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Theoretical Perspectives On Central Europe*

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Abstract: Various theoretical perspectives on political developments in post-communist Central Europe are considered. The paradigms of the modernisation and democratic theories are found insufficient to explain such phenomena as the renewal of ethno-regional identities that are typical of the region and sometimes lead to irredentism and secession. It is argued that these phenomena can be better understood in the context of Rokkan's conceptions of state- and nation-building. Rokkan's theory on the critical junctures in history is tested on the return of the 1991 Polish parliamentary elections. The map of the turnout in this elections is produced, showing the lines of the Third Partition (1795-1919) in contemporary electoral behaviour. Other examples of the re-integration of historic regions are presented and the consequence of this development discussed.

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The first surge of the literature on post-communist transition concentrated on the nascent democratic institutions and developing markets. These are typical issues that democratic theory – wherein democracy is understood as a redistributive mechanism – addresses. From such a perspective it is easier to understand the way in which wealth is distributed and institutional constraints are challenged in the established democracies, with their defined boundaries, entrenched institutions, operating markets and social structures already in place. It seems less helpful, however, in approaching the processes of institution-building and the major, almost revolutionary, changes of societal structures.

Democratic theory does not address the issue of state-making and political integration as processes with their own dynamics nor can it handle the problem of territorial tensions generated by these processes. Such phenomena as irredentism and secession are beyond the grasp of the leading paradigms of social sciences and therefore are consigned to the sphere of irrational incidents or peculiarities of a "political culture". This means that they are of no relevance to the mainstream models. Since territorial tensions are the leading phenomena of the post-communist world, to understand them we must go to Rokkan rather than to Dahl.

While studying the dynamics of political integration in West European societies, Stein Rokkan was convinced that the most persistent paradigm of social sciences on the diminishing significance of territorial boundaries within modern societies had already been "shaken to the core" [Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 117]. He understood what complex

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entities the modern, developed societies were, with their several layers of identity, such as a city, a region, an ethnic group. The fact that those various layers "are historically derived" he wrote, "does not necessarily make them anachronistic, without relevance to the modern industrial world" [Ibid.: 119]. As early as the mid-seventies, Rokkan pointed to four countries as dubious cases of social integration: Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Belgium.

It seems, though, that Rokkan underestimated the resilience of early traditions in the social sciences. The real shock came only with the breakdown of communist regimes. These regimes were the testing grounds for the paradigm of modernisation. Such objectives as industrialisation, urbanisation, mass education and secularisation of society were the prime items on the agenda of communist governments and were implemented with lightning speed. How did those vehicles of modernity affect communist societies? The results seem somewhat different from those predicted by modernisation theory. The significance of territorial boundaries (ethnic, religious, historic, cultural) within post-communist societies has by no means decreased. On the contrary, since the corset of coercion was lifted, ethno-territorial lines of division have become more distinct than any other cleavages. The voting patterns in post-communist elections have hardly showed consistent functional cleavages at the national level [O'Loughlin et al. 1993].

At the same time, research on electoral returns in East-Central Europe has shown the increasing significance of territorial cleavages that can be traced back to the pre-war period. In the last Czechoslovak parliamentary elections of 1992, the only all-national party was that of the former Communists. The two winners, ODS and HZDS, drew their support from the Czech Lands and Slovakia respectively. Within the Czech lands themselves, the regions of Moravia and Silesia gave as much support to the local party (HSD-SMS) as to Václav Klaus' victorious ODS. The same phenomenon occurred with the substantial Hungarian minority in the southern districts of Slovakia [Kostelecký 1992, Jehlička et al. 1993]. In Hungary, the pre-war cleavage between east and West of the Danube was still present in the electoral returns of 1990 [Martis et al. 1992]. In the first democratic elections to the Polish Sejm in 1989, the geography of electoral turnout recreated the century-long differences between the traditional regions of Galicja, Wielkopolska and the Congress Poland, the territorial entities that had ceased to exist more than 70 years before [Florczyk et al. 1990].

In this context, the first question to be considered is: how modern were communist societies? This question will be considered in the following section. In further sections, I shall try to show that Rokkan's perspective might be more fruitful in research on post-communist transition than such leading paradigms of social sciences as democratic theory and modernisation theory.

How modern were communist societies?

In the special issue of *National Interest* on the "Strange Death of Soviet Communism", Fukuyama reprimanded sovietologists for developing their own models and methods apart from the paradigms of modern social sciences [Fukuyama 1993]. Had they been more familiar with modernisation theory and the collateral models of political development, he wrote, the students of communist regimes would have a better chance of understanding what was happening in the Soviet Union. Such phenomena as the diffusion of power from the Soviet centre to the Party's lower reaches, the growing significance of

industrial managers and academics, even the growth of "mafias" inside and outside the Party were all but typical facets of a "proto-civil society". In this, Fukuyama says, the Soviet Union falls into the same category as other countries that have made the recent transition from an agricultural economy to a modern industrial one and have to cope with the vicissitudes of modernity.

It seems, however, that Fukuyama himself did not spend much time reviewing the output of Soviet studies over the last two decades. For since the mid-seventies, the mainstream of Western sovietology had been dwelling precisely on the current issues and paradigms of social sciences. Soviet politics was combed in order to find evidence of such phenomena as institutionalisation, managerialism, the formation of interest groups etc. [Almond and Roselle 1989]. The Western political scientists were often helped in their efforts by the modern-thinking section of the Soviet establishment, who considered it quite reassuring to find the ills typical of Western modernity inside the Soviet Union.

In fact, modernisation theory was effectively forcing out the theory of totalitarianism as the flagship model of the area.[1] Since the result was more rather than less confusion, one may think that perhaps the major paradigms of social sciences, at least those referred to by Fukuyama, have been wanting not less than the indigenous models produced by sovietologists themselves. Indeed, the opposite to Fukuyama's argument can be made, namely that the post-war social sciences in general, and modernisation theory in particular, have neglected to their detriment the experience of communist societies.

Modernisation theory is a paradigm rather than a theory with an exact content. Indeed, the notion of a paradigm is too narrow for the idea which itself gave birth to the social sciences. Such disciplines as economics and sociology owe their existence to the intellectual discovery of changes taking place in Britain and France at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries [Binder 1971]. The idea of transition from a traditional to modern economy was soon turned into a powerful ideology with its own impact on both social sciences and political developments. In the classical version of the paradigm, the process of modernisation was either a by-product of actions undertaken by rational individuals (the invisible hand of classical economics) or was directed by transcendental forces (historical dialectics) beyond individual control. In both cases, the modernising outcome was not intended and politics was merely adapting to the economic and social changes. This was more or less the most commonly accepted explanation of the subsequent stages of Western European development from a traditional, rigidly stratified society to a more mobile, modern one with all the political consequences that followed.

Later on, the modernisation paradigm responded to the demand from belated modernisers in their quest for beneficial changes already achieved in Western Europe. Thus the subsequent models assumed that economic and social transition to modernity might by planned, directed and brought about by a government. Prescriptions for modernisation multiplied in the fifties and sixties, when the demand was particularly high in the post-colonial world and developmental models were put on the political agenda. Industrialisation was the prime item, not only for the sake of economic development but also in order

[1]) It originated with Barrington Moore's *Terror and Progress, USSR* [1954] and practically dominated the production of the field since the appearance of J. F. Triska and P. M. Cocks (eds.) *Political Development in Eastern Europe* [1977].

to facilitate social transition. The rise of the urban proletariat in the predominantly peasant societies was seen as a necessary social base for modern development.

The modernising function of Marxist regimes was taken for granted. After all, industrialisation, urbanisation, mass education and secularisation of society as well as other items of modernity were the prime issues on their agenda. Indeed, some authors saw the Leninist party as the only practical solution to the problems of belated modernisation. That democracy may become a hindrance rather than a precondition to late modernisation was already suggested by several theories of political development. In the sixties, Huntington summarised the experience of post-colonial development in the unequivocal alternative: "...the non-western countries of today can have political modernisation or they can have democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both" [Huntington 1968: 138].

A closer examination of the institutional landscape left behind by communist regimes should have given pause for thought to those who saw communist parties as the agents of modernity. Democratic governments in Eastern Europe were often prepared to use whatever structures of the former regime might be helpful in discharging their new responsibilities. They found few such structures. That came as a surprise. After all, the state apparatus left behind by communist regimes was considered fairly strong or even excessive. Thus, the general expectation was that once this all-powerful state machinery was made accountable to representative institutions, the main thrust of political transition would be accomplished.

It soon appeared, however, that the creation of representative institutions by means of popular elections was a relatively easier task than bringing the executive organs back into working shape. Indeed, the lack of modern administrative and economic institutions has been the major obstacle in the entire process of postcommunist transition. For example, it was easier to draw the laws on taxation and pass them through newly-elected parliaments than to set up a working system of tax collection. The rapid industrialisation and urbanisation was paralleled by the withdrawal from the money economy and its replacement with an economy in kind. As in the "war economy", when money is no object, the first result was a rapid increase in the material output of sectors chosen by the government. But the loss of capital efficiency and flexibility as well as shortages of all items not included among governmental priorities were unavoidable.

Indeed, as far as institutions go, the communist period resulted in "demodernisation" in most of the countries concerned. Post-communist transition has largely consisted of the recovery of pre-communist financial and administrative institutions as the lost threads of modernisation. In the Czech Republic, the pre-war Katastral Offices were only reopened in January 1993 to keep a record of land holdings; now they must cope with the consequences of the former regime's practices of granting unrecorded and frequently informal property titles. In Poland, attempts have been made to restore the pre-war local lending and saving associations (KKO), so far without much success.

If the forces at work on both sides of the Iron Curtain were essentially similar or equivalent in their modernising impact, how such disparate results be explained? Unfortunately, modernisation scholarship appears quite impervious to empirical data. I have not seen a single attempt to test any of the numerous developmental models sprung from the theory of modernisation against the data freely available in the former communist

countries. On the contrary, the same paradigm has been applied again and with renewed vigour, this time to explain the collapse of communist regimes.

The keyword has become "civil society". The notion has had quite diverse antecedents in the history of ideas. In the tradition of the early Enlightenment, civil society is a form of government as opposed to the "state of nature", whereas in the Hegelian tradition, the adversarial role of civil society to the government (state) is stressed. Most often applied in the modern social sciences, the deTocquevillian notion of civil society posits a network of voluntary organisations protecting individual interests against excessive interference by the state. The latter meaning, however, has more in common with the liberal tradition of natural law and civil rights than with the Hegelian apology of state. In any case, the idea that civil society might have existed in the legal vacuum of an arbitrary regime that denied not only civil rights but also private property would have struck both Hegel and de Tocqueville as absurd.

Nevertheless, the frequent use of the term "civil society" by East European dissidents gave it its own place in the history of ideas. In this new context, "civil society" was to become a remedy against the "totalitarian state". The underlying creed was that no amount of state pressure was able to suppress social initiative for independent organisations and it was well-tuned to the sensibilities of Western observers, left, right and centre. The neo-conservatives found in the dissident idea of civil society an additional argument for cutting back on the expansion of the welfare state. The New Left or "unorthodox Marxists" found it stimulating in their search for alternatives to ordinary party politics and a capitalist state.

The latter meaning of civil society, as an alternative to "ordinary" liberal democracy, was particularly appealing to the taste for "anti-politics" typical of the dissident culture in Eastern Europe. For example, both Havel and Michnik were trying to prevent the split up of all-embracing revolutionary movements (Solidarity and Civic Forum) into regular political parties by arguing that party politics with its left-right division was already a thing of the past. Thus the proponents of "civil society" found themselves in opposition to the development of a pluralist society. But pluralism was unavoidable under the new circumstances. The only way of preventing it would have been to reverse the methods of the former regime.

There is a conspicuous adversity between the idea of modern society as presumed and practised by Marxist modernists on the one hand, and the empirical features of developed societies on the other. In the Marxist tradition, social development anticipated a simplification of societal structures including the elimination of the most persistent modern division into classes. Such an idea of social progress informed the policies of communist governments. Communist take-overs resulted in the destruction of the existing societal structures by means of wholesale nationalisation and terror. The uniform content of mass media further enhanced the appearances of social homogeneity. Empirical sociology has shown, however, that developed societies do not become simpler in their structures but rather more complex. Indeed, the more developed society, the more complex it becomes: "There will be more groups, more classes, more occupations, more structures, more roles – and more conflict" [Binder 1971]. The absence of a complete array of classes, statuses, social groupings etc. has been considered tantamount to the absence of civil society.

The point of contention is therefore whether modern social differentiation had in fact developed under communist regimes, despite their ideological commitment and political interest in preventing the expression of group interests. To be sure, neither could the pre-existing social differentiation be eliminated without a trace nor the most severe repression and indoctrination control or eradicate all economic transactions outside the official framework of redistribution. A shrewd observer of the Ukrainian culture described how the ever-present threat of Mongol invasions shaped the manners of local trade. Merchants displayed their goods in such a way as to be able to pack up their business at the blow of a whistle and disappear into the nearby bushes. The same manner of trading could be observed in the Ukraine under Soviet rule [Stempowski 1992].

Moreover, communist leaderships were in the business of government and that could not be done without a rudimentary organisation, delegation of powers, giving some groups better access to goods and privileges than others etc. [Kamiński 1992]. This in turn created a certain type of social stratification, various entrenched interests and countervailing centres to defend them. In particular, the late communist regime was incapable of effective control over its own territorial administrations. All the same, the defective centralisation did not, as some observers of Soviet politics had it, translate itself into pluralism.

The ability to stage a protest has been identified as the prime feature of modernity, as proof of the existence of civil society under communist regimes. However, the form in which communist societies protested was indicative of something to the contrary. The contagious quality of such discontent, if not immediately suppressed by force, derived from the lack of modern social divisions that might have counter-balanced each other's interests. In this sense, the ten-million strong Solidarity union emerging overnight and almost without warning cannot be an indication of the existence of civil society but rather of its conspicuous scarcity. Communist societies were not class societies, neither in the Marxist nor Weberian senses, both of which refer to market and property relations. Even in Poland, the country most often pointed to as the example of a civil society simmering under the pressure of the communist regime, more systematic research found that the only two structures attracting individual loyalties were "family" and "nation" with a vacuum in between, that is, in the space designated for the structures of civil society.

Western experience has demonstrated yet another and perhaps more important feature of civil society than staging a protest, namely its role in bringing about *political integration*. The dominant theme of sociological research and theory – from Tönnies and Weber to Rokkan and Lipset – concerned the changing social cleavages and commitments that pull individuals out of their primordial local-ethnic and kinship ties and integrate them into modern, nation-wide, interconnected networks of interests and structures [Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 1-63]. Rokkan's studies in particular demonstrated that the political integration of modern societies is based to a large extent on class and other functional cleavages cutting across the more traditional – religious, ethnic or regional – ones [Rokkan 1975: 368-440]. His theory received a peculiar confirmation à rebours after the collapse of communist regimes. As a result of the lack of modern, functional divisions, post-communist societies tend to crumble along ethno-territorial lines. The same dearth of vertical social structures has been pointed to as the major stumbling block to the development of mass political parties in the post-communist era [Staniszkis 1991]. The phenomenon of communist leaderships swept from power by overwhelming majori-

ties in the first elections only to return with narrow pluralities in the next, is another indication of the want of modern cleavages that would facilitate the development of mass political parties capable of challenging the remnants of the former ruling elites and organisations.

Central Europe from Rokkan's perspective

From the Rokkanian perspective, East-Central Europe is in the process of *territorial retrenchment*; a large territorial system has broken up and the former peripheries are consolidating around their own historic centres. There are many constraints caused by the historic legacies latent in the region. But there is also little doubt that Central Europe is undergoing the most significant turn in its history, a turn which itself will have important consequences for the future. As Rokkan noted: "In the history of the territorial structuring of political systems, it is as important to analyse the process of retrenchment as it is to study the phases of expansion" [Rokkan 1970: 77].

In such a perspective, post-communist transition means the acquisition of a new status by the former peripheries, a process by no means harmonious and wholly predictable. The split of Czechoslovakia has already shown that, under the new circumstances, there is nothing given in the maintenance of the central status by any particular site. To do so, the resources are necessarily, not only economic, but also political and cultural and the new democratic governments may find them in short supply. Thus, the new democratic regimes in East-Central Europe are being established in a contest of centripetal and centrifugal forces, with all the challenges to the latecomers.

The problem of timing seems crucial and has already been described in the context of the post-colonial state and nation building. Such problems as the consolidation of a political centre, effective administration of its policies and the maintenance of public order may appear almost intractable in societies embracing mass democracy without modern institutional safeguards already in place [Rokkan 1975]. Rokkan pointed out that the traditional western democracies had managed to solve the worst problems of state and nation building in sequence. His model consists of four phases: (1) Administrative penetration, (2) Cultural standardisation, (3) Participation, and (4) Redistribution. Thus, in the successful ventures of building a state, the administrative machinery was already in place before the demands of mass democracy emerged. The welfare state usually came last. In contrast, the newcomers must cope with all these tasks at one and the same time. Further, the new states have been confronted with highly successful development in the West which made the public even more demanding.

All these challenges of the belated state building have reappeared in Eastern Europe. The dynamics of post-communist reforms do, in a way, follow Rokkan's model, but in reverse. The post-communist governments must begin with the dismantling of the overloaded mechanisms of redistribution, on the way they loose popular support, which results in the political fragmentation of the electorate and the mobilisation of the periphery that has become increasingly resistant to administrative penetration from the centre.

There is, in fact, a marked gap between the aspirations of new democratic governments in East-Central Europe to maintain the unitary systems of public administration and their ability to do so. For while the process of *external* territorial retrenchment that gave the historic "failed centres" the second (or the third?) chance to reinstate their sovereignty, the same process has also activated the countervailing forces of *internal* re-

trenchment, that is, the movements for greater local and regional autonomy within a regime.

Such internal retrenchment has always been an important factor in democratic transitions and the post-communist transition is no exception. The main reason is general in nature. It results from the fact that the former regime collapsed and the new one is in the process of establishing itself. Thus some local elites, especially in regions with strong historic identities, are trying to renegotiate their position within the newly emerging regime. The process of internal retrenchment may also occur at the level of municipalities. Demands for revision of their administrative affiliation and boundaries are usually followed by the demand for greater decentralisation.

The microcosm of civil society

Local frays over administrative sites and boundaries have usually been perceived as primeval tribulations typical of backward communities and considered wholly irrational by many a political scientist and policy-maker. The latter's analytical predilections make them more preoccupied with the general features of a political process rather than with its content. Such an homogenising approach may leave significant political traumas not only unexplained but also unnoticed, until it is too late to come up with a remedy.

Local aspirations do not need to involve ethnic or religious differences although their presence makes the conflict more dramatic. For example, the Czech municipalities placed on the "wrong side" of the historic border of Moravia by the arbitrary division of 1960 showed some symptoms of a "frontier mentality" in their voting patterns in 1992 national elections [Jehlička et al. 1993]. During the Polish debate on reinstating the intermediary units of *powiat*, one of the criteria considered was the presence of land registers in the town. Neighbouring towns engaged in snatching those books from each other and citizen's committees were called up to guard them.

The issue of territorial boundaries remains at the heart of democratic process, even though democratic theory tends to discard it as marginal. The degree to which inhabitants accept the scope of a territorial unit as an appropriate entity of communal life or a distinct cultural space (i.e. a historic region) is irrelevant, since at the grassroots, the democratic process is expressed in the awakening of such primordial identities [Linz and Stepan 1992]. What is more, such collective identities may appear a precondition of successful democratic development. The importance of local "civic roots" has recently been demonstrated by Putnam in his study on civic traditions in modern Italy [Putnam 1993].

Putnam's "discovery" of great territorial differences in the performance of democratic institutions in Italy surprised nobody. The division between the North and the South of the country as well as the historical antecedents of this division were common knowledge. What is new in Putnam's approach is that he made use of this common knowledge in systematic political studies. Putnam draws his theoretical perspective from more general concepts of collective action, and makes no reference to Rokkan's studies in his book. Perhaps that is why Putnam's geo-political explanations of the circumstances that shaped particular types of communities are more anecdotal than systematic.

Rokkan's models are not easily applicable. The very preparation of a data base that would have met their empirical requirements may take more than the usual time and funds designated for a research project. Nevertheless, the effort of extending his conceptual map of Europe to the East, where it has some major gaps, seems worth taking. In the

following section, some preliminary results of such a project will be presented. The research begins with an empirical investigation of the geo-political consequences of Poland's complex territorial history. In the following section some elements of the Rokkanian concept of nation-building find confirmation in the electoral returns in contemporary Poland.

The concept of critical junctures and the "freezing" hypothesis

The European process of mass democratisation at the turn of the XIXth and XXth centuries developed within the framework of the already existing institutions of government. In Rokkan's models, both structures – that is, the existing machinery of government and the developing institutions of mass participation – are conceived together in his concept of *critical junctures* in nation building. There are four such junctures in the development of European nation states in Rokkan's model: (1) the Reformation-Counterreformation movements of the XVI-XVII centuries, (2) the national revolutions of the post-Napoleonic era, (3) the industrial revolution of the XIXth century, and (4) the international revolution of 1917 [see Rokkan 1983 for the latest version]. Each of those junctures created a typical set of cleavages and alliances depending on the circumstances under which they happened in particular countries [Rokkan 1970].

Without going into the details of the model which developed into a conceptual map of European democracies, the important point for further consideration is that the national responses to each critical juncture tend to "freeze" into quite persistent patterns of cleavages, often territorially defined and reflected in the contemporary party systems of particular countries. Rokkan's "freezing" hypothesis coincides with the position taken by Putnam on the persistence of patterns of civic engagement rooted in the history of various regions [Putnam 1993]. I shall test this theory of "freezing" of civic makeup as it emerged in the early stages of the national and industrial revolution on Polish electoral data. Poland is a good case to test such a theory since in the XIXth century – that is, at the time of the watersheds in European nation-building – the country was divided between three empires of diverse political cultures: Russia, Prussia and Austro-Hungary.

After the Partitions of 1773-95, the region of Wielkopolska became the eastern province of Prussia as the Great Duchy of Poznań and shared in the German modernisation and industrialisation drive of the mid-Nineteenth century. Now the region leads the process of economic transition. The southern part of Poland (Malopolska) went to the Habsburgs as the province of Galicja. The region was largely rural, dominated by a conflict between the peasants and landowners, skilfully manipulated by the imperial rulers. The Galicjan peasants were turned into Poles only under the Second Republic and the region has remained the stronghold of the peasant movement until now. Densely populated villages with their closely knit communities were virtually impossible for the outsiders to penetrate, even under the communist regime. It was the Galicjan village that defied Stalinist attempts at collectivisation. The part of Poland that was taken by Russia, the Congress of Poland (from the Congress of Vienna in 1815), was in many ways a spearhead of Russian industrialisation, while at the same time sharing in the Russian political backwardness. After the subsequent uprisings the region lost its economic advantage as well as its meagre political distinctiveness from the rest of the Russian Empire.

How do those differences in historical traditions influence the electoral behaviour of post-communist Poland? In the research presented below, data come from the level of

municipalities. Making municipalities the basic units of territorial inquiry may solve the problem of shifting administrative and political boundaries in East Central Europe. Further, it makes it possible to trace on the maps of electoral behaviour in recent years the effects of some long since disappeared historical boundaries.

Figure 1 and Table 1 show the territorial differentiation of the turnout in the Polish parliamentary elections of 1991. The national turnout was relatively low (43.2%), one of the reasons being a fairly complicated voting procedure. Nevertheless, the historical boundaries come out quite clearly. Two sets of such boundaries seem of particular importance. The first are the borders of the Partitions. The second are the western boundaries of the Polish Second Republic (1919-1939). The effect of both sets of boundaries on electoral behaviour will be discussed in turn.

Fig.1 Parliamentary elections in Poland in 1991. Electoral turn-out.



Table 1. Electoral turnout in the 1991 Polish parliamentary elections (Former names of the regions in brackets).

	Region	Mean turn-out in 1991
1	Central (Congress Poland)	36.1
2	Wielkopolska (Galicja)	46.7
3	North-East (East Prussia)	34.7
4	Wielkopolska (Duchy of Poznań)	43.6
5	Gdańsk & Pomorze	43.1

A similar phenomenon of a lower electoral turnout in the resettled parts of Bohemia was discernible in the last Czechoslovak parliamentary elections of 1992 (...)

The map of electoral turnout in 1991 recreates the Partition boundaries with remarkable precision. The differences in the political cultures of the three empires seem to have "frozen" into the civic makeup of the respective localities for several generations.

Under the Habsburgs, Polish Galicja had its own elected parliament and local government. Although the Ukrainian minority and the peasants were heavily discriminated against, those representative institutions gave the Poles their first training in political participation. The results can be seen more than one hundred years later. Electoral turnout in the former region of Galicja exceeds by 10% the level attained in its immediate neighbourhood to the North, which was under Russian sovereignty (see Table 1).

The boundary separating the former Congress Poland from the former Duchy of Poznań is similarly distinct. What we call today "race relations" were bad in the Duchy of Poznań at the time of Prussian and later German sovereignty over the region. Max Weber, the great supporter of the germanisation of those territories, complained about the negligible results achieved by the policies applied to this effect by German authorities. The Poznań Poles were resurgent nationalists. Paradoxically though, it was the Prussian tradition of "law and order" and the ethics of hard work that were to make the region distinct later on. It provided the administrative class and economic managers for the reconstruction of the Second Polish Republic (1919-1939), as it more or less continues to do today. The strip leading from Gdańsk to Poznań is marked by a higher electoral turnout than the surrounding areas. Further west, however, as well as in the north-east (the former East Prussia), some contrasting patterns appear. To understand those contrasts, we must go back to the more recent history.

The consequences of mass resettlements

At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the Allies conferred the territories east of the rivers Odder and Nissen to Poland as compensation for her eastern lands already taken over by Stalin. As a result, Poland was bodily moved some 300 km to the West. Some 5 million Germans left the territories acquired by Poland, either escaping ahead the Red Army or being deported by the new Polish authorities. The former East Prussia, Pommerania, East Brandenburg and Lower Silesia became resettled by the Polish population from those parts of the Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, which went under the Soviet jurisdiction. Thus the part of contemporary Poland under former German sovereignty from the time of the Partitions consists of two types of territories: (a) those which belonged to the Second Polish Republic, as the provinces of Pomorze, Wielkopolska and the eastern part of Słąsk, and (b) those which only became part of Poland after W.W. II.

The levels of electoral turnout contrast quite clearly across both sets of boundaries. The civic make-up in the territories acquired after W.W. II seems rather weak, as indicated by a low electoral turnout (37% on average). It would be difficult to explain this in any other way than by the mass resettlements which had affected those territories nearly 50 years earlier. In the southern parts of Śląsk and the Gdańsk region, where many indigenous communities (for example Silesians and Kashubs) largely managed to avoid resettlement, the electoral turnout is in fact higher than in the areas where it was more comprehensive.[2]

The former East Prussia is perhaps the best illustration of the contemporary consequences of the post-war resettlements. The region was almost completely resettled, giving the subsequent communist governments the widest space for their "modernising"

[2]) More detailed research on the relationship between the size of resettlements and electoral behaviour are at the stage of data collection.

agenda. The collectivisation of agriculture that failed in the rest of the country was relatively "successful" in this area, if the number of state farms is considered. Similarly, the "great building sites of socialism" proliferated here, bringing in masses of migrant workers who settled in the new housing estates, but have never integrated with local communities. As a result of such "social engineering", those territories are lagging behind in the economic transition, studded as they are with the municipalities built around one factory which now finds itself in a state of decline in the new market economy conditions. The concentration of such municipalities with "structural problems" in those northern parts of Poland resettled after the war is shown in Figure 2.

Fig. 2 Municipalities with structural problems (official government list).



The new regionalism

The main challenge in the post-communist transition is coming from environs of "structural poverty" formed in rural areas dominated by economically unviable large state farms or industry. The electoral results showed that these sites might have politically explosive potential as they provide a disproportionate share of votes for all kinds of political extremism. There is little local activism in such precincts, both inhabitants and their elected councils looking to the centre for help. The poverty of such areas cannot be cured by means of self-government since participation is low due to the lack of communal bonds among the inhabitants.

On the other hand, it is becoming quite clear that the centrally directed economic transition has its limits. Capitalism is a grass-roots phenomenon which can be encouraged by macroeconomic policy, but only up to a point. The role of local government in both stimulating economic growth and providing protection against its side-effects has been increasing in Poland. This in turn may lead to the widening of territorial inequalities rather than their alleviation. One remedy might be a diffusion of local initiatives over wider areas in the form of regional mobilisation. The current debate in Poland on the role

of intermediary territorial units has been paralleled by the emergence of regional movements which started as cultural and social organisations and have become increasingly political.

