our data cannot be considered a statistically representative set describing 'the complete supply and demand presented in newspaper advertisements and by real estate agencies'. Instead the data we have collected form a probability sample of those offers from newspaper advertisements and real estate agencies which contain enough specific information to be recorded. The character of the data should be taken into account as the sampling error cannot be calculated accurately. However, it should be noted that there is no way in which to obtain a data set that can be regarded as strictly representative from the statistical point of view. Moreover, the methods of the analysis of the data we have used in the article were not sensitive to sampling errors, and thus the results presented below are robust. Altogether, more than 22,000 cases were collected. After the exclusion of duplicated records and logical control, 21,688 cases remained (6503 records concerning rental housing, 8240 records concerning flat purchases and 6945 records concerning family house purchases). As all recorded data include information about the location of the estate (municipality, district, region) and the data from all 76 districts + Prague were collected, several different regional sortings could be carried out. The number of recorded cases were roughly proportional to the number of flats and houses in each particular region, with three exceptions: Prague and the North Moravian districts were over-represented in the data set, while districts in South Moravia were under-represented. In most analysis working with regional sub-samples, the division of the Czech Republic into 13 regions + Prague as a separate spatial unit was used, and in some cases a division into 76 districts + Prague was used. The regions correspond to the administrative regions of the Czech Republic introduced in autumn 1997, while the districts correspond to administrative districts in effect from 1997.

We then focused on the group that is the most threatened by housing problems – newly-founded families [Matyáš 1994]. A short questionnaire was prepared in order to determine basic data on the social and economic structure of newly-founded families, their housing situation at the time of their marriage, and their strategy for the future. Data was collected for a period of six months (June 1997-November 1997) with the assistance of clerks in selected register offices (The register office is where anyone wishing to be mar-

ried is obliged to fill in statistical forms necessary for the official registration of the marriage.). The sample of register offices covered all regions as well as all types of municipalities. Every couple appearing at the selected register offices who met the selection criteria (age of both under 35 years, first marriage for both) was asked to fill the questionnaire – brides and bridegrooms separately. In the end a total of 1966 completed questionnaires were gathered, representing around 7% of the couples married during that time period throughout the entire country.

Social Inequalities Generated by the Housing Market

One of the characteristic features of the transformation of post-communist societies is the increase of inequalities among individuals, households, social groups, and territorially defined units – towns, districts, regions [Večerník 1992, 1997; Matějů 1993; Machonin, Tuček et al. 1996; Kostelecký 1994, 1995]. The inequalities mentioned above have various causes, manifold features and different consequences. It is important to note, however, that some are 'generated directly' while others are partially influenced by the position of particular individuals or households in the housing market. In the search for characteristics of the housing market which have an influence on social inequalities, several such attributes can be identified. The first one is the division of the housing market into regional and local markets that function to some extent autonomously [Kemeny 1992]. The second concerns the division of the housing market into segments which may operate under different rules [Siksiö and Borgegard 1990]. The division into different segments also relates to the differences between the housing situation of 'old' households, which already lived in their flats or houses (either owned or rented) before the breakdown of communist rule, and new households, which have entered the housing market under new conditions, after the regime had changed.

1. Regional inequalities

The fact that there are substantial differences among various regions, cities and neighbourhoods in respect to both the prices and the quality of housing is no surprise to anyone who lives in a country with a market economy. However, under the communists in the Czech Republic, planners intentionally diminished all types of regional differences, including those concerning housing. The idea of regional equality and strict control over the trade in real estate, combined with the authority of state administration over regional development, resulted in a situation radically different from that in most Western countries. The overwhelming majority of state money intended for new housing went to district authorities, and consequently to the construction of blocks of flats in the district capitals (75 middle sized cities spread throughout the country). This housing policy more or less ignored smaller towns and villages, but at the same time suppressed the development of the biggest cities and metropolitan areas. The only exception from this rule was the strongly supported housing construction in 'old industrial areas' which had been founded on the coal mining, steel and chemical industries. Therefore, at the end of communist rule, the country inherited a settlement structure for which the following features were typical: no large metropolitan areas, limited sub-urbanisation, housing stock of a similar type and technical standard throughout all regions, little regional difference in the purchase price of flats, houses and land, and virtually no regional differences in rents.

The partial introduction of free-market principles into the housing sector at the beginning of the economic transformation revealed huge differences among the regions (see Table 1).

Table 1. Regional differences in the prices of flats (per 1 m^2 of living space) in 1996 – figures show the distribution of flats (in %) into price categories based on quintiles calculated on the country level

Regions	1. quintile	2. quintile	3. quintile	4. quintile	5. quintile
Praha	0.4	2.9	4.0	7.9	84.8
Central Bohemia	1.2	18.3	23.8	40.4	16.3
České Budějovice	12.1	29.5	26.8	19.7	11.8
Plzeň	2.8	14.1	25.4	37.8	19.9
Karlovy Vary	8.0	30.4	27.5	20.3	13.8
Ústí nad Labem	89.2	9.8	0.9	0.0	0.2
Liberec	22.6	25.6	32.3	13.1	6.4
Hradec Králové	20.2	29.3	12.1	12.1	26.3
Pardubice	2.4	11.8	23.6	38.7	23.5
Jihlava	6.9	27.5	25.5	32.4	7.8
Brno	2.6	11.8	23.7	34.6	27.2
Olomouc	5.3	29.7	36.6	26.3	2.0
Ostrava	55.8	31.1	8.8	2.6	1.7
Zlín	3.4	12.1	20.9	36.9	26.7
The Czech Republic	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0

Source: [*Šetření*... 1996].

The figures in Table 1 illustrate well the extent of price inequalities among different regional housing markets. While in the entire sample 20% of the most expensive flats belong to the fifth quintile, in Prague almost 85% of flats belong to this category, and only 0.4% of flats fit in the first – the cheapest – quintile. On the contrary, almost 90% of flats in the industrial region of Ústí nad Labem in North-Western Bohemia belong to the cheapest quintile, while there are practically no flats in the two most upper quintiles. An even higher level of price inequality among the regions was revealed when the prices of family houses were compared. Differences in market rents were slightly lower.

It is important to mention that the 'market evaluation' of the housing in different regions does not simply trace inequalities in household incomes. It also includes the situation in the local labour market, perspectives of local economy, the traffic infrastructure, environmental conditions, the attractiveness of the region for foreigners, the positive or negative image of the place etc. In fact, the extent of price inequalities in different regional housing markets highly exceeded that of household incomes, which were surprisingly low (see Table 2).

Table 2. Regional differences in household incomes in 1996 – figures show the distribution of households (in %) into categories based on quintiles calculated on the country level

Regions	1. quintile	2. quintile	3. quintile	4. quintile	5. quintile
Praha	19.5	16.8	17.3	18.3	28.1
Central Bohemia	20.1	21.0	18.6	20.6	19.7
České Budějovice	18.3	20.5	21.2	20.7	19.3
Plzeň	19.9	20.1	20.9	20.0	19.7
Karlovy Vary	23.1	21.9	19.1	20.5	15.4
Ústi nad Labem	22.8	20.6	20.5	18.3	17.8
Liberec	22.5	19.4	19.2	20.6	18.3
Hradec Králové	17.8	23.2	20.0	18.9	20.1
Pardubice	19.3	20.7	22.8	20.7	16.5
Jihlava	18.0	20.9	20.9	21.1	19.1
Brno	19.5	19.5	19.2	21.0	20.8
Olomouc	18.8	20.9	22.2	21.4	16.7
Ostrava	20.9	20.7	21.5	20.0	16.9
Zlín	19.8	18.0	20.2	20.2	21.8
The Czech Republic	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0

Source: [*Šetření*... 1996, *Příjmový*... 1998].

The fact that a high level of regional inequality in the prices of housing contrasts with the relatively similar income structure of the households in individual regions has two opposite consequences for the development of social inequalities. For those living in attractive regions, and who owned some real estate or co-operative flat, the rapid price growth in such areas meant high capital gains, and consequently an increase in the property value, both of which have nothing to do with the household members' success or failure in the labour market. Conversely, those living in less favourable regions were suffering a relative loss. It should be stressed here that the capital gains mentioned above were high in comparison with household incomes. The average price of a one-bedroom flat of 57 m^2 of living space in Prague in 1996 (1,019,331 CZK) represented 6.2th multiple of the annual net income of the average Czech household at that time, while the price of the same flat in the 'cheapest district', the city of Most in North-Western Bohemia, (154,755 CZK) was slightly less than what the average Czech household earned in one year. Similarly, the price of 'tenants' decrees' as well as market rents in attractive regions became much higher than those in less attractive areas (even if controlled for regional differences in incomes). All this made moving from 'cheap' regions to 'expensive' ones more difficult than any time before. This can be well documented through statistical figures on migration which show that all of the most expensive districts (Prague, Brno, Plzeň, Zlín...) were losing their populations in spite of the high number of available jobs and the lowest rates of unemployment (for example 0.4% in Prague). The lowest prices in the housing market were typical for regions with the highest rate of unemployment [Heřmanová and Kostelecký 2000]: the highest unemployment rate was in the district of Most in 1996 (9.4%), which had the lowest prices for flats. To live in such 'low-price regions' could be risky: anyone who lost their job (and the probability of losing one's job was the highest in these regions) found themselves in a kind of a 'social trap'. To find a new job in the region in which one lived was difficult due to the high unemployment rate, while to move

to some region with more jobs was difficult because of the cost of housing there. When pressed to choose between two 'bad options' – to stay at home on social benefits or to reduce one's own housing standard while moving to regions with available jobs – most households elect to maintain their housing standard and not to move.

The unequal real estate price increase has, of course, quite an inverse impact on the households that were established only once the new situation in the housing market was in effect. Thus the most serious problems with access to housing are felt by new households in the regions with the highest prices in housing in relation to the level of local income. While not taking into account the possibility that new households received help from relatives, the easiest way for a new household to obtain its own housing was to rent a flat on the free market. The following table will illustrate the range of regional differences in access to housing by displaying ten districts with the easiest and ten districts with the most difficult access to housing on the free market.

Table 3. Regional differences in access to housing on the free market in 1996 – figures show the number of m^2 of living space which a local household with an average local income could afford to rent on the free market if paying 30% of its income on housing

Districts with the easiest access	m^2 of living space	Districts with the most difficult access	m^2 of living space
Litoměřice	80	Capital Prague	23
Jeseník	79	Prague-East	30
Karviná	78	Plzeň-South	31
Hodonín*	77	Prague-West	33
Nový Jičín	77	Brno-Countryside*	34
Chomutov	72	Brno-City*	36
Přerov	71	Karlovy Vary	37
Most	71	Cheb	41
Frýdek-Místek	66	Benešov	41
Bruntál	66	Náchod	41

*) Subject to high sampling error due to the low numbers of registered cases
Source: [*Šetření*... 1996, *Příjmový*... 1998].

It is clear from the table that regional differences in access to housing on the free market are high. On one side of the scale there are districts with a rather favourable market-rent/income ratio, allowing new local households with average incomes to rent a smaller or larger two-bedroom flat (from 66 to 80 m^2) on the free market, while not spending all their money on housing. On the other side there are regions where new local households, paying the same share of their average income on housing, could hardly rent more than a studio with – or even without – a kitchen of merely 30-40 m^2; in Prague the area was only 23 m^2.

The fact that difficulties in the search for separate housing for new households depend on the housing market situation in particular regions is documented by the results of a survey conducted among couples at the time of their marriage. As the number of questionnaires (N = 1966) received did not allow for working with too many regionally defined sub-samples, we divided the questionnaires into three groups, defined by three different levels of the accessibility of housing measured by *prices in housing / local in-*

comes ratio, and then statistically tested for whether the respondent's answers depend on the housing situation in the regions where they live. As the answers of brides and bridegrooms in regard to housing were rather similar, and moreover, as the overwhelming majority of them lived either together or in the same type of region prior to marriage, we will present only the answers of the bridegrooms (presented are only answers with statistically significant differences at $p < 0.01$). It is evident from the data that the greater the problems with access to housing were, the greater the role of the extended family also was. In regions with the most difficult access to housing, 46.2% of respondents claim that "problems with housing will be solved with the help of the extended family", while only 38.7% did so in 'average' regions, and 32.6% in the regions with relatively the easiest access to housing. 'Help from the extended family' can take various forms: 12.6% of respondents living in regions with extensive housing problems wanted to borrow money from relatives, while only 7.4% of respondents living in regions with the easiest access to housing planned to do so. More often, help from the extended family simply means that a new family does not constitute a new household, but starts or continues to live with parents. While in regions with the easiest access to housing 14.9% of new couples live together with the parents of either the bride or bridegroom, in areas with the greatest difficulty in access to housing the figure is 23.9%. Finally, it is not very surprising that the level of satisfaction with one's own housing also depends on the situation in the local housing market. While 42% of couples in 'regions with the least problems' were satisfied with their housing, the same was true for only 33.5% of couples living in the 'regions with the greatest problems'.

2. Inequalities connected with the division of the housing market into segments

The evolution of the housing market after the fall of communism resulted in the establishment of distinct segments which operate under different rules. Segments are defined both by the type of ownership and by how the housing expenditures (rent) are determined. It is possible distinguish five segments:

a) Private flats and family houses occupied by owners

b) Co-operative flats occupied by members of co-operatives

c) Rental flats in public (municipal or state) ownership with regulated rents

d) Rental flats in private ownership with regulated rents

e) Rental flats of any ownership with market rents.

The position of the household in a certain segment of the housing market influences three important things: the household property value, the structure of household expenditures (namely the share of housing expenditures) and how easy or difficult the household can alter its own position in the housing market. As far as household property value is concerned, it is clear that the differences are huge. On one side of the scale there are households that own the flat or house in which they live, which of course represents the bulk of their total property. Households living in co-operative flats can sell their membership in the co-operative and, similarly to those living in rental flats with regulated rents, can (legally, semi-legally or illegally) capitalise their tenant rights (specifically the possibility to pay less than the market rent). On the other side, households that live in rental flats with market rents cannot gain any money from selling 'their housing', as they possess neither real estate nor any tradable 'tenant rights'. The following table shows the average cost of the flat in different market segments by regions.

Table 4. Price differences between flats of different ownership status in 1996 by regions (family houses not included) – figures show the average purchase price per 1 m^2 in CZK and private/rental flats price ratio in % by region

Region	Flats			(Private/Rental)
	Private	Co-operative	Rental**	×100%
Praha	21,240	16,974	9,972	213
Central Bohemia	8,722	8,796	6,402	136
České Budějovice	7,378	7,387	6,572*	112*
Plzeň	10,362	8,586	5,997	173
Karlovy Vary	9,191	7,221	4,202*	219*
Ústí nad Labem	4,245	3,217	1,689	251
Liberec	8,277	6,731	3,932	211
Hradec Králové	9,463	8,104	4,590	206
Pardubice	9,090	8,967	7,826	116
Jihlava	8,424	7,853	8,383*	100*
Brno	11,380	9,226	6,400	178
Olomouc	8,862	8,060	4,891*	181*
Ostrava	7,157	4,153	3,714	193
Zlín	9,387	9,018	8,754*	107*

*) Subject to high sampling error due to low frequencies in respective sub-categories.
**) Category 'Rental flats' here refers to flats with regulated rents (state, municipal or owned by private landlord)
Source: [*Šetření*... 1996].

In spite of remarkable regional differences, it is worth noting that the same logic is revealed by the data from all regions. The most expensive are private flats, but the prices of co-operative flats are not much lower. The gap lies between co-operative and rental flats: the number of co-operative flats offered or demanded on the market is much higher than the number of rental flats and, even more important, their average purchase price is also substantially higher in most regions. Thus the diversified price increase of housing in the post-communist period favoured households living in privately owned flats and co-operative flats, while households living in rental flats were at a disadvantage. Moreover, the large discrepancy between the 'property value' of flats of different ownership categories represents an important obstacle for households living in rental flats to move to another flat of the same size. Its choice must either be limited only to other rental flats or to paying a considerable amount of money when moving is necessary.

In the post-communist era, however, there were two possible mechanisms for enabling a household to change their position in the housing market without moving from the flat it was living in: restitution and housing privatisation. Both of these procedures have their own winners and losers. In both cases, who the winner or the loser was has nothing or very little to do with household incomes or the success or failure of the individual household members in the labour market. For households living in state-owned flats that were returned to the former owners or their descendants, this change has some important consequences. Although rents remained controlled (and as a result housing expenditure does not differ from that of households living in public rental flats), the position of the household in the housing market became considerably worse, even when we assume that all landlord-tenant relations were correct, and both sides followed the laws and regula-

tions. The danger emerged that a landlord might want to have the flat vacated and then use it for himself, members of his family, or rent it as an office at market prices. In spite of the fact that in this situation the landlord was required to provide tenants with a substitute flat of adequate quality, moving to a substitute flat could mean a worsening of the housing standard of tenants, particularly as far as the location of the flat is concerned. To become a tenant in a privately owned flat even further reduced the number of options if such a household decided to move. The only legal, and the most frequently used, possibility for moving while maintaining the 'right to regulated rent' is the exchange of a flat with another household.[1] As an overwhelming majority of households living in state or municipal owned flats, not to mention people living in co-operative flats, are reluctant to move to rental flats with a private landlord, only other flats with private landlords can be considered. The third, and most important, fact is that households which found themselves in the position of tenants in privately owned houses lost the chance to privatise the flats they were living in.

This leads us to the second process in the housing market which could have a remarkable influence on the household position within the social structure – the privatisation of municipal and state owned flats. There were many ways in which to privatise flats in public ownership, but despite the proper technique of privatisation, in the majority of cases the flats ended up in the hands of tenants. As the declared, prime objective of privatisation was to remove the financial burden of maintaining housing stock from the municipalities and to shift it to the future private owners, taking into account the low level of purchasing power of most households, municipalities sold the flats well below market price. In Prague, for example, flats were sold to tenants for about 2000 CZK per m^2, and in smaller cities it was usually less. Commonly, only part of the total amount had to be paid immediately, while the rest could be paid later in instalments. Moreover, this arrangement allowed some municipalities to let new owners deduct money they would spend on repairs and reconstruction from the purchase price. Regardless of whether the purchase price was high or low when compared with incomes and savings of the tenants, to sell flats for below-market prices means nothing less than capital gain being donated to new owners by the other taxpayers. The amount of the 'granted money' varies, depending on purchase price, the size of the flat, its quality and location. The capital gain of households having purchased an average, quality, two-bedroom flat, 77 m^2 in area, for 2000 CZK per m^2, ranges between 0 and 230,000 CZK (if the average 'price of a decree' in the region is subtracted from the total gains). If the purchase price considered is 1000 CZK per m^2, capital gains increase to about 20,000 to 300,000 CZK per household. In Prague, however, the figures are much higher: 710,000 and 790,000 CZK respectively. Even if the purchase price in Prague was set up to 3000 CZK, the capital gain was still over 630,000 CZK, which represents a 3.3 multiple of the annual income of the average Prague family. How huge an amount of granted money that 630,000 CZK represents will be even clearer from the next example. Suppose that two average households are living in two identical 77 m^2 flats in the same location, but in two different municipal houses. Flats in the first house are offered to tenants for 3000 CZK per m^2, while the other house remains in public ownership. As a result the 'lucky' household in the first flat becomes the

[1]) The exchange of flats itself is difficult, as the pairs of households interested in each other's flats must first be found. Then a 'contract on the exchange of flats' must be agreed to by the owners of both flats.

owner of the flat with a price on the market highly exceeding the market price of its less lucky neighbour's flat. If the less lucky household were to decide to buy the same flat on the free market, it would have to borrow 630,000 CZK from either the building savings bank or a mortgage bank. Monthly payment of the loan would be 8820 CZK[2] in the case of a loan from a building savings bank, and 7647 CZK[3] in the case of a mortgage bank, which would represent 54% (47%) of the total income of an average household. In practice, however, this less lucky family might not get either of the loans mentioned, as the average household income may not be enough to qualify for such loans.[4]

Thus far all that has been said about the inequalities generated by the division of the housing market into different sectors has left aside the households living in rental flats with market rents. Such households are in the worst position, as they not only have nothing to capitalise, but their housing expenditures could also be substantially higher than the average for the population. As Vajdová and Buštíková [1998] show, these households do not substantially differ from the average Czech household in any characteristic, except that of the age of the household members. In fact, the key characteristic is that these are new households, established under the new conditions of the housing market. There are several possible ways by which newly established households can get their own, separate housing: they may receive or inherit some sort of housing from parents or relatives; they may buy or build some flat or house; or they may rent it out of the free market. Although the last option is open to everyone, including those without any property, the 'dark side' of this possibility is the necessity of paying market rent. This may cause considerably higher housing expenditures for these households than for those living in flats with regulated rent (see next table).

[2]) Under the following conditions: the family already saved another 630,000 CZK and has it in its account for down payment, the monthly payment is set up to 0.14% of borrowed 630,000 CZK, the loan is to be paid back within 10 years, the state subsidy applied, no tax deductions applied.

[3]) Under the following conditions: the family already has 270,000 CZK for down payment, the interest rate is 14%, the loan is to be paid back within 20 years, no state subsidy and no tax deductions applied.

[4]) It depends on the number of family members and their age, as banks take into account the minimum standard of living of the applicant's family. While the average income of a family without children would qualify, that of a family with two children would definitely not.

Table 5. Housing expenditures* in flats with market rent, in flats with regulated** rent and in flats bought on loan*** and their relation to incomes of an average local household living in 77 m^2 flat in January 1st 1997 by region

Region	Housing expenditures (CZK/m2)			Housing expenditures/Total income (%)		
	Free market	Regulated	On loan	Free market	Regulated	On loan
Praha	193	32	135	91	15	64
Central Bohemia	99	28	81	54	15	44
České Budějovice	90	30	72	49	16	39
Plzeň	96	30	82	53	16	45
Karlovy Vary	94	28	74	56	17	44
Ústi nad Labem	66	30	43	37	17	24
Liberec	87	30	69	50	17	39
Hradec Králové	92	28	79	50	15	43
Pardubice	75	28	83	43	16	48
Jihlava	75	28	76	42	15	42
Brno	99	30	86	54	16	47
Olomouc	67	30	76	38	17	44
Ostrava	57	30	51	33	17	30
Zlín	94	28	83	52	15	46

*) Housing expenditures include rent + utilities (mortgage payment + utilities in the case of flat ownership). Costs of utilities were estimated at 20 CZK per m^2 monthly.

**) The highest possible regulated rent in each region was considered, which refers to the situation in the biggest cities in respective regions. In reality, average regulated rents in regions outside Prague were slightly smaller than in the table, due to lower rents in smaller cities.

***) Loans from a building savings bank under the following conditions: 50% down payment is already saved and deposited in the bank account, monthly payment is set up at 0.14% of the borrowed amount, the loan is to be paid back within 10 years, state subsidy applied, no tax deductions applied.

Source: [*Šetření*... 1996, "Vyhláška..." 1993, *Statistika*... 1997].

Two remarkable differences between rental sectors with regulated and free-market rents are obvious. The first is that while the level of housing expenditures (in relation to incomes) in flats with market rents vary highly from region to region, there were almost no regional differences in the cost of living in flats with regulated rents. The second is that housing expenditures in flats with market rents were much higher than in flats with regulated rents. Living in a flat with a market rent could mean paying twice as much (Ostrava region) or even six times more (Prague) than when living in a flat of the same size and quality with regulated rent. Moreover, the high housing expenditures of average households living in rental flats with free market rent radically reduce the chances of saving money from their budget and avoiding paying high rents by buying their own flat.

Why do households simply not borrow money from banks, and then pay monthly instalments, particularly when the figures in the table suggest that it could even be cheaper than renting on the free market? There are several serious obstacles to such household behaviour. The income of many households is too low to qualify for a housing loan. The criteria of the banks usually require that, after payment of the monthly mortgage instalment and all other debts, there is at least a 1.5 multiple of the living minimum remaining at the disposal of the household applying. Provided that the household applying consists of two adults with one child under than 6 years old, the 1.5 multiple of the

living minimum equalled 7875 CZK per month (in January 1st 1997). The bottom quarter of households in the income hierarchy, however, had no such income at that time [*Příjmový...* 1998], and were automatically excluded from taking out any loan for housing. The households with a median income would be able to afford a loan of about 300,000 CZK (if they had another 300,000 CZK already saved for down payment). Together (600,000 CZK) it could be enough to buy a large luxury flat in some regions (Ústí nad Labem, Ostrava...), a reasonably large flat in most other regions, but only a very small flat in Prague. The problem is that among households with housing needs, young couples with a child or children are heavily over-represented. Such households, however, usually rank among the poorer ones [Večerník 1997]. Moreover, many potential loan holders simply do not have enough money saved to pay the down payment.

The last but by no means the least obstacle to receiving a loan is the problem of debt guarantee. To be sure that the loans are secure, banks require a debt guarantee from applicants, the value of which must be at least about 25% higher than the amount of the intended loan. Such a guarantee could be savings, shares or other valuables, or – most commonly – real estate (flats, houses, building lots). But practically none of the applicants seeking housing have either of the above mentioned possibilities. If they had, they would not have housing problems, but would simply buy a flat without any loans. The critical point is that applicants cannot offer as a guarantee the flat they intend to buy using the borrowed money, because they do not possess it at the time their application is processed. There is a theoretical possibility that the seller will be willing to wait for the money: just selling the flat after gaining part of the money, transferring legal ownership rights to the buyer, letting the buyer go through the loan procedure, and then receiving the rest of the money afterwards. In practice, however, almost no seller is willing to sell a flat this way, as it is a risky procedure, which could take several months to be completed. Buyers, on the other hands, are in a tricky position: They cannot borrow money before buying a flat, and they cannot buy a flat before borrowing the money. Thus the only applicable solution remains to persuade friends, parents or other relatives (if any have valuable property) to offer their real estate as a guarantee for the bank. This condition apparently further reduces the number of qualified applicants, as such guarantors may be hard to find.

Conclusions

The housing market in the post-communist Czech Republic is not a single market with uniform rules of operation, but rather a mosaic consisting of different sectors and regional sub-markets that to a high extent function autonomously. No matter how it has come about that different households have found themselves in a different part of the 'mosaic', their housing situation must be taken into account when thinking about social inequalities. It is evident that the position of the households in the housing market does not simply reflect the differences in household incomes. The relation between housing inequalities and social inequalities is complex. In many cases, the housing situation of households is directly influenced by property value, the structure of incomes, and expenditures. Thus the differences in housing may also be an important source of social inequalities in general.

The way the housing market has developed in the course of the economic transformation favoured some groups while disfavouring others. The regionally unequal increase of prices benefited the owners of real state located in the areas evaluated by the

market as the most attractive (Prague and its surroundings, regions of Brno, Plzeň, Zlín...). On the other hand, those who owned real estate in the least attractive regions (North-Western Bohemia, Ostrava region...) were relatively disadvantaged. As far as the division of the housing market into segments is concerned, the 'winners' were private flat owners, members of housing co-operatives, and those who had a chance to buy a municipal flat for prices below the market price. The relative 'losers' were those who found themselves in the position of tenant in privately owned houses. But the most apparent 'losers' were those who simply had no flat to live in, and were pressed to rent a flat out of the free market, particularly in more expensive regions. They not only had to pay substantially more for the same as what others are paying for, but furthermore, they were often not considered as being poor, as state social policies are based on income testing (the poor are those who have a low income), and do not take into consideration the housing situation.

Finally, it should be taken into account that 'winners' and 'losers' are to some extent relative categories. As the laws and other rules regulating the housing market change rather frequently, the situation of different groups can also change substantially. Even the development in the housing market, which is driven by 'pure market forces', is far from stable, and what may look like an advantage at one time may not be advantage later. Regardless of the scope of uncertainty connected with the development of the housing market, we believe that any attempt to incorporate the problems of housing into the research of the development of the social structure is worthwhile.

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Criminal Victimisation and Depression in the Czech Republic*

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Abstract: Since the fall of communism in 1989, criminal victimisation has become an issue in the Czech Republic, and research indicates that it is a stressful experience. The relationship between criminal victimisation and depression was examined by adding fear of crime, protection against crime, avoidance of crime, mastery over one's life, social support, and trust in government (as well as socio-demographic controls) to successive regression equations. A total of 703 Czech households in the second of a three-wave (1994-1996) panel study were studied. For men, the total and direct effects of criminal victimisation on depression were significant. However, the relation of men's fear of crime and depression was mediated by avoidance. For women, criminal victimisation was not related to depression. The relation of women's fear of crime and depression was mediated by mastery. Interpretations of these results are grounded in the different relevance criminal victimisation has for the well-being of men and women.

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Since the fall of communism in 1989, the issue of criminal victimisation has become a public concern in the Czech Republic. American research shows that criminal victimisation has real consequences, such as the diminished psychological well-being of victims, and it can be assumed that it poses a threat to the well-being of Czech citizens also. In this analysis, criminal victimisation in the Czech Republic is examined within the theoretical framework of the stress-distress perspective. The analysis begins with a brief discussion of rising crime during the period of the Czech transformation prior to 1994.

Rising Crime in the Czech Republic

Since the fall of communism in 1989 crime rates have been rising in former Czechoslovakia. The 1992 International Crime Survey (ICS) revealed that of all Czechoslovak respondents in the survey, 10.9% reported having been a burglary victim, 22% reported having had personal property stolen, and 9.4% reported that they had been the victims of an assault – the second highest proportion of assault victims reported for post-communist countries [Valkova 1993]. In addition, among Czechoslovak respondents in the 1992 ICS, 9% of the women reported having been the victims of sexual offences, and almost 44% of car owners in the survey had experienced car vandalism [Siemaszko 1993]. In Prague, Buriánek [1994] found an increase in types of crime new to the Czech Republic, such as drug dealing, economic crime and organised crime. The 1992 ICS also reported that 33.4% of Czech respondents felt 'a bit unsafe' and 10.5% felt 'very unsafe' when walking alone in their area at night [Valkova 1993].

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While the Czech public's concern with crime has increased, its faith in the state to control it has decreased. In a 1992 national poll, 86% of Czech respondents reported that they were dissatisfied with police [Hraba et al. 1996]. The 1992 ICS showed that 55.4% of respondents were dissatisfied with the way police handled reported crime, and 32.4% thought the police do a bad job of patrolling streets [Valkova 1993]. The 1992 ICS also showed a lack of faith in police as the main reason given in former Czechoslovakia for not reporting car vandalism [Siemaszko 1993]. Hraba et al. [1998] found a perceived increased risk of crime among Czechs that was due to a lack of trust in government as well as criminal victimisation.

One reason for the rise in crime is that economic motives for crime have increased in the Czech Republic. With the transformation, the state no longer guarantees employment and public entitlements have diminished. Earnings inequality began to increase in 1990, with higher incomes rising and diverging from others [Rondinelli 1994; Večerník 1995, 1996a], who in turn have experienced declining income, economic insecurity, and subjective poverty [Matějů and Řeháková 1996; Musil 1992; Večerník 1996b]. These factors have been associated with arrest rates in the United States [LaFree and Drass 1996] and may also serve as economic motives for crime in the Czech Republic.

Criminal Victimisation in the Stress-Distress Perspective

Consistent with both criminological and stress-distress research, criminal victimisation is posited to be a stressor that can produce depressive symptoms in victims [Coyne and Downey 1991; Hraba et al. 1999; Kilpatrick et al. 1985; Mawby and Walkate 1994; Norris and Kaniasty 1994; Proulx et al. 1995]. The effect of criminal victimisation on depression may depend, however, on the emotional reactions of victims to victimisation. Increased fear of crime is one of these reactions. In criminology, fear of crime is defined as a feeling of dread about being victimised by crime [Ferraro 1995; Garofalo 1981; Giles-Sims 1984; LaGrange and Ferraro 1989; Miethe and Lee 1984; Taylor and Hale 1986], and it is considered to be a consequence of crime itself [Giles-Sims 1984; Ferraro 1995; Garofalo 1981; Norris and Kaniasty 1994; Roundtree and Land 1996; Thompson and Norris 1992]. It is also seen as a cause of psychological distress in stress-distress research [Ross 1993]. This analysis will test whether Czech victims become depressed in direct response to criminal victimisation, or whether they must first fear it (interpreting it as a threat to personal well-being) in order to become depressed.

The effect of criminal victimisation may also depend on victims' behavioural responses to victimisation and fear of crime. These reactions can be stress-coping strategies. Approach strategies are those intended to increase one's resistance to stress, and avoidance strategies are those intended to reduce the occasions when one is confronted by stress. Approach strategies appear to have more power in reducing distress [Coyne and Downey 1991; Elder 1974; Lorenz et al. 1996]. The restrictions to personal freedom associated with avoidance strategies may have a negative effect on people's psychological well-being, thus reducing their effectiveness in reducing distress [Hraba et al. 1999]. Similarly, criminologists are interested in protection and avoidance as reactions to crime. Protection strategies are those which are intended to increase a person's ability to resist criminal victimisation – learning self-defence techniques, for example. Avoidance strategies, on the other hand, are those which are intended to reduce the opportunities for others to offend – not going out after dark or into certain neighbourhoods, for example [DuBow et al. 1979; Garofalo 1981; Liska and Warner 1991; Roundtree and Land 1996].

In this analysis, protection from criminal victimisation is considered to be an approach-coping strategy, while avoidance of criminal victimisation is, obviously, an avoidance-coping strategy. Norris and Kaniasty [1994] found that protective action reduces the effects of criminal victimisation on distress, while Proulx et al. [1995] found the use of 'escapist' coping strategies to be associated with higher levels of distress. Hraba et al. [1999] found that protection decreased depression among Czech men, while avoidance increased their depression and anxiety.

The effect of criminal victimisation on distress also depends on the personal and social resources victims have for coping with the stress of victimisation. In stress-distress studies, a sense of personal control (mastery) has been identified as one of the most important psychological resources one can have in handling stress [Aneshensel 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Pearlin et al. 1981; Taylor and Aspinwall 1996; Turner and Roszell 1994]. People with a high sense of mastery believe they have a high degree of power over themselves and their environment [Turner and Roszell 1994]. Social support can also reduce psychological distress [Coyne and Downey 1991; Ensel and Lin 1991; Sarason, Pierce, and Sarason 1994; Taylor and Aspinwall 1996]. Social support may come in the form of advice, tangible aid (money, for example), and reassurances of self-esteem [Taylor and Aspinwall 1996]. It is reasoned in this analysis that Czech victims who believe they can count on others for support should suffer less depression from criminal victimisation. Also, trust in government is added to this analysis as another social resource – a state resource – that may be used to cope with criminal victimisation. Since the beginning of the transformation, some surveys have indicated that the trust Czechs have in their government has been declining [Hraba et al. 1998; Rose 1994]. It is reasoned here that Czech crime victims who are still able to trust authorities to protect them from future victimisation should suffer less depression.

Since research in the United States [Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Pearlin 1989; Turner, Wheaton, and Lloyd 1995; Williams 1990] and the Czech Republic [Hraba et al. 1999; Hraba, Lorenz, and Pechačová 1997; Hraba et al. 1994] shows that depression levels vary according to age and social status, the control variables of age, education, marital status, income, and rural/urban residence of respondents are included here. Research in the US also reveals sex differences in reported distress [Elder et al. 1994; Friedemann and Webb 1995], and sex differences in distress were indeed found in the Czech Republic [Hraba et al. 1994; Hraba, Lorenz, and Lee 1996]. Males and females are here analysed separately because most of the data are taken from paired husbands and wives.

This analysis presents an empirical test of the argument that criminal victimisation is related to depression symptoms directly and indirectly through fear of crime, protection, avoidance, mastery, social support, and trust in government. Multiple regression analysis is used to test this relationship. Criminal victimisation is included as an exogenous variable, depression symptoms make up the outcome variable, and the other six variables are considered as possible mediating variables. The variables are then examined with a series of eight equations. After regressing depression symptoms on criminal victimisation, control variables, fear of crime, and personal and social resource variables are added in successive equations.

Methods

Sample

The sample consists of two waves of data collected in the Czech Republic in 1994 and in 1995. The original sample was selected from a panel of 4,000 households contacted periodically by the Czech Census Bureau Division of Family Budgets. Families were informed about the research goals and asked to participate in a survey during the Bureau's interviews in autumn 1993. Those who agreed to participate returned a signed consent form to the Bureau. From among them the Bureau randomly selected 774 families, with roughly equal numbers from rural and urban areas, and mailed them questionnaires. The Bureau detected no selection bias, but the panel is a quota sample based on rural/urban residence and is not necessarily representative of the country. A total of 740 families (96%) returned the questionnaires. The first wave sample is comprised of 577 husbands and wives, 146 single female-headed households, and 17 single male-headed households. In the second wave, 703 (95%) of the 740 families from the first wave returned questionnaires. The second wave sample is comprised of 546 husbands and wives, 139 single female-headed households, and 16 single male-headed households. In both waves, spouses answered separate questionnaires and returned them in separate envelopes. They were asked not to consult each other when answering them. This analysis is based on 535 men and 639 women who provided complete data in both waves.

Measures

Criminal Victimisation. Three items were summed to create an index of criminal victimisation. Respondents in 1995 were asked: *"During the last year, 1) were you robbed, assaulted or mugged? 2) did anyone break into or somehow illegally get into your apartment or home? and 3) did anyone take something directly from you by use of force – such as a hold-up, mugging, or threat?"* Responses to these three items are coded as "Yes" = 1 and "No" = 0. Victimisation was reported 11.2% of the men and 10.2% of the women.

Age. Respondents in 1995 were asked: *"How old are you?"* The respondents' ages are coded in their years of age. Men's ages ranged from 21 to 81, with a mean of 44.4, and women's ages ranged from 20 to 85, with a mean of 42.11.

Education. Respondents' education (in 1994) is coded as the level of completed education. Respondents chose from: (1) elementary (2) vocational training (3) secondary school (4) college (5) university (6) post-graduate degree (CSc. or DrSc.).

Marital Status. Respondents' marital status (in 1995) was coded as 1 = single (never married, divorced/separated, and widowed) and 2 = married (including cohabiting partners). A total of 97% of the men and 80.3% of the women reported being married.

Urban/Rural Residence. Residence is defined as the population size of the locality in which the respondent lives. Respondents' residences (in 1995) are coded as 0 = rural (5,000 or less inhabitants) and 1 = urban (over 5,000). Of all respondents, 52.7% of men live in rural areas and 47.3% live in urban areas, while 48.8% of women live in rural areas and 51.2% live in urban areas.

Income. Income is coded as the amount of money a person receives from any source per year. Respondents (in 1995) wrote their income in one thousand units of Czech crowns. The median incomes are 73,000 CZK for men and 53,500 CZK for women, both with a

range of 0 to 450,000 CZK. A logarithmic transformation is used on income to adjust for skewness (2.584 for men and 2.71 for women).

Fear of Crime. Two items were summed to create an index of fear of crime. Respondents in 1995 were asked: 1) *"Is there any area right around here – that is, within a kilometre or two – where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?"* ("yes" = 1, "no" = 0, "don't know" = 0) and 2) *"Compared with last year, do you personally feel more uneasy on the streets, less uneasy or not much different?"* (Responses are coded as: "more uneasy" = 1, "less uneasy" = 0, "not much different" = 0, "not sure" = 0). The first item has been routinely included as a measure of fear of crime in American surveys [cf. Warr 1994]. The second item is used to measure Czech respondents' emotions about being in public during a time of rising contact crime. The mean scores are 0.54 for men and 1.13 for women.

Protection. Two items were summed to create an index of protection. Respondents in 1995 were asked: 1) *"Has the fear of crime caused you to install a home security system?"* and 2) *"Has the fear of crime caused you to install an automobile security system?"* ("yes" = 1, "no" = 0). These items, especially the second, are more likely to measure protective action against property crime. However, the measure of victimisation used in this analysis is concerned with crime that is more dangerous to personal safety. A 'crossover effect' from property protection to personal protection will be tested for here. It is possible that actions taken to protect one's property also include actions taken to protect one's person [Hraba et al. 1999]. The mean protection scores are 0.27 for men and 0.21 for women. Protective behaviour was indicated by 21.8% of the men and 18.5% of the women.