Regional associations have taken various forms, beginning with co-operation between the present small provinces initiated by the (state appointed) voivodes, to voluntary associations of local governments for economic and cultural purposes, albeit with a distinct political flavour. Such associations have been organised by mayors of historic regional centres and cover more or less the territory of the old provinces that had been subdivided in 1975. There is also a vigorous regional association of Vistulan Pomerania (Pomorze Nadwiślańskie), a new region with the centre in Gdańsk. Its engine is the ethnic minority of the Kashubs, the descendants of a Baltic tribe decimated in the Middle Ages by the Teutonic Knights. Attempts to organise regional movements in other parts of Poland have so far failed, one of the reasons being a dramatic change of Polish territory after the war. A good example is Wrocław, a natural centre of the Lower Silesia region which failed conspicuously to integrate the surrounding provinces.

Fig. 3 Membership of the Association of Wielkopolska Municipalities and the Western Union of Municipalities



The territorial diffusion of local initiatives has its limits though. The old boundaries still linger in people's minds, as can be seen in Figure 3. It shows the membership of the Association of Wielkopolska Municipalities that covers more or less the territory of the former Duchy of Poznań, which at present consists of several administrative provinces. Figure 3 also shows a more scattered pattern of another association of municipalities, the Western Union, created in the territories acquired by Poland after the Second World War. It should be mentioned that neither the Wielkopolska Association nor the Western Union made geographic restrictions for their membership. In fact, Wielkopolska Association made considerable inroads in the recruitment of municipalities beyond its historic border to the East, that is, in the territories of little indigenous regional activity. It was less

popular, however, among municipalities in the immediate neighbourhood to the West, where the sense of regional identity seems more complicated.

Conclusions

Ethnic conflicts have been most frequently cited as the major source of centrifugal forces in East-Central Europe. In fact, the region has been notorious as a "belt of mixed populations" and, as such, considered the least suited for the development of unitary nation states. Territorial tensions, however, may originate from a variety of other sources. For the democratic transition also means a greater diversification – political, economic and cultural – across the territories and within the nations that for decades had been kept under tight control. Such diversification has been fuelled by many factors, from the very mechanics of the disintegrating regimes to the nature of the democratic and market reforms already underway.

In this context, Poland is a particularly good example; after the last war, the country became fairly homogeneous, at least as far as ethnicity is concerned. Nevertheless, the territorial differentiation of voting behaviour shows the persistence of certain boundaries that have long disappeared from political and administrative maps. Rokkan's concept of the "freezing" of a civic make-up that had been formed in the early periods of democratic revolutions seems a good explanation for this phenomenon.

The question remains open as to how such patterns of civic behaviour are being transmitted through the generations, especially in a country with such a turbulent history as Poland. The reason we do not know the exact answer to this question is because there is not enough research on the subject. Family and community traditions may provide the first set of hypotheses to explain such transmission. The issue requires separate studies, and perhaps can be better handled by the methods of social psychology than those of political science.

There is another problem, however, illustrated by the maps of electoral behaviour in Poland, that requires further research. It concerns the consequences of "social engineering" in the form of the mass resettlements that followed the change of borders after World War II. Such resettlements were not unique for Poland and their social, political and economic consequences need to be studied more comprehensively.

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Can Inequality Be Reformed?

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Abstract: Three limitations in "standard method" measurement of income redistribution are considered: that redistribution is seen as a matter of global rather than marginal effects, that structural effects on the distribution of factor income are not accounted for, and that cross-section and life-cycle effects are conflated. Evidence from recent research is introduced. It is argued that "standard method" results are reasonably robust in spite of limitations in the methodology. A positive association in advanced industrial companies between tax/transfer policy and income inequality is argued to be a firmly established conclusion. This suggests both that if government wants to modify income inequality it has a tool for so doing in tax and transfer policy, and that if it should want to reshape transfers or taxes for other reasons it must expect there to be distributional consequences.

Czech Sociological Review, 1996, Vol. 4, (No. 1: 19-28)

Comparative research on income distribution in advanced industrial societies over the last ten to fifteen years has produced at least two findings which can now be characterised as firmly established. The first is that there are considerable *differences* between nations in the distribution of income. This has been demonstrated above all in the Luxembourg Income Study [Smeeding et al. 1990]. Before the co-ordinated LIS estimates there was uncertainty about this and the tendency was to emphasise similarity more than difference. It has also been shown in more limited comparisons, for example of the Nordic countries [Ringen 1986, 1991; Gustafsson and Uusitalo 1990a, 1990b; Ringen and Uusitalo 1992] and of Australia and New Zealand [Saunders, Stott and Hobbs 1991]. The second finding is that there have been considerable and systematic *shifts* within countries in income inequality over relatively short periods of time. Here I refer to studies by Jenkins [1991], Coulter et al. [1993], Atkinson [1993], and Goodman and Webb [1994] for Britain, to the works cited above for Finland, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand, to Ringen [1993] on the composition of household income in Norway, to Fritzell [1993] for a five-country comparison, and to "official" poverty estimates in Britain and the United States. Previously, the tendency was to regard income inequality as relatively stable over time and such changes as were observed as mainly fluctuations around a stable underlying trend. Through these findings, income inequality has become established as a sensitive indicator of social life.

Whereas established conclusions have been reached on the descriptive facts, there is less agreement about what the relevant underlying pressures are, in particular: to what degree are transfer and tax policies a factor in accounting for variations in income inequality?

The question is of obvious policy relevance, but there is also a more general relevance. There are strong theories, in particular in sociological writing, of an inherent

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tendency to social stability through mechanisms in which society "strikes back" against attempts to impose an arbitrary order on it. One such mechanism may be the ability of those in privilege to confound attempts to undermine their relative advantage. It is suggested that social inequality sits too deep in the fabric of society to be reachable by cautious after-the-fact redistributional measures [cf. eg. Goldthorpe et al. 1980]. The implication is that the choice for society is between drastic market regulations or *laissez-faire*, with no middle ground for reformist and piecemeal strategies.

I am not concerned here with the question of what the distribution of income should be. Nor do I consider such major controversies as equality vs. liberty vs. efficiency. I am concerned only with the power of transfer and tax policies for influencing income inequality, if society should want to move towards more equality than is generated in the market. This needs to be known for considerations of what government *can* do, but knowing this is not necessarily of much consequence for considerations of what government *should* do. It is the potential I am concerned with, and the paper does not offer a comprehensive review of actual country experiences.

A recent review of this kind is available in [Atkinson et al. 1995]. Obviously, it is the normative distribution between persons or households that is considered, and not macro-distributions, for example between labour and capital.

Redistribution

A large body of research has concluded with great consistency in support of the *redistribution thesis*, namely that transfers and taxes in advanced industrial economies tend to have the effect of modifying the distribution of income in the direction of equality. [For a survey of evidence, see Ringen 1987.] However, despite the quantity of supporting evidence, this thesis has not become unreservedly accepted. The reason is that objections can be raised about the solidity of the underlying research.

The available evidence has for the most part been based on "standard method" research in which pre- and post-tax/transfer income distributions at one point in time are compared and the difference is taken as a measure of the redistributive effect of transfers and taxes. This method has many merits. It reflects real flows of market income, and of transfers and taxes, and establishes correctly the distribution of post tax/transfer income. It shows the distributive profile of the tax/transfer regime and how these policies affect the resulting income distribution. Standard method results should in no way be dismissed and do constitute powerful support for the redistribution thesis.

However, it is also clear that there are shortcomings in the standard method. These shortcomings are well-known, but until recently there has not been much that could be done about it since the necessary techniques or data for more complete analyses have been lacking, in particular consistent time-series data.

One limitation in the standard method is in the narrowness of the factors and effects which are considered. Direct effects of transfers and taxes on disposable income are estimated, but all effects on factor income are ignored. This includes changes in economic and social structures in society, policies which work directly on factor income (eg. incomes policies), and indirect second-order tax/transfer effects. Implicitly, the standard method assumes that the distribution of pre-tax/transfer income (factor income) is the distribution "before policies". This is, of course, a considerable simplification. The factor income distribution itself is not stable and is subject to policy pressures. Taxation

may have work incentive or disincentive effects which could influence the distribution of factor income; the same might be the case for social security benefits, for example if they encourage some people to work less than they would have done in the absence of benefits.

A second limitation is that the standard method is static. It gives cross-section evidence on redistribution at one point in time. In a sense, this is not very meaningful since redistribution must necessarily occur over time. A certain redistributional result at one point in time may be "corrected" by an opposite result later, for example as a result of second-order effects, so that a trend analysis would show only arbitrary fluctuations around a stable long term distribution. Cross-section results may be spurious in the sense that what appears to be redistribution between persons here and now, is in effect the result of redistributions over the life-cycle for the same persons, in which case there may still be no redistribution of life-time income.

Methodological advances have now started to make inroads into the limitations of standard method research. There is a constant movement towards better and more comprehensive data sets, and, related to this, new techniques are being taken into use to get some grip on the long-term dynamics of income redistribution. Where, then, does the redistribution thesis stand in light of evidence from research that goes beyond the standard method?

Marginal vs. global redistribution

One of the difficulties which arise from the static quality of the standard method, is that redistribution is estimated from the profile of the tax/transfer system as a whole. Of course, we do not keep constantly starting afresh with a virgin distribution of income upon which a system of transfers and taxes is imposed. At any point in time, we start from prevailing distributions and policies and then introduce, if we so choose, some policy change. In a dynamic perspective, redistribution is captured more realistically in marginal effects on inequality of marginal policy changes than by estimating, more theoretically, global effects of entire policy systems.

In Britain, the distribution of income followed a trend of equalisation from around 1950 to the mid 1970s. This trend was then broken and the distribution gradually moved to more inequality so that by the mid 1980s, the 1950 distribution had been restored and, towards 1990, had become yet more inegalitarian, a movement towards inequality "unparalleled in recent British history" [Coulter et al. 1993]. This dramatic shift in the distribution of income is a test case for the redistribution thesis: if there is power to generate equality in transfer and tax policy, we would expect also a shift towards inequality to be associated with changes in such policies.

Atkinson has analyzed the movement towards inequality in Britain [Atkinson 1993]. He has pointed to three factors. First, a shift from work in the sense that fewer households are headed by persons in work (down from about 70% in 1970 to less than 60% in 1985) and a smaller proportion of household income is from work (down from more than 80% in 1975 to just over 70% in the mid 1980s). This factor, he finds, accounts for about half of the increase in inequality from 1975 to 1985. In addition, the income differential between the in-work and the not-in-work groups increased, notably after 1985. Second, a rise in earnings inequality among those in work. Around 1975, among full-time workers, the earnings of those in the top decile were about three times

the earnings of those in the bottom decile, whereafter the ratio increased steadily to about 3.4:1 in 1990. Third, the distribution of income among those not in work. During the 1980s, while the value of non-state pensions continued to follow earnings trends, the relative value of state pensions and benefits declined when the basis for upgrading changed from earnings to prices, the result being a relative deterioration in the income position of those depending most heavily on state pensions and benefits.

The story is a complex one with a range of economic, demographic, and political factors contributing to the end result. The explanation is clearly not exclusively political, but policies do play a role, for example for economic development and unemployment. Among the relevant policy factors is that of changing rules in social security benefits. This accounts for a good deal of the increasing inequality among those not in work, and for some of the increasing difference between those in work and those not in work. How much exactly this factor contributes to the total explanation is not clear, but for the present purpose it is sufficient to say that it is significant. The new British trend towards inequality cannot be put down to "automatic" forces of long-term stability in the distribution of income; it is to a significant degree induced by changes in redistributive policies.

In a comparison of income inequality trends in five countries during the 1980s, Fritzell found stability in Germany and Canada and a trend towards increasing inequality in Sweden, Britain, and the US [Fritzell 1993]. Changes in redistributive policies are found to contribute to explaining both stability and change. In all five countries, an increase in factor income inequality was observed; in Germany and Canada this was counterbalanced by changes in policies pulling in the opposite direction, hence end stability; in Sweden, Britain and the US, changes in the distribution of factor income carried through to the distribution of disposable income, and changes in redistributive policies added to this effect, rather than, as in the two other countries, neutralising it.

In an earlier study, I made a comparison of income redistribution in Norway and Sweden, using carefully co-ordinated survey data for 1982 [Ringen 1986]. That comparison turned out to have a quasi-experimental flavour: while factor income was identically distributed in both countries, disposable income was more egalitarian in Sweden than in Norway. This suggests that the difference in the end distribution of disposable income is, in this comparison, to be accounted for by political forces which redistribute factor income "afterwards" rather than by economic forces which determine the original distribution of factor income (although some uncertainty about second-order effects on factor income remains).

Taxes and transfers can influence the distribution of disposable income in two ways: there is a *volume* effect through their levels and a *profile* effect through their shape. (By "volume", understand the proportion of total household income coming from direct transfers and the percentage of gross income going to direct taxes. By "profile", understand the distribution of transfer income relative to factor income and the distribution of taxes relative to gross income, i.e., how progressive or regressive they are.) While the level of transfers and taxes was higher in Sweden than in Norway, their profiles were more progressive in the Norwegian system. By cross-simulation – imputing the Norwegian profiles into the Swedish system while keeping levels constant, and the Swedish levels into the Norwegian system while keeping profiles constant – it was demonstrated that the volume effect was more powerful than the profile effect. The

marginal change in the level imputed into the Norwegian system resulted in a greater change in the distribution of disposable income, than did the marginal change of profile imputed into the Swedish system.

Again, the story is complex and a full account is not possible. However, in this comparison, in which there is no difference in factor income distribution and the influences on factor income inequality may in large measure be assumed constant, much of the explanation seems to lie between factor and disposable income, i.e. in transfer and tax redistributions. In addition, it is here established that differences in volume matter in addition to differences in policy profiles.

Structural and redistributive factors

From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, Finland experienced what is perhaps the most dramatic case of reduced income inequality in any industrial nation and was transformed in this respect into the most egalitarian of the Nordic countries. During this period, the gini index for the distribution of equivalent disposable income fell from about .32 to about .20. Most of this change occurred during no more than ten years, from 1966 to 1976. Since 1985, the distribution has been stable. [Uusitalo 1989, and personal communication on trends from 1985 to 1992.]

Having established this remarkable trend, Uusitalo has sought to explain the change in inequality in Finland through an analysis which considers three sets of explanatory factors: transfer and tax policies, incomes policies, and structural changes in society. This study covers a long period, observes trends in both factor income and disposable income, takes in the effects of structural change in society, and considers policy effects on the factor-income distribution (incomes policies) along with the effects of transfers and taxes. Second-order effects "back" to factor income would be captured in this analysis, although not identified specifically. Through its richness, this is an exceptionally informative study in respect to both major problems in the standard method, narrowness and the static limitation.

There were important changes in socio-economic structure in Finland during the period, such as in the occupational composition of the work force, the regional pattern of residence, and household size and composition. These structural changes turn out to be of relatively little importance in explaining the change in income inequality. They changed the relative income position of some socio-economic groups, but these changes tended to pull in different directions and to balance each other out. Finland did not become more egalitarian in income terms as a result of Finnish society itself becoming more egalitarian in some structural sense. Rather, income equality was generated without structural pressures pushing systematically in that direction - an important finding in its own right.

The change in final inequality was a result of changes both in the distribution of factor income and of redistributions of factor income into disposable income, both elements pulling in the direction of equality. The change in the distribution of factor income is attributed in large measure to incomes policies. In a period of "solidaristic wage policy", factor-income inequality was reduced; when this policy was relaxed, factor-income inequality stabilised. Here, there are two additional important findings. First, at no time was a trend of increasing inequality of factor income observed. In a period of strong redistributive pressures, there were in other words not countervailing forces of sufficient strength to undermine redistribution by pulling factor income in the

direction of more inequality. Second, in the period of reduced inequality of factor income, the explanation is not underlying socio-economic change, but instead policy interventions in market processes, in this case in the form of income policy agreements between government and labour market partners. Not only changes in final inequality, therefore, but also in factor-income inequality turn out to be politically induced rather than structurally determined.

Although changes in the distribution of factor income did push final income in the direction of equality, the most important of the explanatory factors considered is transfer and tax policy. Changes in these policies had a strong equalising impact. This effect was at work while factor income inequality was reduced and continued to work after factor-income inequality had stabilised. Redistribution occurred through taxes as well as transfers, between the working and non-working populations, and within the working population. In a decomposition of transfer and tax effects, changes in volume were found to be more important than changes in profile.

This analysis is in terms of general inequality. In a separate study, Uusitalo has replicated the main analysis in terms of poverty rates, and found these to have been reduced in much the same way as general inequality and this reduction to be influenced in much the same way by redistributive policies. Gustafsson has analyzed changes in income inequality and poverty in Sweden over the same period (prior to the shift towards increasing inequality observed by Fritzell) and reached conclusions for Sweden much like those of Uusitalo for Finland [Gustafsson and Uusitalo 1990a, 1990b]. The importance of the volume effect is the same as I found in my comparison of Norway and Sweden.

As with the story of inequality in Britain, the story of equality in Finland is a complex one with a range of forces interacting. Had we studied this story within a standard-method framework, we would have found support for the redistribution thesis. Having studied the story within a broader framework that overcomes the limitations of the standard method, Uusitalo still reaches conclusions which are equally in support of the redistribution thesis.

Life-time redistribution

Equalization of income implies a transfer in favour of those in need. Being in need, however, is not necessarily a permanent situation for persons but may be limited to certain periods of the life course, for example during unemployment or in old age. To the degree that such periods are reasonably predictable, the relevant needs can be accommodated through insurance-type arrangements to which people in some periods make contributions and from which they in other periods draw benefits. Modern welfare state social security systems are in considerable measure insurance-type arrangements, although not necessarily explicitly so [Hills et al. 1993]. If social security systems were perfectly insurance organised, it would all be a matter of inter-person redistribution over the life-cycle with no intra-person redistribution, except what might result from accidental misfortune. If all redistribution were inter-person, there would be no redistribution between persons in life-time income. Standard method results add up the cross-section manifestations of inter- and intra-person over-time redistributions.

Obviously, it is not possible to observe future effects of current policies directly. What has proved possible, however, is to simulate the life-cycle effects implicit in

current policies. In this, no prediction is involved; simulations show only theoretical long-term effects implicit in *present* policies.

Harding has developed a "dynamic micro-simulation model" for this purpose applied to the case of Australia [Harding 1992]. The model simulates the life of a cohort "born" in 1986 through a life span of 95 years with regard to events such as birth, marriage, divorce, death, children leaving home, labour force entry and exit, and so on. The simulations are made year by year over the life-span of the cohort, on the basis of known probabilities from existing statistics and today's rules in transfers and taxes. A simulation of this kind does not predict what will happen in the future – that obviously depends on future decisions and events – but shows what would happen under a steady-state assumption. The question the study seeks to answer is the following: if the demographic, labour force, income and other characteristics of the population, and all government policies existing in 1986, remained unchanged for 95 years, what would the distribution of income be like at different points in time and what income redistribution would be achieved by government programmes over the life-course of the cohort?

The characteristics and limitations of the study are essentially those of standard redistribution analysis, except for the introduction of the time dimension: the analysis is limited to cash income and to first-order redistribution, income is recorded as equivalent income for persons, only cash transfers are considered. On the tax side, the simulations incorporate the level of income taxes which is needed to finance actual cash transfers. The simulation does not break new ground on the concept of redistribution, but it overcomes the cross-section limitation of standard method research and thereby shows the degree to which cross-section results can be generalised to a life-time perspective.

Main findings: The tax-transfer system in Australia has a profound effect on life-cycle income. This works in two ways. Income is redistributed both over the life-course of persons (from the years of work to the years of retirement) and between persons during their life-courses. On average for males, about 45 per cent of the income tax paid was returned to the same persons at another point in the life-cycle. The remaining 55 per cent was absorbed by inter-person redistribution. The winners in this redistribution are first of all women compared to men. While men on average get less back in transfers than they pay in taxes, women on average break even up to about the age of 60 and then become net winners. When groups defined in terms of life-time standard of living are compared and transfers and taxes are accumulated over the life-course, those with a lower standard of living are the winners and those with a higher standard of living the losers.

In a simulation for Britain, Falkingham et al. [1993] separate inter-person from intra-person lifetime redistribution of cash transfers and taxes (using a model population rather than a cohort). Their conclusions are similar to those of Harding. The British system is found to be redistributional both in the inter-person and intra-person sense. Of all direct transfers received over the life-course, 62 per cent are found to have been paid for by the same persons at various times during the life-course, while 38 per cent represent transfers beyond what the recipients have contributed. The profile of the net benefit across life-time income groups (and of gross benefits and gross taxes for that matter) is progressive: the lower the life-time income, the relatively higher the life-time transfers and the relatively lower the life-time taxes.

Conclusion

Standard method research shows there to be an association between transfers and taxes and the distribution of income. This suggests two recommendations to policy makers. If government wants to modify income inequality, it has a tool for doing that in the system of transfers and taxes. If government wants to reshape transfers or taxes for other reasons than egalitarian idealism, it should not expect to be able to do so without effects for the distribution of income.

Since it is easy to point to shortcomings in the standard method, policy advice based on such results may be considered speculative. Ten years ago, we had only standard method results to go by. New research has, however, gone beyond the standard method in ways which meet objections to it.

It can be argued that the standard method is unrealistic since it considers redistribution as a matter of global rather than marginal effects. I have introduced evidence specifically on marginal effects. It can be argued that the standard method is unrealistic since it ignores the process of income formation "before" transfers and taxes. I have introduced evidence on the interplay between structural and redistributional effects. It can be argued that the standard method is unrealistic since it confuses cross-section and life-cycle effects and fails to distinguish between inter-person and intra-person redistributions. I have introduced evidence from micro-simulations which distinguish between these elements. The evidence that is introduced is not complete, and possibly not representative, in respect to the experience of advanced industrial societies in recent years, but is strategic in respect to well-known shortcomings in the standard method.

It has long been recognised that standard method results tend to exaggerate the redistributive impact of transfers and taxes. Standard method results have therefore not had much credence as to the absolute *magnitude* of redistribution, but considerable claims have been made as to the *existence* of a redistributive effect. The material considered in this essay confirms that the standard method is not a good guide for the magnitude of redistribution, but it does not otherwise undermine what has been learned from standard-method redistribution research. Obviously, a universal generalization that transfers and taxes equalize income would be nonsense, it depends on the transfers and taxes. But a conclusion that transfers and taxes *can* equalize income must now be said to have strong underpinning. To the two firmly established descriptive conclusions, it should be possible to add a third equally established analytic conclusion" that income inequality is associated with tax/transfer policy and that such policies are a factor in accounting for variations in income inequality. As a consequence, the two policy recommendations stand.

In his much quoted article, *The Welfare State in Historical Perspective*, Asa Briggs [1961] defined the welfare state as the deliberate use of politics and administration to modify the play of market forces. Mixed economy democracies have relied heavily on after-the-fact redistributive policies to modify inequality. I think it is a sound hypothesis that democracy is a sufficiently rational system for a policy strategy not to be maintained unless it proves reasonably capable of performing as intended, and that the expected finding should therefore be that tax/transfer redistribution works. This, indeed, is what the evidence shows; at least that there is in a cautious reformist strategy the potential for modifying inequality.The counter-hypothesis is that such policies are superficial and do not penetrate the surface of society to reach the real forces of inequality. If this were the

case, it would represent a devastating verdict not only on the strategy of redistribution but also on the very idea of reform democracy. The experience of redistribution is in favour of the first hypothesis. What has been learned is not in support of the theory that society has no middle ground for commonsense, piecemeal policy reform.

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Large-Scale Privatization and Industrial Relations*

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Abstract: The problem of social tensions and of establishing new industrial relations was investigated within the project "Large-Scale Privatization: Social Conflict and Consensus", which is based on semi-structured interviews with 265 workers, trade union functionaries and managers in 44 Czech industrial enterprises selected according to the conflict potential arising at the outset of their restructuring. In the necessary transition to lean production often more than one half of the employees were forced to leave. As many of them changed their employer spontaneously or found jobs elsewhere, there were, surprisingly, no societally dangerous conflicts connected with this hitherto foreign process. Problems arose through conflicts within the management and among the staff of the newly decentralized company units. In addition, the redundancy of their administration, re-evoked the hostility between blue and white collar workers. Typical cases of disappointment from the negotiation and cooperation with foreign partners can also be found. The position of trade unions (hereafter TUs) is a result of the general tendency to question their role. In connection with their newly restricted competencies to influence the position of employees. The management is for the most part not used or able to negotiate with them. Usually, however, it does not assert or implement extreme decisions; the TUs themselves are not very radical either. Besides the conflictual relations between the two bodies, many situations can be found where confrontation is replaced with cooperation which does, however, retain its contradictory character. The absence of strikes can be explained not only by general socio-economical stability, but also by the ability of numerous workers, functionaries and managers to adopt the "role of the other". The mutual tolerance limits labour conflicts mostly to a latent form of discontent. Consensus has been very often attained as a result of apathy and resignation to the unsolved problems. Social tensions thus change into fragile peace without any marked prospects for social partnership. With regard to their differences from the traditional systems of interest representation, the newly emerging industrial relations can be hypotheticaly denominated and explained as post-industrial.

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1. Initial Situation: The Pre-Privatization Syndrome

At the beginning of the large-scale privatization of big enterprises in the Czech Republic public opinion expressed considerable doubts as to: 1) the proposed forms of privatization and voucher privatization in particular; 2) the progress of privatization of mammoth or lucrative enterprises; 3) foreign participation, which brought about first the

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fear of the "sale" of national property and then misgivings at its postponement. The opposition considered the drop in industrial production, real wages and income, internal investment and consumption demand, business activities and the further devaluation of labour too high a price for the achievement of macroeconomic equilibrium. Nevertheless, the positive development of external economic relations, the small increase in unemployment and the stabilization of currency in particular represented, in the governmentally accentuated comparison with other post-communist countries, the basis for successively established consensual regulation of the natural clash of interests of labour, capital and the state.

The conflict potential of privatization has therefore not been activated on a societal scale. Following the new tripartite agreements, the generally expected social tensions shifted mostly to the enterprise level, where they were connected particularly with the so-called pre-privatization syndrome. According to a summary reproduction of reservations about the privatization strategy, this syndrome was temporarily characterized by:

1) the paradox of a state-performed de-etatization of property and centrally asserted decentralization of decision-making;
2) the ideologization of private property and the role of the market as the only means of economic recovery;
3) "desperate privatization" in which the speed of technical implementation was superior to the demonopolization and reorganization of enterprises at the cost of their flexibility, value and, consequently, of state profit from their transfer;
4) "state desertion", in the course of which the appropriate authorities shed their responsibility for the further fate of the contradictory "state joint-stock companies", did not behave as the main owner and withdrew from the continuous exercise of their proprietary function;
5) the "self-service" or "nomenclatura privatization", whereby privatisation was abused as an instrument of redistribution and concentration of economic and political power, i.e. the reduction of the economic transformation to the transformation of group or personal positions;
6) the managerial "revolution from above" bringing about "negative participation", i.e. seeming engagement in the reform masking the desire to slow its progress and the tendency of enterprise employees to use the privatization as an organized self-defence against proclaimed "shock therapy";
7) "wild privatization" through the usurpation of property rights by the previous management which, together with ministry officials, became privileged owners of confidential information and exchange transactions;
8) the artificial liquidation of effective enterprises or operating units in the interest of competing companies, their decapitalization or speculative sales, pressure subcontracting or forced cooperation with unsuccessful firms, reciprocal advantages granted to unofficial partners, etc. on the part of management;
9) the short-term economic rationality of illegitimate business activities such as tax evasion, money laundering, the cartelization or direct "gangsterization" of legally uncontrolled markets and the coming into being of "South American" types of clientelist systems and corruption structures;

10) questionable forms of direct sale or public competitions, assessment of privatization projects granting advantages to existing managements or, on the contrary, the assertion of competitive projects and use of advisory services of compromised former managers, etc., provoking subsequent doubts about the conflicting roles of some state officials, the "vested interests" of the investment fund coalitions and the general fairness of several known problematic privatization cases.

Some of the above quoted reservations might be understood as ideologically grounded hypotheses or constructions based on excessivelly generalized "anecdotical" stories. The pre-privatization syndrome appears to be a widespread notion or "social definition of a situation" which could not be verified without the use of extra-sociological methods but which exerts a strong influence on the behavior of staff and other actors. The initial mistrust in the purpose of mass privatization was gradually overcome by additional measures ("privatization quarantine"). Doubts due to the understanding of the privatization process as the "second nationalization" were replaced by partial manifestations of disapproval of the concrete decisions made by the relevant authorities and finally by discontent with the rate of progress of this process. In the end, this process was adopted as a whole with general consent.