Avoidance. Three items were summed to create an index of avoidance. Respondents in 1995 were asked: *"Has the fear of crime caused you to... 1) limit the places or times that you go shopping? 2) limit the places or times that you work? and 3) limit the places that you will go by yourself?"* ("yes" = 1, "no" = 0). Fear of crime was specified in these questions to avoid responses based on limiting these activities for other reasons such as physical disability or external constraints (such as business hours) [Hraba et al. 1997]. The mean avoidance scores are 0.27 for men and 0.66 for women. Avoidance action was taken by 20.1% of the men and 50.5% of the women.

Mastery. Consistent with Pearlin et al. [1981], mastery is defined as the perception of control over one's life. Seven items were summed to create an index of mastery. In 1994, respondents indicated how strongly they agreed or disagreed with seven statements about themselves. Sample statements are: *"There really is no way I can solve some of the problems I have"* and *"I can do just about anything I really set my mind to"*. Responses are coded as: "strongly agree" = 1, "agree" = 2, "uncertain or mixed" = 3, "disagree" = 4, "strongly disagree" = 5. The $\alpha = 0.75$ for men and $\alpha = 0.74$ for women. The mean mastery scores are 25.16 for men (range = 14 to 35) and 24.19 for women (range = 8 to 35).

Social Support. Twelve items were summed to create an index for social support. Respondents in 1995 were asked: *"Thinking about relatives, neighbours, close friends or acquaintances other than your spouse or children, how true is each of these statements for you?..."* The statements indicated three types of social support: appraised, tangible, and that of belonging. Samples of each are: *"Other than my husband or children, there are several people that I trust to help solve my problems"* (appraised); *"If I needed an emergency loan of 1000 crowns, there is someone (friend, neighbour, other relatives, or acquaintance) I could get it from"* (tangible), and *"My friends really care about me"*

(belonging). Responses are coded as: "definitely true" = 1, "probably true" = 2, "probably false" = 3, "definitely false" = 4. The $\alpha = 0.78$ for men and $\alpha = 0.77$ for women. The mean social support scores are 21.18 for men (range = 22 to 48) and 20.68 for women (range = 19 to 48).

Trust in Government. Two items were summed to create an index of trust in government. Respondents in 1994 were asked: 1) *"To what extent do you trust the current government to take actions necessary to control crime?"* ("do not trust at all" = 1, "to some extent" = 2, and "to a great extent" = 3) and 2) *"Think about how the changes in government have directly affected you since 1989. Would you say you experience more, the same, or less danger from crime?"* ("more" = 1, "same" = 2, "less" = 3). The mean trust in government scores are 2.84 for men and 2.88 for women.

Depression. Ten items adapted from Derogatis [1983] SCL-90 were summed to create an index of depression. Respondents in 1995 were asked about depressive symptoms they experienced "during the past week", such as "loss of sexual interest", "feeling low in energy or slowed down", "crying easily", "feeling lonely", "trouble concentrating", and "feelings of worthlessness". Responses are coded as: "not at all" = 0, "a little bit" = 1, "moderate" = 2, "quite a bit" = 3, "extremely" = 4. The $\alpha = 0.85$ for both men and women. The mean depression scores are 4.48 for men (range = 0 to 31) and 7.10 for women (range = 0 to 33).

Results

Tables 1 (men) and 2 (women) contain the regression coefficients (with standard errors and significance) from eight successive equations. In Equation 1, depressive symptoms are regressed on criminal victimisation. Criminal victimisation is significantly and positively related to depressive symptoms for men ($\beta = 0.147$) but not for women ($\beta = 0.065$). With Equation 2, (Tables 1 and 2) the age, education, marital status, income, and rural/urban residence of respondents are added as a set of controls. The net of controls shows that criminal victimisation is significantly related to depressive symptoms for men ($\beta = 0.143$) but not for women ($\beta = 0.059$). Among the controls, age is related to men's depressive symptoms ($\beta = 0.194$), and marital status (unmarried) is related to women's ($\beta = -0.111$). The change in R^2 from Equation 1 to Equation 2 for men (0.049) and women (0.018) are both significant.

Table 1a. Men's self-reported depression symptoms regressed on criminal victimisation, controlling for demographic characteristics (Equation 2), fear of crime (Equation 3), protection (Equation 4)

	Equation 1		Equation 2		Equation 3		Equation 4	
Variable	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β
Victimisation	1.506**	0.147	1.463**	0.143	1.322**	0.129	1.373**	0.134
	(0.439)		(0.445)		(0.444)		(0.448)	
Demographic Characteristics								
Age			0.082***	0.194	0.077***	0.181	0.076***	0.179
			(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.018)	
Education			-0.319	-0.075	-0.338	-0.079	-0.305	-0.071
			(0.186)		(0.185)		(0.189)	
Marital Status			-1.188	-0.040	-1.116	-0.037	-1.130	-0.038
			(1.259)		(1.251)		(1.251)	
Residence			0.190	0.019	-0.033	-0.003	0.031	0.003
			(0.435)		(0.439)		(0.445)	
Income			-0.146	-0.031	-0.135	-0.029	-0.131	-0.028
			(0.198)		(0.197)		(0.197)	
Fear of Crime					0.824**	0.123	0.871**	0.131
					(0.290)		(0.294)	
Protection							-0.366	-0.041
							(0.404)	
Constant	4.161***		4.338		4.135		4.112	
R^2	0.0022		0.0071		0.085		0.086	
R^2 Change	-		0.049***		0.014**		0.001	

*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed tests)

Note: N = 535; b = unstandardised regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses; β = standardised regression coefficient.

Equation 3 (Tables 1 and 2) adds 'fear of crime'. As expected, fear of crime is positively related to men's depressive symptoms (β = 0.123). Criminal victimisation remains related to men's depressive symptoms in Equation 3 (β = 0.129), and fear of crime is also related to women's depressive symptoms in Equation 3 (β = 0.094). The changes in R^2 for men (0.014) and women (0.008) are both significant.

Equation 4 (Tables 1 and 2) adds 'protection from criminal victimisation'. Protection is not, however, related to men's and women's depressive symptoms (β = -0.041 and -0.040 respectively). Criminal victimisation remains related to men's depressive symptoms (β = 0.134), as does fear of crime (β = 0.131). For women, fear of crime also remains related to depressive symptoms (β = 0.099). The changes in R^2 for both men and women (0.001) are insignificant.

Table 1b. Men's self-reported depression symptoms regressed on criminal victimisation, controlling for avoidance (Equation 5), mastery (Equation 6), social support (Equation 7), and trust in government (Equation 8)

	Equation 5		Equation 6		Equation 7		Equation 8	
Variable	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β
Victimisation	1.303**	0.127	1.105**	0.108	1.079**	0.105	1.076**	0.105
	(0.442)		(0.420)		(0.414)		(0.414)	
Demographic Characteristics								
Age	0.067***	0.158	0.054**	0.128	0.042*	0.100	0.042*	0.100
	(0.018)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)	
Education	-0.362	-0.085	-0.144	-0.034	-0.104	-0.024	-0.105	-0.025
	(0.187)		(0.179)		(0.177)		(0.177)	
Marital Status	-1.013	-0.034	-1.742	-0.058	-1.595	-0.053	-1.587	-0.053
	(1.234)		(1.174)		(1.156)		(1.157)	
Residence	-0.052	-0.001	0.248	0.025	0.197	0.020	0.198	0.020
	(0.438)		(0.417)		(0.411)		(0.411)	
Income	-0.159	-0.034	-0.102	-0.022	-0.112	-0.024	-0.110	-0.024
	(0.194)		(0.184)		(0.182)		(0.182)	
Fear of Crime	0.305	0.046	0.110	0.016	0.262	0.039	0.248	0.037
	(0.323)		(0.308)		(0.305)		(0.307)	
Protection	-0.532	-0.060	-0.495	-0.056	-0.500	-0.056	-0.504	-0.057
	(0.401)		(0.380)		(0.374)		(0.375)	
Avoidance	1.570***	0.192	1.467***	0.180	1.411***	0.173	1.401***	0.172
	(0.395)		(0.375)		(0.370)		(0.370)	
Mastery			-0.401***	-0.313	-0.343***	-0.268	-0.340***	-0.265
			(0.052)		(0.053)		(0.053)	
Social Support					-0.182***	-0.170	-0.181***	-0.169
					(0.044)		(0.044)	
Trust in Government							-0.088	-0.018
							(0.196)	
Constant	4.514		15.760***		21.135***		21.270***	
R^2	0.113		0.204		0.230		0.230	
R^2 Change	0.027***		0.092***		0.025***		0.000	

*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed tests)

Note: N = 535; b = unstandardised regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses; β = standardised regression coefficient.

Avoidance is related to men's depressive symptoms in Equation 5 (β = 0.192). Criminal victimisation remains related to men's depressive symptoms (β = 0.127), but fear of crime is no longer significantly related to their depression (β = 0.046). Avoidance mediates the relationship between men's fear of crime and depression. For women, avoidance is not significantly related to depressive symptoms (β = 0.032), but fear of crime remains related to their depression (β = 0.088). The change in R^2 for men (0.027) is significant, but the change in R^2 for women (0.001) is not.

As expected, mastery is related to men's depressive symptoms in Equation 6 (β = -0.313), and criminal victimisation remains significantly related to their depression (β = 0.108), as does avoidance (β = 0.180). Mastery is also related to women's depressive symptoms (β = -0.375), while fear of crime is no longer significantly related to women's

depressive symptoms (β = 0.066). Mastery mediates the relationship between women's fear of crime and depressive symptoms. The change in R^2 for men (0.092) and women (0.137) are both significant.

Table 2a. Women's self-reported depression symptoms regressed on criminal victimisation, controlling for demographic characteristics (Equation 2), fear of crime (Equation 3), protection (Equation 4)

	Equation 1		Equation 2		Equation 3		Equation 4	
Variable	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β
Victimisation	0.906	0.065	0.827	0.059	0.685	0.049	0.757	0.054
	(0.553)		(0.570)		(0.571)		(0.576)	
Demographic Characteristics								
Age			0.035	0.062	0.034	0.061	0.035	0.063
			(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)	
Education			0.111	0.016	0.089	0.013	0.083	0.012
			(0.286)		(0.286)		(0.286)	
Marital Status			1.745**	-0.111	-1.810**	-0.115	-1.749**	-0.111
			(0.638)		(0.637)		(0.640)	
Residence			-0.276	-0.022	-0.471	-0.037	-0.377	-0.030
			(0.526)		(0.531)		(0.539)	
Income			-0.169	-0.034	-0.164	-0.034	-0.156	-0.032
			(0.199)		(0.199)		(0.199)	
Fear of Crime					0.883*	0.094	0.933*	0.099
					(0.379)		(0.383)	
Protection							-0.541	-0.040
							(0.563)	
Constant	6.797***		8.904***		8.212***		8.060***	
R^2	0.004		0.022		0.030		0.031	
R^2 Change			0.018*		0.008*		0.001	

*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed tests)

Note: N = 639; b = unstandardised regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses; β = standardised regression coefficient.

Social support is related to men's depressive symptoms in Equation 7 (β = -0.170). Criminal victimisation remains related to men's depression (β = 0.105), as do avoidance (β = 0.173) and mastery (β = -0.268). Social support is also significantly related to women's depression in Equation 7 (β = -0.127), as is mastery (β = -0.342). The change in R^2 for men (0.025) and women (0.015) are both significant.

Equation 8 (Tables 1 and 2) adds trust in government to the explanation of depression. Trust in government is not significantly related to men's or women's depressive symptoms (β = -0.018 and -0.006). Criminal victimisation remains related to men's depressive symptoms (β = 0.105), as do avoidance (β = 0.172), mastery (β = -0.265), and social support (β = -0.169). Criminal victimisation and fear of crime continue to be unrelated to women's depression (β = 0.049 and 0.077), but mastery and social support are related (β = -0.342 and -0.127). Equation 8 explains 23% of the variance in men's depressive symptoms and 18.4% in women's. No significant changes in R^2 occur for men or women.

Table 2b. Women's self-reported depression symptoms regressed on criminal victimisation, controlling for avoidance (Equation 5), mastery (Equation 6), social support (Equation 7), and trust in government (Equation 8)

	Equation 5		Equation 6		Equation 7		Equation 8	
Variable	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β
Victimisation	0.758	0.054	0.646	0.046	0.682	0.049	0.683	0.049
	(0.576)		(0.534)		(0.530)		(0.530)	
Demographic Characteristics								
Age	0.033	0.060	0.030	0.054	0.023	0.042	0.023	0.042
	(0.023)		(0.021)		(0.021)		(0.021)	
Education	0.080	0.012	0.230	0.033	0.241	0.035	0.240	0.035
	(0.286)		(0.265)		(0.263)		(0.264)	
Marital Status	-1.736**	-0.110	-1.133	-0.072	-1.161*	-0.074	-1.161*	-0.073
	(0.640)		(0.597)		(0.592)		(0.593)	
Residence	-0.408	-0.032	-0.331	-0.026	-0.265	-0.021	-0.267	0.021
	(0.541)		(0.502)		(0.498)		(0.499)	
Income	-0.153	-0.031	-0.110	-0.023	-0.081	-0.016	-0.081	-0.017
	(0.199)		(0.185)		(0.183)		(0.184)	
Fear of Crime	0.827*	0.088	0.622	0.066	0.712	0.075	0.722	0.077
	(0.408)		(0.378)		(0.376)		(0.382)	
Protection	-0.565	-0.041	-0.424	-0.031	-0.545	-0.040	-0.538	-0.039
	(0.564)		(0.523)		(0.521)		(0.523)	
Avoidance	0.266	0.032	0.120	0.015	0.079	0.010	0.083	0.010
	(0.353)		(0.327)		(0.325)		(0.326)	
Mastery			-0.612***	-0.375	-0.559***	-0.342	-0.559***	-0.342
			(0.060)		(0.062)		(0.062)	
Social Support					-0.177***	-0.127	-0.177***	-0.127
					(0.053)		(0.053)	
Trust in Government							-0.034	-0.006
							(0.243)	
Constant	8.065***		21.659***		27.086***		26.970***	
R^2	0.032		0.169		0.184		0.184	
R^2 Change	0.001		0.137***		0.015***		0.000	

*p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed tests)

Note: N = 639; b = unstandardised regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses; β = standardised regression coefficient.

Discussion

There was a direct relation between men's criminal victimisation and depression through all of the equations. This relationship was reduced with additional equations, but remained significant. Criminal victimisation was not related to women's depression. For Czech men at least, it appears that criminal victimisation is an undesirable experience that leads to depression. It may be more of a gender identity threatening stressor for men than it is for women. Assuming that higher resistance to victimisation is typically a major part of men's masculine identities (and typically not a major part of women's feminine identities), being victimised could be perceived by male victims as their inability to meet the expectations of their gender roles – which could then lead to unfavourable self-evaluations and increased depression [Thoits 1991; Wheaton 1996].

Fear of crime was also related to men's depression. However, it did not mediate between men's criminal victimisation and depression. Perhaps criminal victimisation presents such a threat for Czech men that it needs little subjective appraisal to produce distress. Fear of crime was also related to women's depression. It appears that the more Czech men and women are afraid of being the victim of a crime, regardless of whether or not they have been victimised, the higher their risk of depression becomes.

Taking protective action was not related to men's and women's depression. This may be due to the use of a protection from property crime measure. This analysis attempted to find a crossover effect from property protection to protection from physical harm, but no such effect was detected. Avoidance was related to men's depression, by contrast, and it added to their depression. Avoidance did not mediate between men's criminal victimisation and depression, but it significantly added to the explanation of Czech men's depression. Avoidance may not have mediated between Czech men's criminal victimisation and depression because they were not able to avoid situations that render them vulnerable to future victimisation, perhaps due to a lack of flexibility in work or other role demands. However, avoidance was found to mediate between men's fear of crime and depression. Czech men who responded to their fear of crime with avoidance may have been more adversely affected by the resulting disruptions of daily life and restrictions on personal freedoms. On the other hand, avoidance was not significantly related to women's depression. Perhaps women are more used to using avoidance-coping strategies in dealing with the threat of criminal victimisation. It is typical for American women to incorporate avoidance of higher crime-risk situations and activities into their daily lives [Karmen 1984]. Perhaps Czech women have similar routines and suffer relatively little distress from them [Hraba et al. 1999].

For men, mastery was related to decreased depression. For women, mastery was also related to decreased depression, and it mediated the relationship between women's fear of crime and depression. People who perceive a high sense of mastery may generally be less depressed because of its enhancing effect on self-confidence, self-esteem and happiness. Perhaps Czech women, even if fearful of crime, become less depressed from this fear because their sense of personal control lowers their perceived risk of being victimised. Perhaps mastery did not mediate between criminal victimisation and depression because being victimised leads to the interpretation that one does not have total mastery over one's life. Thus a sense of mastery may have been neutralised, and criminal victimisation was allowed to have a more direct impact on well-being.

For both men and women, social support was significantly related to decreased depression. Although social support did not mediate between criminal victimisation and depression, it significantly added to the explanation of depression. People in mutually supportive relationships may generally be less depressed because they continually serve as resources for each others' self-actualisation. It appears that depression was reduced by receiving interpersonal support, which is consistent with stress-distress studies examining the distress-reducing effects of social support. Perhaps social support did not mediate the relation between men's victimisation and depression because social support used to cope with criminal victimisation is selective and specific, whereas the measure of social support used in this analysis is a general one. For example, after experiencing criminal victimisation, the victim may seek the support of only significant others such as spouses or parents, and this support typically involves reassurances rather than tangible aid.

Trust in government was not significantly related to depression for men or women. It was expected that the more confidence Czechs had in their government to prevent future criminal victimisation, the less they would become depressed. Perhaps one's fear of crime and depression due to criminal victimisation are more influenced by micro-level social factors such as the quality of the neighbourhood, the perceived effectiveness of local police, and the quality of interpersonal relationships within the community rather than the qualities of large-scale government.

Criminal victimisation, fear of crime, and behavioural reactions to crime were patterned by the controls. Among Czech men, criminal victimisation was higher for the higher educated, the unmarried, and those living in urban areas. Among women, criminal victimisation was higher for those living in urban areas. Men's fear of crime increased with age and education level and was higher for those living in urban areas. Women's fear of crime was higher for those living in urban areas. More protective action was taken by higher educated men, and urban men and women. Avoidance of crime was taken more by older men and women, higher educated men, and urban men and women. Further sex differences are also worth noting. A higher proportion of men reported victimisation than women, but women's fear of crime was twice as high as men's. These patterns indicate a sociological significance to this social psychological study. Criminal victimisation, fear of crime, and their effects on well-being vary by residence, age, education, and coping, as well as sex.

An exact causal ordering cannot be inferred from this analysis. For example, it is possible that respondents could have taken action or been afraid of crime prior to experiencing any victimisation. Still, this analysis was able to detect that male victims were more likely to report depressive symptoms, and that avoidance of crime appeared to amplify men's depression. The fact that these trends did not hold true for women presents an interesting sex difference in regard to responding to criminal victimisation. Fear of crime was related to depression for both men and women, but women's mastery appeared to suppress this relationship, while men's avoidance appeared to amplify it.

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The housing policy changes and housing expenditures of households in the Czech Republic

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Summary: The paper provides brief list of changes in rental and ownership housing sector during the transition in the Czech Republic. The historic statements on development of housing under the Communistic regime as well as important changes on the field of rental housing after the fall of the Communism are presented. The complete analysis of housing expenditures of all Czech households as well as analysis of housing expenditures of different social categories of households form the first part of the paper. The second part is composed by the description of main social tensions in the sector of rental housing. According to the author there are three main social tensions on the Czech rental market: the tension between households without economically active members and households with at least one economically active member; the tension between private owners of rented flats and their tenants; and the tension between the tenants living in rent-controlled flats and the tenants living in free market rental flats. Tenants from rent-controlled flats are subject to large scale of tenant protection laws and prosper from very low level of rent prices. On the contrary households that are forced to live in market rental sector do not obtain any state contribution or any tenant protection. Moreover, the share of lower income households on total number of households living in municipal rent-controlled housing sector is not significantly higher than this share in the case of other types of housing (tenures). Regulated rent prices are too low to cover even maintenance costs of rental flats and their share on the total net income of households is still much lower than is the case in the countries of the European Union. The Eurostat and Cecodhas data sources are used for this comparison. The political will for change is weak currently. The author concludes his paper with statement that the transformation of rental housing sector has been realised only partially up to now. The brief list of necessary housing policy measures is provided.

Changes in Consumption of Households during 1990-1997*

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Abstract: The article provides social statistics concerning the main changes in the consumption behaviour of Czech households between 1990 and 1997. The description is based on a comparison with the situation and trends in countries of the European Union. The author uses the Family Budget Surveys data files that were weighted to assure higher representativeness of the research results. Different statistical procedures are employed to describe main shifts in the composition of household budgets on the whole and for different consumption items in the first stage, and according to different factors characterising the household in the second stage. In the last part of the article, multiple regression and ANOVA analysis were applied to answer the question of the changes in the influence of different social indicators of households on the relative household expenditures. The author cannot confirm the hypothesis that 'meritocratic' factors (income, education) have strengthened and 'demographic' factors (family size, age or residence size) have weakened in influence for explaining the variability of four basic relative consumer items. The changes in consumption behaviour have a transitional character rather than the character of long-term historical changes apparent in the countries of the European Union.

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Introduction

There are two main approaches forming the methodological background of a consumer behaviour analysis: the approach of econometrics and economics on the one hand, and the approach of sociology and social statistics on the other. The path of econometrics remains rather more theoretical than empirical; it is based on neo-classical assumptions of rational utility imperatives in human action and there is no (or only a small) place for a statistical analysis of real professional, gender, family size and other demographic cleavages. Moreover, a further assumption often plays an important role: the permanent and non-problematic development of a society and its economy. In the case of the wide economic reforms currently underway in Eastern European countries, there are many more 'political' factors influencing individual and household consumer behaviour than in a standard Western democracy (deregulations, new tax structure, etc.). The housing expenditures and their share in the family budgets of Czech households are effects of the liberalisation of rents and energies and the continuous rigidity in the regulated rental sector rather than

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effects of life-cycle assumptions[1] or purely economic factors (inflation and interest rate changes).

Therefore, the approach of a complete statistical analysis of the main structural shifts in household consumption, along with a sociological interpretation, seems to be much more appropriate for an analysis of the consumer changes during the transition of Czech society. As we would like to stress the comparative aspect of the description, the first question of interest is: Is the structure of Czech household budgets closer to or further from the consumer patterns of European households after seven years of transition? Table 1 shows the structure of household consumption in the EU countries in 1993. According to Pouquet and Maincent [1999], who analysed empirical trends in consumption behaviour of households in Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, there was the following development in relative expenditures[2] from 1970 to 1996:

- Convergence of all countries in the case of relative 'food, beverage and tobacco' expenditures that are derogating (in Italy very sharply) with the economic development of the country;
- A growth in relative housing expenditures, but with no sign of convergence; this is due to the wide housing reforms in the European countries that had, however, different timing and different governmental goals;
- A growth in relative 'transport and communication' expenditures that is apparent mainly in more developed European countries;
- A diminution in relative 'clothing and footwear' expenditures; here also there is no convergence trend, because of different cultural traditions.

Are the changes in the Czech consumption patterns similar or completely different? How have Czech households compensated for the economic reform burden in their budgets? What were the main shifts in the structure of household budgets caused by the liberalisation of food and energy prices? What were the main social determinants of this change? Is there a shift towards more 'meritocratic' factors explaining the variability of relative household expenditures?

Data and Methodology

The *Family Budget Surveys 1990-1997* (FBS's) provide us with a basic data source for an analysis of change in consumer behaviour. FBS was established in 1958 as a quota sample-based survey of households and it is conducted on a roughly 0.1% sample. The main quotas currently form the following social categories: manual workers, employees, co-operative farmers, pensioners and entrepreneurs. The survey is based on the daily records of all income and expenditures of sample households. Its realisation, however, is marked

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[1]) In the EU countries, it is a common fact that young households start out by living in the rental sector (private or social) and only the higher income part of 'older' households can afford to buy a house or a flat into their ownership. Owner-occupation is a kind of luxury good, and if not (e.g. thanks to the 'Right to Buy' policy in Great Britain) then it is still quite an expensive adventure: owners are obliged not only to repay mortgage loans but also to cover all necessary maintenance costs of their home, which is not the case of families living in social rental flats.

[2]) *Relative expenditures* are defined as an average share of the monthly household expenditures of a specific kind (food, culture, clothing, etc.) out of the total monthly household expenditures.

Table 1. The structure of European household budgets (in % of total household expenditures)

	Food, beverages and tobacco	Clothing and footwear	Housing	Housing equipment	Medical care and health	Transport and communication	Leisure time and education	Miscellaneous
Germany	15.1	7.1	19.6	8.5	15.1	15.3	9.2	10.1
Austria	19.0	8.5	18.5	7.8	6.0	16.1	7.5	16.6
Belgium	17.2	7.7	17.7	10.2	12.3	12.7	6.2	16.0
Denmark	20.8	5.2	28.8	6.1	2.2	15.4	10.4	11.1
Spain	20.0	8.1	13.0	6.5	4.7	15.3	6.6	25.8
Finland	23.0	4.6	24.8	5.8	5.3	14.4	9.6	12.5
France	18.0	5.9	20.6	7.3	10.0	15.5	7.3	15.5
Greece	36.4	7.7	13.5	7.4	4.2	14.7	5.3	10.9
Ireland	35.2	6.8	12.3	6.9	4.1	13.1	11.9	9.8
Italy	20.2	9.1	16.9	9.1	7.1	11.6	8.8	17.2
Luxembourg	18.2	5.7	19.8	10.8	7.3	19.9	4.1	14.2
Netherlands	14.8	6.8	19.0	6.9	13.1	12.6	10.2	16.6
Portugal	30.2	9.3	7.0	8.3	4.5	14.9	7.4	8.4
UK	20.6	5.9	19.5	6.6	1.7	17.1	10.2	18.3
Sweden	19.9	5.8	32.9	6.6	2.3	15.7	9.5	7.2
Europe 15	**18.7**	**7.1**	**19.0**	**7.8**	**8.8**	**14.8**	**8.6**	**15.3**
Norway	21.6	6.7	24.4	6.2	2.6	16.6	9.6	12.3
Switzerland	25.9	3.9	21.1	4.5	11.6	11.7	10.0	11.1
Canada	15.7	5.2	24.7	8.7	4.6	14.3	11.2	15.6
Japan	19.9	5.8	20.8	5.9	11.3	9.7	10.7	16.0
USA	11.4	5.9	18.1	5.8	17.8	14.0	10.3	16.5

Source: La consommation des ménages en 1997 [Cases 1999]

by some methodological and statistical defects: the lowest income households are underrepresented in research samples, the arrangement of consumer items does not correspond to the Eurostat standardisation hitherto, and the definitions of housing expenditure items do not separate the expenditures on primary housing from the expenditures on secondary housing (secondary housing is very popular in the Czech environment and pivotal for its analysis). The FBS data files were therefore weighted for the above mentioned social categories according to the representative survey *Microcensus 1992* (FBS 1990 to FBS 1995) and *Microcensus 1996* (FBS 1996 and 1997). The FBS 1996 was further weighted according to *Microcensus 1996* by the control variables: age of head of household (HH), economic activity of HH, sex of HH, completed education of HH, and the region of the household residence (8 regions). The differences in results between the first and the second file weighting were very marginal and therefore we worked with FBS's 1990-1997, weighted simply for main quotas.

A wide scale of statistical procedures has provided a statistical comparison of consumer patterns 'in time and space'. To identify major trends and changes, the multiple comparison procedures (Scheffé and Duncan testing of means), the multiple regression analysis and the multiple ANOVA analysis were used. ANOVA analysis (an analysis of variance) tests the hypothesis that the group means of the dependent variable are equal. In multiple classification analysis (forming a part of ANOVA syntax) the η and β coefficients were computed. The square of β coefficient multiplied by 100 indicates the proportion of additional variance explained by each independent variable. β coefficients of the multiple regression analysis serve as the parameters of the regression equation (linear trend). The special multiple regression analysis on merged files from different years enabled us to answer the question on the structural change in demographic factors between 1990 and 1997. The FBS data files from different years were weighted to assure the same number of cases in all files, and then compared by using new variables ('dif' variables) connected with the year of the survey.

Henceforth in this article, there is no difference between the terms 'consumption' and 'expenditures'.

1. Description of the General Changes in Consumption Patterns

It is a common fact that higher income households have higher levels of total expenditures, but the marginal expenditures with the rise of income (between different quintiles of income distribution) are generally decreasing. Table 2 shows the very specific position of the richest households in the Czech Republic: the trend of a decrease in marginal expenditures is interrupted very significantly between the 4th and the 5th income quintile groups when the marginal expenditures are much higher than between the 3rd and the 4th quintile groups. The richest households from the viewpoint of consumption behaviour form a very particular class and their standard of living has completely altered towards Western consumerism; membership in new financial oligarchic class is connected with the unlimited consumerism and low level of savings. Consumerism is perhaps considered by the 'new rich' as the most apparent sign of their success, position and welfare.

Table 2. Average total expenditures according to the income of household

Income quintiles	Average total expenditures	Marginal expenditures
1993		
first quintile	3452.18	
second quintile	6240.02	2787.84
third quintile	8545.13	↓ 2305.11
forth quintile	10010.82	↓ 1465.69
fifth quintile	13609.88	↑ **3599.06**
1997		
first quintile	5930.25	
second quintile	9865.53	3935.28
third quintile	13408.46	↓ 3542.93
forth quintile	16422.55	↓ 3014.09
fifth quintile	23712.83	↑ **7290.28**

Source: FBS 1993, 1997.

Note: Income quintiles are computed from the total net income of household. Average total expenditures are the total monthly expenditures of a household. Marginal expenditures are defined as a differentiation between quintile groups in values of average total expenditures.

Table 3. Relative expenditures during the Czech transition

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
food	29.09	30.80	29.75	31.78	29.05	29.86	30.75	29.13
beverages + tobacco	7.68	7.36	6.97	5.72	6.74	7.09	5.8	5.65
housing	10.92	11.89	14.79	17.03	17.45	17.46	17.62	19.37
housing equipment	8.05	8.06	7.75	8.05	7.77	6.87	8.59	8.68
transport	10.5	10.33	9.77	8.92	10.01	10.67	9.48	9.1
clothing + footwear	12.35	10.40	9.45	9.65	8.94	6.68	6.14	5.46
personal care	2.77	4.46	5.03	4.19	5.25	5.45	4.89	5.09
leisure time	11.79	10.92	11.20	11.01	10.38	11.28	13.1	13.09
miscellaneous	6.95	5.92	5.48	4.14	4.69	4.86	4.11	4.43

Source: FBS's 1990-1997

Note: Relative expenditures are defined as the share of x-expenditures on the total household expenditures.

Table 3 shows the change in the composition of household expenditures of the average Czech household during the transition from 1990 to 1997 (changes in relative expenditures); Table 4 provides the relevant information on the change in the amount of absolute nominal (in current prices) and absolute real (in 1990 prices) expenditures on selected consumption items for the years 1990, 1993 and 1997.[3]

[3]) Absolute real expenditures are defined as the total average monthly expenditures of households in 1990 prices (according to the inflation index received from the Czech Statistical Office); absolute nominal expenditures are defined as the total average monthly expenditures of households in current prices (sometimes, when it is mentioned, per head of a household).

Table 4. Monthly absolute nominal and real expenditures 1990, 1993, 1997 (in CZK)

	nominal 1990	nominal 1993	inflation index 1993/1990	real 1993	nominal 1997	inflation index 1997/1990	real 1997
Total	5033	7626	**210.3**	*3627*	13203	**297.9**	*4432*
Food. Beverages and Tobacco	1666	2624	**187.3**	*1401*	4155	**256.6**	*1619*
Bread and cereals (pastries, flour, noodles)	134	297	**230.4**	*129*	493	**352.6**	*140*
Meat	400	572	**171.9**	*333*	884	**239.0**	*370*
Fish	24	22	**235.0**	*10*	48	**301.1**	*16*
Milk, milk products, eggs	187	384	**257.6**	*149*	601	**355.3**	*169*
Oils and fat	109	172	**151.3**	*114*	221	**188.6**	*117*
Fruit	92	150	**161.2**	*93*	219	**217.6**	*101*
Vegetables	50	81	**179.3**	*45*	161	**232.6**	*69*
Potatoes and potato products	17	39	**189.6**	*21*	62	**261.7**	*24*
Sugar and other food	100	212	**150.5**	*141*	318	**203.9**	*156*
Non-alcoholic beverages	47	155	**183.7**	*84*	331	**205.8**	*161*
Alcoholic beverages	161	212	**164.8**	*129*	298	**199.4**	*150*
Tobacco	69	133	**229.1**	*58*	202	**328.8**	*61*
Clothing and Footwear	643	802	**211.5**	*379*	1063	**311.3**	*342*
Clothing	504	518	**195.6**	*265*	799	**281.4**	*284*
Footwear	117	162	**269.2**	*60*	264	**421.6**	*63*
Housing	500	1122	**279.3**	*402*	2417	**466.2**	*519*
Furniture, Furnishing and Household Equipment	448	677	**224.7**	*301*	1198	**279.2**	*429*
Furniture and fixtures	83	158	**200.8**	*79*	280	**249.8**	*112*
Household textiles	176	68	**241.6**	*28*	89	**297.4**	*30*
Heating and cooking appliances, refrigerators, washing machines, etc.	102	134	**197.4**	*68*	300	**229.6**	*131*
Glassware, tableware, glasses and household utensils	34	65	**234.3**	*28*	94	**312.0**	*30*
Garden appliances	-	13	**249.7**	*5*	58	**333.6**	*17*
Household operation (cleaning. laundry)	122	73	**251.5**	*29*	86	**312.0**	*28*
Medical Care and Health	16	76	**191.7**	*39*	195	**275.4**	*71*
Transport and Communication	744	930	**204.2**	*456*	1784	**275.2**	*648*
Personal transport equipment	243	203	**194.8**	*104*	467	**235.5**	*198*
Operation of personal transport equipment	275	464	**201.0**	*231*	847	**268.6**	*315*
Public transport	79	159	**236.9**	*67*	250	**372.7**	*67*
Communication (postage, telephone)	74	75	**178.4**	*42*	220	**297.4**	*74*
Recreation, Entertainment, Education and Cultural Services	358	467	**203.0**	*230*	988	**281.7**	*351*
Sport goods and accessories	139	82	**169.3**	*48*	167	**200.4**	*83*
Entertainment, recreational and cultural services	141	238	**189.1**	*126*	577	**260.0**	*222*
Books, newspapers and paper goods	78	148	**279.4**	*53*	244	**478.8**	*51*

Table 4 (cont.). Monthly absolute nominal and real expenditures 1990, 1993, 1997 (in CZK)

	nominal 1990	nominal 1993	inflation index 1993/1990	real 1993	nominal 1997	inflation index 1997/1990	real 1997
Restaurants and Hotels	219	332	**219.7**	*151*	580	**299.9**	*193*
Restaurants and cafes	39	79	**226.3**	*35*	205	**305.6**	*67*
Firm canteens	116	172	**180.9**	*95*	248	**245.8**	*101*
Hotels and similar lodging services	5	11	**331.5**	*3*	20	**572.5**	*4*
Education	16	42	**204.3**	*21*	40	**439.4**	*9*
Miscellaneous Goods and Services	333	335	**210.0**	*160*	585	**286.6**	*204*
Personal care	25	75	**228.2**	*33*	140	**297.6**	*47*

Source: Family Budgets Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997

Note: Nominal expenditures are defined as the average monthly x-expenditures of the household in current prices. Real expenditures are defined as the average monthly x-expenditures of the household in 1990 prices.

Food

According to Eurostat [*Eurostat*... 1998], the share of food consumption out of total consumption in the average EU household was around 14% in 1993 (with the lowest in the United Kingdom, 10.8%, and the highest, in Greece, 28.3%). Every society naturally has its own traditional cultural pattern of consumer behaviour. In Ireland or in the United Kingdom, there are relatively low food expenditures (in stores) in comparison with some other European countries, simply because of the fact that Irish and British households spend much more of their income on meals in restaurants and pubs; for a comparison, Irish households spent 7.27% of their average budget in restaurants and cafés in 1988 and Danish households, conversely, only 0.22% of their average budget.

In the Czech Republic, the average relative food expenditures rose from 29.1% to 31.8% between 1990 and 1993, then they decreased to the level of 29.4% in 1994, and again increased to the level of 30.7% in 1996. In 1997 the relative food expenditures were 29.1%. In absolute real values, there was a slight decrease in real food, beverage and tobacco expenditures from 1,665 CZK to 1,401 CZK between 1990 and 1993 and, similarly, a slight growth to 1,619 CZK in 1997. According to the results from FBS' analysis, the real food, beverage and tobacco expenditures still did not reach the levels of 1990 in 1997. Price liberalisation led to a growth in the variety of food and to greater choices for the consumer, but for most of the middle and low income households it led to a huge decrease in their purchasing power (see the inflation index in Table 4).

The high value of relative food expenditures (in comparison with the EU standards) is not only the result of wide economic reform, slow economic growth and the new 'food consumerism', but it may also be a result of a lack of any efficient housing reform in the Czech Republic. In the case of the EU countries, there was also a sharp rise of relative housing expenditures which had a great influence on the decrease of relative food expenditures: according to INSEE [Cases 1999], the total absolute real food and beverage expenditures in 1980 prices rose 94% in France between 1960 and 1997, but the real housing expenditures rose 358% in the same period.

Housing

According to Eurostat the relative housing expenditures of European households rose from 18% to 19.8% between 1986 and 1995; the highest growth was apparent in Sweden (seven percentage points), Finland (five percentage points), France and Italy. Figure 1 provides an international comparison of the coefficients of the housing burden, defined as the average shares of total housing expenditures out of the total net income of households; the data for the European countries refer to 1992 [Cecodhas 1995], the data for the Czech Republic refer to 1996, the data for Hungary to 1997, the data for Poland to 1996, and the data for Slovenia to 1994 (in all cases without the market rental sector). The low coefficients of the housing burden in southern European countries are mostly explained by the tradition of living in large families where more economically active members of the household share housing costs. The low quality of housing and relatively lower energy expenditures belong among the other reasons.

The housing sphere demands special attention. In international comparisons, the concept of imputed rent for owner occupied housing is applied. This, however, is not possible in the case of the Czech Republic, due to the wide defects and many dysfunctions of the Czech rental sector which have survived from the period of communism. Moreover, the housing expenditures on primary housing are not separated from the expenditures on secondary housing in FBS's, and the number of families with secondary residences is relatively high in Czech society.[4]

Alongside the problems with secondary housing in the Czech environment, other important aspects of the comparison should be mentioned. First, the coefficients for the EU countries are already reduced by a housing benefit that forms a very important part of their housing policies; conversely it has no meaning in the Czech environment.[5] Secondly, the coefficient from the Cecodhas source relates to the situation in 1992, and it can be expected that the actual coefficients are higher. According to the Netherland Ministry of Housing, the average coefficient of the net rent burden (the share of net rent out of total net income) was 21.1% in the Netherlands in 1995; given the assumptions that imputed rent in the ownership sector is generally higher than in the rental sector, and that the rent forms two thirds of total housing expenditures, we can expect that the real coefficient of the housing burden is actually between 6 and 7 percentage points higher than the Figure 1 shows [*Ministerie...* 1998]. According to the *Housing Finance Review 1999/2000* by Steve Wilcox [1999], the average coefficient of the housing burden was 25% in Great Britain 1998, i.e. 5 percentage points higher than is indicated in the figure. Similarly, the results from the survey *Enquête Logement 1996/1997*, realised by INSEE, show a difference of three percentage points; the average coefficient of the housing burden was 26.7% in the rental sector without a housing benefit, and 23% with a housing benefit, while the average coefficient of the housing burden was 24.1% in the ownership sector, and 23.1%

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[4]) According to the 1991 census of households, 12.7% of households indicated they have a secondary residence, but according to the 1991 census of housing residencies (including cottages not separated from the list of primary housing, and flats that are not occupied), this share is probably higher (about 15%). In the EU-12 [*Eurostat...* 1998] the average share of households with a secondary residence was 9% in 1994, with the highest percentage in Spain (16%).