In this transitional situation, the research project, "Large-Scale Privatization: Social Conflict and Consensus" was proposed in 1991, allocated funding by the Academy of Sciences in 1992 and completed in 1993. Conceptually, it was based on the theories of: 1) industrial relations, organizational policy and labour conflicts [Euler 1973, Sabel 1982, Lee and Lawrence 1985, Mueller-Jentsch 1994], 2) conflict, property, competition [Dahrendorf 1959, Bühl 1976, Binns 1978], 3) workers' control, participation and industrial democracy [Tannenbaum 1968, Brannen 1983, Poole 1986, Kotthoff 1994], 4) communication, cohesion and consensus [Coser 1956, Hodges 1971, Krysmanski 1971, Kriesberg 1973], 5) conflict control intraorganizational behaviour and its postmodern characteristics [Clegg 1990; Crook, Pakulski, and Waters 1992; Daheim, Krahn, Scheider 1994]. In contrast to the prevailing macro-structural approach to the investigation of transformation, the qualitative method of case studies at the enterprise level was selected. The field survey was carried out on 44 industrial enterprises in 5 regions. The enterprises were selected – on the assumption that privatization is not the sole source of their problems – with regard to conflict situations arising in them at that time. The researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with 265 respondents selected mostly at random from the ranks of workers (78), foremen (20), techno-economic staff (40), TU functionaries (82) and managers (45). Among the principle questions to be investigated were the socio-economic aspects of restructuring (section 2 of the article), changes in management and participation (3) and the socio-political frame of labour relations (4). [For detailed methodological information and empirical evidence see Vláčil 1994].

2. The Conflictual Situation of Enterprises and Employees

Most of the investigated firms are struggling with the change of markets or the demands they place, obsolete equipment, recovery of receivables and shortage of investments. In the necessary transition to lean production, TUs agreed – contrary to their traditional role – with the dismissal of redundant employees in order to save the jobs of the remaining ones. They, of course, preferred solutions with the most "painless" possible social consequences. As many of the departing employees changed employers spontaneously or

found other jobs elsewhere, there were – surprisingly and in contrast to other countries – no societally dangerous conflicts connected with this hitherto foreign process. The remaining overemployment should be solved by further "controlled natural fluctuation". At the same time, many specialists left their firm in response to its uncertain prospects, creating a shortage of qualified personnel to meet market demands.

The intraorganizational adaptation of the structure and behaviour of enterprises has been limited to the customary formal decentralization, reported as insufficient in 75% of investigated (44) firms. Restructuring was mostly understood as a simple mechanical deconstruction, the division of bigger units to smaller ones. The absence of real subjectivity on the part of newly established daughter companies or divisions prolonged the traditional, demotivating redistribution of profit to unsuccessful units by the still existing general directorates. This is, in fact, one of the most actual causes of conflicts within the management and among the staff of different firm parts. Contrary to intentions and demands, administration is in many cases growing, communication and coordination becoming increasingly complicated and tensions between blue and white collar workers are – sometimes with ideological contamination from the past – recurring.

An attempt at a sort of "comparative biography" of the investigated enterprises suggests that at the time of research it was possible, within the progressing changes, to discern and re-construct the following principal types from among them:

1) the liquidated firm, where the causes of the situation most frequently mentioned by respondents are obsolete and then reduced production, incapacity for product reorientation or unsuccessful marketing of the innovated product;
2) the existentially threatened firm, where the main causes are the loss of sale contacts and markets, incomplete reorganization or newly emerging competition;
3) the technologically out-of-date firm, where the former customer guaranteed long-term sale but, simultaneously, obsolescence or where the product development was interrupted by negotiations with the foreign partner;
4) the firm revitalized by the change in external conditions, e.g. a return to temporarily suspended armaments production;
5) the firm revitalized by its own management, e.g. through securing sale of newly developed products;
6) the ever prosperous firm with long-term foreign cooperation and an internationally recognised trademark;
7) the unsuccessful joint venture in which the foreign partner does not observe the original agreements and undesirable working conditions persist;
8) the prosperous joint venture or foreign firm with highly qualified personnel and long-term trade contracts.

(Some of the investigated firms were not fully privatized until the end of 1995 so that information on their conflictual situation is still very actual.)

Roughly corresponding with these types are the typical staff attitudes toward the firm (disrespect, criticism or pride) and toward the management (long-term scepticism, temporary distrust, disappointment or ambiguity of expectations) [Vláčil 1994]. Employees criticize the management but are not sure if its replacement would solve the undesirable situation the enterprise is in. Inexperience with approaches to competition engender disputes about the motives of foreign partners. In many cases it became clear

that the potential "cooperator" will actually 1) buy the firm for far less than its value, 2) usurp its markets, 3) liquidate the Czech competitor, 4) suppress technical innovations, 5) acquire confidential information, 6) "steal" individual specialists, 7) bring the staff of the mother enterprise under negotiation pressure, 8) convert the final production into the mere assembly of foreign-made components. More than of unemployment, the workers now fear loss of qualifications. In joint ventures, the main source of social conflicts is the workers' disappointment ("we are now exactly where we were without foreign capital") and the behaviour of the managers – from different sociocultural milieu – toward them ("they treat us as if we were monkeys").

The research results enable a certain redefinition of both the initial conceptual assumptions and the present social situation. The gloomy socio-economic situation many enterprises find themselves in is accompanied by the socio-psychologically unusual conciliatory mood of their employees. There were, for example, almost no strikes directly connected with large-scale privatization. Their potential initiators are increasingly aware of their paradoxical situation whereby the successful assertion of high demands risks the liquidation of the entire enterprise. Such fears represent another source of motivational and interests conflict. The absence of confrontational actions – surprising particularly for foreign sociologists – can obviously be explained not only by the overall societal stability but also by a certain historically rooted feature of the Czech political culture and mentality. The ability of numerous rank-and-file workers, TU functionaries and partly also managers to see a problem from the point of view of the opposite party, i.e. to adopt "the role of the other", is the source of their mutual tolerance and preparedness for compromise or/and consensus. (This "mentality hypothesis" of the non-confrontational nature of Czech political culture is based on the subjective statements of a great number of respondents and seeks to offer one possible explanation of an as yet neglected phenomenon. It is shared by some foreign scientists investigating the Czech situation [e.g. Rutland 1994, Orenstein 1994] and should be verified in a contingent cross-cultural study.)

The ascertained conflicts most frequently take the form of hostility and symbolic aggressiveness and are caused by concerns about the future continuation of contradictions rather than with the present state of affairs. Questionable, unverifiable information can also lead to conflicting behaviour. Social control and communication determine the image of the opponent, the course and nature of the conflict or, on the contrary, the establishment of consensus [Krysmanski 1971]. The conflicts have some positive effects such as the growing cohesion of the participating groups [Coser 1956], but they can also effectively limit the achievements of the enterprise as a whole [Euler 1973]. The escalation of unresolved contradictions – predicted in the conflictualistic literature [Moscovici and Doise 1994] – did not occur. Conflict postponement could be, nevertheless, a simple consequence of the traditional, culturally specific patterns of resistance.

Consensus in the investigated enterprises has been attained not only by overcoming the initial opposite standpoints but also as a result of resignation on the part of both parties (i.e. not only workers, but managers as well) to the unsolved or temporarily insoluble problem. Social tension thus changes into a temporary, unsafe and very fragile social peace with no strong prospects of social partnership. However, even minimum consensus on values and temporary compatibility of interests enable the joint

use of the necessary incentives, the establishment of mutual, consistent and foreseeable relations and the change of the system integrity of the enterprise from simple functional dependencies into a truly social integration. Apathy and resignation expressed in the interviews towards exercising influence on both the future of the enterprise and one's own is considerably widespread. However, it is also mentioned with a certain measure of self-reflection, comparison with previous activities and self-criticism. This aspect, too, may be assessed with mild optimism as an indication of the lasting interest in the formation of new industrial, employment or labour relations.

3. The Contradictorial Cooperation between Management and TUs

In spite of a number of reservations on the part of respondents to the concrete cases of its implementation, privatization is considered most frequently as a means of saving the investigated enterprises. Their restructuring was influenced not only by the known socio-economic, technical and legislative limitations ("a socialist enterprise in capitalist conditions"), but also by the unpreparedness of the management ("the revolution came too soon") and the rigidity of a part of employees ("nothing needs improving"), their interpersonal relations and socio-psychologically rooted stereotypes or prejudices. The investigated management executives often lack such qualificational requirements as the ability to deal effectively with people, to take consistent operative measures, etc. Their strategy in the given business conditions mostly aims at survival and not expansion in the market and the long-term development of the enterprise. By their reliance on foreign investors and their own managerial "know-how" they place themselves in the role of the expendable "middle link" of leadership. They do not formulate the specific "mission" of the firm and therefore cannot win greater support of the enterprise policy from the employees ("we don't understand the reasons for reorganization"). They often behave merely as economic administrators entirely lacking the entrepreneurial mentality of the Schumpeterian "adventurer" characterized by his willingness to take risks.

"Leaned" production brought about a reduction in the number of employees, but not the lessening of overemployment in some jobs or the "right-sizing" of the required professions. The hiring and training of skilled, initiated employees, who would identify themselves with their firm, was imprudently postponed until the period of prosperity. With limited possibilities for technological innovation, managers mostly disregard the organizational innovations which have low investment requirements, were promoted in other countries and can ensure, for example1) the "flattening of the pyramid" of leadership hierarchy, 2) the establishment of autonomous, self-controlled working groups with high motivation, responsibility, satisfaction and adaptability, 3) network communication among such teams, 4) job rotation, horizontal job enlargement or its vertical enrichment, 5) the use of organizational culture, socio-emotionally integrating the staff of the enterprise and presenting an outward "image", "goodwill" or "personality" of the firm. "Job redesign" is mostly enforced by the newly re-emerging shortage of personnel, not by prospective concepts of the rationalization of production or humanization of work. Conscious generation of the enterprise culture is – like human resources management, marketing policy etc. – postponed by the turbulent environment. Therefore, the restructuring performed so far could be considered somewhat backward both in timing and concept.

The prevailing structurally conservative type of management [Lungwitz 1995] is repeatedly expressed in efforts to continue "proven" ways of organizational control

adopted from the socialist past. The recommended transition from the previous collectivist and now rather paternalist leadership to consultative vertical cooperation of the labour force and from its hierarchic authoritative style to a participative "joint labour-management" climate was not applied. The managers obviously do not reflect upon their own entrepreneurial culture and self-control, corporate governance or societal responsibility. The "philosophy" of their decision-making is based on the endeavour to satisfy the staff rather than to optimize the solution of its problems. They foster primarily their own image in the sense of impression management and prefer to suppress conflicts rather than to overcome them in the sense of conflict management. In the near future they will have to combine the so far prevailing responsibility towards their employees with "account rendering" to new owners.

Along with former administrators, the study has identified that newly installed directors (two thirds in the investigated enterprises as compared to approximately three fifths in the whole economy) with better managerial education, but lack of social capital accumulated through experience and contacts. Besides the critical findings some results have shown the first signs of a very probable emergence of a new type of manager – competitively market- and customer-oriented, strategically planning, staff-mobilizing etc. Such a type (now 20% of respective respondents, independent of age and qualification) might soon be not only better adapted to or prepared for the forthcoming economic reform at the enterprise level, but also necessary for its successful completion.

The questionable achievements of many present managers make increasingly topical the problem of employees' participation in decision-making. Such participation may be spontaneous or organized, direct or institutionally mediated, continuous or campaign-like, concerned with the assessment of past management results, operative problem solutions or future strategy of the enterprise and bargaining with its management. It can fulfil the function of information, motivation, definition of standards and rearticulation of roles, social learning, the establishment of consensus and the organizational integration of activities of working groups. The relation between the management and the labour force in this process (Mitwirkung) can be scaled from consultation over endorsement requiring mere consent with the managerial decision (Mitsprache) to co-determination (Mitbestimmung).

For a typical manager – often with little or no experience in this position – it is, however, difficult to understand that the total amount of power in an organization is not constant and definite. The increase of influence of subordinates does not exclude and need not reduce the power of superiors [Tannenbaum 1968]. Participation in control increases responsibility, discipline and, consequently, controllability. There are more potential competences in an enterprise than in the zero sum assumed in the majority of cases. Indeed, changing the power monologue into dialogue, from one-direction to mutual influence, may even increase the scope of control. The delegation of decision-making powers, the use of power to "empower", entitlement and power sharing re-introduces, naturally, the problem of governance responsibility.

Widespread among the employees is, on the one hand, the fear of existential consequences of nonconforming pro-social activities. On the other hand, however, similar fears of wage reduction or loss of job increases their interest in participating in the formulation of the social and often business policies of the enterprise. Increasing working requirements and significant organizational changes enhance their need for

control over their own working conditions. In the modernization of production, this need mostly manifests itself not as a struggle against it but, on the contrary, as a struggle for participation in it. Decentralization necessitates a new connection between hierarchical levels and coordination methods. Participation may also represent an economisation of the behaviour of decentralized units. Although in the newer literature rather relativized [de Bal 1993] and in the investigated firms rarely found (i.e. not verifiable), the concept of participation seems to be one of the important, presently unutilized schemes of general enterprise modernization.

Underestimation of participation ranks among the principal shortcomings of liberalism. Its consequences, particularly when combined with work satisfaction and achievement, cannot be expressed directly in quantitative terms. Regardless of its assumed economic advantages, however, the requirements of participation may also serve the further assertion of political freedom and civil rights. Nevertheless, activist groups are passively suffered rather than actively supported by the employees. By participation the management seemingly risks loss of control and the TUs the suspicion of disloyalty to their members. On the other hand, foreign management often seeks in vain its local social partner. The requirements and prospects of participation are very limited and obviously will not represent a source of further conflicts in the near future. Nor, however, will social partnership, which assumes participative cooperation, balance and legitimation of power, regulation as a commodity exchanged in negotiations and agreement as a form of communication, soon become a mass phenomenon.

Currently in the Czech Republic, the TUs represent the only and exclusive organ of participation. They are fulfilling their traditional function by the organization of solidarity, protection and services for their members, but participate only to a limited extent in the control of the distribution of the profit of the enterprise. They are involved only rarely in decisions concerning the production of goods and profits which should be distributed. As an institution of interests representation they are still seeking an opportunity for everyday co-determination of managerial decisions. The position of TU associations and enterprise organizations is a result of the general tendency to question their role. The opinion that with the present legally restricted competency or ability of co-determination the TUs in no way influence the situation of the employees, grant them any advantages, are the "remnants of socialism" and the "retardation of economy", is considerably widespread. The decrease in membership is a result both of their members' mobility, passivity and disinterest in rejoining after changing job and the duty of the TUs to also defend the interests of those employees of the enterprise who are not members. The idea that in private and particularly foreign firms TUs are entirely unwanted is also widespread. Individualized employment relations are reducing their influence over rank-and-file members and represent another cause of the loss of TUs' prestige. Nevertheless, in the former state enterprises the rate of organized employees has not dropped below 80% and the TUs functionaries are now in favour of 50-60% because of a greater capacity for action.

In most of the investigated enterprises the TUs have participated actively in the assessment of privatization projects, using the following criteria: 1) the guarantee of the prosperity of the enterprise, 2) the principle of share distribution including possible staff shares, 3) the prospects of employment, retraining of the employees, the wage standard as well as the solution of further socio-political problems, 4) the protection of TU property,

particularly the fund for social and cultural needs and the recreation and/or training facilities, often owned jointly by the enterprise, 5) the forms of representation of the employees' interests in the Boards of Directors and the Supervisory Boards, 6) the future power of TUs in collective bargaining, etc. Access to some projects, particularly the alternative ones, was denied them. In some cases, TUs submitted their own privatization projects. In general, however, there was a tendency to condemn the privatization projects rather than prepare them.

In many enterprises, the majority of previous social advantages and services – particularly housing, rehabilitation and medical facilities, subsidized catering, reduced-price of large-scale shopping, subsidized transport to work, domestic and foreign recreation and holiday camps for children – were abolished. These changes reflect a more general trend in the transformation of TUs from the former lucrative "transmission belt" of one-party rule into the bumper or lighting rod of the discontent of both employees and management. TU organizations have originated mostly from the revolutionary Strike Committees which decided on the dismissal of the management in the recent past. Now they have to adapt once more to changes "from above". They will come increasingly into new conflicts in which the owners of the enterprises will emphasize their own rights, the management its powers and status, and the employees their social security requirements.

In general, the management of Czech enterprises is not used to and cannot negotiate with the TUs. Their functionaries are often better informed and prepared for the negotiations than the managers. They are versed in alternative foreign methods of organization of labour and formation of employment relations. In the present conditions, however, the contrast of the mostly techno-economic orientation of enterprise management and the socio-political orientation of TU functionaries makes their joint deliberations on such prospective subjects rather difficult. In most cases, the management does not assert extreme decisions, and the TUs are not very radical. Their mutual endeavour to avoid sharp conflicts is often the result of long-term personal contacts and the ability to distinguish both between a conflict of interests and the consensus in shared values and between role conflict and interpersonal relations.

The minimalism of requirements is brought about by fears of 1) the assertion of utilitarian interests and the suboptimization of enterprise management, 2) the excessive restrictive interference of TUs' top administration or, on the contrary, 3) the erosion of collective agreements by the employers. For these reasons, the TU functionaries of the investigated enterprises do not represent "managers of discontent" [Watson 1988]. Institutionalized relations are relatively problem-free; this does not mean, however, that they are conflict-free [Mueller-Jentsch 1994] in concrete issues. They may deteriorate with the arrival of new owners or new management. Nevertheless, confrontation is at present replaced by cooperation which has understandably retained its antagonist [Klient 1986], contradictory character.

4. Preliminary Conclusions: The Formation of New Industrial Relations

The earlier mentioned industrial relations cover the various types of socially institutionalized representation of employee and employer interests as well as the types of employee/employer attitudes and behaviour in concrete situations. They influence the enterprise modernization [Brannen 1983], staff satisfaction as well as the profit of the owners. The negotiations of TUs and employers' associations on the rules of the sale of

labour on the labour market and the general conditions of its use in the enterprises influence the methods of application of property rights, management powers as well as formal subordination and superiority structures. This aspect of industrial relations manifests itself further in the hierarchical differences in the contents of work and remuneration, in the scope of competence, autonomy and influence, in career perspectives and so on. It links the professional orientation of the employees with organizational norms, determines the possibilities of their participation in the solution of the problems at their work place and their initiative as well as loyalty to the enterprise.

On the enterprise level, the changes in employment relations reflect the macrostructural political and economic transformation of society, arise from the re-establishment of both plurality of property relations and group interests. Employees' attitudes to the owner and the management of the enterprise are influenced by these processes [Sabel 1982], but are also frequently generalized and transferred to the opinions of the government and political system. Large-scale privatization increases the responsibility of the enterprise for the control of conflicts among the individual groups and the transformation of social tension into social peace. The social climate of the enterprise may become an expression as well as a constitutive component of the general societal atmosphere. The mutual assertion of the interests of employees and employers also belongs to the decisive sources of the changes in the organizational structure of work. All these changes are being legitimized in retrospect by the achieved social peace.

A parallel to TUs and their organizations is represented in many countries by the Enterprises Councils. These conclude, without government participation, specific agreements with the management which could not be formulated on the general platform of TUs. In the Czech Republic there was also a long tradition of this dual representation of the interests of the employees both in the TUs and in enterprise councils, which was respected in the prewar republic and partly survived, though in the curtailed form of formalized initiative, during the time of socialism. The discrediting of this system is increased by the fact that it is promoted, like participation in general, by those who had suppressed or bureaucratically abused it in the past. Mistrust of such institutions, often of a mock-up character, limits the possibilities for their use as a counterweight to authoritarian tendencies. The broadening of the participation organs – e.g. the establishment of enterprise councils – is opposed by the Trade Unions for fear of a competitive disintegration of the "uniform movement".

The present codification of employment relations is considered by many specialists as an economically understandable, but politically immature and sociologically surprisingly unfavorable prerequisite for the establishment of industrial democracy within the enterprise. The state governed by the rule of law should define such scope of the freedom of association, pluralist representation of interests and autonomy of decision-making as would correspond with the citizens' requirements [Kotthoff 1994] and simultaneously would not disturb the effectiveness of management, co-creating the material prerequisites of the permanence of the "property-owning democracy". In addition, the management should realize that the restructuring of enterprises requires a more effective use of cooperation between workers and their superiors. Modernization means not only the innovation of technological equipment, but also the introduction of new social standards and consensual forms of mutual relations. The organizational decentralization also means the deregulation of existing industrial relations,

communication, control and bargaining. Unfortunately, technical modernism is often combined with social conservatism.

According to the present prevailing opinion "democracy terminates at the factory gate", beyond which, it would disturb the liberalist principles of free enterpreneurship and the application of meritocratic criteria, reduce the authority and effectiveness of management as well as the respect and discipline of subordinates ("you are here to work, not to discuss"). The assertion of the idea of the "rule of a strong hand" represents a threat that privatization will exclude democracy from the life within the enterprise ("those who should reorganize have other, personal worries and don't want to speak with the workers"). According to the opposite minority opinion, such democratization represents the fulfillment of the unsatisfied requirements of social justice and is the necessary prerequisite for de-alienation, the counterpart of technocratism and the basis of bargaining between employees and employers ("when you are not informed, you assume the worst"). Unlimited power also makes agreement and consensus impossible on enterprise level. As with every monopoly, here too the almost absolute power is ineffective. Both opinion parties, however, understand industrial democracy exclusively in the context of hierarchical, non-participative management.

Similar to the employers and managers, politicians for the most part do not appreciate the fact that the absence of enterprise democracy [Poole 1986] may reduce confidence in the democracy of public life ("neither management nor the government have any concept or willingness to discuss it"). The frequently heard utterances that "nothing has changed" often imply "in our enterprise" first, but subsequently "in society as a whole". The drop in production in prospective industrial branches and the export of products of a low degree of processing may – according to the concerns of some economists – result in the deindustrialization of some branches. The transition from the collectivist, solidarity orientation to the liberal, individualist one, from the collectively endorsed to individually agreed employment relations could – according to the fears of foreign sociologists in particular – lead to their "re-feudalization". This risk is increased by the authoritarian, demotivating tendencies provoking interpersonal conflicts, which often characterize the approach of new managers, who are unsure of their qualifications and the scope of real control. The forthcoming formation of industrial relations, therefore, will influence not only economic restructuring, but also the democratic design in the political approach to the regulation of these relations and, possibly, the institutionalization of further forms of participation.

In the past, employment relations were influenced most markedly by the implicit "gentlemen's agreement", according to which the management did not require too much work from the employees and even tolerated its slackness expecting, as countervalue, their consent with its policy and at least outward loyalty with the regime which it represented. The present relations are determined primarily by reviving meritocratism. However, the principle of achievement is applied in two contradictory directions. The first represents the return to the authoritarian managerial practices of Taylor, Ford or Bat'a. Its milder modification is represented by a sort of post-taylorism or post-fordism prevailing – but also frequently criticized – in the present foreign, particularly West European enterprises and their joint-ventures with Czech firms. Its application conceals the known risk of gradual demotivation and of solidarity conflictual actions of the employees. The pressure of the employers, naturally, will provoke counterpressure from

the employees. The second tendency is based on the individualist liberalist orientation, particularly characteristic of American enterprises and their Czech branches. There, the employment relations are in the form of a "psychological contract" assuming a high degree of interest, initiative and responsibility in every employee. They may but need not result in a participative, joint-labour management system.

The newly emerging employment relations do not tend to the dual system of interest representation of the employees by the TUs and autonomous enterprise councils which have proved themselves well in, for example, pre-war Czechoslovakia and contemporary Germany. With regard to their differences from traditional enterprise conditions and managerial ideas, such relations can be, in analogy with the theory of post-modern society and its organizations [Clegg 1990], explained and denominated with certain justification as post-industrial ones. Such relations are characterized by pluralism as well as eclecticism, individualism lacking in solidarity as well as negation of subjectivity, logical incoherency as well as satisfactory functioning. The systematic undermining of the established organizational structures, characteristic of the post-industrial society [Drucker 1993] and the post-modern phenomena of multiplied meanings, the hypertrophy of images, the dissolution of decision patterns, responsibilities and identities, connected with the broadening skepticism toward cultural values and the refusal of traditional arrangements [Daheim, Krahn and Scheider 1994], could, on the contrary, make understandable some contemporary changes in labour relations. It can be assumed that the symptoms of their occurrence – parallel with regress in the paternalistic authoritarian leadership – in a number of enterprises will confirm the author's conviction as to the strength of this concept in the near future. The hypothesis on the origin of a new type of employment relations will continue to form the object of theoretical elaboration and ongoing empirical research. It could also, at least partly, contribute to the understanding of new social problems both in the investigated and very probably other enterprises, which will continue to represent the principal fields and simultaneously the institutions of transformation of society as a whole.

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Economic Change and Change in Well-being in the Czech Republic, with Comparisons to Married Women in the United States*

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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of economic change on change in individual well-being for a panel of Czech respondents during a time of rapid social and economic transformation (1990-91), and compares married Czech women with a sample of married women in the United States. In examining five specific hypotheses from the stress-distress tradition in the United States, data from a panel of 192 Czech men and women showed that respondents who were forced to make economic adjustments reducing their standard of living also reported increased health problems and depressive symptoms. Contrary to findings sometimes observed in the United States, the relationship between economic adjustments and change in depressive symptoms was strongest among those who reported having the strongest sense of personal control (mastery) and the highest perceived social support. Compared with the sample of married U. S. women from Iowa, married Czech women reported more depressive symptoms, had more health problems, and were lower in feelings of mastery. In addition, these Czech women recorded significantly stronger paths linking education to changes in both health conditions and depressive symptoms, whereas Iowa women had signficantly stronger paths linking actual economic conditions to subsequent economic adjustments. The data suggest that the stress-distress model developed in the U. S. applies in the Czech Republic as well, but further understanding of the differentiated role of social support and mastery for Czech and U.S. women is necessary to more completely interpret the observed interactions.

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The transition from state socialism to a market economy has made Eastern Europe an important environment in which to study social change and its consequences. One important framework used in the United States to study the effects of change on individuals is the "stress-distress" perspective [Coyne and Downey 1991; Lin and Ensel 1989; Turner, Wheaton and Lloyd 1995]. This perspective focuses on the physical and emotional consequences to individuals of society- or community-wide events such as the

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Great Depression, the Farm Crisis of the mid-1980s, and plant closings [Elder 1974; Lorenz, Conger, Montague and Wichrama 1993; Voydanoff and Majka 1988]. In this paper, we apply the stress-distress approach to a panel of adults in the Czech Republic in order to (1) model the effects of economic change on changes in individual well-being, as indicated by both physical health conditions and psychological distress, (2) examine the moderating effects of personal control and social support, and (3) compare married Czech women with a sample of women from a parallel study conducted during the same time in the state of Iowa in the United States.

Economic change in the Czech Republic

Unlike the context of most previous studies done in the United States, the rapid economic change in Eastern Europe since 1989 is perceived by many to be positive. But the transformation of the Czech Republic into a democracy and a market economy has had social costs from the beginning. When we collected data for this paper in 1990 and 1991, economic output was in decline, and inflation and unemployment reached levels not seen in Europe since World War II. Food prices increased by 26 percent in July of 1990, petrol prices by 50 percent, and the cost of train travel rose by 100 percent. Prices of goods and services in the third quarter of 1990 were 14.1 percent higher than they were during the same quarter of 1989. Wages increased by only 3.4 percent during the 1980s, but personal loans increased by 34 percent [Pechacova and Hraba 1991].

Through all this, individuals had to earn a living even while the rules governing economic exchanges were being renegotiated almost daily. Over 80 percent of a national sample in 1990 believed their personal circumstances would deteriorate over the next two years, over 80 percent found it necessary to economize, over 65 percent reported problems getting desired food, and 60 percent said they had problems in obtaining good clothing (Institute of Sociology, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences 1990). Thus, the idea of reform may have been well-received by both Czech and world opinion, but the personal uncertainty it created shares many parallels with conditons under which the stress-distress perspective has been applied in the United States.

Hypotheses from the stress-distress tradition

The representation of the perspective that we are applying to the changing Czech economy is shown in Figure 1. This figure visually summarizes five key hypotheses from the stress-distress tradition [Ensel and Lin 1991; Lin and Ensel 1989]. These hypotheses take into account both the social and economic stressors that can affect individuals' sense of well-being and the resources that can help them.

Economic and social stressors

Our central hypothesis is that economic events can undermine individual well-being. This hypothesis, referred to as the *victimization hypothesis*, is reflected in paths (a) and (b). Based primarily on empirical observations from the United States, these two paths underscore the idea that one's economic circumstances can create physiological demands and emotional arousal, not directly, but indirectly through a process of appraisal and accommodation [Lazarus and Folkman 1984]. Attempts to cope with a changing economy may deplete physical and psychological resources, thus increasing the probability of illness, injury or disease [Holmes and Rahe 1967], or the probability of psychological distress or disorder [Brown and Harris 1978].