[5]) The share of households receiving housing benefits was 27% in France, 22% in Denmark, 18% in Spain, 20% in Great Britain, 13% in Sweden, etc. Conversely, this share was only 3.6% in the Czech Republic (1998).

with a housing benefit. According to our estimation the real coefficient of the housing burden (with a housing benefit) was then around 23% in France in 1997. The gap between the situation in the Czech Republic and in the EU countries is therefore deeper than is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The relative housing expenditures (of total net income) in the EU and CEE countries (%)



Source: [Cecodhas 1995], FBS 1996, [*Regional...* 1995, *Price...* 1998], Urząd Mieskalnictwa i Rozwoju Miast 1999.

Though it is correct to say that housing expenditures rose in their absolute nominal and relative values in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 1997 (relative expenditures from 10.9% in 1990 to 19.3% in 1997), due to the above mentioned problems the actual relative housing expenditures were, by our estimation, roughly 2 or 3 percent lower than is indicated in Table 3 (about 16,5% in 1997). The liberalisation of rents has had a much lower impact on their growth in comparison with the rise in energy prices; expenditures of households on energy (electricity, heating) compose two thirds of the total housing expenditures in the rental sector, while rent forms only one third of total expenditures at present. In 1997, rent formed only 5.5% of total net household income and only 32.1% of all housing expenditures in the average Czech household! The opposite is true in European Union countries. In France, for example, the rent formed 19% of the total net household income and 69.4% of all housing expenditures of the average French household in the rental sector in 1996 [*Enquête...* 1997].

Prices of privately owned flats and of family houses have grown geometrically since 1990, and up to 1998 the annual rise in prices of estates was above the general inflation rate. The decrease in new housing construction, along with the rise of prices in

housing, has led to in a growing number of households in the situation of 'unwanted co-existence' with parents. By estimation, this number rose from 170,000 households in 1991 to 300,000 in 1999 (currently it constitutes 7-7.5% of all Czech households). Though housing construction has slightly increased since 1993, after a deep decline between 1991 and 1993, the share of rental housing construction out of the total housing construction that had been initiated was only 6.1% in 1997. The system of state rent regulation survived not only in the municipal flats but also in 'private' rental flats (houses returned to their former owners), and the regulated rent for the average rental flat was still 6 times lower than the market rent for this kind of flat on average and did not even cover maintenance costs in 1998. According to our computation, higher income households had the highest hidden profit from rent regulation![6] As a consequence, there occurred strong social tension between households in 'unwanted coexistence' and households with privileged rent contracts, as well as a tension between households of pensioners and households with an economically active head.

Clothing and Footwear

According to Table 1, the average value in relative clothing expenditures in the EU countries was 7.1% in 1993 (with the highest in Portugal and Italy, 9.3%, and the lowest in Finland, 4.6%). Between 1990 and 1997, clothing expenditures decreased in their absolute real value from 643 CZK to 311 CZK in the Czech Republic; relative clothing expenditures fell from 12.35% in 1990 to 5.46% in 1997. It is obvious that this sharp decrease in absolute real and relative clothing expenditures is firmly connected with the rise in 'necessary expenditures' (food, housing). For comparison: in France, there was a decrease in relative clothing expenditures from 10.99% in 1960 to 5.2% in 1997; over a period of 37 years there has never been such a dramatic decrease as there was during the period of 7 years in the Czech Republic. It can be expected then that the share of clothing expenditures will grow as a result of potential economic growth in the future.

The fact of the decrease in 'unnecessary expenditures' is curious, mainly for the character of its 'redistribution': the relative expenditures on personal care, recreation, entertainment, education and cultural services (leisure time activities) increased between 1990 and 1997! Compensation for the growth in 'necessary expenditures' was not equally distributed among all 'unnecessary' items, but there was, on the one hand, a slight decrease in the relative consumption of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, and transport and communication, and a sharp decrease in relative clothing expenditures; on the other hand, there was stagnation or growth in the relative expenditures of the aforementioned consumption items.

One particular interpretation of the relative clothing expenditure decrease seems highly probable: after 1990, many shops and kiosks with cheap Asian clothing sold by the Vietnamese minority were opened. This also includes the appearance of second-hand stores. The clothing at kiosks or in second-hand shops was much cheaper than in most normal clothing stores. The kiosk gained in popularity among lower income households and the second-hand shops were popular throughout the entire population.

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[6]) This fact was tested by a large comparison of regulated and market rents for the same kind of flats when the coefficient of the undervaluation of rent regulated flats was computed. This coefficient was higher for higher income households than for lower income households: the higher income households thus have a higher profit from the regulation.

Leisure time (recreation, education, entertainment, culture, books, television, sport, restaurants and hotels in specific case)

The average value in relative leisure time expenditures was 8.6% in 1993, with the highest in Ireland (11.9%) and the lowest in Luxembourg (4.1%) and Greece (5.3%); the restaurant expenditures are included. The sphere of leisure time and recreation is completely open to national differentiation. The high share of restaurant expenditures in Ireland and Great Britain was already mentioned, and some differences are also apparent in the sphere of recreation: in 1998 Dutch households spent 1.75% of their budget on hotels and lodging services, Luxembourg households only 0.04% of their budget.

The expenditures in restaurants and cafes are included in 'leisure time' relative expenditures for the Czech Republic in Table 3 and are excluded in Table 4 (there is a separate item concerning public alimentation). In both cases, we can see a growth (!) in the relative leisure time expenditures (in Table 3 from 11.8% in 1990 to 13.1% in 1997); this increase was very sharp between 1995 and 1996 and it was connected mainly with higher recreation expenditures and partially with higher sport and restaurant expenditures.[7] The growth in expenditures for recreational services and services rendered by restaurants is apparent even in the case of absolute real expenditures (Table 4).

The sphere of leisure time expenditures is precisely the sphere in which the main social and income inequalities demonstrate themselves: between 1990 and 1997, real leisure time expenditures increased only for the households from the fourth and the fifth quintile of income distribution (and the highest rise was apparent for the fifth quintile), while the lower income households spent less on leisure time activities in real values in 1997 than in 1990; real leisure time expenditures rose for households in which the head had secondary- or university-level education (and mostly for households in which the head had university-level education), while for households in which the head had elementary-level education, the expenditures have decreased in real values. There are, of course, many other demographic factors influencing this development which the next sections should explain.

Other

Transport expenditures form 14.8% of the European households' budgets. In the Czech Republic the real and relative expenditures on transport and communication slightly decreased (from 10.5% in 1990 to 9.1% in 1997 in relative values). Though there was a decrease in the real expenses of buying the vehicles, the real expenses of operating the vehicles was higher in 1997 than in 1990. This would lead to the conclusion that there were fewer cars (or fewer car sales) in 1997 than in 1990. Such a conclusion does not correspond to reality, however, for car sales increased dramatically after 1990, so that there are now many more cars on Czech roads than ever before. The explanation lies in the fact that most new car purchases were made by businesses, and households also used these business vehicles privately. The real expenditures on public transport were a little bit less in 1997 than they were in 1990.

[7]) The higher restaurant expenditures are partly connected with the decrease in the possibility of 'canteen alimentation' since 1990; mostly white-collar workers were then forced to have lunch in restaurants.

The real expenditures on furniture, furnishings and household equipment and operation were on the increase after 1993, but they had not reached the level of 1990 by the end of 1997. Conversely, there was a permanent rise in real medical care and health expenses: in 1997, real expenses were 4.4 times higher in real values than in 1990. After the reform of the health service (introduction of health insurance) not all health costs (prescriptions, medical investigation) are fully covered by insurance agencies, and households must contribute to health expenditures out of their own budgets.

2. Factors behind the Change in Consumer Behaviour

The next comparison and analysis concentrates on four consumer items: food, clothing, housing and leisure time activities. Their change is described using the 1990, 1993 and 1997 data files.

Income

Income means the total net income of a household (net after taxes, health and social insurance). The relative food and housing expenditures decrease with the level of income, and the relative clothing and leisure time expenditure rise with the level of income in all three years. The average nominal monthly food expenditures *per capita* took the highest values for households from the first quintile of income distribution (poorest households) for all three years, but the income factor must be very carefully interpreted. There is a very significant spurious correlation between the total net income and the number of household members, which means that the higher the number of members the higher the total net income a household has. This fact reflects a large income gap between families with economically active members (mostly with children) and those with economically non-active members (children do not live with parents anymore). The expenditures in restaurants are not included into food expenditures; the higher income households were more often boarding out of their homes.[8]

Similarly, poor households spent a much higher nominal amount *per capita* on their housing than higher income households (with the exception of households from the fifth quintile of income distribution in 1997). In 1997, the households from the first quintile group had relative housing expenditures about 10 percentage points higher than the households from the fifth quintile. The significant negative correlation between housing expenditures in their absolute values per capita and the total net income disappeared again when it was tested for the influence of the family's size. According to our expectations, clothing and leisure time expenditures in their absolute nominal values rise with the level of the total net income of a household (for all three years). The rise in structural income and expenditure inequalities demonstrates itself mostly in the sphere of leisure time activities: in 1990, the households from the fifth quintile spent 65% more on leisure time activities than the households from the first quintile, in 1993 93%, and in 1997 111% more.

[8]) The households from the last income quintile spent about 29% more on leisure time activities (restaurants included) than the households from the first quintile in 1990, and about 55% more in 1997. While there is a differential between the first and last quintile of 100 CZK, both in the case of food expenditures and leisure time activities in 1990, this differential in the case of food expenditures rises to 200 CZK and in the case of leisure time activities to 600 CZK in 1997.

Age

Age indicates the age of the head of a household. There are no apparent changes in the structure of consumption patterns according to the age categories between 1990 and 1997 (Table 5). For all three years:

- Relative food expenditures were increasing with age;
- Relative clothing expenditures were decreasing at the beginning, rising for households with a household head aged from 35 to 44 years, and then sharply decreasing (in 1997 they were decreasing from the age category 45-49 years);
- Relative housing expenditures were decreasing at the beginning, and the category of households aged 40-44 was the turning point after which relative housing expenditures were further rising with age;
- Relative leisure time expenditures were rising up to the age of 35-39 in 1990, and the age of 40-44 years in 1993 and 1997, and then decreasing with age.

Table 5. Relative expenditures according to the age of the head of the household 1990, 1993, 1997

	18-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	70-74	total
1990											
food	22.74	24.26	26.16	26.88	27.24	27.32	28.31	31.94	38.76	38.19	29.09
housing	11.65	10.56	9.10	8.86	9.81	9.86	10.37	11.98	13.18	14.91	10.92
clothing	14.22	13.51	13.80	14.59	13.35	13.05	12.45	10.09	8.73	8.56	12.35
leisure time	13.04	13.67	13.95	13.61	12.80	12.07	11.75	10.44	8.25	6.61	11.79
1993											
food	26.42	26.17	28.14	29.13	28.29	29.43	31.30	36.67	39.72	41.24	31.78
housing	16.64	15.37	13.39	13.07	13.59	15.37	17.31	22.03	21.04	23.28	17.03
clothing	11.61	10.90	11.28	11.98	11.30	10.68	9.24	6.81	6.44	5.76	9.65
leisure time	11.13	11.68	12.49	13.37	12.09	11.54	10.55	8.49	8.80	9.07	11.01
1997											
food	24.91	26.47	26.33	27.05	26.01	26.31	28.88	31.69	35.41	37.22	29.13
housing	18.33	17.28	16.18	16.76	17.15	17.68	18.58	22.64	24.58	23.58	19.37
clothing	6.69	6.18	6.15	6.43	6.86	5.89	5.44	4.10	3.57	3.62	5.46
leisure time	14.30	15.33	15.55	15.89	14.24	13.03	11.34	10.76	9.79	10.02	13.09

Source: Family Budget Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997

Note: Relative expenditures are defined as the share of x-expenditures out of total household expenditures.

In comparison with the situation in Germany [Borsch-Supan 1994: 231] there are some specific features in this consumer structure. In the sphere of food expenditures there is no great inequality between 'younger' and 'older' households: there was a differential of 2.4 percentage points between the youngest (21-24 years) and the oldest (70-74) in relative food expenditures in Germany in 1983 (in CR 1997 12.3 percentage points!), a differential of 3.6 percentage points in relative leisure time expenditures (in CR 4.3 percentage points) and a differentiation of 0.1 percentage points in relative clothing expenditures (in CR 3.1 percentage points). The correlation between relative clothing expenditures in Germany (relative expenditures increase with age up to the age category 70-74 years) is precisely opposite to the correlation in the Czech environment (relative expenditures are

already decreasing from the age of 45-49 years). The very low standard of living among older Czech households is a consequence of communist limits on the accumulation of assets. Conversely, in France, 33% of all private wealth is concentrated in the hands of people over 60, and 50% of all private wealth is in the hands of people over 50 [Tréquer 1998]; in 1994, people over 50 received 43% of the total net income of all French households!

Other

Table 6 provides the relative expenditures of households according to the number of children. While relative food and clothing expenditures rose for households with two or more than two children, absolute nominal food expenditures per capita decreased with the number of children. This situation is equalised in the sphere of housing where fixed costs of housing escalate the relative and absolute values of housing expenditures for those households without children. This differential is strengthened over time: households without children paid in absolute value about 87% more than households with more than 2 children in 1990, and about 132% more in 1997. There is a big leap between households without children and households with one child in relative leisure time expenditures.

Table 6. Relative expenditures according to the number of children of a household 1990, 1993, 1997

	without children	one child	two children	more than two children	total
1990					
food	32.14	26.43	25.78	28.32	29.09
housing	12.23	9.86	9.35	9.21	10.92
clothing	11.25	14.38	14.15	14.25	12.35
leisure time	10.82	13.14	13.25	12.26	11.79
1993					
food	34.12	27.79	28.26	31.69	31.78
housing	20.24	15.32	13.72	11.36	17.03
clothing	8.21	10.86	11.68	11.58	9.65
leisure time	10.27	11.86	12.15	11.75	11.01
1997					
food	31.28	24.65	27.83	29.59	29.13
housing	22.31	17.27	16.24	14.57	19.37
clothing	5.28	6.35	6.42	5.89	5.46
leisure time	12.28	14.63	14.87	15.23	13.09

Source: Family Budgets Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997
Note: Relative expenditures are defined as the share of x-expenditures out of total household expenditures.

Table 7 shows the consumer differences between households with economically active (EA) heads and households of pensioners. Households with EA heads spent significantly more on clothing and leisure time activities in both relative and absolute values, households of pensioners were forced to have much higher relative and absolute nominal food and housing expenditures per head. All the means are – statistically significantly – different on the level of reliability 0.05 (t-test).

Table 7. Relative expenditures according to the economic activity of the head of a household 1990, 1993, 1997

	EN head	EA head	total
1990			
food	39.29	26.35	29.09
housing	14.32	9.63	10.92
clothing	7.75	14.28	12.35
leisure time	6.76	13.15	11.79
1993			
food	40.22	27.91	31.78
housing	23.26	14.66	17.03
clothing	6.13	10.61	9.65
leisure time	8.89	12.15	11.01
1997			
food	36.25	25.58	29.13
housing	25.27	16.84	19.37
clothing	3.47	6.15	5.46
leisure time	9.75	14.41	13.09

Source: Family Budgets Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997
Note: Relative expenditures are defined as the share of x-expenditures out of total household expenditures.

The factor of education is also a very important sociological constant in explaining different consumer behaviour. Education is defined as the highest level of education of the head of the household. The elementary education of the head of the household is connected with higher relative and absolute food and housing expenditures and, conversely, the university education of the head of the household is connected with higher relative and absolute clothing and leisure time expenditures (Table 8). These inequalities were strengthened between 1990 and 1997, mostly in the case of leisure time expenditures: in absolute values, households in which the head had university education had about 95% higher leisure time expenditures in 1990 than households in which the head had elementary education, and about 135% higher in 1997. The higher the level of acquired education is, the higher the relative expenditures on books, computers, sport, lodging, education, culture and recreation are; this relation does not apply in the case of expenditures in restaurants and cafés. Scheffé's and Duncan's testing confirm the significance of differences between means for all values of relative expenditures with the exception of housing expenditures, where only the average value for households with an elementary educated head was significantly different from all other mean values.

Table 8. Relative expenditures according to the level of completed education of the head of the household 1990, 1993, 1997

Education of head	elementary	vocational training	secondary	university	total
1990					
food	37.26	29.58	26.75	24.21	29.09
housing	13.21	9.58	10.23	10.42	10.92
clothing	9.85	12.24	12.84	12.41	12.35
leisure time	8.02	11.21	12.57	12.32	11.79
1993					
food	40.02	31.82	29.74	26.28	31.78
housing	21.32	17.13	17.28	14.69	17.03
clothing	7.39	9.15	9.86	11.12	9.65
leisure time	7.65	10.27	11.82	12.85	11.01
1997					
food	35.68	30.57	27.42	24.20	29.13
housing	23.18	18.87	20.08	19.43	19.37
clothing	3.85	5.28	5.87	5.78	5.46
leisure time	9.68	12.08	13.85	17.08	13.09

Source: Family Budgets Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997

Note: Relative expenditures are defined as the share of x-expenditures out of total household expenditures.

There are some differences between the Czech regions[9] in relative expenditure structure, and there is a slight sign of change towards greater differentiation between 1990 and 1997. Scheffé's testing of means did not find any significant difference in relative housing, clothing or food expenditures between regions; the leisure time expenditures formed the only exception because Prague households paid significantly more on leisure time activities than the rest of the Republic (the lowest relative and absolute leisure time expenditures seem to be in Moravian regions). In 1997, Praguers spent in absolute nominal values (per capita) about 13% more on food that the average Czech household, about 19% more on housing, about 11% more on clothing and, the most important feature, about 43% more on leisure time activities. The Duncan test, which is much less conservative in means testing, confirms the significant difference between Prague and the rest of the Republic, not only in the sphere of leisure time expenditures, but also in the sphere of food, housing and clothing relative expenditures in 1997.[10] The exceptional position of Prague increased (according to the Duncan tests) between 1990 and 1997.

3. Multidimensional Analysis of the Factors

To explain the variation of relative expenditures, the regression and the ANOVA analysis were used. Table 9 provides the standardised β coefficients of multiple regression models

[9]) There are eight main regions in the Czech Republic to date; reform of regional organisation is currently being implemented.

[10]) The leading position of Prague in all kinds of leisure time expenditures has only one exception: expenditures in restaurants. The region of Pilsen has the highest relative and absolute value of average expenditures in the Czech Republic for all three years.

(continues variable factors); Table 10 provides the β coefficients[11] of multiple classification analysis forming a part of ANOVA analysis (categorised factors). Both regression and ANOVA confirmed that in all three analysed years:

1. The most influential factors of the variability of *relative food expenditures* were age (positive correlation) and income (negative correlation), and a less influential factor was the size of residence (change of mark to negative correlation).
2. The most influential factor of the variability of *relative clothing expenditures* was age (negative correlation), and a less influential factor was the size of residence (change of mark to negative correlation).

Table 9. Multiple regression analysis of relative expenditures 1990, 1993, 1997

	β coefficients		
Variable	1990	1993	1997
Food			
Age of the head	0.483	0.476	0.404
Number of children	0.292	0.262	0.296
Education of the head	-0.147	-0.120	-0.161
Household income	-0.369	-0.344	-0.376
Size of residence	0.014*	-0.030	-0.037
R^2	0.409	0.393	0.338
Clothing			
Age of the head	-0.276	-0.277	-0.280
Number of children	0.043	0.043	-0.064
Education of the head	0.049	0.040	0.107
Household income	0.062	0.168	0.166
Size of residence	0.021*	-0.030*	-0.030*
R^2	0.124	0.184	0.140
Housing			
Age of the head	0.066	0.097	0.143
Number of children	0.007*	-0.039	-0.042
Education of the head	0.016*	0.026*	0.023*
Household income	-0.288	-0.441	-0.235
Size of residence	0.061	0.170	0.170
R^2	0.105	0.290	0.149
Leisure time			
Age of the head	-0.220	-0.067	-0.178
Number of children	-0.087	-0.014*	0.017*
Education of the head	0.130	0.065	0.144
Household income	0.148	0.180	0.162
Size of residence	0.068	0.065	0.178
R^2	0.115	0.084	0.129

Source: Family Budget Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997.
Note: All coefficient except * are significant on the level $\alpha < 0.005$.

[11]) Square of the *β coefficients* of ANOVA analysis multiplied by 100 gives the percentage of the explained variability of the dependent variable by the independent variable.

3. The most influential factor of the variability of *relative housing expenditures* was income (negative correlation), and less influential factors were education (positive correlation) and the number of children (change of mark to negative correlation).
4. The most influential factors of the variability of *relative leisure time expenditures* were age (negative correlation) and income (positive correlation), and a less influential factor was the number of children (change of mark to positive correlation).

Both the regression and ANOVA analysis confirmed the importance of age and income, the medium position of education, and the relatively less important position of family size and residence size for the explanation of consumer behaviour in the Czech environment.

Table 10. ANOVA analysis of relative expenditures 1990, 1993, 1997

Variables	Number of categories	β coefficients 1990	1993	1997
Food				
Age of the head	(4)	0.446	0.443	0.416
Number of children	(4)	0.326	0.290	0.350
Education of the head	(4)	0.164	0.146	0.177
Household income	(5)	0.418	0.357	0.367
Size of residence	(5)	0.023*	0.049	0.039*
R^2		0.375	0.369	0.323
Clothing				
Age of the head	(4)	0.259	0.267	0.267
Number of children	(4)	0.041*	0.053*	0.086
Education of the head	(4)	0.051	0.050	0.119
Household income	(5)	0.091	0.169	0.146
Size of residence	(5)	0.058	0.062	0.078
R^2		0.130	0.193	0.159
Housing				
Age of the head	(4)	0.059	0.087	0.129
Number of children	(4)	0.045*	0.036*	0.007*
Education of the head	(4)	0.034*	0.029*	0.020*
Household income	(5)	0.370	0.467	0.294
Size of residence	(5)	0.089	0.184	0.169
R^2		0.151	0.331	0.182
Leisure time				
Age of the head	(4)	0.218	0.173	0.228
Number of children	(4)	0.140	0.077	0.040*
Education of the head	(4)	0.138	0.137	0.143
Household income	(5)	0.187	0.179	0.189
Size of residence	(5)	0.072	0.078	0.083
R^2		0.118	0.104	0.142

Source: Family Budget Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997
Note: All coefficients except * are significant on the level $\alpha < 0.005$.

The regression analysis on merged files 1990-1993, 1993-1997 and 1990-1997 enabled us to describe precisely the main changes in the mutual structure of factors (Table 11). The variables with the prefix 'dif' show the differences (and the significance of these differences) in β coefficient values of independent variables between two analysed years (files

were weighted to obtain the same number of cases). This kind of analysis serves as a confirmation of the ANOVA results.

Table 11. The regression analysis of relative expenditures on merged files 1990-1993, 1993-1997 and 1990-1997

	β coefficients			
Variables	Food	Clothing	Housing	Leisure time
1990-1993				
Year	0.207	-0.287	0.409	-0.306
Total household income[1]	-0.375	0.104	-0.294	0.193
Age of the head	0.474	-0.277	0.038	-0.230
Education of the head	-0.140	0.044	0.022*	0.132
Size of residence	0.015*	0.023*	0.050	0.075
Number of children	0.301	0.025*	0.040	-0.112
DIFEDUC	0.020*	-0.012*	0.014*	-0.015*
DIFAGE	-0.045*	0.078*	0.028*	0.311
DIFRES	-0.074	-0.074	0.180	0.023*
DIFCHILD	-0.017*	0.000*	-0.040	0.074
DIFINC	0.015*	0.096*	-0.270	-0.026*
R^2	0.411	0.199	0.340	0.107
1993-1997				
Year	0.042*	-0.487	-0.152	0.261
Total household income[1]	-0.369	0.220	-0.464	0.172
Age of the head	0.454	-0.271	0.047	-0.051
Education of the head	-0.120	0.038	0.030*	0.116
Size of residence	-0.035	-0.031*	0.154	0.064
Number of children	0.276	0.029	-0.010*	-0.018*
DIFEDUC	-0.050	0.045*	0.002*	0.046*
DIFAGE	-0.142	0.142	0.129	-0.222
DIFRES	-0.003*	0.013*	0.036*	0.028*
DIFCHILD	0.034*	-0.074	0.006*	0.017*
DIFINC	0.020*	-0.085	0.161	0.011*
R^2	0.377	0.318	0.243	0.126
1990-1997				
Year	0.256	-0.689	0.207	-0.044*
Total household income[1]	-0.387	0.101	-0.257	0.181
Age of the head	0.485	-0.268	0.033*	-0.215
Education of the head	-0.143	0.042	0.019*	0.123
Size of residence	0.016*	0.023*	0.045	0.072
Number of children	0.308	0.024*	-0.035*	-0.104
DIFEDUC	-0.029*	0.025*	0.011*	0.029*
DIFAGE	-0.190	0.193	0.153	0.084*
DIFRES	-0.080	-0.060*	0.193	0.004*
DIFCHILD	0.017*	-0.061	-0.029*	0.085
DIFINC	-0.005*	0.024*	-0.076	-0.014*
R^2	0.375	0.409	0.326	0.131

Source: Family Budget Surveys 1990, 1993, 1997

Note: All coefficients except * are significant on the level $\alpha < 0.005$.

[1]) Total household income was transformed into 20 categories variable to avoid the influence of inflation.

DIFEDUC = year x education of the head; year = 1 or 0
DIFAGE = year x age of the head
DIFRES = year x size of residence
DIFCHILD = year x number of children
DIFINC = year x total household income

1. Between 1990 and 1997, the factor of age significantly weakened in importance (positive correlation) and the factor of residence size strengthened in importance as an explanation of the variation of *relative food expenditures*. In the case of residence size, there appeared even a complete turn of the sign of β coefficient of the regression equation, that is, from a positive relation to a negative one: in 1990, the greater the residence size, the higher the relative food expenditures a household had; in 1997, the relation was significantly reversed. This trend seems to reflect the change in food consumption and alimentation norms in towns and in consumption in kind in villages, as well as the growing gap between the standard of living in towns and the standard of living in villages. The factors of the number of children and education slightly weakened in importance between 1990 and 1993 (the number of children in its positive correlation, and education in its negative correlation), but they slightly strengthened their influence between 1993 and 1997; the reverse was the case for the factor of income.
2. A similar change of mark in β coefficient appeared in the case of the family size factor and the residence size factor in the explanation of *clothing relative expenditures*: from 1993 the higher the number of children and the greater the residence size, the lower the relative clothing expenditures a household had (in 1990 the relation was reversed). This change is, however, not statistically significant for the factor of residence size, but it is significant for the factor of the number of children, which strengthened in importance between 1990 and 1997. The households without children are mostly composed of one or two fully employed members and their higher income (per capita) gives them the possibility to spend more on clothing; first-rate clothing may also be a necessity for their employment. Conversely, the factor of age weakened in its significance, especially between 1990 and 1993. Though the factor of income strengthened its importance between 1990 and 1993 significantly, between 1993 and 1997 its influence slightly decreased, and the strengthening of its importance between 1990 and 1997 is not statistically significant.
3. Between 1990 and 1997, the most fundamental changes concerned the variation of *relative housing expenditures*; four 'dif' variables were significant on the level of 0.95 probability. The factors of age and residence size significantly strengthened their positive influence and the factor of family size strengthened its influence from a positive relation into a negative one (!). These are the consequences of the deregulation of rents and the lack of a good system of housing benefits. The rents were deregulated differently by the government edicts, according to the size of residence, and the growth in rents was therefore higher in larger cities than in smaller ones. The housing benefit did not compensate the growing burden for the lower income households, mostly formed by older households. On the contrary, in the Czech environment a new trend appeared: the higher the number of children a household has the lower the relative housing expenditures are. This is naturally the result of growing higher fixed costs for households without children, but it is also an argument showing that the system of social assistance very firmly supports households with children, and that these households should not gener-

ally form the potential target group of the new model of housing benefits. The factor of income strengthened its influence between 1990 and 1993, but this importance has weakened significantly between 1993 and 1997. The relative housing expenditures rose for higher income households more than for lower income households in that term, mostly in the ownership-housing sector. There appeared, therefore, no significant change between 1990 and 1997. The factor of education remained completely non-significant for all three years.

4. The relatively smallest changes in the factor's structure appeared in the case of relative *leisure time expenditures*: between 1990 and 1997, the relation between the number of children (a factor itself non-significant in explaining the variability of leisure time expenditures) and relative expenditures has changed from a positive into a negative one; children were the subjects of higher leisure time expenditures than ever before. Though there was a very significant decrease in the importance of the factor of age in its negative relation to relative expenditures between 1990 and 1993, this decrease was followed by a very significant rise in its importance between 1993 and 1997, when new possibilities of leisure time activities for young people appeared (travel, sport).

Conclusion

The general changes in household consumption during this relatively short historical term took very specific features that are not simply comparable with the consumption trends in the EU countries. Though the relative food expenditures slightly decreased, they remained on the relatively very high level of more than 28%. Though the relative clothing expenditures decreased (and very sharply), this fact seems to be more a compensation for the growing financial burden in the sphere of housing, food and transport than the result of structural historical change. Though housing expenditures increased (and also very sharply) they are still on a relatively low level in comparison with the situation in the EU countries, and this increase was not connected with the structural change in the housing market. The housing rental sector remained in a more or less catastrophic condition, and the growing housing costs in connection with the deregulation of rents were equally distributed among all income groups of households (lack of a housing benefit system): a higher financial burden for lower income households on the one hand, and an accumulation of profits for higher income households on the other are natural consequences. Relative expenditures on transport even slightly decreased, but this was partially caused by new ways of buying and using vehicles, and it may be expected that in the very near future the situation will be reversed.

The rise in nominal 'necessary' expenditures was compensated for mostly by the decrease of expenditures in the sphere of clothing and transport; not in the sphere of leisure time activities. Signs of consumerism among the highest income households appeared. There has been an apparent trend of an escalation in social inequalities between 1990 and 1997, especially in the sphere of leisure time expenditures. The standard of living among 'older' households (pensioners) remains very low.

We cannot confirm the hypothesis that 'meritocratic' factors (income, education) have strengthened and 'demographic' factors (family size, age or residence size) have weakened their influence on explaining the variability of four basic consumer items. The results from multiple regression analysis on merged data files demonstrate that, in the sphere of relative housing expenditures, there is an apparent trend towards the strength-

ening of demographic factors (age, family size, residence size); education is not even significant for explaining variability in housing expenditures. In the sphere of relative food expenditures, the significance of the factor of age grew, but the significance of the factor of residence size decreased; the influence of 'meritocratic' factors remained the same. In the sphere of relative clothing expenditures, the factor of age weakened its influence but the factor of family size has strengthened its influence; similarly, the influence of 'meritocratic' factors did not change. There was also no change in the significance of 'meritocratic' factors in the case of relative leisure time expenditures, and the factor of family size only slightly weakened in importance. Some of the changes had a special transitional character. For example, the factor of age in explaining the variation of relative leisure time expenditures significantly strengthened its importance between 1990 and 1993, but it significantly weakened in importance between 1993 and 1997. The same applies to the factor of income in the case of relative housing expenditures.

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Polish Women in the mid-1990s*

Christian Democrats in a Country without a Christian Democratic Party

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Abstract: This article discusses Polish attitudes toward gender in the early- to mid-1990s. It shows that during this period, Poles on the average had 'Christian democratic values', although there were no Christian democratic parties in parliament during this period. The majority of Poles supported some type of 'social market economy', while maintaining traditional views toward gender roles and moral issues. Polish women on the average, though, were clearly more in favour of gender equality than their male counterparts. Age and years of education were also important factors in determining attitudes toward gender roles, while the Church was not as influential as expected. Furthermore, the gender gap was largest among those with a middle level education and smallest among those with a low level of education.

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Much literature has claimed that in Western European countries with large Catholic populations the Catholic Church has been able to push social gender policy in a conservative, Christian democratic direction [Esping-Andersen 1990, Bimbi 1993, Borchorst 1994, Ginsburg 1992, Siaroff 1994]. The question remains, however, whether its influence will be as great on the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. If this hypothesis holds true for the post-communist countries, then since Poland is the most Catholic country in the region, we would expect it to pursue the most Christian democratic policies. A recent survey shows that 85% of all Poles consider themselves Catholic, 11.6% are not related to any religion or did not answer, leaving only a small percentage for members of non-Catholic religions.[1] Will the Catholic Church obtain as much influence as in the Christian democratic Western European countries, such as Italy and Germany, or will 40 years of communist-led regimes damper its influence? For in contrast to Western Europe, democracy has come to a country in which the traditional family has already changed. Almost all Polish women have worked for the majority of their adult life, they have been able to send their children to day-care centres, and they have enjoyed ready access to contraceptives and abortion. Will they be willing to give up their newly gained independence?

It is still too early to know how much the Church will influence social policies toward women, because the post-communist welfare system is still being configurated. So far, no government has ever been re-elected, which further increases uncertainty about future developments. During this past decade, Poland has already experienced several market, liberal governments, as well as one social democratic government (in the form of the reformed Communist Party). Now it has an unusual combination of a liberal-

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1) The survey data forms the basis of this study and thus will be named in detail below.

conservative coalition in Parliament with a social democratic president. This lack of continuity means that social policies could quickly change during short time spans. There are some signs, though, of a Christian democratic turn, such as the ban on abortion. Yet surprisingly, in contrast to the Czech and Slovak Republics, for much of the decade Poland has not had an official Christian democratic party in Parliament. Until the most recent elections, the Catholic Election Action was the only Christian party to have ever been elected to Parliament, and then only from 1991-1993, with a modest 8.7% of the votes [Michta 1997: 80]. Nevertheless, the recently reconfigured Solidarity Alliance, which won the 1997 elections, has taken on a Christian democratic character, and includes Christian democratic organisations.

Even if Poland is indeed moving in a Christian democratic direction, the relationship between the Church and politics is still not clear. Is the country becoming Christian democratic because the Church has been able to influence politicians, or because it has influenced the populace? In the first case, this would mean that politicians are more religious than the average citizen. In the second case, it means that the Church has been able to influence the political parties by influencing the voters.

So far, most observers writing about women's issues in Poland have claimed that the Church has supported policies that encourage the traditional family model, in which the women's main role is to be a mother and housewife [e.g. Nowakowska 1997, Fuszara 1994, Siemienska 1994, Bystydzienski 1995]. It has successfully lobbied politicians to support conservative policies on such issues as abolishing the right to an abortion. As a symbol of unity against foreign occupation, the Church had been an influential political actor throughout much of Poland's history. During the communist era, it increased its influence over Polish society because of its opposition to the communist-led regime and its role in helping the country maintain its national identity [Siemienska 1994]. Since Poland was basically an agricultural society until the communist era, the Church did not evolve under a full modernising process of industrialisation and urbanisation. Instead, the modernising process took place under communist rule, which put the Church in opposition to much of these events. Consequently, the Church has resisted secularisation more successfully than in Western European countries, such as Belgium and France [Ciupak 1994: 28]. Thus, after the fall of the communist regime, the Polish Church was both more conservative than in Western European countries and it found itself in a stronger position. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Church *still* enjoys as much sway among the public at large. It is certainly possible that during the process of institutionalising democracy the Church began to lose its influence over Polish public opinion. In the post-communist era, the organisation no longer unified the country against the regime; instead, it divided the country into those with conservative and those with secular values. Even some authors, who are generally positive toward the Church, admit that it lost popularity in the early 1990s because of its political activities [cf. Nosowski 1998: 16].

Although this article is concerned with the role of the Catholic Church in shaping public opinion on gender issues, it is obviously not the only source of influence on attitudes in Poland. Social scientists have also emphasised the role of the previous communist-led regime. They have noted that under the previous regime, no independent women's movements existed which could articulate women's issues [Titkow and Duch forthcoming]. Meanwhile, although virtually all women had entered the workforce, by the late 1960s the mass media began to portray women in traditional roles [Siemienska 1994: 211]. Therefore, while these Polish women had the 'modern' role of engaging in a career,

the vast majority still had the 'traditional' role of being responsible for household activities [Gucwa-Leśny 1995: 128, cf. Heinen 1997: 579]. Nevertheless, although women maintained their traditional role in the home and they rarely held posts of any authority in the public sphere, "under communist rule, there was in force in Poland a specific myth about equal rights for men and women" [cf. Fuszara 1994: 82]. Polish feminists have often claimed that although there might have been some advantages in communist policies which increased female participation in the labour market, on the whole, the responsibilities of women increased, but not the number of available social roles which women could choose [Firlit-Fesnak 1998: 51]. Firlit-Fesnak thus argues that increased labour market participation did not allow for 'increased self-actualisation' for Polish women. A common accusation has been that the fact that the previous regime claimed to support women's equality, while merely giving women extra burdens, has discredited the notion of gender equality for much of the population. In the words of Malgorzata Fuszara [1991: 205]: "Under the banner of equal rights for women, the system burdened women with additional duties but failed to grant them any actual rights: this discredited the very slogan used and for some time has deprived the ideology of equality and the struggle for women's rights of its potency." It went so far that there was talk of 'excessive equality between the genders' [Siemienska 1999: 203]. Consequently, most women's organisations are afraid to be associated with the word 'feminism' among the populace [Fuszara 1997: 150].

Most of the above discussion of women in Poland differs little from the general discussions about women in other post-communist countries. However, there are some differences, which could possibly cause differences in opinions in the Polish case. Besides the special status of the Catholic Church, Poland differs from other Central European countries in its dependence on agriculture. In 1994, 26.5% of the population was employed in agriculture and forestry [Kryńska 1998: 64], compared to 9.3% in the Czech Republic in 1991 [calculations based on *Statistická...* 1993: 177]. Another unique fact was the comparatively low percentage of Polish children attending day-care centres during the communist era. In 1989, for example, 48.7% of all children aged between 3 and 6 attended kindergartens, compared to 85.7% in Hungary, 89.8% in the Czech Republic, and 91.5% in Slovakia ["Women..." 1999: 133].[2] This combination of Poland being a rural country, where several generations of one family lived together or near each other, combined with relatively little access to day-care, probably accounts for the common observation that grandparents often took care of the children [cf. Siemienska 1994: 19]. For demographic reasons, it has become even easier for grandparents to help out with child-raising than in the past. One study shows that in 1900 there were only 19 grandparents per 100 grandchildren, while in 1995 the number grew to 51 grandparents per 100 grandchildren [Dąbrowska-Caban 1997: 23]. It is quite possible that this reliance on the extended family helped preserve traditional views of the family and gender roles in Poland more than in some of the other transition countries.