Path (c) reflects an important related hypothesis, the *social causation hypothesis*. This hypothesis highlights the importance of social positions as a source of role strain, rewards, and resources which may impact well-being [Hraba, Lorenz, Lee and Pechačová 1994; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Pearlin 1989]. Women, the elderly, the unmarried, and those with fewer economic resources have been found to exhibit higher psychological distress than their higher-status counterparts [Conger, Lorenz, Elder, Simons and Ge 1993; Thoits 1993]. For Czech as for U. S. citizens, key explanatory roles and positions are denoted by age, gender, marital status, education and number of children living in the household.

Figure 1. The life-stress perspective applied to economic change in the Czech Republic



Social and psychological resources

Individual's experiencing economic and social stressors do not all suffer the same physical and emotional distress. One reason may be that some people are protected more than others by social and psychological resourses. Our third and fourth hypotheses, represented by paths (d) and (e), capture arguments for why social resources (social support) and psychological resources (sense of control) should help people maintain their

sense of well-being even when facing adversity. For path (d), the *additive burdens hypothesis* emphasizes the importance of both psychological and social resources in maintaining well-being [Cohen and Wills 1985; Kobasa 1987; Lin and Ensel 1989]. For example, social support as indicated by the size and availability of friendship networks has been found to improve health, perhaps because supportive friendships encourage and monitor healthful behaviors, model good habits, and urge medical treatment at key times [Cohen and Wills 1985; Thoits 1993].

Path (e) denotes the *vulnerability hypothesis* [Lin and Ensel 1989], which argues that the strength of the relationship between economic conditions and subsequent well-being depends on the level of social support and personal control. Respondents with high support or a strong sense of control are expected to demonstrate a weaker relationship between economic conditions and well-being; that is, the negative consequences of economic conditions on well-being should be weak or non-existent among Czechs who (1) felt they were receiving relatively high levels of support from friends [Cohen and Wills 1985], and (2) felt they had a strong sense of mastery or control over events in their lives [Hraba et al. 1994; Kobasa 1987].

Modeling change in well-being

Most studies use data collected at one point in time. One problem with cross-sectional data is that we must infer intra-individual change from inter-individual differences. With panel data, we are able to directly observe intra-individual changes in health and distress, and estimate the effects of stressors and resources on these changes. How this is done is illustrated in Figure 2. The victimization hypothesis denoted by paths (a) and (b) in Figure 1 is elaborated by introducing adverse health conditions (η_2) and depression symptoms (η_3) as two important aspects of well-being. Adverse health conditions reflect the effects of nonspecific sources of stress on subsequent changes in physical health [Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Selye 1976]; depressive symptoms are interpreted in sociology as one important indicator of individual response to inequality and change [Mirowsky and Ross 1989]. Both are included because there are good reasons to believe that physical health problems and psychological distress follow different etiologies [Aneshensel, Rutter and Lachenbruch 1991; Thoits 1993].

In Figure 2, *changes* in the Czech respondents' physical health problems and depressive symptoms between times 1 (1990) and 2 (1991) are incorporated into the model by including initial health conditions (ξ_4) and depressive symptoms (ξ_5) in the model. Applying the calculus of change for panel studies [Kessler and Greenberg 1981], paths γ_{24} and γ_{35} estimate the stability of adverse health conditions and depressive symptoms between times 1 (1990) and 2 (1991). The variance that remains after controlling for stability is then interpreted as change, and significant paths linking economic variables to subsequent health conditions and depressive symptoms are interpreted as the effects of the economic variables on changes in health and depression.

Figure 2 Model of the effects of economic conditions on physical health and psychological distress



The respondents' experience of economic change and reform are represented by the exogenous variables on the left hand side of Figure 2. For most families in the Czech Republic, as in the United States, having a low income is the most tangible measure of susceptibility to economic hardship. But more importantly for our study, change in income (ΔIncome) and negative economic events (EcEvts) represent two ways in which the larger macro-process of social change directly impacts individuals and their families [Elder, Conger, Foster and Ardelt 1992]. A loss in income, or even small gains in a time of high inflation, represents a general decline in the ability of families to make purchases they need to maintain their accustomed standard of living. Negative economic events (e.g. loss of job, cut in wages, etc) reflect explicit shifts and dislocations that may result when families are caught in major social change [Hamilton, Broman, Hoffman and Renner 1990; Voydanoff and Majka 1988].

For Czech families in our study, the process of appraisal and accommodation that links objective economic changes to changes in health conditions and depressive symptoms is represented in economic adjustments (EcAdj), the extent to which respondents acknowledged the widespread inflation and economic uncertainty they faced and accordingly reduced their standard of living. Tensions rise when family income fails to cover expenses; economic adjustments follow as families make overt reductions in expenditure that include cutting costs, avoiding or postponing expenditures, and taking-on additional jobs [Elder et al. 1992]. We hypothesized that Czech families in this study would be forced to reduce their level of consumption during the second year of the study (1991) if, during the prior year (1990), they had relatively low levels of income ($\gamma_{11} < 0$), they experienced declining income ($\gamma_{12} < 0$), or they accumulated negative economic events such as job losses or other economic setbacks ($\gamma_{13} > 0$).

Individuals who were forced to accommodate declining economic conditions were expected to experience increases in depressive symptoms ($\beta_{31} > 0$), a result that has been inferred from cross-sectional analyses and confirmed by longitudinal studies in the U.S. [Lin and Ensel 1989; Lorenz et al. 1993]. But we also expect the process of accommodation to be reflected in changing levels of physical health problems, as indicated by the path $\beta_{21} > 0$, in part because of the effects of nonspecific stressors [Ensel and Lin 1991; Rabkin and Struening 1976], but more directly because respondents who were lowering their consumption may also have been working harder and longer hours, eating poorly, and may have been less attentive to preventative health care practices. When initial levels of health conditions (ξ_4) and depressive symptoms (ξ_5) are introduced as control variables, paths $\beta_{21} > 0$ and $\beta_{31} > 0$ imply that Czechs with relatively high levels of economic adjustments between 1990 and 1991 also experienced *increases* in adverse health conditions and increases in depressive symptoms, respectively.

Although our central argument is that economic change undermines physical and emotional health, a competing hypothesis is that prior physical or mental health problems may be instrumental in creating economic hardship. This hypothesis, known as the *selection* or *event proneness hypothesis*, argues that pre-existing illnesses, injuries or psychological conditions may force respondents to reduce consumption if, as a result, they worked less, earned less, and spent more discretionary income on treatment and medicine. To control for this possibility, we introduce paths $\gamma_{14} > 0$ and $\gamma_{15} > 0$ to represent the selection or event proneness hypothesis as our fifth and last hypothesis [Lin and Ensel 1989; McLeod and Kessler 1990].

Methods

Sample

The hypotheses outlined in Figures 1 and 2 were applied to a sample of 294 households selected in 1990 from a sampling frame of 4000 households maintained by the Czech Statistical Bureau. Questionnaires were distributed in person during October, 1990. Respondents were instructed to mail completed questionnaires to the Agricultural University of Prague. Two hundred and thirty-four questionnaires were returned for an initial response rate of 80%. Respondents were also asked to give their names and addresses if they were willing to participate again, and a second questionnaire was sent to those in October 1991. From this group, 199 responded and, after adjusting for

miscellaneous missing cases, complete information was available on 192 Czech adults, including 61 men and 131 women.

To begin to generalize the stress-distress perspective across cultures, we contrast the Czech data to a U. S. sample in which most key concepts were measured in exactly the same way. The comparison group for which we have direct access is the Iowa Youth and Family Project (IYFP), a large scale panel study of two-parent families that started in 1989 in central Iowa. The Iowa panel offers an interesting contrast to the Czech families because many of the respondents were also experiencing traumatic social change brought on by the Farm Crisis of the mid-1980s [Lorenz et al. 1993]. During this time, a major financial restructuring of farms took place, whereby many farmers were forced to give up farming, and may small businesses in small towns closed.

Details about the IYFP study design, sampling procedures, and reliabilities of measures are summarized elsewhere [Lorenz and Melby 1994], but we note several key features of the study: (1) it included only married couples with a 7th grade child in 1989, so the range of age of the women is narrower than in the Czech study; (2) the couples lived on farms, in the countryside, or in small villages or cities in an eight county area of Iowa, whereas the Czech respondents are from rural and urban places; and (3) the data were collected by personally-delivered self-administered questionnaires and by videotaping families in interaction. Although the IYFP data contain more detailed information about families, to facilitate comparisons all key measures in this paper were constructed with the same items as were used in the Czech sample. Because the number of Czech men in the study was relatively small (n = 61), we limited our comparative analyses to married women.

Measures

The descriptive statistics for the Czech respondents who completed both waves of the survey, along with comparative data on married Czech and Iowa women, are summarized in Table 1. The average age of the Czech respondents at the time of the first survey in October, 1990 was 39.5 years, with men averaging one year older (40.1) than women (39.1). Education, also measured in 1990, was obtained by asking for the highest level of education completed, where the response categories were elementary (1), vocational (2), secondary school (3), college (4) and university (5). Of the 192 respondents, 59 percent reported finishing secondary school and another 22 percent said they finished university. For the Iowa sample, education was reported in years of school completed so that the average of 13.3 implies slightly more than one year of college or technical school. Number of children in the household averaged 1.3 for the Czech sample, with 33 percent reporting no children in 1990. The Iowa average of 2.9 is larger than the U.S. average because of characteristics of the sampling procedures.

Income in 1990 was obtained by asking, as a monthly estimate, the "present total income including all benefits, allowances, extra income in your household." The average income was 5,030 Crowns (approximately $180; $1 = 27.8 Kč's) per month, with an actual range from 580 Kč to 11,400 Kč. Although difficult to directly compare, the average annual income for the Iowa families was $41,100. For comparative analyses, the incomes of married Czech and Iowa women are standardized. Change in income between 1989 and 1990 was obtained by asking both Czech and Iowa respondents to "think about how *much* your family's monthly income from all sources *has changed during the past year.*" Categories ranged from decreases of more than 30 percent (0) to less than 5

percent either up or down (4) to increases by more than 30 percent (8). Fifty-one percent of the Czech respondents reported that their income changed "less than 5%" in the previous year, while 24 percent recorded reductions in income and 25 percent reported increases.

Negative economic events experienced during 1990 was obtained by providing respondents with a list of events they could have experienced, and then asking them if each event happened to them. Sixty three percent of the respondents reported no events during the preceding 12 months. Among those Czechs reporting events, the most common included taking care of an elderly relative (17%), getting demoted (9%), taking a cut in wages (7%), changing jobs for a worse one (6%), and stopping work (5%).

Economic adjustments between 1990 and 1991 were measured by presenting respondents with a list of 35 possible adjustments and asking, "in the last 12 months, has your family made any of the following adjustments in your family financial management practices because of *financial problems or difficulties*?" The number of adjustments made during the 12 months between October 1990 and October 1991 ranged from 0 for 38 respondents to a high of 17 for one respondent. The mean was 7.2 with a median of 6. Examples of the types of change people made included using savings to meet expenses (71%), changing food shopping and eating habits (65%), cutting entertainment budgets (64%), reducing use of utilities (53%), postponing vacations (33%), taking on additional employment (27%), borrowing money from relatives or friends (19%), and postponing medical care (5%).

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all Czech respondents, and for married Czech and Iowa women

	All Czechs (n = 192)		Married Czech Women (n = 115)		Married Iowa Women (n = 386)	
Variables	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age in 1990	39.5	9.6	38.9	8.9	38.8	4.0
Education	3.3	1.1	3.2	1.0	13.3	1.6*
Number of children	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.1	2.9	0.9
Income (in hundreds of Crowns per month)	50.3	22.3	56.1	21.1	41.1	19.2**
Change in income during 1990	3.9	1.2	3.9	1.3	3.6	1.4
Negative Economic during 1990	0.5	0.9	0.6	0.9	0.6	1.1
Economic Adjustments during 1991	7.2	3.3	7.2	3.4	6.7	5.5
Level of Mastery in October, 1990	24.4	4.5	24.2	4.5	26.6	3.9
Level of Social Support in October, 1990	128.3	13.9	40.2	5.3	40.8	5.3
Health symptoms in October, 1990	3.6	2.9	4.2	2.7	1.0	1.5
Depressive symptoms in October, 1990	8.3	7.8	9.2	7.9	6.5	6.2
Health sumptoms in October, 1991	3.4	2.6	3.8	2.6	1.0	1.5
Depressive symptoms in October, 1991	8.1	7.1	8.8	7.1	6.4	7.3

*) Czech data are reported in highest level of school completed; U.S. data reflect years in school.

**) U.S. income data reflects annual total family income.

Mastery, our measure of one's sense of personal control over events, was measured using Pearlin et al.'s [1981] seven item index. The index included items such as "There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have" and "I can do just about anything I really set my mind to." Each item was scored on a four-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4) so that higher scores indicated higher levels of mastery. The seven items had an internal consistency estimate of reliability (Cronbach's α) of 0.68. Scores ranged from 12 to 34 and averaged 24.4 There was no significant differences between Czech men and women, but married Czech women had a significantly lower sense of mastery (24.2) than their Iowa counterparts (26.6).

Social support in 1990 was obtained from Cohen's 40 item Interpersonal Support Evaluation List (ISEL), which measures perceived emotional, appraisal, belonging and tangible support. Examples of items include "There are several people I can trust to help solve my problems" and "I feel I am not always included by my circle of friends" [Cohen, Mermelstein, Kamarck and Hoberman 1985]. Each item was scored on a four-point scale from definitely true (1) to definitely false (4) and then recoded so that higher scores imply higher levels of perceived social support. The reliability of the index was estimated at 0.78, while actual scores ranged from 90 to 155 and averaged 128.3. There were no significant differences between Czech men and women in their reports of support.

When comparing Czech and Iowa married women, social support was re-calculated using a subset of 12 items used in the Iowa study. This shortened index included 4 items representing each of the domains of appraisal, belonging and tangible support [Lorenz and Melby 1994]. Married Czech women reported slightly lower levels of perceived social support (40.2) than did Iowa women (40.8), a difference which was not significant.

Health conditions in both 1990 and 1991 were obtained by presenting respondents with two lists. First, they were presented with a list of medical conditions and then asked, "during the last 12 months, have you had any of these conditions?" The list included anemia, asthma, artritis, bronchitis, cancer, chronic liver trouble, diabetes, serious back troubles, heart trouble, high blood pressure, kidney trouble, stroke, tuberculosis, and ulcer. Second, they were presented with a list of symptoms and asked whether they had "experienced any of them *fairly often in the past 12 months*." Examples from this list include feeling weak all over, feeling hot all over, heart beating hard, poor appetite, nervousness, acid stomach or indigestion, and insomnia. Responses to the two lists were combined, with a mean of 3.6 in 1990 and 3.4 in 1991. The average number of symptoms reported by Czech women (4.2 in 1990 and 3.9 in 1991) was significantly higher than the average reported by Czech men (2.3 in both 1990 and 1991). Married Czech women reported significantly more symptoms than did the Iowa women, both in 1990 and in 1991.

Depressive symptoms in both 1990 and 1991 were measured using 13 items from Derogatis' [1983] SCL-90 symptomology checklist. Respondents were asked "how much discomfort have you had during the past week" from the items listed, with response categories ranging from not at all (0) to extremely (4). Examples of depressive symptoms include loss of sexual interest or pleasure, low energy, thoughts of ending your life, crying easily, and feeling lonely. The reliability of the index was estimated at 0.86 in 1990 and 0.87 in 1991. Average scores on the depressive dimension were 8.3 in 1990 and 8.1 in 1991. Again, Czech women scored significantly higher (9.6 and 9.3 in 1990 and

1991, respectively) than men (5.4 and 5.2, respectively), consistent with gender differences in the United States. Married Czech women were significantly higher in depressive symptoms than their Iowa counterparts in both 1990 and 1991.

Results

Before testing the five hypotheses proposed in Figures 1 and 2, we first examined correlations among variables to make sure there were no serious problems of collinearity. From this correlation matrix, we noted that adverse health conditions and depressive symptoms were strongly correlated in both 1990 (0.46) and 1991 (0.51), and the stability correlations between time 1 and time 2 were 0.68 for adverse health conditions and 0.70 for depressive symptoms.

For ease of interpretation, the results obtained when actually modeling the data are presented in standardized coefficients; however, all model estimates are based on covariances. Although all variables in the study are directly observed and do not contain corrections for measurement error, we actually obtained maximum likelihood estimates using the LISREL computer program. In the analyses that follow, we first fit the models outlined in Figures 1 and 2 to the entire Czech sample; next, we examined the data for evidence of hypothesized moderator effects; and then we directly compared married Czech and Iowa women.

Economic conditions, adverse health and depression symptoms

The models outlined in Figures 1 and 2 were estimated for the Czech sample, with the results summarized in Table 2. The first column in Table 2 shows the results for the first endogenous variable, economic adjustment. First, the number of economic adjustments reported by the families during the second year of the study (1991) was weakly related to family income reported at the end of 1990 (-0.13; t = -1.6). Second, and central to our hypothesis about the effects of change, economic adjustments were significantly related to change in income during the previous year (-0.16; t = -2.3). Economic events, however, did not predict adjustments (0.02; t = 0.2). Third, consistent with the selection or event proneness hypothesis, respondents who were initially high in depessive symptoms also reported more adjustments (0.23; t = 2.8). We suspect that respondents who were feeling depressed at the beginning of the study may have been reacting defensively to changing economic conditions rather than proactively embracing the challenge of change.

The variables representing social position were entered as control variables, and some predicted economic adjustments. Specifically, number of adjustments was predicted by gender, with women reporting more adjustments than men (-0.14; t = -1.8); by education, with more highly educated families experiencing significantly fewer adjustments (-0.14; t = -1.8); and by the number of children living in the home (0.28; t = 3.5). In addition, number of adjustments was significantly related to initial level of perceived social support (0.20; t = 2.6). This implies, contrary to our expectations, that those who were initially relatively high in feelings of support were also those who later made more economic adjustments, even after controlling for actual economic circumstances. The predictor variables, taken as a group, accounted for 21 percent of the variance in economic adjustment.

Table 2. Standardized regression coefficients (with t-tests) for adverse health conditions and psychological distress for Czech men and women (n = 192)

	Economic Adjustment (t2)	Adverse Health Conditions (t2)	Depressive Symptoms (t2)
$Income_1$	-0.13 (-1.6)		
Change in $income_1$	-0.16 (-2.3)*		
$Economic\ events_1$	0.02 (0.2)		
$Health\ conditions_1$	0.09 (1.1)	0.58 (10.7)**	
$Depressive\ symptoms_1$	0.23 (2.8)**		0.63 (10.9)**
$Economic\ Adjustments_2$		0.16 (2.9)**	0.14 (2.4)**
Age	0.02 (0.2)	0.15 (2.7)**	0.04 (0.6)
Gender (1 = men; 2 = women)	-0.14 (-1.8)*	0.08 (1.5)	0.09 (1.6)
Marital status (single = 0)	0.01 (0.1)	-0.11 (-2.0)*	-0.07 (-1.6)
Education	-0.14 (-1.8)*	-0.15 (-2.5)*	-0.06 (-1.1)
Number of children	0.28 (3.5)**	0.00 (0.0)	-0.04 (-0.7)
$Mastery_1$	0.00 (0.1)	0.00 (0.1)	0.05 (0.9)
Perceived social support	0.20 (2.6)**	0.05 (0.9)	-0.08 (-1.4)
R-Squared:	0.21	0.54	0.52
Chi-squared (8 df):	8.75		

*) One-tailed test significant at the 0.05 level.
**) One-tailed test significant at the 0.01 level.

The second and third columns of Table 2 show evidence supporting our central hypothesis. After controlling for initial levels of health (0.58; t = 10.7) and depressive symptoms (0.63; t = 10.9), the number of economic adjustments the family made during the year was significantly related to *changes* in both adverse health conditions (0.16; t = 2.9) and depressive symptoms (0.14; t = 2.4). Although the magnitude of these effects are not large in absolute value, they do reveal a discernable relationship between economic events and changes in health conditions and depressive symptoms over the fairly short period of one year. Taken together with the finding that change in income does effect economic adjustments, these paths linking economic adjustments to subsequent changes in both health and depression provide direct evidence for our proposed victimization hypothesis.

In addition, consistent with the social causation hypothesis, adverse changes in health conditions are related to increasing age (0.15; t = 2.7) and are significantly higher for single compared with married respondents (-0.11; t =-2.0), but are lower for the better educated (-0.15; t =-2.5). In aggregate, there was no significant relationship between changes in adverse health conditions and either mastery or perceived social support. Thus, we have little evidence supporting the additive burdens hypothesis outlined by Lin and Ensel [1989].

In reviewing the third column, only economic adjustments predicted depressive symptoms; there were no significant paths linking depressive symptoms to either social roles and positions, to mastery or perceived social support. This latter conclusion will be

examined more closely, however, when examining the moderating roles of social and psychological resources.

Modeling moderator effects

To evaluate the vulnerability hypothesis using structural equations, we twice split the sample into two parts, first according to those who were initially high or low on perceived support in 1990, and then again according to those who were high or low on mastery in 1990. For social support, the vulnerability hypothesis predicts that the relationship between economic adjustments and adverse health conditions, and between economic adjustments and depressive symptoms, should be stronger for those low on perceived support than for those high on support.

To test this hypothesis, the low (n = 94) and high (n = 98) groups were estimated simultaneously according to procedures outlined by Jøreskog and Sorbom [1989: 255-272]. In examining our results, we found no differences between the two groups in terms of the relationship between economic adjustments and adversive health conditions, but we did find significant differences in the strength of the relationship between economic adjustments and depressive symptoms. Surprisingly, it was in the opposite direction than predicted by the vulnerability hypothesis. The relationship between economic adjustments and depressive symptoms was positive and strong for the high social support group (0.30; t = 4.2) but virtually zero for the low support group (0.02). When the change in chi-square was used to test the difference between the two slopes, it was found to be significant ($\chi^2(1) = 7.4$). As illustrated in Figure 3, these two groups were not significantly different in their average number of adjustments (7.2 in both groups), but Czech respondents who were relatively low in perceived support had comparatively high levels of depressive symptoms, regardless of the number of economic adjustments they had to make, whereas those high in support had low depressive symptoms only when they had to make few economic adjustments. It appears that for this sample of Czech citizens, freedom from depressive symptoms is contingent upon having enough money to avoid economic cutbacks and having friends with which to do things. With increasing levels of economic adjustments, the effects of support in reducing feelings of depression appear to dissipate.

Figure 3. The moderating effects of high (n = 98) and low (n = 94) perceived social support on the relations between economic adjustment and depressive symptoms for Czech respondents



To examine the vulnerability hypothesis with respect to mastery, the sample was again divided into two groups to compare those who were relatively high in mastery (n = 97) with those who were relatively low (n = 95). A series of model comparisons revealed two points at which mastery served as a moderating factor, but again not as predicted by the vulnerability hypothesis. First, the slopes linking economic adjustments and changes in depressive symptoms were significantly different for the two mastery groups ($\chi^2(1) = 5.1$), but in the opposite direction from that predicted by theory and previous research on personality [Kobasa 1987]. Contrary to the vulnerability hypothesis, the relation between economic adjustments and depressive symptoms is virtually zero for those low on mastery (-0.03), but significantly positive for those high on mastery (0.23; t = 3.7). As illustrated in Figure 4, these two groups were not significantly different in their average level of economic adjustments. Respondents low on mastery, however, had relatively high levels of depressive symptoms regardless of their level of economic adjustments, whereas those high on mastery had comparatively low levels of depressive symptoms when they also had low levels of economic adjustments. Using an explanation similar to Elder's [1974] in his study of the Great Depression, the results suggest that respondents who initially felt "in control," perhaps invulnerable to change, were the ones who were the most devastated when adverse changes in economic conditions directly affected their lives.

Figure 4. The moderating effects of high (n = 97) and low (n = 95) mastery on the relations between economic adjustment and depressive symptoms for Czech respondents



Second, the relation between marital status and depressive symptoms was significant in the high (-0.39; t = 5.75) but not the low (0.06) mastery group. Looking closely at this data, we found that of the 61 men in this study, only one was single. Among the 60 married men, those high in mastery reported lower levels of distress (4.4) compared with those high on mastery (7.1). For women, 16 of the 131 were single and they averaged remarkably higher levels of depressive symptoms (13.1) than their married counterparts (8.8). As sketched in Figure 5, however, the role of mastery is complex: the five single women with high levels of mastery have the highest level of depressive symptoms of all (18.4), more than doubling the scores of the 58 married women with high mastery (7.7) and substantially higher than the 11 single women with low mastery (10.6). Dividing the sample in this way leaves us with few cases in each group, and our results must be replicated with a larger sample. The results do imply, however, that the relationship between sense of control and depressive symptoms is more complex than originally supposed, and may be closely tied to expectations about relationships and the social evironment in which people must live and work.

Figure 5. Relations between economic adjustments and depressive symptoms in married and single women with high and low mastery



Comparing Czech and Iowa women

To directly compare our two samples, we applied the model in Figure 2 to the covariance matrices for married Czech (n = 115) and Iowa (n = 386) women simultaneously, again using procedures outlined by Jøreskog and Sorbom [1989]. The results are summarized by the standardized coefficients shown in Table 3.

First, by examining the magnitude of the coefficients linking economic adjustments to income, change in income, and negative economic events, we are led to conclude that economic adjustments are less strongly related to actual economic circumstances among Czech women compared with the Iowa sample. Statistically, the change in chi-square when the coefficients for these two groups were forced to be equal is signficant ($\chi^2(3) = 28.7$). These differences were particularly strong for income and economic events. For our sample of married Czech women, only change in income was significantly related to subsequent economic adjustments (-0.17; t = -1.7), whereas in the Iowa sample all three measures of economic circumstances were significantly related to economic adjustments in the predicted direction. In addition, economic adjustments were significantly related to the number of children living at home (0.27; t = 2.5 among Czechs and 0.14; t = 3.2 for the Iowans), and to prior level of depressive symptoms (0.22; t = 2.1 for Czechs and 0.13; t = 2.2 for Iowans) but not to prior health conditions. This significant path linking initial depressive symptoms to subsequent economic adjustments suggests that depressed women may be interpreting economic changes with greater severity and pessimism, and reacting more strongly to each new economic report.

Table 3. Standardized regression coefficients linking adverse health conditions, symptoms of distress, and economic conditions for married Czech (n = 115) and Iowa (n = 393) women

	Married Czech women			Married Iowa women		
		Adverse	Symptoms		Adverse	Symptoms
	Econ.	Health	of	Econ.	Health	of
Explanatory variables	Adj.	Cond.	Depress.	Adj.	Cond.	Depress.
$Income_1$	-0.08			-0.23**		
$\Delta Income_1$	-0.17*			-0.22**		
$EcEvts_1$	0.02			0.23**		
Economic $Adjs_2$		0.13*	0.10		0.10**	0.14**
$Health_1$	0.11	0.59**		0.06	0.53**	
$Depression_1$	0.22*		0.67**	0.13**		0.50**
Age	-0.08	0.08	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	-0.02
Education	-0.08	-0.22**	-0.16*	-0.04	-0.01	0.04
Children at home	0.27**	0.00	-0.05	0.14**	0.02	-0.02
$Mastery_1$	0.07	-0.01	-0.00	-0.06	-0.17**	-0.17**
$Social\ Support_1$	0.13	0.07	-0.06	0.04	-0.05	-0.05
R-squared:	0.19	0.51	0.52	0.32	0.38	0.45
Chi-squared (8 df)			16.33			19.20

*) One-tailed test significant at the 0.05 level.
**) One-tailed test significant at the 0.01 level.

Second, the relations between economic adjustments and changes in health conditions (0.13; t = 1.7) and symptoms of depression (0.10; t = 1.3) for Czech women were *not* significantly different from those same coefficients for the Iowa sample (0.10; t = 2.5 and 0.14; t = 3.5, respectively). The change in chi-square that results when constraining these two pairs of coefficients to be equal was not significant ($\chi^2(2) = 1.7$). Thus, the relationships between actual economic conditions and subsequent adjustments were significantly stronger among the Iowa women than among the Czech women, but the effects of the adjustments on changes in their health and psychological well-being were not significantly different.

Third, among the variables measuring social position, only education predicted changes in either adverse health conditions or depressive symptoms, and then only for the Czech sample. For the Czech women, the relation between education and changes in health conditions (-0.22; t = -3.0) and symptoms of depression (-0.16; t = -2.2) were significant, implying that those with higher levels of education reported fewer changes in health conditions and depressive symptoms. When constraining these two coefficients to be equal, the chi-square changed 11.7 with 2 degrees of freedom, a difference which is significant.

Finally, mastery was significantly related to both changes in health conditions (-0.17; t = -3.8) and depressive symptoms (-0.17; t = -3.8) for the Iowa women, whereas in aggregate these variables appear unrelated in the Czech sample (-.01 and -.00, respectively). Yet, when constraining the two sets of coefficients to be equal, their differences were not significant ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = 4.2$).

Discussion

The results from our analyses provide several points for further elaboration. The model we tested was based on a perspective developed in the stress-distress literature in the United States [Coyne and Downey 1991; Lin and Ensel 1989; Mirowsky and Ross 1989; Turner et al. 1995]. Our application of this model to the sample of Czech respondents is encouraging: indices developed in the United States to measure control, perceived social support, and depressive symptoms had high reliabilities in our Czech sample. And we found support for several key hypotheses. Consistent with the victimization hypothesis, change in income was significantly related to economic adjustments, and economic adjustments were significantly related to *changes* in both adversive health conditions and psychological distress. There was also evidence for the selection, or event proneness, hypothesis that argues that initial levels of depressive symptoms do in fact lead individuals to differentially interpret how dramatically they must adjust to changing economic conditions.

For the Czech sample, the additive burdens hypothesis was not supported; that is, we found little evidence to suggest that either social support or psychological control (mastery) predict changes in either health conditions or depressive symptoms. Only in the Iowa sample was mastery significantly related in the predicted direction to these two outcome variables.

There were some surprising differences between our Czech and U. S. samples. First, different aspects of socioeconomic status appear to have important roles in affecting health and distress. In contrast to married Iowa women, the married Czech women had weaker links between actual economic circumstances and subseqent adjustments. Perhaps the economic adjustments Czech families had to make during the early transition years of 1990 and 1991 were still less strongly tied to actual income and work stability than is typical in the United States because of the safety net of social programs and state support still in place from its socialist era. For the Czech women when compared with Iowa women, education seems to have a stronger effect in suppressing adversive health conditions and depressive symptoms. Because of this intriguing education effect, future research should ask whether the effects of education on health and depression can be explained in terms of socioeconomic conditions (less hazardous and more rewarding jobs) or other factors such as better information processing and coping skills. Whether these differences replicate in subsequent years as the Czech (and Iowa) social structures change with the time remains to be seen.

More dramatic and surprising were the moderator effects. The results for the Czech respondents were unlike many studies in the United States which have found evidence of moderator effects due to supportive relationships [Cohen and Wills 1985] and a "hardy" personality [Kobasa 1987]. The Czech data suggest that it was those who initially felt they had supportive friends and who were initially high in control (mastery) who were also the ones reporting the sharpest increases in symptoms of depression. This pattern did not show up when changes in health conditions was used as the outcome variable. For social support especially, one has the image that low levels of distress are associated with a combination of enough money to do things plus friends to do them with. Conversely, the protective support of friends appears to evaporate once individuals begin to make the economic adjustments necessary to bring spending in line with income. This finding is at odds with most previous research in the United States, but it replicates cross-sectional results obtained in an earlier paper in which higher levels of both self-esteem and

perceived social support exacerbated feelings of depression and hostility in Czech men [Lee, Hraba, Lorenz and Pechacova 1994]. One possible interpretation of these interactions is that those who were high in mastery and feelings of support were also in advantaged positions during the Communist era and may now feel abandoned or are struggling to come to terms with changing social structure.

More generally, the strength and consistency of the interaction effects relating mastery and perceived social support to depressive symptoms in the Czech sample are dramatic enough to merit further investigation in the United States and elsewhere. If these results hold up under replication, it implies that economic change may be the most devastating emotionally to men and women who initially feel "in control" or perceive themselves to have strong friendships. Actual economic setbacks may have their most devastating effects among those for whom the sense, or illusion, of control and support was initially the strongest. Coupled with other evidence that a "hardy" personality moderates the relation between stress and distress, the question for further research then becomes: under what conditions does one's sense of control moderate, and under what conditions does it exacerbate, the relation between stress and distress?

Future research should strengthen the link between macro-economic and macro-political change and the individual's response to the resulting opportunities and hardships. Although we had information on income and specific life events, we were unable to ask detailed information about the role of individuals in the old regime. The sensitivity of asking about these roles is subsiding as the new government is solidifying its position. Yet there are dramatic and interesting changes going on. Since our data were collected, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have split, and dramatic economic change is continuing. News from the Czech Republic indicates a conservative backlash: political parties dominated by unions, especially unions representing agricultural workers, miners, and heavy industry are gaining popularity. These parties, whose leadership draws from the old communist hierarchy, are arguing that reforms must proceed more slowly. If agricultural and mining unions continue to gain strength, future research would benefit from a comparison of groups within the Czech Republic, especially by comparing rural and urban families and by comparing families that benefited from a controlled socialist society and those who are now seizing opportunities provided by newly emerging markets.

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Ignored But Assumed. Family and Gender Between Public and Private Realm

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Abstract: In the analysis of the social transformation after the collapse of the communist regime, the way the transformation of the public sphere is made possible by the strategies within the private sphere has been insufficiently investigated. In particular, the role of women as the bearers of these strategies has been ignored but assumed. This paper posits that this is also due to the omission of the concepts of the public and the private and the concept of gender as analytical sociological tools. It deals with the private-public relationship in modern society as an open process in which gender relations are not only formed, but in return also form the connotations of these spheres according to gender understanding. On this theoretical base, possible ways of rethinking the model of the bourgeois family, which, in Czech society, has a normative power, are suggested with reference to Arendt's and Habermas' concepts. Thus, the current process of the socialisation under changing conditions can be dealt with as a complex problem of interrelations between the private and public spheres broadening the thus far narrow and static conception of the family and bridging the so far separately solved problems of family and gender.
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Within the analyses of the social transformation after the collapse of the communist regime, analysis of the transformation of the underlying relationship between the private and public spheres is virtually non-existent. And yet it is precisely in this area that major structural shifts, both in terms of modern and democratic "standards", can be shown. Under the communist regime, both the absence of a market economy and a democratic political system reduced the importance of the public existence of citizens and emphasized their private life. With the restoration of the public realm after 1989, the importance, demands and overburdening of private life have not declined. This might seem paradoxical, but it is not. The public strategies of societal transformation could not be possible without the loyalty of the citizens who bear the social impact of the transformation process (through, for example, the threats to their accustomed standard of living) and cope with this impact by complex and demanding private strategies. Besides economic factors, they also face destabilized social conditions including an increase in criminality in general and drug consumption by young people in particular. The family, of course, continues to be regarded as the main moral bastion – probably more than under communism. We can say that the public economic and political strategies rely to a large extent upon the capacity of Czech families to cope with difficult situations. Yet the more this capacity is assumed by the liberalist leaders of the transformation, the more it is in fact ignored.

Although private coping strategies are discussed by some sociologists in great detail, the agents of these strategies in their analyses are "people and households" [Večerník 1994] or "families" [Možný 1994]. The way this very area is gendered continues to be

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ignored, although it is not too difficult to show that those who "coordinate" and mostly realise these strategies are women. This correlates with the fact that the revival of the public sphere after 1989 considerably increased men's involvement in it.

A gender perspective is urgently needed, yet in the Czech social sciences the very concept "gender" is as little used as an analytical tool as are the concepts of the public and the private. Both are the result of the country's lengthy isolation. Not only has the feminist parole "personal is political" not yet been uttered here, but the works that have theorized the public-private issue since the early 1960s such as those by Hannah Arendt or Jürgen Habermas have not yet been translated into Czech and are virtually unknown. In addition, the implementation of the gender perspective in the Czech environment is apparently being prevented by a specific emphasis on the concept of the family linked with the high value of the family in society.

It is for this reason that I wrote this paper: to argue that the concepts of "gender" and "private and public" are especially valuable to the analysis of the family concept. Since the paper was addressed first of all to the Czech sociological audience, I pointed out that neither can the family perspective be a substitute for the gender perspective nor need it contradict it. Given the absence of the theorizing of the public-private issue in general, I did not begin my exploration of the gender perspective from the feminist starting points; instead I tried to connect it directly with more or less gender neutral theories on public-private. I did so because I believe that on the one hand, an understanding of the underlying public-private structure of Czech society is not possible without the inclusion of the gender perspective, but that on the other hand, the local specificities in gender relations must be explored against the more general analysis of the specific characteristics of the public and private realms in this society.

In the same way, I pay attention to the expectations connected to the bourgeois family model which, despite the tendency towards a greater diversity of the real forms of family life (similar to those in Western societies), seems to play a different role under the specific circumctances of Czech society. Unlike in my previous articles addressed to the Western audience where I explained the specific status of the family in Czech society [Havelková 1993a, 1993b], here, on the contrary, I criticise the overly traditional way the family is thought of, a way which, first and foremost, in no way corresponds to the real biography of the vast majority of Czech women.

Categories of the public and the private

The origin of modern society was connected with a fundamental structural transformation: the creation of a public space for *intercourse* between free individuals on the one hand, and the creation of a private sphere for the *formation* of these free individuals, on the other. The process of individualization takes place and is manifest in the *relationship* between these realms. Their institutional *separation*, unknown and unthinkable in a traditional society, is as significant as is their mutual *interdependence*.

In spite of the fact that this is undeniably one of the fundamental structures of modern society, until recently political philosophy and sociology in most cases did not operate directly with the categories of the private and the public in their conceptual framework. Instead they spoke simply of the discrete institutions themselves. The relationship between the private and public spheres was most frequently dealt with in terms of a relationship between the individual and society or the family and the state, between

provisions under public law and private law, etc. This is still the approach adopted in the Czech social sciences, including sociology.

The reasons for this were undoubtedly methodological: sociology in particular, emerging as a positivist science, concentrated on clearly definable formations and their functions. However, the private and public spheres not only do not represent such institutions but can best be characterized as two *dimensions of existence* of the life of the individual. The fundamental definition of the public and private is, therefore, a philosophical one. Moreover, the concepts of the public and private indicate the flexible *attributes* of institutions, a kind of indeterminacy. It is probably no accident that these concepts experienced a revival only with the arrival of the "sociological imagination" and the frontal critique of modern society which had become so predominant in the 1960s. It is increasingly apparent that when profound social changes are to be analyzed, these categories possess a specific heuristic potential, thereby providing a better understanding of the social transformations than the concepts previously employed – such as concepts of the individual and society, the family and the state. I believe this to be doubly true of an analysis of the current transformation of our society.

The failure to exploit the advantages of the categories of the private and the public has yet another cause: the inherent lack of interest of liberal theories in the private sphere, a disinterest which prevailed until recently. The private sphere was considered to be the personal affair of each individual, in total disregard of the differentiated status of "personal affairs" for either sex. This, again, is a predominant view in Czech theories.

In my paper I would like to point out that while it is true that the relationship between the private and the public *determines the social role* of the two sexes, the opposite also applies: namely that in the relationship between the private and the public, the social (political) *perception of the gender roles* is one of the major *structuring* elements. If the institution of the family plays a key role in these relations, it is essential to question, expand and deepen its current conception. I consider the contradiction between the concealed normativity of the family as the bourgeois family, and the existing conditions in our society as a problem which has received insufficient attention.

The public and the private in the light of human activities and their connotations

Though the Athenian polis was, from the sociological point a view, a traditional society, its political organization caused a separation of the public and private realms. Historically, this was the first such separation of these spheres. While the differences between the modern and traditional societies are decisive for the character of these spheres in the former, the connotations associated with both the public and private spheres and recorded in the Athenian polis have, remarkably, recurred in modern times.

According to Hannah Arendt, Athenian democracy was founded on the relationship between the public and private spheres; and yet the evaluation of the two spheres is *asymmetrical*. Democracy in the Greek *polis*, she maintained, was possible only thanks to the *oikos*, the private organization of the economy within the household. The relationship between the public and the private was a relationship between *necessity and freedom*: "As living beings, concerned with the preservation of life, men are confronted with and driven by necessity. Necessity must be mastered only through domination. Hence the freedom of the 'good life' rests on the domination of necessity. The mastery of necessity then has as its goal the controlling of the necessities of life, which coerce men and hold

them in their power. But such domination can be accomplished only by controlling and doing violence to others, who as slaves relieve free men from themselves being coerced by necessity." [Arendt 1987: 117-118]. Private life and political life constitute two "orders of existence" (Aristotle). Hannah Arendt does not explicitly mention women, yet it is well known that they were restricted to the private space and, consequently, subject to all its implications of lesser prestige, status and dignity.

This analysis is connected with Arendt's fundamental philosophical conception of *vita activa* which is reflected in three fundamental human activities: *labour, work and action. Labour* corresponds to processes of the human body and natural processes and is defined by necessity since it concerns *life* and the need for its preservation; it includes *reproduction* in the wider sense. It does not safeguard individual survival alone but the life of the species as well. *Work*, in contrast, produces an artificial world of things different from nature but, at the same time, introduces the dimension of permanence and endlessness into life. It overcomes the transitoriness of *labour*. In spite of this, Arendt considers only participation in the "common world" i.e. *action*, political action – to be a supreme human activity. If the justification of *labour* is the reproduction of life as such, and the justification of *work* is the production of (useful) things, then the justification of *action* is to give life a purpose, make it significant, and only in this way, profoundly human. As long as action results in establishing and maintaining political formations, it creates the possibility for memory, for history [Arendt 1958].

In ancient democracy, the polis was the only domain of action and hence the only ensuing possibility of full humanity. As pointed out, it was founded on the lack of freedom of the excluded – slaves and women as well as foreigners and some free men. The significance of the contraposition freedom-necessity is complemented by others: permanence-transitoriness, light-dark, etc. As Jürgen Habermas maintains, these connotations of the concepts of the public and the private (in part, expressed by the renaissance) have retained their "peculiarly normative power" [Habermas 1989: 4]. They are also accepted in their full strength in a 1949 analysis of the woman's fate by Simone de Beauvoir, where she describes, from an existentialist position, the then contemporary existence of the man as *transcendence* and the existence of the woman as *immanence*. "Every subject plays his part as such specifically through exploits or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence. He achieves liberty only through a continual reaching out toward other liberties. There is no justification for present existence other than its expansion into an indefinitely open future. Every time transcendence falls back into immanence, stagnation, there is a degradation of existence into the en soi – the brutish life of subjection to given conditions – and of liberty into constraint and contingency" [Beauvoir 1974: xxxiii]. So, if women want to be "included into the human *Mitsein*" [Ibid.: 5], there is no other road than the "endeavoring to make their escape from the sphere hitherto assigned them " [Ibid.: 5]. The inferiority of reproduction (the woman's domain) is expressed even more explicitly in connection with the explanation as to why women have accepted their subordinate position in history: "The warrior put his life in jeopardy to elevate the prestige of the horde [...] and in this he proved dramatically that life is not the supreme value for man, but on the contrary that it should be made to serve ends more important than itself [...] For it is not in giving life but in risking life that man is raised above the animal. That is why superiority has been accorded in humanity not to the sex that brings forth but to that which kills [...] Her [woman's] misfortune is to have been biologically destined for

the repetition of Life, when even in her own view Life does not carry within itself its reasons for being, reasons that are more important than the life itself." [Ibid.: 72-73]

In modern society too, the contraposition of the private and public life is understood as the contraposition of complete and incomplete *humanity*; yet it is only here that the exclusion of the woman from *action* becomes a theme. Even though one could never speak of the public and the private sphere within modern society as exclusive domains of one or the other sex, the exclusion of women from that which Habermas calls the political public sphere nevertheless persists. Representatives of different analyses of the so-called women's question, liberals (J. S. Mill), socialists (Bebel) or humanists (Masaryk) all agreed on this point. They linked equality of the sexes or the emancipation of women precisely with women's participation in public affairs. Yet emancipation along the lines of the universalization of civil rights made only slow progress. Critics argued that this approach was half-hearted, formalist and led only to tokenism. The reason, according to Habermas [1989], is that in the case of women it is not merely a matter of expanding democratic participation (as was the case for lower class men), since the exclusion of women also rests on an underlying social structure. Its correction does not impact only on the economic sphere but on the internal private space of the family too.[1]

This, however, says nothing more than that the functions in the public sphere remain *vitally dependent* on functions in the private sphere. As the emancipation of women advanced, the question of who will carry out functions in the private sphere and how this is to be done, has become increasingly acute. In our society, this question has long ceased to be purely ideological since the presence of women in the public sector (although not in the sense of total participation in the political public) is a *reality* and, in a certain sense, even the social norm to an extent not experienced by any Western society. Under these circumstances, the theme of the dependence of the public sphere on the private sphere is of particular urgency.

This situation has the unquestionable disadvantage that Czech society has so far not been involved in the feminist debate which has been in progress in Western theory since the early 1980s. In this debate, gender *equality* was seen to require the recognition and respect for gender *difference*. In theory and in practice, the specific female perspective began to be evaluated in connection with an evaluation of the *"life-world"* or *everyday life*. The experience of women, women's sensitivity and moral attitudes are losing the stigma of inferiority. It is only thus that the abovementioned connotations of the public and private spheres as well as the uneven evaluation of human activities are being changed. The *preservation of life* is beginning to have a higher value than war, while the content of the concepts of transcendence and immanence is changing.

It might appear that stressing the role of the mother and the significance of the family in our country corresponds to the trend; this is something the mass media have been saying loud and clear since 1989. But this rhetoric does not concur with the cultural process which took place in the West. A rise in values related to *public virtues* is more in keeping with our reality, i.e. competitiveness, performance and public prestige. The connotations of the public and private spheres have not changed greatly, and the pressure to restore the traditional division of roles on the basis of sex is, therefore, problematic. It is

[1]) In the Preface to the 18th German edition of *Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit* (1993), Habermas admits that he only became aware of this twenty years after having written it.

incredible how little interest our social sciences show in *the conditions determining the actual performance* of the functions expected of the family. It appears that the conservative declaration, like the post-modern adoration of the moral superiority of women, is a matter for the intellectual elite – but only a part of it. The great majority of the population is torn between the dream of the harmonious family and the reality of the exceptionally high percentage of women holding jobs of their own free will or due to economic pressure. Under these circumstances, social sciences are charged with finding an answer to the Kantian question *"How is a functioning family possible?"*

The relationship between family ideology and reality concerns not only better or worse functioning families. The *normativity of the family model* determines the *normativity of the gender roles* for those who are already in the family, for those who are just entering it or leaving it, as well as for those who have never lived in it. Ivo Možný convincingly documents that the share of the nuclear family is an absolute *minority* in our population: "We definitely cannot claim that such an arrangement is today in our country a majority arrangement of the fundamental social micro-structure of human relations, forming the basis of our everyday existence, or, to put it differently, of our normal way of life during the time not spent at work. It is more often an ideal, a harmonious memory, a permanent goal of our endeavour rather than a reality valid for everyone." [Možný 1990: 23]. But what is the content of this "memory", of its illusion and at the same time, of that which we consider worthy of our endeavour? Možný's analyses lead from sociology towards psychology, concentrating especially on one of the contents of the ideal conception of the family as the site of love conceived as a monogamous relationship. My reflections go in the opposite direction, to *the political-philosophical implications of family normativity*.

Shift in the content of the concepts of the private and the public in modern society

The content and function of human activities in the private and public spheres in modern society differ substantially from those in ancient society. According to Hannah Arendt, the shift in the character of the *public sphere* is the fundamental characteristic of *society*, society being a term which according to her, could only be applied to the modern society. "The emergence of society – the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices – from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen." [Arendt 1958: 38]

Does this not refute all I have said thus far about the relationship between the private and the public in a modern democracy? Not at all, because just as the public space has been filled with new functions, so has the private space. The remarkable thing is that despite the fundamental change in the "content" of these spheres, the relationship between them repeats the Athenian model, i.e. the dependence of the public on the private in the sense of anchoring public "freedom". The question arises as to what degree this relationship is a structural prerequisite for democracy as such.

Arendt maintains that activities have shifted into the public political sphere which she characterized by the concepts of labour and work; it is no longer the supreme sphere of political action. And this is precisely what Arendt has in mind: she is afraid that with the emergence of the social, the political in the classical sense of the free intercourse of

autonomous and unique individuals participating in a common human world is threatened in modern society. In this sense, Arendt argues, the sharp boundary between the private and public has been eliminated. Production and reproduction in addition to action, have become part of the political. This has been expressed in an articulate manner in Arendt's definition of (modern) society: "Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public." [Ibid.: 46] She feels that this leads to a de facto devaluation of political action and, hence, to the public sphere as such.

At the same time, so Arendt argues, modern individualism brought an immense enrichment of the private sphere. "[...] we call private today a sphere of intimacy whose beginnings we may be able to trace back to late Roman, though hardly to any period of Greek antiquity, but whose peculiar manifoldness and variety were certainly unknown to any period prior to the modern age." [Ibid.: 38] According to her, what is decisive for the character of the private in modern times is that historically it has emerged as an antithesis to the social and not to the political. This is the source of its primary function, namely to guarantee intimacy. Therefore, it is in a closer and more substantial relationship with the social than with the political [Ibid.: 38]. Whereas the social, as distinct from the political, is determined primarily by economic activity, the role of the private concerns rather two dimensions of the existence of the modern "private human being": as owner and as a human being as such.

Jürgen Habermas, who analyzed the emergence of the public and private spheres from traditional feudal society, draws a distinction between two areas of the public sphere and two levels of private life. He distinguishes between public administration, which has become separated from traditional power structures (initially understood as the authorities), and the bourgeois public, civil society emerging from below. The latter, however, consists both of private, independent persons whose activity is nevertheless publicly relevant and of a strata of intellectuals (Bildungsbürger). When consciously addressing and controlling the public administration, the bourgeois public represents the political public which is not identical with the purely economic behaviour of individuals. So here it is also a question of distinguishing between the political and the social as does Arendt. Habermas holds that the line between public and private spheres extended right through the home [Habermas 1989: 45]. The private sphere is the place where the owner confirms his independence from the market and his independence as a "human being" from his role as owner.

The family is the private institution which, according to Arendt, is to "safeguard intimacy" and, according to Habermas, to create a consciousness of the independence of the "human being". It is therefore necessary to differentiate between the concept of the private in the economic sense of private enterprise and in the narrower sense of intimate life, which was ruled by the normativity of the bourgeois family. The model of the bourgeois family has specific features. The internal space of the patriarchal nuclear family is the "scene of a psychological emancipation which corresponded to the political-economic one" [Ibid.: 46]. It is also the creation site of bourgeois culture and morals. The bourgeois family rests on a specific ideology since it is based on the illusion of independence i.e., on the negation of its economic origin and function. Yet Habermas maintains that it

can be understood only if we realize that it is not purely ideology, that it was and is a substantial reality as well.

The ideology of the bourgeois family is characterized by three fundamental features: voluntariness (it appears to be established freely and to be maintained without coercion), the community of love, and cultivation (here there is supposed to be a non-instrumental development of abilities for their own sake). These three features merge into one concept of humanity [Ibid.: 47). In Habermas' view, this idea clashes with reality, above all, because not only is the family not exempt from the constraint of the social norms, but because it is an institution deriving from necessity (not from one's own free will). "It played its precisely defined role in the process of the reproduction of capital. As a genealogical link it guaranteed a continuity of personnel that consisted materially in the accumulation of capital". But, in the first place, "As an agency of society it served especially the task of that difficult mediation through which, in spite of the illusion of freedom, strict conformity with societally necessary requirements was brought about." [Ibid.: 47]

That is where the core of the sophisticated relationship between freedom and necessity lies in modern society, a relationship which proceeds along the line dividing the private and the public and which is intrinsically "gendered", in other words, the opposite of a sexually neutral relationship. It is the woman who must ensure "strict conformity with the societally necessary requirements", guarantee the cultivation of family intimacy, thus giving that "appearance of freedom". This is not just any kind of necessity. The family represents an important instrument of social integration once the ties of traditional society have disintegrated. A society based on intercourse between autonomous individuals is vitally dependent on this integration function. The development of the personality in the family, family cultivation, has assumed exceptional importance. In the family, Riesman's inner directed man has been programmed to withstand the test of the public world and be capable of communication.

The defining characteristic of the woman was closely linked with the ideology of the bourgeois family. The woman had to be tied to the family. The German historian Ute Gerhard refers to German pedagogical literature to demonstrate that whereas in the late 18th century the role of the woman was still seen as a social necessity, in the middle of the 19th century it was already perceived as the natural role of the woman. She quotes the educator Campe (*Advice of the Father*, 1789) who claimed that the true mission of the woman consists of the "wife as gladdening the heart", "mother as educator" and "the woman as representative of domestic existence" [Gerhard 1978: 128]. Campe distinguishes between two definitions of the woman (Frau): the general (as a human being) and the specific (as the "Weib"). Her general role is to raise herself and others by goal-directed education with a purpose and using all her forces and abilities, but her specific role obliterates that which is general "in view of her mission as a female (Weib) and her tie to objects and activities lying within the realm of her female role". The important thing is, however, that Campe does not see this special role of the woman as privilege it had been in feudal times, but as an "unfavourable relationship", as a state of affairs which "in our current perception of the world is considered as dependent and leading to a spiritual as well as physical weakening" [see Gerhard 1978: 130]. The internal ideological contradiction is here quite explicit, and it is probably no coincidence that the greater the

philosopher of freedom, the more patriarchal his opinion of the woman – Fichte especially stood out in this respect.

Here, democracy comes into contradicition with the fundamental premises of its self-understanding. In dealing with this conflict, the woman's question received its name, while the resolution was the goal of the women's movement. But as I have tried to show, the conflict was not merely ideological or consisting merely in the "belatedness" of individual liberation for women but was part of the very conditions for the functioning of modern democracy, and is therefore much more profound. Yet it is also untenable. The question of "how the well functioning family is possible" is connected to the elimination of this conflict, and it is senseless to raise it in an isolated manner, without dealing with gender relations in the family and in public life. The changes in the relationship of the private and public spheres reveal which functions of the family are essential and alive; they also reveal the spontaneous situation in the development of gender relations in society as a whole, i.e., what expectations are realistic vis-a-vis the family depending on what can be expected of real individuals and of a given society.

The bourgeois family – still an acceptable model?

To analyze this, one must recognize what was intially only partially real in the original model of the bourgeois family. The argument of personal autonomy is naturally of primary importance. The fact that in the era of human and civil rights, the woman was dependent and subordinated, that she was always dependent on a specific man (Simone de Beauvoir uses the term "vassal") and kept in this dependence by public law, i.e., by having neither ownership nor civil (human) rights, was an unsustainable state of affairs per se. For the woman, the premises of voluntary entry into marriage and remaining in that state was questionable from the very beginning (the right to divorce was one of the means of women's emancipation). The idea of the community of love combined with the institution of the marriage contract, frequently a "marriage for money", was problematic too, as was the illusion of cultivation which was to be the purpose in itself. The requirements of the profession contradicted this ideal.

Habermas breaks down the myth of the bourgeois family as an institution which, by not going beyond the scope of social pressures, is not in a position to live up to all ideal expectations: the ideal of freedom from social requirements, pure love and the cultivation of the personality for its own purpose. But at the same time, it seems that it is only in the family that it is possible (to attempt) to come close to these ideals. In doing so, its ideal nature also becomes real since it implies "humanity of the intimate relationship between human beings who, under the aegis of the family, were nothing more than human [Habermas 1989: 48]. From our own experience we know for example, that in the contradiction between the cultivation of the personality and mere training in skills, the individual mostly receives the former in the family.

The family was also seen as the guardian of morals, a moral institution. Richard Sennett [1992] demonstrates how the world of fierce public competition gradually loses moral attributes and how these are increasingly tied to the family. In accordance with this, the woman is portrayed as a moral being. We have seen, however, that all these virtuous roles of women were, in fact, not recognized by society, probably precisely because they took place in private. The mercilessness of the final judgment was determined by the

connotations of the public space of transcendence and the private space by "mere" immanence.

Where was equality not introduced? In two types of activity, both vitally important for modern society: unpaid care (covering the material, educational and emotional function) and paid work outside the family, connected with power (male domination in the public sphere and in the family). The tension produced by the internal ideological contradiction of modern society, which is the true cause of the tension between the gender roles, is, however, not the only self-disintegrating element in the bourgeois family. Two further ones should be mentioned. First, the ideological factor of the bourgeois family lay also in the fact that in the past the nuclear family was statistically even less frequent than it is today. The normativity of the family was especially hard on all who did not live in it, but it hit women – whether single or one-parent providers – and their children – not to mention illegitimate children – harder. This resulted in the pauperization of women. Second, it is not true that the woman was only expected to perform her humanizing role. Neil McKendrick [1974] points out that one always counted on the woman's economic contribution – in working class families even on her work outside the home, in bourgeois families on her running of the household whereby the economic activity was reduced to sheer prudence. When specifying the "virtues" of women, thriftiness was always ranked highest. But McKendrick maintains that her role in social production was of key significance. Yet public work by women was connected purely with routine and mechanical jobs.

Arendt's categories can be applied when reviewing the overall situation. What does it enable us to deduce? The category of labour (work securing a basic livelihood) has been split. As a political task of supporting the population – a social task, in other words –, it has become a public matter. What remains of it in the private space has been both reduced to the reproduction of the species (engendering and giving birth), and also expanded and enriched by securing intimacy and the reproduction of the autonomous individual (emotional and moral education). Reproduction in the private sector is the task of the woman. Production (manufacture, work) has also been shifted from the private sector to the public sector. All that remains in the private sector is "thriftiness", and not "economy" in the full sense of the word. Historically, however, the woman has never been totally excluded from participation in production. More affluent sections of bourgeois women and girls about whose "useless and futile life" a great deal has been written constituted one exception. Yet woman has never been a "homo faber", a "creator" in the true sense because this would require a connection with a third fundamental type of human activity, political action. Up until the 20th century, women were virtually barred from action .