Nevertheless, despite all these factors which are detrimental to the emergence of a women's movement, it is still not certain that Polish women necessarily have more con-

[2]) The true difference is even greater, since the Polish statistics are for the 3-6 year olds, while the statistics for the other countries are for 3-5 year olds. Since 6 year olds are more likely to attend kindergartens than younger children, the percentage of 3-5 year olds in Poland attending kindergartens was undoubtedly lower.

servative views towards gender than women in other post-communist countries. First, Havelková [1996] notes, the Church's anti-abortion drive actually helped women's organisations mobilise the populace around the issue of protecting a woman's right to choose. Consequently, the Polish women's movement has succeeded in mobilising its population more than in most transitional societies. Second, since Poland was a relatively open country during the communist era, some researchers, such as Siemienska, were allowed to write about gender issues, although they were not allowed to openly propagate feminist ideals. Third, even if many Polish women activists fear being labelled 'feminist', in contrast to countries such as the Czech Republic, some organisations openly refer to themselves as feminist (such as the Polish Feminist Association; [see *Informator...* 1995: 20 and Walczewska 1999: 175]). Some feminist theorists in Poland even use phrases such as 'emancipation', which have become nearly taboo in the Czech discourse [see e.g. Walczewska 1999], and in contrast to the Czech Republic, one of the Polish journals dealing with gender issues (*pełnym głosem* [full voice]) openly advertises itself as being 'feminist'.

Moreover, the lack of a strong feminist movement does not necessarily mean that there is no support for feminist ideals among the Polish population. For example, Siemienska [1994: 216] remarks that although 85% of Poles in a 1993 survey believed "it is good when the women can take care of the house and family, and the man is the breadwinner", still 51% also believed that "it is not true that the women should be limited to helping the husband pursue his career rather than following her own". Another survey showed that only 13.5% of Polish women believe that for the welfare of the family, they should devote themselves fully to housework [Dąbrowska-Caban 1997: 22]. Thus some of the early surveys showed some ambiguous results. So far, although much has been written about gender in Poland, nobody has done a detailed study about which groups within the population are more likely to have such views. According to the knowledge of this author, Siemienska goes the furthest in posing testable hypotheses by claiming that younger, better educated Poles are more likely to support a family model based on partnership, and that women are more likely than men to do so. However, she does not run any statistical tests to see if these correlations are statistically significant; nor does she pose a hypothesis as to *why* age and educational level are important.

If this study confirms Siemienska's results, I will assume that it is for the following reasons: a) Younger Poles are less influenced by the 'communist legacy' than older Poles, since they have lived a smaller portion of their life under the communist system, and Polish youths are also more likely to have travelled to the West or read Western texts, and thus, more likely to have come into contact with the Western feminist discourse; b) Older Poles are more likely to be influenced by pre-communist society, when female labour market participation was much lower and society was more rural and thus less 'modern'; c) Educational levels are important because women who invest time and effort into obtaining university degrees are more likely to want to have a career and less likely to be satisfied being a housewife than women without any higher education.

In summary, we now have three hypotheses which might be able to explain attitudes toward gender in Poland: the Catholic Church, age, and educational level. Finally, there is the obvious hypothesis that gender influences attitudes toward gender. Since women face gender-based discrimination in the labour market and the political sphere more directly than men, and since women are the ones who bear most of the double-

burden of household work while having gainful employment, it is likely that women feel more deprivation over this situation.

This study will examine attitudes toward gender in Poland based on data collected by Bogdan Cichomski and Zbigniew Sawinski from the Institute for Social Studies at the University of Warsaw carried out a survey of 4905 Poles from 1992 to 1994. They donated their database to the International Consortium for Political Science Research (ICPSR 6155), so their results are now easily accessible to other researchers. Unfortunately, their later surveys have not been made available to the public.

Some might object that the data is too old to be empirically interesting, but the data is still certainly *theoretically* interesting for several reasons. It allows us to test whether the Catholic Church really had the influence on public opinion and gender that its critics claimed. It also allows us to test claims about whether the communist legacy influenced attitudes toward gender during the formative years of the post-communist system. Other authors, such as Henryk Domański [2000: 1] have recently used databases from the early 1990s to create a 'snapshot' of this period, though they have not addressed the gender issue. This snapshot comes from a formative period, in which several important changes were made in family policy in Poland (such as the closing of most kindergartens and nursery schools). These changes influence the position of women in society. At the time of these changes, intensive debates also went on about the proper role for women in society [Balcerzak-Paradowska 1996]. Moreover, this survey data allows us to develop a hypothesis about the existence and causes of gender gaps in public opinion, which we can test with newer data to see whether these hypotheses still hold true for Poland, and whether these hypotheses also hold up for other post-communist countries. For while some researchers have used similar survey data in discussing gender in Poland, so far, according to the author's knowledge, they have only used aggregate summary data, rather than applying rigorous statistical methods, which could allow for hypothesis testing [examples include Firlit-Fesnak 1998 and Siemienska 1994]. Finally, the data is also empirically interesting because it can help explain how it could have been possible for the Poles to elect a socialist government and then a conservative one, without there necessarily being any important changes in their public opinion. This article argues that already in the 1992-1994 period, the majority of Poles had Christian democratic attitudes, which in the absence of a viable Christian democratic party could have encouraged them to favour a social democratic government over a market liberal one.

If the population as a whole turns out to be Christian democratic, it is interesting what this implies for gender relations. Do Poles support traditional gender roles despite four decades of communist rule, in which almost all women had gainful employment? Is a gender gap emerging between women, who have become used to working, and men who are more likely to prefer a return to pre-communist times, in which most women were housewives? Do Polish women see the financial independence which they gained from their husbands as something positive which should be improved, or do they see working as a 'double-burden' which means that they must have two jobs? If Polish women feel they have a double burden, they have two logical alternatives. One is to withdraw from the labour market and confine themselves to the single job of taking care of reproductive labour. The other possibility is to demand greater equality both on the labour market and for caring out productive labour – that is, they could demand a measure that would encourage men to share in the household work. For example, they could be given incentives to take parental leave to spend time raising their children.

Below I address these issues in three steps. First, I define more closely the main characteristics of Christian democratic regimes. Then I discuss Polish attitudes in general to see whether the majority of Poles held Christian democratic opinions. Afterwards, I will investigate whether there is a gender gap and ask whether Polish women are more or less Christian democratic (or social democratic) than Polish men. Finally, I will discuss which groups are more likely to retain traditional, conservative attitudes toward gender roles and which groups are more likely to support gender equality

Characteristics of Christian Democracy

Social scientists have long observed that among the industrialised, democratic societies, those with large Catholic populations usually pursue Christian democratic socio-economic policies. Christian democratic policies have several basic characteristic:

1) Support for the Catholic Church's stand on moral questions such as abortion and divorce.

2) Support for maintaining traditional gender roles.

3) A 'social market' economy, in which social spending is normally much higher than in liberal societies (such as the USA), but lower than in the Scandinavian Social Democracies.

The first point is rather obvious. Christian democratic parties claim to be Christian, and thus are more likely than secular parties to take conservative stances on moral issues. To be sure, Christian democratic parties differ from the pre-war confessional Catholic parties, in that they claim to be open to all Christians and even to non-Christians espousing Christian values. Nevertheless, the most important post-war European Christian democratic parties (in Germany and Italy) have had strong Catholic influences. This is not surprising in Italy, where the vast majority of the population considers itself Catholic. However, even in Germany, where Protestants predominate, the majority of Christian Democratic Union members and voters are Catholic [Pütz 1984: 37]. Thus, for example, German Christian democratic parties (particularly the Bavarian CSU) have used their influence to keep the abortion law "one of the most restrictive in Europe" [Chamberlayne 1993: 184].[3] In Italy, abortion and divorce eventually became legal, but these steps were taken against the opposition of the Church and much of the Christian Democratic Party [Bimbi 1993]. In contrast, liberal and social democratic parties tend to be more 'secular', and thus positive toward such issues as legalised abortion and divorces or gay rights.

On gender issues, Christian democratic parties have also traditionally followed the Catholic Church's view that the nuclear family forms the basis for society [for the German case, cf. Pütz 1984: 94]. Thus traditional Christian democratic family policy encourages the male-breadwinner model, in which the mother is mainly responsible for the household and the father is the main money earner. As a result of these policies, female participation in the labour market is normally lower in countries with Christian democratic welfare regimes than in liberal or social democratic ones [Esping-Andersen 1990, Gornick et al. 1997, Lewis 1993, Siaroff 1994]. Countries dominated by market liberal

[3]) Of course, Ireland has more restrictive abortion laws than Germany, but that is not surprising, since the Catholic Church is much stronger in Ireland. Also, shortly after Chamberlayne wrote her article, Poland introduced more restrictive abortion laws than the German ones, but again, Poland too is a highly Catholic country.

traditions (such as the UK and USA) have pursued some policies that have encouraged increased female participation in the labour market, such as anti-discrimination laws, but they have done little do provide services for working mothers, such as day-care centres, nor have they encouraged a rethinking of gender roles within the household and family [see, e.g. Heitlinger 1993]. In the Scandinavian countries with social democratic welfare regimes, the governments have encouraged women to work, for example, by giving greater support to day-care than liberal and Christian democratic welfare regimes [Siaroff 1994]. In addition, the social democratic parties in Norway and Sweden have officially endorsed the idea of role sharing. Thus they have encouraged men to share in child-raising and household duties, by such measures as reserving one month of parental leave for the father [Bergqvist 1999, Dahlerup 1994, Ellingsæter 1998, Leira 1998].

While Christian democratic parties have traditionally supported rightist policies on moral and gender issues, their stance on socio-economic issues is more ambiguous. Although there was some support for Christian socialist policies during the first post-war years, Christian democratic parties have generally supported the traditional Church belief in the need for private property and economic incentives to encourage personal initiative [cf. Irving 1979]. On the other hand, they also heed the Vatican's call for supporting the needy. Consequently, the German Christian Democratic Union especially has endorsed the notion of a 'social market economy', in which the state takes responsibility for social goods such as healthcare, and schools. In addition, according to social market theorists, the state should redistribute income in a more 'equitable' manner [Thieme 1973]. Thus countries with Christian democratic types of welfare regimes usually have more generous social policies than countries with liberal, free market welfare regimes [Esping-Andersen 1990, cf. Siaroff 1994].

It is easy to contrast social market policies with market liberal social policies, which traditionally rely on means testing. It becomes more difficult, however, to differentiate social market from the social democratic socio-economic policies. Theorists of welfare policy have often claimed that social democratic policies are based on universalist principles of social citizenship [Esping-Andersen 1990, Rothstein 1994). The main idea is that all members of a community have an inherent right to receive welfare payments and social services regardless of their income. "People receive payments and services to enable them to be full participants in their society..." [Ware and Goodin 1990]. In reality, only a minority of policies in the social democratic countries completely fit this description. Income related social insurances (such as unemployment benefits) comprise the majority of social programme [for the Swedish case, see, e.g. Davidson 1989, Olsson 1990, and Svensson 1994]. Such insurances protect one against the loss of income, but they do not treat everyone equally, because not everyone has the same income. Since the majority of social programmes under Christian democratic welfare regimes are also based on income related insurances, it becomes more difficult in reality to differentiate Christian democratic from social democratic welfare policies.

Still, there are some important differences: a) Social democratic policies are not always universal in the sense of giving everyone the same benefits regardless of income, but they usually *are* universal in giving the same conditions for everyone. In contrast, as Esping-Andersen [1990] notes, Christian democratic welfare regimes (as in Germany) typically offer different types of benefits for different groups of people. The best known example are the *Beamter* (a privileged group of civil servants), who receive much higher pensions than the rest of society [Esping-Andersen 1990]. Esping-Andersen claims that

the desire to favour special groups is in line with the traditional conservative and Catholic values of wanting to maintain social hierarchies. By contrast, under social democratic welfare regimes all members of society have the same basic conditions regardless of their place of employment. For this reason, some authors have used the term 'semi-universalist' to describe these programme [Ferrera 1998: 91]. b) For average citizens, benefits are normally higher under social democratic regimes than under Christian democratic regimes, although the privileged groups (such as the German Beamter) might receive more benefits under Christian democratic regimes. c) Even when Christian democratic policies offer benefits that are as high as social democratic regimes, these benefits often give different incentives. For example, Esping-Andersen [1990] argues that Christian democratic policies often induce people to leave the labour market (by encouraging early retirement and encouraging women to become housewives), while social democratic policies encourage people to enter the labour market.

Unfortunately, survey questions are rarely formed in a manner that allows one to distinguish between the social market and social democratic policies, since the questions are usually too general. Survey questions most often ask the respondents if they think the government should spend less or more money on certain programmes or whether the government should have responsibility for certain areas such as healthcare. Consequently, the only way to differentiate between social democratic and Christian democratic views on socio-economic policy is to follow the general rule that social democratic respondents are *generally* more strongly in favour of generous social policies than Christian democratic respondents, and that Christian democratic respondents are more generous than market liberal respondents. While it is difficult to distinguish Christian democratic survey responses from social democratic ones on social issues, when these answers are combined with gender and moral issues, it becomes much easier to classify the attitudes of survey respondents.

Are Poles More Christian Democratic than Polish Governments?

1) Moral Issues

On moral issues, the survey results indicate that the Catholic Church has a much greater influence on politicians than on citizens. On the controversial question of abortion, for example, the populace is much less 'Catholic' than the politicians, although more Christian democratic than, for example, the secular Swedes. The new government recently passed a law forbidding abortion under any circumstances, and the first post-communist government passed a law forbidding it in all cases except for rape or danger to a woman's health [cf. Robinson 1995: 214-215]. Yet 81.3% of the survey respondents support the right to abortion if there is a "strong chance of serious defect in the baby", and 84.1% are in favour if the woman's own health is in danger, 76.6% in the case of rape, and 55% if the family cannot afford more children. A great number of respondents also support the right to abortion if the woman is married, but does not want any more children (2,369 for, 2,000 against, 521 do not know, and 15 no answer). However, there are limits to their support for abortion: only 37% are in favour of abortion if "the woman wants it for any reason".

Similarly, Poles are less conservative than the Church and their government on the divorce issue: 36.2% think divorces should become easier to obtain, compared to 29.1% who think it should become more difficult, and 18% who think it should remain the same. (The remainder do not know or did not answer the question.)

2) Economic Issues

Although the Polish population is less Christian democratic than its governments have been on the abortion question, it is also less market liberal. A large majority of the population believes that the government should become more active in providing jobs, reducing income inequalities and providing social services: 44% strongly agree and another 41.2% agree that the "government should provide everyone with a guarantied basic income"; 74.6% strongly agree or agree that it "is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes"; 78.6% think that the government is spending too little on welfare. These responses do not necessarily mean that the populace is more Christian democratic than the politicians. Socialists, communists, social democrats and social liberals might all give similar replies.

3) Gender Issues

A clearer Christian democratic profile emerges when we look at the responses to family and gender questions. The survey shows that despite four decades of extensive female participation in the labour force most Poles believe that men should be the main breadwinners, while women should take care of the household. For example, 53% agree that "most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are women", and 47.5% agree that "women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country to men". Only 35.4% disagree, while the remainder are not sure or did not answer.

In the 1994 survey (n = 1609), more detailed questions were asked about family relations. Poles still believe that raising children is a task best left to women: 61.2% strongly agree or agree that "it is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the woman goes out to work". Only 21.3% disagree or strongly disagree. On the other hand, the Poles hardly have a Protestant work ethic for the men who must work if the women stay at home: 61.2% believe that "family life often suffers because men concentrate too much on their work". These responses do not mean, however, that both men and women should stay at home: 64.8% agree or strongly agree that "a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family".

Other questions show that Poles are concerned about working women: 66.1% agree or strongly agree that "a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works"; less than half (48.9%) agree or strongly agree that "a working mother can establish just as warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother who does not work"; 51.5% agree or strongly agree that "all in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job"; 57.9% agree or strongly agree that "a job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children". At the same time, 62.1% agree or strongly agree that "having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person". Thus, the majority of Poles seem to feel that the independence which women have won from men during the last four decades is not worth the price.

Christian Democracy on the Left-Right Scale

Finally, the question comes of placing Christian democrats on a left-right scale. Traditionally, Christian democrats have considered themselves conservative, which places them fairly far to the right. For example, in Germany both Christian democratic parties, the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and CSU (Christian Social Union), place themselves to the right of the liberal FDP (Free Democratic Party). Although liberals have

traditionally placed themselves in the centre, between conservatives and socialists, today the situation has become more complicated. In an era dominated by market liberal thinking, it has become more common for people to conceive of 'left' and 'right' in terms of government intervention in the economy. In this case, Christian democrats occupy the political centre-right, between socialists and liberals. The survey results show that this is also where the majority of Poles stand politically. On a scale of 1-10, in which '1' means extreme left and '10'extreme right, the mean score is 5.8, while the median is 6.0 (n = 4367, plus 538 "don't knows" or "no answers").

A factor-analysis of the main questions asked on these topics shows that the degree of left-right political orientation scales together with moral rather than gender or economic issues (see Table 1). In other words, Poles who consider themselves right-wing do not necessarily do so because they are in favour of market-liberal economic policies, but rather because they are conservative on moral issues. Thus those who consider themselves right-wing do so because they are against a woman's right to abortion and against the right to divorce. This factor analysis thus also demonstrates that Poles generally consider abortion and divorce to be moral rather than gender issues. These results can help explain the reasons why Poles could elect a socialist government in 1993 in the absence of a clear Christian democratic alternative, and it also helps explain why it was possible for the Solidarity Electoral Alliance to win the 1997 elections with a Christian democratic profile. Poles tend to be Christian democratic in the sense of being conservative on moral and gender issues, but at the same time they are very positive toward state intervention in the economy to redistribute wealth, create jobs, and provide for welfare services. If this is interpreted as support for a 'social market', it shows that the average Pole has a typical Christian democratic profile. However, their support for state intervention in the economy is so strong that it might be more true to state that Poles are Christian democratic on gender and moral issues, but social democratic on economic issues. It should be emphasised though, as already noted, that Poles are nonetheless less conservative on moral issues than the Catholic Church or the country's political leaders. Thus the conservative turn on issues such as abortion is more the cause of direct Church influence on Polish politicians than it is through the indirect mechanism of Church influence on voters. This conclusion is backed up by the fact that the socialist government did not try to radically change the restrictions on abortion, even though its voters traditionally are not tied to the Catholic Church.

Table 1. Factor Analysis

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
GOVJOB	**0.83083**	-0.05095	-0.04125
GOVINC	**0.81481**	0.00500	-0.03441
REDISTR	**0.57657**	-0.11331	0.05344
WELFARE	**0.33374**	0.08209	-0.00137
RUNHOME	-0.07127	**0.85254**	-0.00515
MENPOL	0.05589	**0.84822**	0.03803
WORKCHLD	0.00643	**0.41488**	-0.01888
PROABORT	-0.10407	0.07192	**-0.70041**
DIVORCE	0.03379	-0.07644	**-0.64182**
RIGHTIST	-0.05321	-0.01452	**0.57308**

For description of variables see Appendix.

Is There a Gender Gap?

Above I maintained that Poles have a rather Christian democratic political orientation. Now we will investigate whether Polish women are more or less Christian democratic than Polish men. I kept the coding the same as in the original survey: man = 1 and woman = 2. Thus we should expect positive correlations if Polish women are more social democratic than Polish men.

Table 2. Correlation Coefficients

		Factor 1: Economic Issues			
	SEX	GOVINC	GOVJOB	REDISTR	WELFARE
SEX	1.0000	0.0649	0.0971	0.0421	0.0450
	(4905)	(4760)	(4806)	(4726)	(4472)
		P = 0.000	P = 0.000	P = 0.004	P = 0.003
women for public sector		90.4%*	93%*	66.4%**	87.4%***
men for public sector		86.5%*	87.5%*	62.9%**	84.7%***
		Factor 2: Gender Issues			
		SEX	RUNHOME	MENPOL	WORKCHLD
SEX		1.0000	0.1210	0.0961	0.0804
		(4905)	(4495)	(4338)	(4759)
			P = 0.000	P = 0.000	P = 0.000
women for sex equality			53.6%*	44.2%*	49.6%**
men for sex equality			41.2%*	34.8%*	42%**
		Factor 3: Moral Issues			
		SEX	PROABORT	DIVORCE	RIGHTIST
SEX		1.0000	-0.0163	-0.0193	-0.0010
		(4905)	(4308)	(4084)	(4367)
			P = 0.285	P = 0.218	P = 0.947
women non-conservative			41.5%*	42.2%*	18.1%**
men non-conservative			43.1%*	44.9%*	20.3%**

Note: the number of cases is printed in parentheses. P is calculated for two-tailed significance.