Enlightened thinkers always saw an evident connection between this exclusion of the woman from action (not from the public space as such, where they were always present as workers), i.e. from the political public, and between the failure to appreciate her more extensive role in social reproduction. Masaryk sees a chance to fulfil the moral mission of the family as defined by the civil equality of the woman, which allows her to play her full role in the family as "a human being" and thus perform her educational role far better. He put his finger on all that prevented such an opening: on the one hand specific superstitions, on the other hand, a concept of parenthood which deprives the father of responsibility for (especially emotional) education. According to Masaryk, fatherhood is

no less "sacred" than motherhood. Masaryk was thus against the hypertrophic myth of motherhood which is closely linked with the described ideology of the bourgeois family. As regards superstitions, he gives prominence to the superstition of the household, relying on the conviction that a person must do certain things for himself in the home. Here the woman is artificially kept busier than necessary. Masaryk speaks of an "unreasonable economy of forces". He also points to the concealed political public potential of women which he sees in the 19th century, the century of social questions, in their social task [Masaryk 1930]. The first collective female activities were indeed conducted in the social field as philanthropic, educational, health and other activities and as care for single mothers and children. Masaryk's view was rather unique. The answer as to why the bourgeois society took the path along which the woman was excluded from the public realm and why, for such a long time, it closed its eyes to the fact that in doing so, it indirectly weakened the educational function is probably that this was the line of least resistance, namely the line of continuing tradition.

The sexual contract and the transition period

Feminists are probably right when they argue that patriarchy survived for so long in modern society simply because men wanted to retain it. Carole Pateman entered into sharp polemics with the present evaluation of the social contract: "Contract is far from being opposed to patriarchy; contract is the *means* through which modern patriarchy is constituted." [Pateman 1988: 2]. Carole Pateman attempts to bring order to the chaos around the concept of patriarchy. She distinguishes between *traditional, paternal* patriarchy and *modern, fraternal* patriarchy. "Patriarchy ceased to be paternal long ago. Modern civil society is not structured by kinship and the power of fathers; in the modern world, women are subordinated to men *as men*, or to men as a fraternity. The original contract takes place after the political defeat of the father and creates modern *fraternal patriarchy*." [Pateman's emphasis; ibid.: 3]

Carole Pateman's concept of the sexual contract as being original certainly offers an explanation of the "classical" nature of the institution of the bourgeois family and appears to bear out our thesis that the cause of the disintegrating tension within the bourgeois family is the reproduction of the Athenian connotations of the private and public spheres in modern society, where they are in fact an anachronism.

It can be summed up as follows: these connotations construed a non-symmetrical evaluation of the private and public spheres in a modern democracy, but themselves evidently proceeded from an asymmetrical evaluation of the gender dominant in the one or the other sphere, i.e., from the inherited (rooted above all in the religion) hierarchic relationship between man and woman. If it is true that the exclusion of women from the political public sphere seeks to conserve the ideal of the bourgeois family in its rigid and problematic form, then the opposite is also true, namely that this ideal of the family is reproduced in correspondence with the social image of man and woman and their relationship.

The dilemma of saving the family or opening the public space to women has always been an artificial dilemma but one that nowadays is being revived in our country. It would probably be right to clarify our terms: safeguarding the family by safeguarding the woman against the public realm is not a conservative but a reactionary stance in the full sense of the word. I consider the road of the humanization and cultivation of gender rela-

tions in the private and public space as conservative in the positive sense. These relations unquestionably require a lengthy period of cultural refinement.

A false solution to a false dilemma has its sad modus in our society and probably in all post-communist societies. Women are protected above all against the political public but in no way against work outside the home. In this way, everything that is meant to form the worthy side of their family function is drastically limited as a result of their economic family functions. The idea of a woman politically active, among other things, in order to contribute to the better achievement of the woman's reproduction mission in the widest sense of the word, is still not a current part of the sociological imagination in our country.

We cannot and do not wish to give up the values which the family, of all social institutions, can cultivate best. The type of love which may develop in the family, the type of education, forming a (moral) personality which the individual can best receive in the family are unquestionably the values which attach us to the bourgeois ideal of the family. But if it is to function it must first of all rid itself of its anachronistic patriarchal elements (a step of negation) and, secondly, replace them with a new type of parental authority (the positive step). The third condition is for society to make a more realistic assessment of which functions (and individuals) are not covered by the institution of the present-day family.

According to Max Horkheimer, we are currently in a transitional phase. Its significance and complexity lie in the fact that neither does the family appear to be capable of offering sufficient care and love, nor is society sufficiently interested; nor does it possess the means of substituting the family in cultivating young people, at least in part [Horkheimer 1988: 211-212]. Let us repeat that fatal neglect of this interest is the historical consequence of underestimating care as a vital social activity. For the reasons we have mentioned, i.e. the minority of the nuclear family and its frequent unreliability which must be looked squarely in the face, Horkheimer maintains that it is essential to supplement and replace weak family solidarity with a new type of social solidarity. In the concepts of the private and the public this means that the public must take over some of the functions of the private sphere in a modern (democratic) society, and it must do this by means of three fundamental methods: 1. the full appreciation of female private work, specific female "adeptness". 2. the assumption of the responsibility for care, mainly for dependent members of society. 3. the cultivation of social solidarity. Max Horkheimer puts it as follows: "[...] the problem today is that at this point of time we live in an interim stage, and that on the one hand the family is threatened, since the feudal era as well as the era of entrepreneurs has passed, but that on the other hand, society is still not arranged the way it should be so that the individual really could love it" [Ibid.: 215-216].

One could hardly give a clearer characterization of the problem of social integration as a problem which does not stand and fall with the family but which lies somewhere in between the family and society. In brief, a necessary correction of ideology lies in separating the mission of the family from its patriarchal form, which must be regarded as a transitory historical form. The correction of connotations of the public and private spheres, while facilitating their passage in both directions is, of course, connected with this; this alone can ease what Carole Pateman calls "fraternal patriarchy".

This is the direction taken by internal feminist debates on the abovementioned motto "the personal is political". It must be pointed out that its interpretations represent a

very broad scale of theoretical and practical attitudes. The common meaning of this motto is shifting political attention to the sphere of everyday life, thereby broadening the content of democracy. "When politics is redefined, so too is democracy." [Phillips 1993: 95] Anne Phillips puts a question mark on those feminist tendencies which fully assimilate the personal and the political. She believes that the more fruitful line of enquiry is to ask whether an over-assimilation of the personal and political does not endanger what is positive about private life [Ibid.: 103]. She reproduces the position of Jean Bethke Elshtain [1981] who makes a distinction between the public and the personal, resting on the difference of activities. According to her, it is not that politics exists 'out there' in a recognizable space of its own, but that some things we do are political and other things we do are not [quoted from Phillips 1993: 105]. Jean Bethke Elshtain's argument is substantial in both ways. She knows that if we treat the personal as thoroughly identical to the political, we run the twin risks of believing our lives can be made perfect and of handing over to others the responsibility for making them so [according to Phillips 1993: 106]. Nevertheless it is true that "As long as the seemingly intimate relations between men and women (or parents and children) are structured by state regulation, economic conditions and patriarchal power, then these relations are already politicized whether we want it or not." [Phillips 1993: 106] I deliberately mention Jean Bethke Elshtain as an example of a feminism not excluding a rather conservative approach.

Indicating areas of specificity

The mentioned conceptual network enables an analysis of a number of phenomena in Czech society. Moreover, so I believe, it makes it possible to understand some of its peculiarities. Irrespective of the degree to which our specific features are evident, they must be recognized to avoid an unqualified application of a number of analytical instruments. For the moment, we lack the historical, especially historical-sociological data to do so. In spite of this, I would like to at least indicate several directions in which it is possible to look for Czech specifics through the prism of the concepts private-public, women-men and family-society. I refer to my previous papers, where I went into some of these themes in a more detailed way. Here only the main theses included in these articles can be presented.

The first direction leads to the history of the origin of modern Czech society in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Works by American scholars in Slavic studies, written during the past ten years, arrive at extraordinary conclusions. They concur that at that time, the Czech public was more than in other countries in favour of women's emancipation, indeed, they go so far as to claim that there was a conspicuously weak "patriarchy". They see the reason for this in a mutually supportive relationship between the Czech women's movement and the national Revivalist movement. My own research confirms that in Czech literature, for example, we do not come across the same kind of "patriarchic" ideology of the family as, say, in German literature. It appears that with regard to attitudes towards gender questions in our country one can speak of a kind of uninterrupted continuity of the liberalistic tradition in which I include, in a certain sense, the communist era [see Havelková1995].

The second direction of analyses is of key importance given the present situation. An analysis of the private and public spheres in the communist era shows a very fundamental shift in the content and functions of these spheres, of the activities performed within them, as well as in their social evaluation, and thus in the connotations of the

public and private spheres. Since they are therefore different from those which I mentioned as typical for a modern (democratic) society, we have to be cautious of the confusions of concepts when using them for analysis [for more, see Havelková 1993a, 1993b]. I agree with Možný [1991] that during that period our society including family relations and gender relations was a combination of modern and pre-modern social forms. However, I do not agree with him on the point that the patriarchy in general was vanishing [Možný 1990], certainly not when it came to paternal authority. In this sense, so I believe, the family in our country experienced some kind of "modernization" without feminism. But in the sense of Carole Pateman's fraternal patriarchy, the picture would be somewhat different, and the proof thereof not merely the absence of women in politics.

With regard to the third direction – current society in the process of transformation – its characteristic feature is the empirical contradiction between the value of the family and the value work outside the home has for the woman. All that applies to social transformation in general applies twice as much to these questions: they are more profound, more complex and also more concealed. The fact that our way of women's emancipation and the modernization of family relations connected with it went, in the first place, via the financial independence of women, makes this modernization too one-sided and partnership culture too fragile: I suspect that women in our country are afraid to give up their jobs also because they are afraid that their financial dependence could be sustained by neither their husbands nor by them, that the institution of the head of the family would be restored in some tragicomic form. We can thus conclude with the paradox that, probably more than by anything else, the renaissance of the cultivating role of women in the family is hampered by a low gender culture. It is far from certain that our society is prepared to fully respect the woman as a woman.

Specifically gender specific

In what follows I try to demonstrate that the analysis of the current social situation (here, the situation of women) in our country by means of the concepts of "public" and "private" does not work through the mere transfer of a theoretical viewpoint developed in a Western context.

The feminist political theorist Susan Moller Okin has demonstrated how the family (especially as gendered) has been "ignored but assumed" by all liberal theories, including the recent, "enlightened" ones [Okin 1989: 39-40]. The main argument of the feminist critique of liberal theories is the position of women in domestic life as determining their status in the public realm: even though women are no longer confined to the realm of family life, "the still heavily gendered structure of family life affects the relative positions of men and women in the 'public' world outside, which in turn reverberate within the family." [Okin 1989: 42]

This general formulation definitely also applies to the position of Czech women. But as soon as the argument becomes more concrete, conspicuous differences arise. It cannot be stressed and repeated enough that our society has been developing for more than forty years in non-liberal and non-bourgeois conditions. As I tried to argue above, the structural arrangements inherited from this time have not been removed by recent political changes, but rather used in the new context, filled with new content and thus further reproduced. My claim, then, is that in societies such as the Czech one, what is "ignored but assumed" is different from what is ignored but assumed in western democ-

racies and that consequently there must be also a somewhat different starting point in feminist criticism. I believe that generally speaking, the gender determination through the domestic position in Czech society is, on the one hand, less pertinent and, on the other, more so.

Besides the quasi-bourgeois model of the woman as the main carer and the man as the main breadwinner, in Czech families there is also the socialist model of the woman as the second but necessary breadwinner. To support her arguments, Okin stresses the low percentage of women holding full-time year-round jobs in the USA. This has not been the case for Czech women, the majority of whom had had full-time, year-round and life-long jobs for forty years. This has not only made them an irreplaceable segment of the labour market but an irreplaceable second breadwinner as well, to such an extent that women today perceive their job outside the family as their "duty", as do often their husbands and their social surroundings. Thus, as compared to Western women who also often work outside the home, it is not just that there has been a difference as to the number of working women: in addition, a different image and understanding of woman has developed as not bound primarily to the family, but also almost automatically as employed. This situation has not changed greatly since 1989: in the 90s, some 45% of the total labor force is still constituted by women (47% in 1989). Moreover, a "continuous employment" model is typical for Czech women, who "during their productive years combine work and family and continue to work even when they have children, or only with very short interruptions. Such a high degree of work activity is exceptional among Western European women" [Čermáková 1995: 8]. The recent liberalization of the economy and society has brought new opportunities for women. It is estimated that about 10% have improved their professional and social status since 1989 [Čermáková 1995: 14]. Due to their internalized responsibility as the second breadwinner, part of their coping strategies is to take on an additional jobs, sometimes a second, or even a third. On average, their work activity has also increased in quantity.

This means that under communism, not only was women's domestic work assumed in Czech society, but so too was their work outside the home. Paradoxically, this did not lessen their responsibility for the family as a whole. On the contrary. Precisely due to their double burden, women had to organize the family's life in order to manage it [comp. Havelková 1993a]. Correspondingly, sociological research of the mid-80s testified to the vanishing authority of the father in the Czech family [Možný 1990] and revealed the most frequent complaint of Czech women to be men's diminshed responsibility for the family. So if we return to Okin's formulation of "the still heavily gendered structure of family life", it applies in the Czech case above all to the division of domestic labor. In other areas of family life too, however, considerable differences from the Western experience can be found and need to be scrutinized.

As I have tried to argue, this model of double assumption has not only been reproduced since 1989, but even strengthened, for women are as desperately "needed" in the family as they eagerly take part in the competition in the labor market. This of course means increased intrinsic dilemmas and conflicts, first of all in women – not just in "people and households". The situation is "gender-specific" in a very specific way.

To sum up, considering both the liberalist theory as ignoring family and gender and its feminist critique in the Czech context, at least three specific realities must be taken into account. Firstly, an ideal of the family model inherited from the bourgeois or

even pre-bourgeois time, which under communism acquired the specific role of a "harmonized memory" (Možný) and which it keeps playing due also to the fact that no discussions on changing the institution of the family and no real discussion on changing gender roles took place. Such discussions have only started, slowly and hesitatingly, in recent years. Secondly, a reality brought about by the communist gender model, which in fact opposes this ideal model, characterized by the determination of a woman as both a private and public (working) person and by her increased financial and organizational role in the family. Thirdly, the current reality where the two previous conditions are being used in the new context: the first one by a direct appeal to women's caring capacity (to cope with the increasingly tense psychological situation in families), the second one by indirect pressure towards their increased working activity (to cope with the economic hardships in families). Women pay for the public social peace by inter- or intrapersonal conflicts, which can already be traced in recent demographic trends which reveal both an increase in divorce (almost every second marriage in Prague) and a dramatic decline in population (a sudden change in young women's marital strategies).

Conclusions

The relationship between the private and the public spheres in modern society is brought out in the paper as an open process. In analysing this, I have concentrated mainly on its gender dimension which, to a large extent, determined this relationship and which was in turn reproduced by it. From a noetic point of view, this analysis serves as a missing link in questions of the family and gender problems which in our country have been studied more or less separately. As I tried to show, however, the gender problems in modern society are closely linked with the problems of the process of individualization, i.e., of social integration of a modern type. Understandably, therefore, the heuristic potential of the analyses carried out goes beyond the gender problem and is, in my opinion, most topical, especially in a society in the process of transformation such as ours, where a kind of repetition of the process of individualization is taking place.

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GRAPPLING WITH DEMOCRACY
Deliberations on Post-Communist Societies (1990-1995)

Edited by Elżbieta Matynia (Graduate Faculty of New School for Social Research, New York).

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This collection of essays is the offspring of an intellectual project which was initiated ten years ago in New York, Warsaw and Budapest to provide the opportunity for a sustained and uninhibited discussion of democratic theory and the prospects for democratization. After 1990 this loosely structured endeavor came to be generally known as the Democracy Seminars, with more or less formalized chapters in 14 countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The collection introduces the reader to the debate that surrounds the unprecedented systemic changes taking place in the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially in their political, social, and cultural realms. The main body of the book, which follows the Introduction (*The Democracy Seminars and Beyond*) and the Prologue is organizaed in four sections. These are: *Continuity and Change*, *Constituting Democracy*, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, and *Nationality and Diversity: Challenges to Liberal Democracy*. The debate is represented here by contributions from scholars, writers, and journalists from 16 countries who also belong to the larger international community of the New School's Graduate Faculty. Many of them are of international renown. They include Adam Michnik, Marcin Krol, Janos Kis, Miklos Haraszti, Jan Urban, Pavel Campeanu, Martin Butora, Ira Katznelson, Ann Snitow, Claus Offe, Ulrich Preuss, Shlomo Avineri, Andrew Arato, Jeffrey Goldfarb, Jose Casanova, and many others.

For the most part, the main body of the book grew out of the second, post-1989 stage of the Democracy Seminars. The majority of the texts were presented and discussed at regular meetings of the local chapters or at the annual international meetings.

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Society, Politics and Demography

The Example of Soviet History*

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Abstract: Of particular interest within the history of the USSR is how a very strong political desire to disrupt society, its foundations, its structure and its functioning wholly achieved these goals. The notably uneven history of the USSR leads the author to examine the marks it left on social behavioural patterns. This article – with the analysis both of demographic behaviour and the relation between political decisions regarding this and the subsequent social response as point of departure – attempts to provide preliminary answers to these questions. It reveals a real autonomy of behaviour in the face of often fluctuating decisions and therefore offers a reflection on the nature of political constraints. The article makes explicit, through several examples, the particular place statistical administration occupies at the junction between politics and society. Thus it becomes possible to propose a number of hypotheses on an increasing estrangement between the political world and individuals.
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The demographic history of the USSR and its demographic statistics are particular points of interest in the research on the relationship between political and social practices. They also allow – through the study of the production mechanisms of these statistics – the elaboration of a deeper reflection on the relationship between politicians and administrators.

The respective positions of the State and society, the mediation of the administration, the autonomy of the political dynamics and their impact on social conventions are at the centre of these enquiries. Tackling Soviet history via its demographic dynamics allows in effect for the advancement of numerous hypotheses which provide us with an opportunity to illuminate this interaction between the political and social spheres. Soviet history characterises itself, in particular, by the will of the State – rarely pushed to such limits – to effect a modification, indeed a bouleversement of individual behaviour. This touched numerous domains of private life: the desire for a new family, for new relationships between couples, for a new sexuality. These imperatives were most often expressed and made concrete by the State through declarations, laws or decrees, by political manipulation, by articles in the press. Thus, during the 20s and 30s, the individual was subjected to a political policy of change and struck by a series of catastrophic events of direct impact upon demographic dynamics.

The consequences of both this "totalitarian intention" and a particularly uneven history on individual behaviour – as perceived or measured by temporal or geographic

*) This text follows on from a seminar that took place in Prague in June 1994 on the initiative of CEFRES. I hereby thank the centre, the discussions during the seminar having been extremely useful. This piece of work has also benefited from remarks made during the seminar on Eastern Europe at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris in November 1994.

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demographic dynamics – have been the focus of previous research.[1] We will present its conclusions through several revealing examples of this attempt at social upheaval which did not result in a profound modification of societies. These societies have, on the contrary, closed themselves off from the political world to follow autonomous paths certainly, that is, when perceived through demographic behaviour, a subtle gauge of social behaviour. This closing off and this failure can be observed on the geographical level, when we affirm the permanence of spatial disparities and the continuity of a space of colonial nature from the time of the Tsarist empire to the end of the Soviet Union. They are also to be observed when one traces demographic dynamics through time, subjected, as they are, to the perils and about-turns of legislation, violently disturbed by great demographic catastrophes in the short term, but far more autonomous if one moves beyond the short term to interpret these evolutions over longer periods.

The study of demographic behaviour leads, moreover, to an understanding of the mechanisms of the production of statistical data. This, however, is not interesting merely from the point of view of better establishing the quality of sources used. In fact, it also provides numerous elements for the analysis of the relations between the three levels constituted by the political world, administration and society. One thereby joins debates which have constantly accompanied the examination of the soviet world, debates in which the proponents of the interpretation of this history as a monolithic, top-down system and those researching an operational logic implying more profound social dynamics are opposed.[2] As proof, one can cite Hannah Arendt, a pioneer in the definition of "totalitarian" in soviet history, who made occultation, indeed the absence of reliable statistics, one of the foundations of her model:

> "Despite 'an abundance of almost unclassifiable material on the purges' of 1929 to 1937, it contains no indication of the number of victims nor any other statistical data of vital importance. Each time the statistics are presented, they are hopelessly contradictory [...] in other words, if we had always known that official soviet publications had propaganda goals and were never in the least bit reliable, it now seems that dependable sources and statistical materials probably never existed anywhere." [Arendt 1972: 10]
>
> "This is even true of some of their strange lacunas, especially those concerning statistical data. This absence simply proves that in this regard, as in all others, the Stalinist regime was unpityingly coherent: all the facts that did not tally or could not be tallied with the official fiction – data on harvests, crime, real incidences of 'counter-revolutionary' activities, as opposed to previous fictive conspiracies – were considered unreal. In complete harmony with the totalitarian contempt for facts and reality, all data of this type, instead of being assembled in Moscow from the four corners of the immense territory, were first brought to the attention of the respective districts by their publication in *Pravda*, *Izvestia* or some other official organ in Moscow, such that each region, each district of the Soviet Union received its statistics – official and fictive – exactly as they received the no less fictive norms allocated them by the five year plans." [Ibid.: 18]

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[1]) The present article is based on several themes developed in the work [Blum 1994a].

[2]) For a clear and synthesizing overview of the principles of the "totalitarian school" and those of the "revisionist school", see [Werth 1993], as well as the preface by [Werth and Moullec 1994].

In this text, which summarises to perfection the initial leanings of what was known as the "totalitarian school", two images clash which long formed the two central axes of the historiography dealing with the USSR. On the one hand, the manipulative desire of those in power who present the country the way they want it to be seen; on the other, as a consequence of this, a non-existent or manipulated statistical structure. One can therefore understand the current importance of deepening the work on soviet statistical administration, and in particular that of the 30s as well as on the administrative institution itself, its representations and what it provided the political world, and the personnel that worked there. The opening of the archives actually allows access to reports from the 30s, to administrative correspondence, to statistical materials, such as they were collected, prior to their communication, access to the procedures which transformed them.

Such a deepening of research in fact shows unambiguously that statistical sources existed, that the production of figures was important and elaborated by an administrative apparatus that often did not deform it. The above description of a soviet world without statistics or falsified statistics is thus incorrect. We will present a number of research hypotheses which help explain the relation between statistical administration (demographic, so that the field is well-defined, and can be followed continuously from the beginning of the 20th century through to the Second World War right through to today even) and the political world, as well as between statistical administration and observation of the social world.

Social Continuities

Here we will merely indicate, with three examples developed in other works, the application of study on demographic behaviour to examine the relation between the political world and social dynamics. The first will deal directly with the 20s and 30s, and the geography of demographic catastrophes; the second will touch very briefly on the question as to the nature of soviet space as a colonial expansion or a unique and specific model. Finally we will examine from the longer-term perspective the larger characteristics of certain demographic dynamics as they are linked to certain constraints which could have or did overthrow them.

The Geography of Demographic Catastrophes

The famine of 1933 has been interpreted by numerous historians as an explicit intention to strike at the Ukraine, to expunge any desire for independence. Behind this interpretation lies the conviction on the part of certain historians and sociologists that the omnipotence of the political decisions made by the centre, and by Stalin himself, as deeply modifying demographic and social dynamics. Is this famine, the result of a particularly dark period, a fundamental stage in the history of Stalinism, thus apart from Russian history? Is it a turning point in a soviet history definitively stranger to its past? If one puts the geography of the 1933 crisis in perspective as we have reconstructed it from the results of various censuses as well as the geographies of the crises of the 19th century or of 1921-22, one realises that the interpretation cannot be made at this level alone [Adamets, Blum and Zakharov 1993].[3] The crisis of 1933 not only affected the Ukraine,

[3]) English version revised and specially prepared for the conference on Soviet Population in the 1920s and 1930s. Center for Russian and East European Studies, Toronto, Canada, 27-29 January 1995.

but also the whole of Southern Russia as well as Kazakhstan. This geography provides numerous analogies with previous crises. The evidence suggests that the origin of the crisis was the policy of total collectivisation; Stalin's refusal to acknowledge the famine, in spite of all the information received[4] explains the magnitude of it – one never before achieved in Europe. It is no less true that it also reflects a traditional conflict between a centre seeking to control a territory in its entirety and a periphery seeking to remain autonomous. This crisis is the expression of a great instability and, especially, of the failure of the soviet territory to achieve a coherence with Russian history: it presents a traditional schema of the 19th century, in a world subjected to a massive industrialisation. The form of control took on an extreme dimension, with political determination becoming primordial; they did not, however, modify those outlines inscribed in the logic of old spatial and social relations of the Russian ancien regime.

The geographical space – soviet or colonial?

Another example testifying to a certain autonomy of social forms: the development of the regions belatedly integrated to Russia, the regions of central Asia or the Caucasus. Many saw the soviet space as foreign to a logic of colonial composition. In this case there would be a rupture in the imperial Russian space. The important question is therefore to know if we can speak of colonialism within the soviet framework. Is there a continuity between Russian colonialism and soviet colonialism? Those defending a specific nature of the soviet space placed the accent on a far greater homogeneity of this space, from central Asia to Caucasia than in the other colonial empires. They proposed, for example, the same analysis of social stratification in Russia and central Asia. They spoke of soviet society because the language of the statistician or the statesman had been made uniform for the entire Soviet Union, and was irremediably removed from the language used elsewhere in Europe. The Uzbek or Ukrainian peasant no longer existed – he was replaced by the kolkhozian, with nothing to affirm that the first was closer to the second than to Iranian peasant. Was this a case of a real transformation of societies, or was it simply a linguistic illusion, an erroneous metaphor? Several studies have shown and show today that traditional structures have persisted [see for example, among more recent articles, Roy 1993], that the kolkhoze has often reclaimed – under the soviet guise – traditional power relations in the regions.

The study of demographic behaviour, the manner in which the soviet space was populated, as well as the modifications in the demographic dynamics in the colonised space – particularly in central Asia – also shows that the impact of the soviet presence on the colonial margins was not so very different from those of the Russian empire or the USSR or, in the post-war period between the French empire and the soviet empire indeed, later, between the processes inducted by the relations between the developed and developing countries.

Hence, the observation of demographic dynamics confronted by political and legal constraints shows that the latter had no great effect and that one could interpret the demographic transition in the states of central Asia within a theoretical framework corresponding to that of other developing countries: the Soviet Union even enacted a policy

[4] It is strictly impossible today to claim that the politicians were not in the know. The very size of the catastrophe proves this, although the reports on the demographic situation kept at the RGAE show that they also received detailed information.

similar to the one applied in the 60s and 70s by developed countries in their relations to developing countries. A few examples bear clear witness to this.[5] The laicisation of marriage, not followed by a secularisation, forced the marriage age to be raised and religious marriage and traditional practices in these regions to be forbidden [Barbieri et al. 1994]. However, marriage traditions have manifestly modified, and quite independently of legislative measures. In an initial phase, the marrying age of men and women rose as a pure consequence of legal constraints, while the difference in age between men and women hardly changed at all, testifying to the persistence of the traditional model. To observe any real change you have to wait until the 70s, when there was a convergence of the ages between men and women. Analogously, the temporality of the transition of fertility is hardly different from that in neighbouring countries outside the USSR. Although the means of limiting births differed greatly, although the policy enacted had almost nothing to do with developing family planning, the transition of fertility in the mid-70s began at a relatively rapid pace. These are typical factors leading, essentially, to a rise in the level of education. There is hardly anything specifically soviet to them.

Hence this persistence of traditional forms, their modification within a framework that is in no way different to what one observes in developing countries of similar cultural backgrounds.

Autonomous European Societies

Finally, the last illustration of this demographic autonomy with regard to political constraints: the failing will of the State to change the behaviour of individuals within the European populations. In fact, the family or population policy measures taken during various periods of the soviet history had little effect. Very often one finds references to family upheavals that followed the revolution, to upheavals resulting from the changes in 1936, to the individualisation of the behaviour of those populations subjected to the actions of a State intent on their homogenisation after the Second World War. However, several indicators show that none of the above actually occurred. In Russia, the legislative somersaults concerning family planning (authorisation, prohibition, authorisation of abortion, hostility towards contraception) had no particular impact on fertility reduction, with the exception of the fluctuations of circumstances. The revolution no doubt accelerated this drop somewhat, but this trend had already started at the beginning of the century and continued independently of these factors [see, for example, Anichkin and Vishnevsky 1994]. The about-turn of 1936 only very briefly interrupted the already well-advanced fall in fertility. The demographic policy measures of 1981 had an equally ephemeral effect. Finally, the abrupt fall in fertility in Russia at the beginning of the 90s, even if partially attributable to a deterioration in living standards, is above all a consequence of readjustment, after several disturbances, to a behaviour generally accepted throughout Europe [see, for example, Avdeev and Monnier 1994]. The extended role of the family survived. Regional contrasts in terms of extra-marital fertility reflect traditional contrasts: Protestant and Scandinavian Estonia, for example, is remarkable for its very high level of illegitimacy before the break-up of the USSR, while catholic Lithuania has never known such behaviour as a general fashion.

[5]) For a more detailed development of these questions, see [Blum 1994a].

It is true that the evolution of mortality is very particular. Here, the sign of soviet integration – comprising the European part of the USSR – is evident. It does not, however, reflect a change in social dynamics. Mortality is doubtless the most dependent indicator on particular institutional forms. In terms of structure according to causes of death, characteristics particular to the various regions forming the USSR can be found. In terms of the level, on the other hand, one finds a clear result of the bankruptcy of a policy which placed the accent on medical technology, and thus lost sight of the social dimension of the process.

All this therefore shows clearly that the social relations and social practices were much less disrupted than legal constraints or contemporary discourse and descriptions would have it. One realises that the debates, the description of family forms – produced as much by the soviets as by Western observers – are much more reflections of the official changes than reflections of reality. The rupture does not exist in the long term, even if in the short term the fluctuations are strong. Of course, everyday life has been changed profoundly, demographic catastrophes have struck whole families, disrupted generations. However, these disruptions to individual trajectories did not take the path proposed, imposed, by political decisions. Society tried to ignore them as they were too far removed from everyday preoccupations, they were foreign to the modes of thinking of the people of these regions. The representation those in power made of the world they dominated did not correspond with what it really was and, indeed, was too far removed from it. The study of the statistical formulation and its representations could allow for a better understanding of it.

Demographic statistics and the impossible construction of a state[6]

The history of demographic statistics in the Russian Empire is quite different from that of a country such as 19th century France, where the strong links between the formation of a nation-state and the establishment of a statistical administration were emphasised over and over again.[7] The ambition of statistics is not simply to count, but to achieve a uniform description, and hence representation, of society through censuses, surveys, and the regular collection of information from the entire territory. The understanding of the social at the heart of the nation implies the uniformisation, the objectivisation of the interpretative grid. These statistics are therefore constructed on the basis of a conjunction of the interests of administrators, prominent figures and the responsible politicians. The construction of the State is reflected here in the continuity and the superimposition of the three areas: those who make the decisions and those who observe and manage either at the national or local levels.[8]

In Russia, however, statistical endeavour of the 19th century scarcely had a national goal [see Avdeev, Blum and Troitskaïa 1994]. Of course, since Peter the First, the *revisii* have taken place successively, but were never destined to provide the statistical panorama of a nation, having rather an essentially fiscal goal. The first census covering the entire empire – in 1897 – seemed almost an oddity. It seemed beyond the logic of Russian power. Until that time, the production of detailed statistics of all the territory the

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[6]) This section of the text is partially taken from [Blum 1994b].

[7]) See in particular [Desrosières 1994].

[8]) On this question in France, see, for example [Bourguet 1988, Rosanvallon 1990].

Russian empire covered had been the object of several administrative attempts (often dispersed and abandoned), but more especially, of university academics. Statistical research, sometimes inspired by the engaged thought at the heart of the International Institute of Statistics[9], is clearly more the product of individual initiatives and individual relations with sociologists or Western statisticians – from German, the first director of a statistical office and a statistician of German origin, educated at the school of Gröningen [see, for example German 1819], to Ju. Janson [1892], including the first synthesising publication of demographic data [*Sbornik...* 1851] – than the logic of influential groups, at the same time members of the State, prominent figures and scholars, as often classified by Western statistical societies.[10]

This absence of centralised statistics that was being developed at the same time in Western Europe could be justified by the existence of an authoritarian power that feared the aim of the research. Such an explanation is, however, unsatisfactory. A strong state, that represents the territories it governs as unified within a national logic needs administrative statistics, even if it controls them.

An outline of the State statistics

The Russian revolution thus marks a significant rupture. Not so much, however, for those who were to construct the new institutions of demographic statistics – those who formerly worked in the regional statistical offices or on the statistics of the zemstvos. They were trained in the long European statistical tradition, their intellectual reference points were profoundly anchored in the work produced before the Revolution. Pavel I. Popov, the first director of the CSU, was in charge of the Tula government statistics; Vasilij G. Mikhajlovskiij, responsible for the first soviet censuses, was director of statistics for the Moscow government; the statisticians invited to the first soviet congress on statistics after the Revolution, were all regional statistics authorities under the tsarist empire.[11] The works which serve as methodological references were for the most part written before the Revolution; even after modification, they could not be integrated into the new framework of thinking.[12] The bibliographical references are those from the great statistical manuscripts from the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the most cited among them G. Von Mayr, A. Bowley, U. Yule or W. Lexis.[13]

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[9]) The congress of the International Institute of Statistics which took place in St. Petersburg has, without a doubt, had considerable influence in this direction. See, for example [Brian 1989].

[10]) For France and, in particular, the Société de statistique de Paris, see [Kang 1989].

[11]) РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 1, ed. khr. 30, "Учреждения и лица, коим посланы приглашения на Всероссийский съезд земских, городских и правительственных статистиков, 8-20 юня 1918 г. в Москве".

[12]) See, in particular, the works edited or re-edited by A. A. Кауфман, *Теория и методы статистики*, Moscow, various editions before and after the Revolution; H. A. Каблуков, *Статистика (Краткий очерк статистики народонаселения)*, Moscow 1918 (4th edition); A. A. Чупров, *Теория статистики. Статистика народонаселения*, Moscow 1900; A. Ф. Фортунатов.

[13]) For a history of Russian and Soviet statistics, see, apart from the previously cited works, M. B. Птуха, *Очерки по статистике населения*, Moscow 1960, reference work as well as, for example, E. B. Плошко et И. И. Елисеева, *История статистики, финансы и статистика*, Moscow 1990.

On the other hand, the fundamental novelty lies in the fact that the government took these statistics on board in the thirst for knowledge of the country, in the implicit desire to unify – through a detailed account of the population – a territory that would thereafter really be perceived as national. The parallel between this genesis of national statistics and the statistical explosion that followed the French Revolution of 1789 is edifying. The censuses succeeded one another with the same failures, then the same success. The statistical annuals are numerous, touching all domains of social and moral statistics. They sought to serve as a guide for a policy which would be oriented on the observations and studies supplied by the statisticians. Thus a statistic was set up which reflected the desire to construct a modern State, a statistic which, in interpreting all it observed as social facts (Социальное явление), sought to establish itself as an administrative tool for the political world. The desire to create a distance from Western statistics does indeed exist, but discusses the law of large numbers or the average and, in reality, is hardly to be distinguished from discussions of the same questions taking place or having taken place in Western Europe, in the founding tradition and in its critique proposed by Quételet or developed by Durkheim. This statistic discusses Galton or Pearson as, for example, is testified by the proposition – elaborated at the time of the first congress on statistics after the Revolution – to establish a working group on corelation.[14]

A New Formulation of statistics

The period of statistical explosion, an indicator of the modern State as in the West, was of short duration. The political hardening at the end of the 20s was accompanied by research whose orientation allowed a distancing from Western science.[15] A new phase was entered when N. Osinskij published various works and brochures in which he opposed compatibility (Учет) and statistics (Статистика) and developed the idea according to which, in a socialist society founded on planning, the latter gave way to the former. He called this the death of statistics (умирание статистики) [Osinskij 1932]. He perceived the impossibility of extending this theory to social phenomena, and yet his text was to become the compulsory reference for works that were to follow such as those by Starovskij [1936] or Bojarskij [1931]. The transformation of the CSU (Центральное Статистическое Управление, that is, the Central Office of Statistics) in CUNKhU (Центральное Управление НародоХозяйственное Учета, or the Central Office of Economic Accounting) is explicit proof thereof.

These new theoretical references did not really modify the groundwork carried out by statisticians at the end of the 20s on the population, in particular that work on the collection and initial processing of demographic data. The change was more to be found in the publicity surrounding these references, in the uses they were put to by the political world, in the goals to which the administration of demographic statistics was consecrated. Two sources allow for precise evaluation: the demographic reports and the type of data used and exploited. The demographic reports sent from 1933 onwards to Stalin or Molotov by the CUNKhU Department of Population continued to describe a deteriorating situation, underlining the very marked rise in mortality in 1933, without, however, using

[14]) РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 1, d. x.

[15]) A general process which also touches scientific disciplines [see, for example, Graham 1987, 1993].

the word "famine".[16] Other internal reports within the statistical organisation provide analogous reflection.[17] The basic statistical information continued to be collected, worked upon and presented to the political power, in spite of the catastrophes they revealed.

In this respect, 1933 seems pivotal. In demonstrating that statistics cannot avoid describing processes denied by the political power, they become the object of distrust and tension. In the first, this tension was made visible through conflicts between administration – in particular between the NKVD, responsible for the ZAGS (organs of the civil state) and, thus, for the collection of demographic data, and the CUNKhU, responsible for the elaboration of the data.[18] These often violent conflicts did not, however, lead to any particular repression until 1937. That year saw these tensions come to a head dramatically. The course of the 1937 census shows with even greater clarity that statistics on the population could not answer to the responses of power. What followed is well known: the repression that struck many of those responsible – they were shot or deported – and the new census of 1939.[19] The statistical administration was definitively transformed then, in its relations to politics, in the administration of recording figures, but not in interpretation. In this first role, however, it carried out its task rigorously. Is it not surprising to find a series of reports destined to control and improve the quality of death records when they were seeking to show a rapid drop in mortality? How to explain that on the whole the 1939 census was done correctly, even if, at the end of the process, a certain number of manipulations allowed for it to be better adapted to the demands of the relevant politicians?[20]

Statistics become recording

Prudence and attention to political discourse are best perceived in the progressive disappearance of an interpretation in favour of a simple description. Recording continued with rigour, the various tasks carried out were from that time to be distinguished by the disappearance of the social as the object of statistics, by the disappearance of interpretation. With forward planning managing society, regular compatibility alone became neces-

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16) Cf. various reports in РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 329. See, for example, f. 1562, op. 329, ed. 107, l. 90-95: *Докладная зписка о естественном движении населения в период между двумя переписями, 17/12-1926 и 6/1-1937 г.*, sign. Kurman, сов. секретно, 4. экз., sent to Kraval'. Ф. 1562, оп. 329, ед. х. 107, л. 134-139, *Естественное движение населения СССР за 7 месяцев 1936 г. (Обзор)*

17) See, for example, *Воспроизводство населения Ленинградской области (без Ленинграда) в 1934 год,* f. 1562 op. 329, d. 107 l. 2-11. Sign. Серов, начальник Лен. обл. и Гор. управления Нарховучета, Le 17.9.35. Секретно, 1 экз.

18) See, in particular, РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 329, ed. khr. 107, l. 120-127, "Докладная записка о состоянии учета естественного движения населения", the report sent by Алиевский, Head of the Department of Civil State Laws at NKVD, at Ягода, director of NKVD, February 19, 1935.

19) The works dealing with the censuses of 1937 and 1939 are now numerous. See in particular [Volkov 1990; Andreev, Darskij and Kharkova 1990; Poljakov and Zhiromskaja 1994]. Also see [Weathcroft 1990; Adamets, Blum and Zakharov 1994] as well as the works by V. N. Zemskov on the statistics of the NKVD.

20) On this point, see in particular Molotov's instructions by which the sheets of the consensus were to be transferred from Siberia to the Ukraine. (РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 329, rd. khr. x).

sary. The idea of power is therefore that society is managed, is no longer active. Thus a considerable hiatus between action (political) and reaction (social) is introduced, society no longer recognising itself in the image created by political discourse and in the legislative machinery issuing from it. Several examples bear witness to this, two of which are particularly revealing. The 1937 census documents the supposed disappearance of the social classes to later retract this notion in its codification plan. Those articles which allude to this overturned in a rather extraordinary manner the logic of description: social classes were no longer present in the census, this proved that soviet society is a classless society...[21] Here one can see the trap into which numerous western observers have fallen when they describe, right up until the disappearance of the USSR, soviet society as a non-stratified, homogenised society. This homogenisation is in fact the product of a new construction designed to describe society and not a profound modification. Given that social stratifications were no longer measurable, this illusion was of considerable significance. There is nothing to show, however, that they have not persisted. The contemporary explosion of differences, the rising to the surface of complex social groups, of networks based on pre-existent stratifications which occurred at the fragmentation of the Soviet Union indicate quite the contrary.

The tensions between administrators and politicians

The statistical administration's treatment of the question of nationality also reveals the contradictions and tensions existing between administrators and politicians. At the end of the 30s, those conducting the 1939 census had to elaborate a dictionary of nationalities: the one used in 1937 (completed in 1934) was considered or must have been considered substandard as the entire 1937 census was cancelled. Thus the organisers of the census were confronted with two influences, two constraints. The first held to Russian ethnographic tradition which has its own particular criteria for defining peoples; the second stemmed from the political texts, obligatory references, in particular Stalin's, which specified the terms of nationalities and ethnic groups. They therefore had to adapt to an abstract and strongly political definition. Thus, the CUNKhU, the Institute of Ethnography and the Institute of Languages and Mentalities began corresponding with the Academy of Sciences. This correspondence shows the various levels of constraint governing the establishment of such a grid:

> "As the basis of the list is the division of the peoples of the USSR into three principal categories:
>
> 1. the nations, national groups and peoples;
> 2. the national minorities having no precise geographic regroupment on the national territory of the USSR (republic, national oblast' or national okrug);
> 3. ethnographic groups.
>
> To establish the list of nationalities, we have taken as a base the understanding of the nation as given by I. V. Stalin '[...]'"[22]

In another document, they observe that

> "The list was based on the distinction between nation, people and national group. In practice, however, we were compelled to make a fourth distinction: that of the

[21]) "Перепись населения социалистического государства." *Правда*, April 29, 1936.

[22]) РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 336, delo 208, l. 33-43.

ethnographic group for which it is indispensable to conduct analyses at the beginning of the census as numerous aspects of the national composition of the USSR have turned out to be particularly difficult to earmark in the first groups cited."[23]

Behind this would-be intangible principle, however, numerous difficulties arose in the interpretation of the relation between the "official" definition and the real application of distinctions in a definition that was to operate at several levels. This lead to enormous difficulty in integrating all the peoples (for the most part registered on the 1934 list) in one or another of the predefined categories. The list proposed by the census office was sharply criticised as much by the Institute of Languages and Mentalities as by the Institute of Ethnography. Beyond the criticism made at a level of scientific analysis befitting ethnographic research at that time (equivalence of denomination etc.), the criticism shows a real fear of not endorsing what would be an official criterion. After a series of written consultations, the CUNKhU arrived at the implied conclusion that the criteria were not applicable and justified the solution of a simple alphabetical list:

"All the nationalities (155) and all the languages (141) in the Soviet Union are included in the list, independent of their size. [...]

The peoples and languages of the Soviet Union are classified in alphabetical order. We have come to the point where we refuse to re-examine a scientific classification reflecting the peoples and languages. The creators of the list do not have the power to do so.

Nor have we been able to specify groupings to the peoples of the USSR or from the point of view of well-known historical categories: nation (nationality), national group and ethnic group. Although the nation is [...] (Stalin), the creators of the list do not have sufficient material for the criteria."[24]

This official statement of failure was the supreme legitimisation of the Central Office of Statistics' abandonment of classing nationalities according to ethnographic and anthropological criteria. Thus whereas in 1926, the nationalities were regrouped in the lists according to the criteria of proximity, from 1939, they were to be regrouped, like the republics, according to criteria such as the number of people within these nationalities. The categorical definition was irrevocable, the administrators restricted by them, and yet the criteria no longer functioned.

What State?

What is a state then if there is no longer a fusion between the policy-making and the work of the administrators of the statistical organisms? Must one see in this disassociation the survival of a group of men who believed in the existence of a State in the Western sense of the term? If so, one observes a "phantom state", founded on a network of administrators and universities operating like a state, but who have absolutely no political decision-making power and who are ignored by the political world. This coexistence sometimes recalls the existence of these local statistics which dominated the imperial Russian world, but which never resulted in the production of a unified and national image of the territory. At the same time, these statistics can be distinguished. Local

[23]) РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 336, delo 208, l. 53. "Explanatory Note on the Project of the List of Nationalities" (29/06/38).

[24]) РГАЭ, f. 1562, op. 336, delo 206, l. 120-143.

statistics were the product of a close liaison with local decision-making organs. Soviet statistics are centralised, removed from local organs. Even so they do not play an active, unifying role. On the one hand, local administration carries out the censuses, yet they never get to know the detailed results, which are kept in Moscow. On the other hand, Moscow gathers and keeps the results without making much use of them bar a few specialists in each domain who are permitted to manipulate and exploit them.

The 30s bear witness to this fundamental rupture affecting the relationship between administrators/statisticians observing the society and the policy-makers who ignored it increasingly. Thus, if the "facts which did not match up [...] were treated as untrue" as Hannah Arendt claims in the above-cited text, this was not the case for the administrators, and information on the diverse catastrophes afflicting the country had for a long time been transmitted to the policy-makers, even if the interpretative grid had been changed and this change were responsible for rendering them less and less intelligible. Apart from a few exceptions, there had been no real falsification as far as demography was concerned. There had been occultation, there were attempts to modify representations, but that is all. Moreover, the study of representations specifies a contradiction which will scarcely be resolved between the government and the logic of the administrators inscribed in the 19th century European tradition.

Conclusion: a few lines of research

In this text, we have not deepened any particular aspect of the questions we have raised. On the contrary, we have proposed a rapid survey of the various paths of investigation which seemed to us to have been given priority in a demographic approach in order to provide the fundamental elements for debates on the respective place in Soviet history of society, the state and administration. Three complementary points of departure could be prioritised today:

1) A deeper study of the statistical administration allows for the rearrangement in a precise institutional framework the relation between politics and society. It allows for the question as to the nature of the structure of the state which was established, only to crumble, after the Revolution. It would be based on a precise examination of the intellectual formation of the producers of the figures; of the logic of the importance of political constraints on both the people themselves and the renewal of cadres and the manner in which one may or may not speak of a deterioration of the qualification and a politicisation of the cadres; on the place of administration within the State and, finally, an examination of the real information on the political power and the use it makes of this information.

We believe we have shown that the study of the production of demographic statistics provides a framework for reflection appropriate to the research on the role of the administration, on the nature (indeed the existence) of a state in the modern sense of the term and, more generally, on the relation between the political world and society as mediated by the administration. A strong dissociation between an administration destined, after the Revolution, to run a modern state and the political world, which, after several years, renounced this state from the 1930s onwards, and especially from 1933. Claude Ingerflom and I entitled one of our articles "Forget the State in order to understand Russia?" [Blum and Ingerflom 1994]. Behind this undoubtedly somewhat provocative formulation, we wanted to express succinctly that Russian and Soviet history cannot be

limited to a history of the political world. A significant autonomy subsisted and the very construction of the state in the modern sense of the term is problematic. It cannot be considered a given.

2) The study of short- and long-term demographic dynamics seems to be a complex reflection of the various political and social ruptures afflicting Russia between 1917 and 1950 and characterised by a series of huge demographic catastrophes as well as fluctuating debate and legislation on demographic behaviour. By placing in perspective these ruptures and the evolution of the main demographic behaviour, such as marriage and the constitution of families, fertility and death, one can come to a subtle understanding of the consequences of these catastrophes and political and ideological upheavals on individuals, on their place within society, on social relations themselves.

3) Finally, historical demography allows us to reconstruct social relationships and stratifications beyond the representations deformed by the utilisation of categories designed to display an homogenous, immobile society. It aims, in fact, to highlight the full scope of individuals' chosen paths and the relationships which interlink various paths through, for example, marriage. In effect, one of the principal problems the historian of soviet societies runs into is the permanent modification of the analytical framework without so much as being able to distinguish whether these modifications are merely the product of a change in the representation or the expression of deep-seated upheavals.

Towards a comparative history?

All these orientations, this inscription of soviet history within logics which are not so far removed from processes occurring elsewhere in Europe show, furthermore, that it is not possible to deal with these questions without a comparative outlook on the European states which themselves were establishing ever larger administrations. In this respect and by way of conclusion, I want to underline an important question. Tackling the history of the 20s and 30s and Stalinism in particular from a comparative perspective is already an a priori. There are many who consider Stalinism, like nazism, to be of an *exceptional* character and that to apply the same tools used elsewhere, to make a comparison is to deny its exceptionality. We know how much this debate with regard to nazism caused outrage in Germany - indeed, it was at the centre of the "historians' quarrel" (*Historikerstreit*). In his work, *What is Nazism?* [Kershaw 1992], Jan Kershaw sums up well exactly what was at stake here: what role can society play in a unique and apparently asocial phenomenon? Can one "make history" in depolemicising in classical fashion or does the uniqueness of both the phenomenon and the drama necessitate a different approach in which the moral point of view cannot be rejected? Can we deal with this period in the same way as we do the 16th century?

All these questions are being posed, only differently, about Stalinism. However, I do believe that to follow a comparative approach is not to deny the exceptionality of Stalinism, rather that its exceptional character often divulges processes observed elsewhere taken here to their extreme. Furthermore, the history of the 20s and 30s allows for an explanation of administrative logics, in particular in their relationships to politics as well as to scientific and intellectual dynamics.

Two types of comparative research should therefore be conducted. The first would consist in comparing the intent to construct a statistic which would give coherence to the states which arise in the wake of revolutions in France after the French Revolution and in

Russia after the Russian Revolution. This comparison is even more interesting in light of the explicit Bolshevik references to the French Revolution are, moreover, explicit. The second type of research should acknowledge in what way the administrative dynamic of soviet statistics can in fact be incorporated into analogous constructions observed in Europe in the same period.[25]

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[25]) On France, see for example, [Desroisières 1994].

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Ernest Gellner – A Great European

In memoriam professor Ernest Gellner

On 5th November 1995, Ernest Gellner died suddenly here in Prague. He was Director of the Centre for the Study of Nationalism of the Central European University in Prague, and when he died he had just returned from a meeting of the CEU Senate in Budapest at which he was nominated Pro-Rector.

Ernest Gellner was born in Paris in 1925, but lived in Prague until 1939 when the entire family emigrated to England. He went to a Czech primary school in Dejvice and then to the Prague English high school. His father's family were German-speaking Jews from North Bohemia, while his mother came from a Czech-speaking Jewish family near Příbram. He was a distant relative of the poet František Gellner. In England he completed high school and then enlisted in the Czechoslovak Army, with which he returned to Prague in May 1945. He was still in uniform when he began his studies at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, where he attended lectures by Jan Patočka and other lecturers in philosophy. He felt a deep attachment to Prague and wished to make his home here.

Even before 1948, the developments in Czechoslovakia since the war and the fact that after the expulsion of the German inhabitants we became – in his words – directly dependent on the Soviet Union as our "protector" against possible German retaliation, convinced him to return to Britain. He saw only too clearly that a political upheaval was pending and that this would rob Czechoslovakia of what sovereignty it had regained after 1945. He was convinced that incorporation into the Soviet sphere would be long-lasting. He told me, "I thought that this new calvinism, i.e. communism, would settle down in Czechoslovakia for a long stay, in any case for longer than a single lifetime". He never thought that he would be able to come back. The liberalisation of the comunist regime in the 1960s and the events of 1968 raised his hopes to the possibility of a change of regime and reawakened his interest in what was happening here. He returned to Prague in 1965, after an absence of nearly twenty years, to lecture on British sociology. He began to travel here regularly, made contact with various dissidents and began to bring Western books to Prague. Eventually, at the end of the 1970s, the police banned him from reentering Czechoslovakia.

In 1990 he joined the founders of the Prague College of the Central European University and became the most distinguished member of the Department of Sociology there. Gellner's experience in Prague, his father's conversion to a Czech identity, his multicultural family environment, his Czech and English schooling and the rich cultural life in Prague in the 1930s were all formative influences on his intellectual development. These experiences strengthened his interest in nationalism, national culture and identity, as well as in the formation of the modern industrial society and in social change in general.

In England he read philosophy at Oxford and at the London School of Economics, where he also attended lectures in social anthropology. His teachers included Karl Popper and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, who had been a student of Bronislaw Malinowski. Popper's critical rationalism and anthropological functionalism were the starting point for Gellner's own work, although this has its own very personal character which is not easily

classified and is perhaps best referred to as "Gellnerism". Gellner's work was an unconventional melange of philosophy, social anthropology and sociology, but for me he was first and foremost a philosopher of history. This is borne out by the subtitles of some of his books, such as "The Structure of Human History" in *Plough, Sword and Book*, or "The Historical Role of Rationality and Rationalism" in *Reason and Culture*.

He published 18 books (with two more currently in preparation) as well as innumerable articles. His work is proof of his search for ever more precise and comprehensive answers to the question of just what is this modern world in which we live and how it came about. Ernest Gellner was undoubtedly one of the greatest authors thinking and writing about modernity. However he was not just a fashionable author or a critic of modernity; rather he sought to understand and essentially to support the values that created the modern world.

This search took on various forms, the first of which was philosophical criticism. He produced a witty but crushing critique of the Oxford philosophical establishment, that is, the linguistic philosophy he had come to know intimately while at Balliol. The preface to his first book *Words and Things* (1959) was written by the great British philosopher Bertrand Russell, and already marked him out as a controversial figure. One important and constant theme in Gellner's writings already evident here was the setting of all ideas in a sociological context. "People do not think in a vacuum, and even if the content and direction of their thought is in part determined by rational considerations, by where the wind of argument and the force of reasons and evidence drive them, these factors never uniquely determine what people think." For Gellner, the way questions about basic human problems are asked, as well as how the answers are formulated, is essentially determined by the cultural and social scene of the times we live in. This laid him open to accusations of sociological and cultural relativism, but these were unfounded. Gellner was close to Karl Popper in this respect. Both of them considered that philosophy is not an isolated activity for a few specialists, and cannot be separated out from people's everyday lives and concerns. *Every* individual implicitly explores their place in nature and in society and questions the meaning of life and history. Philosophy merely moves in the same field in a more critical, more systematic and perhaps more professional way, but its activities must be based on general valid approaches which are rational and verifiable. Gellner was basically convinced that our most reliable instrument is science, as the product of Western civilisation. He was a calm, undogmatic, but convinced Westerner. For him, despite the many problems which beset Western societies and which Gellner was well aware of, such societies are more ethically acceptable than those based on traditional, dominating or utopian-moral principles. In his book *Relativism and the Social Sciences* published in 1985, he says "such societies have certain important features: they display greater cognitive, technological and economic growth than any other society in human history. They appear capable of maintaining social order with less violence and oppression, with less deprivation and inequality, than any other large and complex society in human history."

The fundamental basis of his work was what J. Agassi and I. C. Jarvie described as his "epistemological, sociological and moral commitment to empiricism". Ernest Gellner said that the world consists of discrete grains, and this lateral atomisation is complemented by the further qualitative atomisation of all features of the grains. For him, reality is not a single holistic whole in which everything is interrelated. On the contrary, there

are many things that have no mutual connection. He felt that this image of the world presented science with a path to boundless progress.

A second aspect of Ernest Gellner's work which is less well known here was his empirical field work among the Berber tribes in Morocco. Several years' work there produced the books *The Saints of Atlas* (1969) and the more famous *Muslim Society* (1981). His research into the Berber tribes set him on the path to a comparative view of society and brought him to a better understanding of Western society and the emergence of its modern form.

This brings us to the third and principle set of questions, i.e. the emergence of modern industrial society. He considered that its appearance in Europe was the most important historical process in the history of humankind. At the same time he saw its genesis as coming about almost by chance, when modern philosophy and particularly science caused a split between temporal and religious power, and the creation of market capitalism and the independent cities led to the appearance of puralist, free-thinking, rich, modern European society. His theory of the nation and nationalism, expressed in his book *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) is closely concerned with the emergence of modern Europe. Industrial society cannot function without a good knowledge of language and the possibility of clear communication between members of that society. Languages differ and it is their functional necessity in modern society that formed the basis for nationalism which then created nations, and not, as most people still believe, the opposite.

Ernest Gellner was a great European liberal who, with his ideas, his teaching and especially his writing, fought for the values of freedom, humanity, tolerance, pluralism and well-being. His untimely death is a great loss.