Notes for factor 1:

*) 'positive' = those agreeing or strongly agreeing.

**) a scale of 1-7 was given, the answers were recoded so that 7 always means the most positive and 1 the most negative. Answers of 5-7 are considered positive.

***) percentage of those claiming that 'too little' is spent by the government in this area.

Notes for factor 2:

*) those disagreeing with the statements.

**) those agreeing or strongly agreeing.

Notes for factor 3:

*) percentage believing that women should have the right to an abortion under any circumstances and percentage believing it should be easier to get a divorce.

**) percentage placing themselves between 1-4 on a scale of 1-10 in which '1' means most left-wing and '10' means most right-wing. The reason for the slight negative correlation for women being rightest, even though they are also less leftist, is because they are much more likely than men to be in the middle ('5'): 29.8% compared to 24.7% of men.

For description of variables see Appendix.

The surveys taken from 1992-94 indicate that there is a gender gap (see Table 2). Polish women are more supportive than men for governmental action to solve socio-economic inequalities, and they are also more in favour of gender equality than men. Moreover, all these relationships are statistically significant at under 1%. On the other hand, the survey shows that women are also less supportive of the right to abortion and easier divorces, but these relationships are not statistically significant.

This does not mean, however, that Polish women are social democratic. It only means that they are *more* social democratic than Polish men. On the gender issues, Polish women are divided, but a small majority still appears in favour of maintaining traditional roles. For the MENPOL variable, a clear majority of women (55.8%) agreed that men are more suitable emotionally for politics than women. On the question as to whether "a mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work" (WORKCHLD), only 13% strongly agreed and 36.6% agreed, compared to a majority of 50.5% who either disagreed or strongly disagreed. RUNHOME is the only question in which a majority of women favoured equality. Yet even on this issue, only 53.6% of the women disagreed with the statement that "women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men". Thus quite a large group (46.4%) believe that women should leave the public sphere.

The 1994 survey includes more detailed questions than the first two years. As can be seen from Table 3, the results are basically the same as for the previous years. Women are always more positive than men to changing gender roles, but the only variables that are statistically significant are RELATION, WOMHOME, INDJOB, and WANTHOME. An important result is that women do not seem to feel that men should stay at home. Almost two thirds (64.4%) of female respondents agree or strongly agree that it is not good if the man stays at home and the woman works (MANHOME). There are actually more men than women who disagree or strongly disagree with that statement. Nevertheless, there is a negative correlation between being a women and believing that men should not stay at home. The reason being that more women than men are ambivalent and replied "neither agree nor disagree", while more men than women both agree and disagree that it is not good if the man stays at home with the children. Not surprisingly, given the ambiguity of these results the correlation is nowhere near being statistically significant.

This issue is one of the most important for gender equality. As many feminists have emphasised, as long as the woman is usually the one who stays at home with the family, gender equality will never be possible in the labour market. First, firms will prefer to hire and then promote men over women, since they fear that women will interrupt their careers for long periods of time. Second, even if an enterprise does hire a women, a similarly talented man will continue to advance his career while the woman stays at home with her children. Although the woman is as talented as the man, the man will be more successful in his career.

These survey questions indicate that Polish women are slightly more social democratic and slightly less Christian democratic than Polish men. They are more in favour of social spending and less in favour of maintaining traditional gender roles than Polish men. Nonetheless, they are inclined to want to solve the dilemma of the double work burden by withdrawing from the labour market rather than by encouraging men to share the household chores.

Table 3. The 1994 Survey on the Opinions toward Family Relations (in %)

Question	Sex	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
MANHOME	M	23.5	44.3	8.4	19.4	4.4	n = 1493
(v4009)	W	20.7	43.6	13.4	19.1	3.2	r = -0.016
CD = +r		CD				SD	p = 0.593
WOMHOME	M	26.3	47.0	11.5	13.2	2.1	n = 1554
(v4008)	W	23.6	38.3	14.3	21.5	2.4	r = -0.104
CD = +r		CD				SD	p = 0.000
FULLTIME	M	13.6	42.4	12.2	29.2	2.6	n = 1509
(v4002)	W	12.0	42.0	12.1	28.7	5.4	r = -0.039
CD = +r		CD				SD	p = 0.167
INDJOB	M	12.5	51.5	15.3	19.4	1.4	n = 1447
(v4005)	W	21.8	51.4	13.0	12.2	1.6	r = 0.128
CD = -r		SD				CD	p = 0.000
RELATION	M	17.3	32.4	6.9	36.0	7.3	n = 1531
(v4000)	W	18.6	34.1	6.7	32.6	8.0	r = 0.025
CD = -r		SD				CD	p = 0.000
SUFFER	M	18.4	52.3	7.0	20.1	2.2	n = 1522
(v4001)	W	17.9	51.0	7.3	19.6	4.2	r = -0.027
CD = +r		CD				SD	p = 0.298
WANTHOME	M	14.4	54.2	16.3	13.9	1.1	n = 1428
(v4003)	W	16.2	46.2	13.8	21.5	2.3	r = -0.071
CD = +r		CD				SD	p = 0.007

Note: In parentheses I include the pre-recoded variable number from the data base. To make it easier to interpret the results, I placed 'CD' for 'Christian democratic' under the answer that is most against gender equality, and 'SD' for 'social democratic' under the reply that is for the greatest amount of gender equality. I also noted with 'CD = +r' or '-r' to indicate whether the correlations between gender and the answers should be positive or negative if women were more Christian democratic than men.
For description of variables see Appendix.

Determinants of Attitudes Toward Gender Roles

So far I have shown that a gender gap does indeed exist. Now I will examine the factors that influence women's attitudes toward gender equality. As the measure of support for gender equality, I use the degree of opposition to the statement that "Women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country to men" (i.e. RUNHOME). A good case could be made on theoretical grounds for choosing MANHOME as the dependent variable. However, since there is so little support for the complete elimination of gender roles in Poland, no regressions (OLS or logistic) could produce robust results for this variable.

The dependent variable RUNHOME is coded as '0', agreeing with the statement that women should take care of running their homes and '1', disagreeing with the statement. As a result, a positive correlation indicates that the variable increases the probability of supporting social democratic notions of gender equality, while a negative

correlation increases the probability of supporting traditional (Christian democratic) views on gender roles. Since RUNHOME is a dichotomous variable, I used a binomial logit regression with STATA and received the following results:

RUNHOME = -2.11 + 0.21 EDU** + 0.07 STATUS* + (-0.01 AGE**) + (-0.42 CONFCATH**)
+ 0.73 SEX** + (-0.01 CATHOLIC)
* = significant at the 0.01 level and ** = significant at the 0.001 level
n = 3984
Prob > χ^2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -2397.8094

Once again, this regression confirms that a gender gap indeed exists, as SEX is extremely significant. When all other variables are held constant at their means, the average Polish woman has a 0.556 probability of disagreeing with the statement that women should take care of the home and leave running the country to men, while the average Polish man only has a 0.376 probability of disagreeing with that statement. In addition, being Catholic does not affect attitudes toward gender roles, as this variable was only significant at p = 0.899. It does turn out that confidence in the Catholic Church (CONFCATH) is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, but this does not necessarily show that religious Catholics are more conservative in their views on gender roles than secular Poles. One can be a practising Catholic and still be critical of some of the actual daily practices of the Church.

The logit regression also confirms Siemienska's findings that age and education influence attitudes toward gender. Younger and better educated Poles are more likely to be against traditional gender roles than the older and less educated. Adding STATUS improves the log likelihood, but it is highly correlated with education, because most people with high status jobs also have high levels of education and visa versa.[4] Diagrams 1 and 2 show the effects of age and years of education on RUNHOME for men and women when all other variables are held constant at their means, except for CATHOLIC, which has been eliminated from the equation, since it is so insignificant.[5] These diagrams show also that for all levels of education and age, women are more likely to oppose traditional gender roles than men. An interesting result is also that the gender gap is smallest among those with low levels of education and highest among those with middle levels of education (see Diagram 2). Apparently, at the lowest levels of education, both women and men are extremely likely to accept traditional gender roles, regardless of their sex. *At high levels of education, the gender gap is much greater than at middle levels*, but the gap is smaller than at middle levels, which shows that highly educated men are relatively more willing to criticise traditional gender roles than those with middle levels of education. A possible interpretation is that highly educated, professional men have come into contact with enough highly educated women to become critical of notions that women are incapable of holding high-level positions.

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[4]) A bivariate regression showed that the two variables are significantly correlated at the 0.001 level. The correlations for Pearson's r was 0.688.

[5]) CATHOLIC was so insignificant that when it was dropped from the logit regression, most of the remaining variables only changed at the fourth or fifth decimal. The one exception is CONFCATH which changed at the third decimal spot. With this new equation, the marginal effects of gender and confidence in the Catholic Church can be calculated.

Diagram 1. The Influence of Age and Gender on the Probability of Disagreeing that Women Should Take Care of the Home and Leave Running the Country to Men



Interestingly, when the same regression is run only for female respondents, the results are basically the same, but AGE loses in significance and becomes only significant at the 10% level. It is not surprising that younger, well educated women, with higher status professions are more likely to support gender equality than older, less educated women with lower status professions. As noted above, women who invest many years in learning a profession are less likely to want to give up their careers to become housewives than women without much professional training. Similarly, younger women have been less influenced by the communist past and the pre-communist traditional values than elder women. In addition, younger women are more likely to have come into contact with Western discourses on feminism.

Conclusion

The results of this study have several implications. First, it shows that the Poles have Christian democratic attitudes, although there is no official Christian democratic party in the country. This helps explain the electoral dynamics in the country. The Solidarity coalition was able to win the first election because the population is anti-Communist. However, the population still supports government intervention in the economy. It believes that the government should intervene to dampen income inequalities, create jobs and provide welfare services. When the first post-communist government embarked upon a market liberal path, it lost the favour of the populace. Since there was no Christian democratic alternative, the populace was willing to give the reformed communists a chance, once they convinced the populace that they really had left behind their totalitarian past and become social democrats. However, when the Solidarity trade union regrouped

its forces and formed a culturally conservative centre-right coalition, the voters flocked over to them. The Solidarity union has a tradition of supporting state intervention in economic policy. In fact, it was the group that brought down the market liberal government and, therefore, made the reformed communist victory possible. At the same time, the Solidarity leadership in its new coalition went to the polls emphasising Christian values. In other words, the new coalition approximates the Christian democratic model.

Diagram 2. The Influence of Gender and Years of Education on the Probability of Disagreeing that Women Should Take Care of the Home and Leave Running the Country to Men



These findings also have implications for studying the transitions to democracy in other post-communist countries. It is possible that in most countries the political development was *not* in line with the wishes of the majority of the population. Instead, voters went for second- or third-best alternatives, in the absence of other viable alternatives. During this consolidation period, the new political elite was often unable to provide party configurations that best represented the values of the voters. Just as Polish voters perhaps had Christian democratic values, but lacked a viable Christian democratic party to vote for, an argument could be made that a large portion of Czech voters harboured social democratic or social-liberal values, but lacked a viable social democratic party until the late 1990s. Thus social scientists such as Orenstein [1996, 1998] have argued that Václav Klaus was able to succeed in the first transformation years precisely because he concentrated on privatisation, monetary and financial issues at the expense of social issues. Once he began to replace universal welfare programmes with market liberal means-tested ones, Klaus started to lose his popularity. Meanwhile, on the centre-left a consolidation process had

begun. Under Zeman's leadership, the social democrats became a more effective opposition, and as the Civic Movement and the Liberal Social Union eventually disappeared from the scene, the social democrats were able to gain many of the former voters of these organisations [Saxonberg 1999]. So although other issues also mattered (such as the ODS financial scandals, fears that the social democrats were too populist, etc.,), the 1998 elections can at least be explained in part by arguing that the party system finally became more aligned with the wishes of the voters.

Second, this study shows that 'left' and 'right' do not necessarily mean the same in the post-communist context as in traditional Western European politics. Despite the tendency of political analysts to add other dimensions, such as environmentalism versus growth, or centralisation versus decentralisation, discussions of left and right in the West still hinge most often on socio-economic issues. In the Polish case, this study shows that respondents placed themselves on left-right scales based on their stance on moral issues. Thus right-wing voters might well favour state intervention in the economy and generous welfare policies, but they consider themselves rightist because of their beliefs on such issues as divorce and abortion. Although these particular issues might not be as important in transitional countries with a less influential Catholic Church, it is still possible that voters use such moral issues as the degree of anti-communism when placing themselves on left-right scales. This could also explain why, for example, in the Czech Republic, most social democratic voters place themselves in the centre rather than to the left of the political spectrum.[6]

Third, in Poland there is clearly a gender gap. Although the majority of Polish men and women hold Christian democratic values, generally Polish women are more social democratically oriented than Polish men, except on moral issues. They are more in favour of increased social spending and government intervention in the economy. They are also more supportive of increasing gender equality. This offers some hope for feminists who might wish to mobilise women around women's issues. So far, little research has been done about the existence of gender gaps in public opinion in post-communist countries, so this would be an issue worth investigating in greater detail. For example, Čermáková [1997: 23, 35, 36] shows that on issues of gender roles, Czech women are less supportive of traditional roles than Czech men. However, she does not run any statistical tests to see if these differences are significant. Nor does she use statistical methods to see which factors make Czechs more or less inclined toward supporting traditional gender roles.

Fourth, the Catholic Church does not appear to have influenced Poles as much as expected. There was absolutely no correlation between being Catholic and views toward gender roles. In addition, although there was a significant correlation between confidence in the Catholic Church and support for traditional gender roles, this is not a clear relationship. Poles, who lack confidence in the everyday behaviour of the Catholic Church *in Poland* might still consider themselves to be religious, practising Catholics. Such people would lack confidence in the Catholic Church in Poland to the extent to which they disagree with the Church's behaviour in certain issues. Thus to some extent, measuring confidence in the Catholic Church amounts to measuring attitudes on issues such as gender roles. Therefore, we would expect a high correlation between CONFCATH and RUN-

[6]) For tables showing left-right placement in the Czech Republic, see Vlachová [1997: 52], IVVM survey presented on 11 May 1998 and shown on the Internet address: http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/volby/statistika.htm.

HOM, because to a certain degree they are measuring the same thing. Since the vast majority of Poles consider themselves to be Catholic, and therefore, there is little variation of this variable, a study using cross-national survey data among post-communist respondents could show more clearly whether there is any relationship between being a member of the Catholic Church and attitudes on gender.

Fifth, the survey results back up Siemienska's findings that education and age are important determinants of attitudes. Poles who are better and more highly educated, and have jobs with a higher status, are more likely to support gender equality than less educated women with low status jobs. Čermáková [1997: 23] finds similar results for the Czech Republic, but again she only provides a chart, so it is not certain how statistically significant these relationships are. This is especially true as her diagram shows a rather ambiguous relationship. In addition, since she shows class, rather than status or education, it is not clear in her study which of these three variables is more important. In the Polish case, status and education turned out to be more important than class.

Finally, as already noted, a generational cleft appears. Younger Poles are more likely to support gender equality than older Poles. Although Siemienska does not offer an explanation for this, one hypothesis is that younger Poles are less influenced by the communist legacy, in which women were encouraged to enter the workforce, while no steps were taken to encourage men to help with the housework and child-raising. At the same time, despite high levels of labour market participation, Polish women still generally achieved much lower positions in the economic and political spheres. Since this situation is basically true for all communist regimes, we could expect the communist legacy to play an important role in the development of attitudes toward gender in all post-communist societies. If this is true, then in some countries we might find a similar generational gap to emerge, as women who did not live most of their lives under the old system have different experiences and expectations. On the other hand, since experiences and expectations vary from country to country, we could also expect the significance of age to vary across countries. In addition, if the communist legacy is really the driving force behind the age factor, then we would expect that later surveys of opinion in Poland will show that the youngest group of adult respondents in more recent polls have become more critical of traditional gender roles than the youngest group in the 1992-1994 surveys, since young adults of the new millennium have lived even a smaller portion of their lives under the communist-led regime than did the youth of the survey used in this study.

In conclusion, this survey has shed some light on the dynamics of post-communist opinion. It shows that political configurations in parliament do not necessarily represent the opinions of voters, and that left-right does not necessarily mean the same thing in the post-communist situation as in the West. A rather surprising finding is that despite the obvious influence of the Catholic Church on political decision-making, the Church does not appear to have as much influence on the general public as expected. Finally, the main result of this study is that more such studies are necessary, to see how much these results may be generalised both for Poland over time and for the transitional countries in general.

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Appendix – List of used variables

DIVORCE = belief that it should be made easier to obtain a divorce (v304);

FULLTIME = "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job" (v4002);

GOVINC = support for the notion that government should guarantee a minimum income (v2047);

GOVJOB = support for the notion that government has a duty to provide jobs (v2046);

INDJOB = "Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person" (v4005);

MANHOME = "It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the woman goes to work" (v4009);

MENPOL = disagreement with the opinion that men are more suited emotionally for politics (v88);

PROABORT = support for the right to abortion "if the woman wants it for any reason" (v311);

REDISTR = belief that government should reduce income inequalities (v262);

RELATION = "A working mother can establish just as warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother who does not work" (v4000);

RIGHTIST = the degree of right-wing political orientation between 1-10 (v328).

RUNHOME = disagreement with the opinion that "women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country up to men" (v89);

SEX = v94;

SUFFER = "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works" (v4001);

WANTHOME = "A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children" (v4003);

WELFARE = the opinion that government is spending too little on welfare (v72);

WOMHOME = "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family" (v4008);

WORKCHLD = agreement that "a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work" (v90);

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Summary This paper explores recent history, geographical correlates and social background of right-wing extremism in the Czech Republic, namely of the Republican party (SPR-RSČ). First, we briefly describe the development of right-wing extremism in the Czech Republic over the last decade. Further, we review sociological theories about the rise of the extreme right in Europe and we test the applicability of these theories to SPR-RSČ. Our findings reveal that social background does not distinguish republican voters from their counterparts in other European countries. Consequently, electoral volatility between left- and right-wing parties and SPR-RSČ is analysed placing the party somewhere into the left part of the Czech political spectrum. Next, some environmental correlates of the Czech right-wing extremism are investigated. Higher inclination towards right wing extremism is found in rural regions with high unemployment and crime rates. In the final section of the paper we suggest possible explanation of electoral failure of SPR-RSČ in the elections to the Chamber of deputies in June 1998. We argue that social insecurity and rising unemployment may have lead a number of SPR-RSČ supporters to vote left. Furthermore, SPR-RSČ failed in mobilising non-voters and first-time voters in 1998.

What Makes Inequalities Legitimate? An International Comparison

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Summary: This paper analyses legitimacy of poverty and wealth in six countries. In the first part various theories about perceptions of poverty and wealth are presented. Most sociologists have been elaborating the theory of dominant and challenging stratification ideology so far. This theory predicts socially universal individual explanations of inequalities and socially specific structural explanations. Based on some previous research I argue, however, that the latent structure of perceptions of poverty and wealth is more complex. Using data from International Social Justice Project I found that people distinguish between merited, unmerited and fatalistic types of poverty. Merited poverty corresponds to what researchers usually call "individualistic explanation" (e.g. loose morals, a lack of effort), unmerited poverty is due to discrimination, failure of the economic system, and lack of equal opportunities (so called structural causes), and fatalistic explanation operates with bad luck and lack of ability and talents. Moreover, people structure their explanations of wealth along three factors too. Wealth can be merited, unmerited, or based on social capital. Positive individual explanation attributes wealth to hard work, ability and good luck. Unmerited wealth is a purely negative explanation (dishonesty and failure of the economic system) and social capital sees contacts, unequal opportunities and good luck as reasons of wealth. Further, I elaborate theories about determinants of perceptions of inequalities. I show how legitimacy of inequalities depends on individual stratification-related experience, group identification and membership, education and changing social atmosphere.

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