Jiří Musil

Emancipation and Ownership

To the discussion on the Lack of Conditions for the Rise of Feminism in Czechoslovakia before 1989

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Abstract: The paper is concerned with the hitherto neglected aspect of emancipation processes and the specific influence of socialisation processes on the status of women in the former socialist countries. According to the paper, the struggle for economic advancement forms part of the emancipation process, including the women's liberation movement. The radical redistribution of property represented by the nationalisation of private means of production equalised property differences between men and women, thus both reducing the normative character of male acting and behaviour patterns and facilitating the penetration of women into working and employment structures, this in spite of the fact that political structures preserved the marked domination of men and retained their typically male authoritative hierarchies. In this way, the socialist societies preserved the old patriarchal and paternalist type of industrial society and have avoided its further development towards a men's society characterised by the conversion of all relations into commodity relations, typical of present-day post-capitalist society. Of further importance is the differentiation of patriarchal societies from men's societies, a differentiation which has not so far been thematised in feminist discussions. The question is to what extent the capitalist transformation of society will influence the status of women in Czech society.

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Introduction

Western feminist literature has a tendency to label all male-dominated societies as patriarchal without any further definition of the term. This use of the term is also evident in the definition of patriarchy offered by the Women's Handbook [*Frauenhandlexikon* 1983], in an article by the prominent German feminist Heide Göttner-Abendroth: "Patriarchy is a certain form of hierarchy of the sexes which pervades all areas of social life. In patriarchy, material ownership, social roles and the possibilities for self-determination are systematically divided according to the criterion of the sex to which a person belongs. Members of one sex (the male) are endowed with the right of disposition of the bodies, work and lives of members of the other (female) sex. In this way patriarchy represents latent or manifest repression and violence towards members of the other sex."

Even though there can be no question as to men's superior position over women in all known societies past and present, as the basic criterion for judging a given society this view of patriarchy as the superior ranking and dominance of men in whatever form is too general and all-embracing. Its clearly ideological nature, in the light of which the history of women appears as a calvary of male oppression, diverts attention from the specific concrete forms of this male dominance and particularly from those economic aspects which, as will be shown, strongly influence the position of women in society. The differ-

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ences between the forms of production, the distribution and apportionment of material wealth in preindustrial society and in both capitalist and socialistic forms of industrial society are too great and fundamental to be explained by an operational concept of patriarchy. While such a simplified ideological view may be of use in the political struggle, it is of little value when it comes to the assessment and analysis of concrete societies and specific, often concealed, forms of this oppression. This ideological view and the attempt to impose pre-existing models were among the reasons for Western feminists' failure to evaluate specific forms of female emancipation that had developed in the countries of the former soviet block.

The definition mentioned above holds water neither historically nor etymologically. Derived from the Greek word patriarch, father, or more exactly forefather, patriarchy does not signify the rule of one sex over the other, i.e. of men over women, but the rule of the fathers or heads of families over men and women belonging to the family group. Even if the dominance of fathers developed and spread male dominance to other areas of life, this is not one and the same thing. In patriarchy, sons are as much subject to the will of the father or head of family as are daughters. The greater range for sons' activities and the resulting freedom arose out of the sexual division of labour and certainly contributed to the dominance of men in society. However the father is himself a member of the family group which he rules and his authority outside the family depends on his position within it, not vice versa. Here Western-style capitalist or post-capitalist societies are no more advanced than any other patriarchy, or are so only in the figurative sense. They should rather be described as societies or rule of men, since positions of authority are held by men not in virtue of their position as the father of a family but simply as men who have carried their status and prestige outside the family into the world of work. Whether they are indeed fathers is not fundamental to their position in society, whereas in classic pre-industrial patriarchy, with its strong sense of family, no single or childless man could become head of a family or clan since he lacked the essential qualification: the status of the father. The implications of this difference will be considered later in this article.

Emancipation and Ownership

Although it is frequently overlooked, the struggle of a group seeking emancipation to improve its economic position is an essential component of any emancipation process. Extricating oneself from servitude means ceasing to be "poor", i.e. it means gaining free and equal access to social resources, to the "capital" of that society, whether money, social or cultural (education and contacts). Indeed all discrimination is also associated with sanctions and often with legislative provisions placing hindrances and limitations on the discriminated group's receiving a share of the society's resources. All subjugation aims to confine the subjugated to poverty and insignificance. (Czechs can find proof of this not only in the history of colonialism or of the English repression in Ireland but also in our own experience under the Protectorate.)

The importance of economic aspects and motivations can also be seen in emancipation processes such as the Czech National Revival. Cultural and intellectual activity was closely followed by increased Czech activity in the economic sphere (also encouraged by the increasing industrialisation). The attempts of Czech revivalists and artists to recreate a culturally sovereign nation were accompanied by the attempts of small and later bigger businessmen to develop Czech economic power, including the subsequent

founding of Czech financial institutions. The motivation of these men – of whom A. Zátka from the then German town of České Budějovice was a typical example – was identical: the prosperity of the national cause. National and economic emancipation thus went hand in hand. The building of the Živnobanka on Na příkopě in Prague is as much a sign of the success of this process as is the National Theatre. There is no doubt that the political weight and importance of Czechs within the Austrian-Hungarian empire grew alongside the increasing economic strength of the Czech bourgeoisie. Here too, as in all processes of emancipation, the hitherto privileged German-speaking population of Bohemia did not see this advance of the Czechs as the economic growth it really was, but as *redistribution*, in simple terms, that Czech gains were made at the expense of Germans.

These basic principles which apply to all processes of emancipation are, of course, equally valid to the main concern here, i.e. to the European Women's movement which began to develop in the 1860s. Women were also poor and propertyless, even when they were the wives or daughters of rich men, since none of the wealth belonged to them. A whole series of laws and social norms and customs limited their rights of inheritance, their access to ownership, education and their freedom of movement. (The problem of women's poverty, their material dependence and their emergence from this was an important theme in European literature in the second half of the 19th century, beginning with Jane Austen, moving through the Brontë sisters to Hendrik Ibsen and Thomas Mann; Virginia Woolf's "A Room of my Own" is particularly important in this respect.)

It can be argued that limitations on women had always existed in one way or another, but they became much more widespread with the changing conditions brought by the development of capitalism. In pre-industrial society, when the family was a self-supporting economic unity and its individual members were fully aware of their mutual interdependence, the limitations on women were neither so clear nor so clearly felt. The particular interests of individual members of the society, including those of men, were subordinate to those of the whole and were moreover far from evident. As the process of industrialisation loosened these bonds, the family lost its economic function and labour became the property of the individual which could be sold to provide the needs for existence. With this change the position of women worsened unbearably, in part because once the family had lost its economic role it was no longer able to ensure the livelihood of unmarried daughters and family members who did not work. The full consequences of the process did not become fully obvious for two or three generations. The women's movement was in fact a reaction to this real lack of rights. Although up to the end of the First World War women gradually won access to work, education and business and became legally independent, they far from challenged the position of men in the economic field. They were still poorer than men and have still not been able to emerge from this position of the economically poorer sex today. (The problem of female poverty in the so-called Third World is a separate one.) According to some estimates only 5% of the world's wealth is the hands of women. This economic preeminence of men not only strengthens and reinforces their position in the field of power politics (where women's participation in politics, notwithstanding the differences apparent even within Europe, is still insufficient), but also contributes to the fact that the models of male behaviour and interaction, the so-called "male qualities" such as rationality, purpose-orientation and efficiency have became overwhelming social norms which are now the general and binding criteria in evaluation and judging human behaviour as such. The models of be-

haviour attributed to women (e.g. emotions, irrationality, a holistic outlook) have been pushed into second place.[1] It is men who define and describe the world. Even the poorest and most insignificant man can bask in the glow of male dominance. When the whole of society is dominated by men, it is exceptionally difficult for women to assert other models of behaviour and value standards as equal alternatives within the social structure, which is a condition for success in the process of emancipation. This process is still further complicated in that although the aims of an emancipation movement are formulated in absolute terms, they are, at least in the initial phase, necessarily relative, i.e. in relation to the privileged group whose standard of living they wish to reach and in comparison to which they judge their own position. The starting question of the women's movement was entirely logical: "Why can't I do what men can?" The first model for women seeking emancipation was necessarily men, in the same way that the model for the American blacks was the white man and for Czechs last century it was Germans. They want to be like us, is the reply of the privileged group and this reinforces the latter's dominant social position. It also provides an opportunity to defame the emancipation group as imitative and to accuse it of lacking originality, thus restating the secondary position of its members.

In this close link between ownership and social dominance that I have sought to demonstrate, the question naturally arises of how this superiority is affected by changes in ownership relations. There are many examples from life and literature showing how economic failure, the loss of property and of the associated position in society, can reduce a man's status and so his authority in his family and social circle.

Looking at the results of the post-World-War-Two nationalisation and expropriation in those countries in Europe which became part of the Soviet block, it is clear that this had an important, if unintended and hitherto neglected, "sexist" aspect. Nationalisation not only hit capitalists and small and large landowners as such but also as men, striking at the core of their identity and self-awareness, since in taking away their property it also deprived them of an important attribute of their social dominance. The communist transformation of society also took away the importance of a whole series of occupations (business, commerce, self-employment) which had until then been traditional domains for male self-realisation. This was of course not without influence on the position in society of men as such. It also affected the poor and property-less since they were no longer bathed in the glow from men at the peak of the social hierarchy. Collectivisation not only attacked capitalist power but also fundamentally limited the power of men. Together with its consequences it meant that patterns of male behaviour and interaction lost much of their significance as the binding criteria of human behaviour. In terms of goods relationships, the "price of men" fell. This negative "redistribution", during which men lost but women did not gain, only partly improved the conditions for women to share in society's resources. In any case, the former economic inequality between men and women was levelled out.

Women's property was also nationalised of course, but women's marginal share in the wealth of society meant that this did not represent a fundamental change. While cer-

[1]) It would perhaps be better to describe the "female ways of behaviour" as an approach to the world not as material and as a source (of power, prestige or satisfaction), as men typically do, but as a social realm in which we exist and in which we must find our place and our role.

tainly unpleasant, loss of property was far less serious for women as it did not touch the heart of their female identity, which was rooted in the immanent inner components of women's existence, in their potential motherhood.

It is paradoxical that the authors and actors of this historical, even if as we now know temporary, "overthrow" of the male sex were in fact men, or rather the institutions and functionaries of the communist party. This party was dominated by men and by extremely strong patriarchal and authoritarian structures and hierarchies and was virtually closed to women throughout the entire communist period. (We can leave aside here the question of whether women in fact wanted to be part of the power structures of the party apparatus and to share in power under these conditions.)

Nationalisation therefore roughly evened out the property distinctions between men and women and so indirectly and unintentionally improved the position of women in society. One major reason for this was that as the economic position of men was weakened so did their dominance in setting norms and patterns of conduct and in the value system founded on the attributes ascribed to men. The position of women and of those without property improved significantly as property lost its importance in determining status. (This did not of course mean that people living under communism did not want to be well-off, but rather that their ideas of well-being were defined differently, being based on the greater possibility of consumption rather than on the possibility of acquiring property.)

These were all unplanned effects of the structural changes in society brought by state socialism.

The achievement of equality between men and women was of course an important element of the political programme of a socialistic rebuilding of society. In Marxist theory, emancipation was originally closely dependent on the liberation of the working class and the liberation of women, but there was already less stress on this emancipation in the ideology of later Stalinism. What became important was the continuing pressure of the labour market dictated by the "liberated" female labour force and the loosening of the traditional bond with the family and the weakening of the function of the family as such, (although the collective rearing of children and the collectivisation of the functions of the individual household as originally conceived had been abandoned). This was "liberation" from above, even if not entirely against the wishes of the liberated, in this case of women. In the lively political atmosphere after the end of the Second World War women expected and demanded improvements in their position in society, as can be seen from many documents pre-dating February 1948. (It was during this period that work began on preparing the new family law giving equal rights to men and women.)

With a certain level of material pressure it was possible to achieve the aims of this rough model of equality which, at least in the early phases, was oriented towards increasing women's share in economic activity. (The majority of men were unable to support a family and so their self-confidence declined, together with their ability and indeed their willingness to support a family and feel responsible for it, as the traditional role of the father demanded.) Alongside that participation in the world of work which made women economically independent of men, there was a rapid and significant rise in women's level of education and qualifications. One sign of all these changes was women's achievement of status independent of their relationship to men (a process which is still incomplete in the West). Despite the physical and psychological pressures which

such communist emancipation imposed, women proved capable of taking advantage of the opportunities which this model offered them. The weakened status of men indirectly strengthened women's position in society. Their position in the family also changed. Economic independence linked with the traditional division of labour, which was basically preserved, concentrated more "executive" power within the family in the hands of women.

The ruling power of the communist state, however, was the matriarchally-patriarchally structured communist party, which with its functionaries functioned as a new form of father. They held virtually all power, but, except for short periods (e.g. 1968), they had no real authority or particular respect in society. The position as a functionary such as the local party secretary did little to strengthen the father's position in the family. This lack permeated the system of hierarchy from top to bottom of society and meant that in a certain sense the society "fell apart" into two organised value systems existing alongside one another. On the one hand, there was the patriarchally-paternalistically organised party apparatus, and, on the other, there was society organised on the basis of immediate family groups as no other form of organisation was available. These women were strongly dominant and had taken over the function formerly allotted to the father, since they now joined their traditional function in the family with a new economic independence. [See Možný 1991] Ordinary party members who were part of both "systems" acted as a link between them. Unlike the "absent father" of Western families, who nonetheless retained his dominance thanks to his role of provider, the father in the socialistic family was not only not absent but indeed more present than before. His function and his role in the family changed. "My mother looked after me and my father played with me" was how one young person described this new situation in the Czech family.

While women were still subject to discrimination in the world of work, this was mostly in terms of pay levels and opportunities for promotion to leading positions, so that the question arises of how the egalitarian communist society really compared with the much more differentiated society in the West. It is clear that there was no reason here for women to feel oppressed by men. The state of society and the form of government aroused a sense of solidarity between them. Men and women had a common oppressor in the party apparatus which limited and regimented their life. Thus the communist societies of the second half of the twentieth century in Europe did not witness the rise of conditions for the emergence of a feminist women's movement since women did not feel any special discrimination and oppression as women but rather as citizens together with their male counterparts. While there were certainly different ways in which this oppression was felt, people remained first and foremost citizens and only secondarily person-man and person-woman. Both the shortcomings of the socialistic model of emancipation and the fall in the prestige of certain professions due to their feminisation (teaching and, to a certain extent, medicine) were the fault of the system rather than of any mechanism common to all industrial societies or of any atavistic prejudices about women.

In its undervaluation of "family work" and the field of reproduction (the reproduction both of the labour force and of the human race) as unproductive compared with "one's own" paid work as productive and value-creating, the original communist model of female emancipation was a typical offspring of the way of thinking of an industrial society fascinated by the possibility of expanding the reproduction of capital with the

concentration of large parts of the labour force in one place and intensive division and mechanisation of its labour. The communist countries also preserved an older form of this society. They did not undergo that further development from a post-patriarchal society to a society of men typical of Western capitalist countries, which can be characterised as a gradual evolution of relations, including (but not exclusively) those in production and the market, into commodity relations. The value of a relation, of things, of human activity was expressed in monetary terms. Money and the effect of money gradually became the only measure of value. The rule of men over women retained the guise given by the dominance of market relations based on rationality, functionality and effectiveness, represented by men, over relations with others based on caring, concern and solidarity, as represented by women, which could only become goods if rejected and destroyed. It is important that the representative of this male dominance in society was no longer the father, as in pre-industrial patriarchy, but had become man, whose family ties were no longer important, who saw his work as purely individual achievement and merit, and for whom the assertion of his abilities at the expense of others was a virtue. His ideal man was no longer the gentleman of the 1930s but a new superman incarnated in American films such as Rambo, a he-man in whom the feminine aspects of his nature, in C.G. Jung's terms,[2] were eliminated.

In the West a new feminist movement grew up at the end of the 1960s in opposition to this male-determined world with its only apparently equal rights between men and women. This movement saw men as guilty not only of oppression of women through devaluing their traditional area of realisation, *de facto* the whole area of reproduction (of labour force and the human race), but also of the whole state of the world as such. It is men who have imposed a view of the world not as creation but as material to be shaped in their own image. The feminist movement is guided by the idea of accepting and asserting a broader scale of values than the narrow pursuit of economic efficiency and profit (and which may be achieved by women taking over a greater share of political power) and has found much in common with the aims of the environmental movement. While in socialistic societies the dividing line was that between the ruling party apparatus and the rest of society, in capitalist societies it is that between the world of men and the world of women.

Conclusion

The speed with which, since 1989, men have regained the position in business, commerce and self-employment they had lost forty years ago provides a measure of the degree to which they had been humbled under communism. While men immediately became visible in society, women have been somewhat marginalised. There are also latent anti-female sentiments which cannot be ignored and which may indicate that men place some of the blame for their former humiliation on women. The advantages which the communist model of emancipation brought for women have in some way compromised them. The still very low level of unemployment means that it is not possible to predict what

[2]) In his theory of the anima, C. G. Jung started out from the idea of the dual basis of man and woman. Each sex has elements of the other, men a female part and women a male part. (Each gender also produces the hormones of the other.) It is these aspects held in common with the other sex which make it possible for men and women to understand each other. Virginia Woolf also expressed this androgyny in a similar way.

would happen to the female labour force if this level should rise and whether the government would seek to resolve the problem at the expense of women. Such a solution would certainly be convenient but it is less certain that it would be either feasible or acceptable to society. Women's employment is still economically important, even after 1989. The sharp fall in the birth rate in the last two years is also proof of the increasingly severe conflict between women's function in the family and their employment. Here, too, women have been able to adapt quickly to the new conditions. Czech women act as if they really do have equal rights in society and a status that is far from the bottom of society. (The role of wife has gained new status with the emergence of a new economic and political elite and it is by no means certain that this will not come to compete with that of an independent earner.) Most Czech women are totally uninterested in emancipation, the women's movement or even feminism. This may be a source of strength but also leaves them unprepared. Unlike their counterparts in the west, Czech women have not had to fight for their rights and were emancipated from above. Will they be able to fight for their place in society if necessary? Will it in fact be necessary? Czech women still do not realise how quickly women may lose their rights.

If a strong feminist movement develops in the Czech Lands over the next few years, it will be due to the failure of Czech men who have turned away from the tradition of those like Náprstek and Masaryk who saw society's development as dependent on the equal collaboration of men and women in all areas of public, political and cultural life.

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Identity and Game

An Attempt at a Sociological Interpretation of Milan Kundera's Story *The Hitchhiking Game*

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Abstract: This paper attempts a sociological interpretation of the interaction between the characters from the story *The Hitchhiking Game* by Milan Kundera. Applying different perspectives connected with interpretative sociology, the paper shows how and to what degree the social actors redefine their roles and identities within a social context. The social context changes in accordance with the game the actors undertake. The relation between them is analyzed on the two levels of personal identity and social identity, both of which refer to the two temporal sequences, before and during the game. In trying to show and explain an identity conflict (personal identity versus social identity), the structural theory, specifically the concept of the latent binary opposites in the actors' interaction which express the nature versus culture conflict, is employed. The paper seeks to reveal the most basic rules governing individuals' behaviour and shows how fragile their relationships are. A "personal social world" can be destroyed by an apparently innocent game.

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> "In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception we have formed of ourselves – the role we are striving to live up to – this mask is our truer self, the self we would like to be. In the end, our conception of our role becomes second nature and an integral part of our personality"
>
> *Robert Ezra Park*

> "We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be"
>
> *Kurt Vonnegut*

Introduction

Many years ago, when I read Milan Kundera's *The Hitchhiking Game* for the first time, I had the impression that it was a very "sociological" story with much in common with that branch of study. I was not able to analyse the story in terms of sociological theories; I simply "felt" this. Now that I have become familiar with modern sociological perspectives such as symbolic interactionism, I have returned to the story in order to verify whether my impression was correct.

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For the purposes of this essay I have accepted the thesis which dates from the findings of G. H. Gadamer, is now commonly accepted in modern hermeneutics and according to which no interpretation of a literary work can be independent from the cognitiving subject. The only conclusion we can reach is an approximation to an understanding [Gadamer 1977]. Therefore, I think that my interpretation of Kundera's story is one of many possible interpretations. I do not claim "objectivity" or "truth" because everybody has a right to understand the sense of this story in a different way. At the same time, no one has the right to evaluate my interpretation as "better" or "worse".

For the purposes of this article I will use elements of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, dramaturgical analysis, with a small admixture of structural anthropology. I am aware of the differences between these theories and perspectives. In my opinion, however, these differences are caused by different academic traditions; yet in point of fact, all these visions of the social world have more in common than they do differences. Common to all of them is a denial of positivistic sociology, naturalism and "macro-social idolatry", and a focus on what is going on between individuals – on interaction, communication and the process of objectivation of one's subjective social reality.

I would like this article to become a test of the explanatory possibilities of the mentioned theories. I am interested whether, if applied to problems they did not invent for themselves and which perfectly fit the area of their concerns, they will reveal hidden springs of human interaction.

For the reader who may not know Kundera's *The Hitchhiking Game*, I will give a brief outline of the story before turning to the main body of the article.

The story

A girl and a boy were going on their first vacation together. She was a little old-fashioned: shy, modest and often jealous of the boy, who valued her most of all because of her purity. In his eyes this was what distinguished her from other women. The girl sometimes dreamed of being lighthearted, self-assured, bold and seductive like other women. She was afraid that women like this might be more attractive for the boy and that one day they could take her lover away from her. However, the boy was like a careful guardian to the girl and said that he had had enough of superficial flirtation.

The car was running out of gas, so the boy drove to a gas station and the girl "took a little walk in the meantime", and then waited for the boy on the highway. When the boy's sports car appeared she began to wave at it like a hitchhiker. The car stopped, the boy leaned toward the window and, like an unknown driver, asked the hitchhiker where she was headed.

The game between them started at this moment. The girl began playing her role as an artful seductress – by which she was fulfilling her hidden desire – a hitchhiker looking for a love affair. The boy began to play the role of a gallant seducer. However, the girl suddenly realized with fear excited by jealousy that the boy was acting in a way which had always alarmed her. He was flattering and flirting with an unknown woman (not with her but with an unknown hitchhiker). She felt she had caught the boy out being unfaithful and had proved his guilt. The boy noticed anger in her face and tried to stop the game. He put his arm around her shoulders and said her name. But the girl, blinded by jealousy,

misunderstood his intentions, repulsed him (or actually the unknown driver) and said that he was going a bit too fast. The girl was reasonable and, a few minutes later, regretted her stupid suspiciousness, but the boy, insulted by the girl's refusal to be herself and stop the game, wanted to get his own back on the hitchhiker. He stopped flattering her and started to play the tough guy – self-assured, willful and ruthlessly macho – he had never been, but had often wanted to become. At last, he had a chance to play the role of his dreams. Meanwhile, the girl adjusted to the situation and assumed the role of a coquette.

The boy and the girl were going to the Low Tatras, while the hitchhiker wanted to go to Banská Bystrica, her fictitious destination, but when the car came to a major crossroads the boy turned off in a completely different direction. The surprised hitchhiker was promised protection... *"The game all at once went into a higher gear. The sports car was moving away not only from the imaginary goal of Banská Bystrica, but also from the real goal, toward which it had been heading in the morning. (...) Fiction was suddenly making an assault upon real life. The young man was moving away from himself and from the implacable straight road, from which he had never strayed until now"* [Kundera 1978: 12].

The boy and the girl drove into an unknown town and decided to spend the night in a hotel. The game went on. While the driver was trying to get the key at the reception desk, the girl, who was waiting in the car, had the idea that other women might have also waited for the boy in the same way. However, this time this idea did not hurt her. She was almost delighted that since she had become one of those indecent women she was so jealous of, she was using their weapons and cutting them all out. She believed that in using the ability to be all women she could captivate her lover. The conversation between the hitchhiker and driver during supper in a shabby restaurant lost all pretence of innocent flirtation and proceeded to the extremes of rudeness. The girl was shamelessly seducing the unknown man and he, caddishly, like the real "demoniacal man", responded to her call. However, the boy did not stop seeing "his" girl in the lighthearted hitchhiker and her perfect metamorphosis started to irritate him. He was angry at how well the girl was able to become a lascivious woman. He started to suspect her of really being like the type of women she was pretending to be. Indeed, in his mind, how else could she transform herself so easily into this kind of women? The boy thought: *"What she was acting now was she herself; perhaps it was that part of her being which had formerly been locked up and which the pretext of the game had let out of its cage. Perhaps the girl supposed that by means of the game she was disowning herself, but wasn't it the other way around? Wasn't she becoming herself only through the game?"* [Ibid.: 16]. The boy had the feeling of being present while his girl was seducing a strange man. He was becoming more and more angry, but simultaneously the more the girl withdrew from him psychically, the more he wanted her physically.

The girl rose, replying directly to the boy's question that she was going "to piss", thus breaking the barrier of shame and violating the taboo. When she walked through the room, some intoxicated men commented on her body and this gave her pleasure. Seeing it, the boy became more vulgar in his speech and mannerisms. He did not hide his intentions and let the girl go with him to their room. In the small room he looked at the defiant hitchhiker searching for the familiar features of the girl he valued so much. *"It was as if he were looking at two images through the same lens, at two images superimposed one upon the other with the one showing through the other. These two images showing*

through each other were telling him that everything was in the girl, that her soul was so terrifyingly amorphous, that it held faithfulness and unfaithfulness, treachery and innocence, flirtatiousness and chastity. This disorderly jumble seemed disgusting to him, like the variety to be found in a pile of garbage (...) It seemed to him that the girl he loved was a creation of his desire, his thoughts, and his faith and that the real girl now standing in front of him was hopelessly alien, hopelessly ambiguous. He hated her" [Ibid.: 21].

The boy felt hatred toward the girl and longed to humiliate her. He ordered her strip and when she refused he took a banknote from his wallet and offered it her. The girl felt that they were passing through a border they should not pass, but she did not have enough strength to put a stop to the destructive game.

When, after the provocative striptease, the girl was standing in front of the boy completely naked, she hoped that the game would end. She thought that in stripping off her clothes she had also stripped away her mask. An expression of embarrassment and shame appeared on her face, an expression which was natural to her. However, the boy, with fury and hatred, did not notice this change. He wanted revenge, not on the hitchhiker but on his girlfriend! He wanted to treat her as a whore. He did not know how to do it, so he used ideas from films and literature. He forced the girl to climb on a small table (which was to replace the imagined shiny top of a piano with a woman in black underwear and blackstockings) and issued his orders. She had to salute, wiggle her hips, dance and sit down. Finally, he had violent intercourse with her – without kissing, without emotion and without love.

Then, the game was over. The girl and the boy were lying beside one another in the dark in such a way that their bodies would not touch. *"The girl's hand diffidently, childishly touched his. It touched, withdrew, then touched again, and then a pleading, sobbing voice broke the silence, calling him by his name and saying, 'I am me, I am me...' The young man was silent, he didn't move, and he was aware of the sad emptiness of the girl's assertion, in which the unknown was defined in terms of the same unknown quantity. (...) There were still thirteen days' vacation before them"* [Ibid.: 25].

Kundera in the mirror of sociology

I think that the crucial factor to be analyzed in order to understand the events from Kundera's story is the problem of identity. Successive turns in the plot, changes of masks and modulations of interaction between the girl and boy are tightly connected with the identities of those social actors and are precisely reflected in them. I accept H. Bausinger's definition of identity, according to which identity is the whole body of the subject's personal constructs which they refer to themselves. This entirety is not a mere sum of the elements but is to a large extent an integrated system. The elements of this construction of one's self are based on identification with other persons and groups, and with selected social structures such as values, norms and artefacts [Bausinger 1983: 337]. To put it simply, I understand the identity of a social actor as an arrangement of their autodefinitions, the system of ideas which define who they were, who they are and who they would like to be.

Before I go on to meritum, I will discuss the notion of a social role which, in a sense, "naturally" precedes the problem of identity. In defining the role I follow P. Berger and T. Luckmann. They refer the role to the socially objectivated form of an ac-

tion which takes place in the context of a certain knowledge, common to a particular social grouping, the action in which a person and other individuals are treated as exchangeable types [see Berger and Luckmann 1991: 89-96]. As Berger writes, *"In a sociological perspective, identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed"* [Berger 1963: 98]. A certain social role is connected with a defined identity. This means that each change of the performed social role generates a change in an individual's identity [see Berger and Luckmann 1991: 194-200].

Simultaneously, my analysis will use the interactionist model of identity, in which identity is defined as a product of interaction, and interaction as a permanent process. In this dynamic concept of identity I would like to emphasize the assumption about the feedback between the subjective self and the looking-glass self, i.e. ideas one has about oneself and which signal to partners in interaction, and ideas of oneself which are inferred from the behaviour of others. The impression that a partner of interaction perceives one in a particular way reinforces one's conviction that one matches this perception and, on the other hand, one's strong idea about oneself increases the probability that one's partner will perceive one the way one perceives oneself [see Piotrowski 1985: 64-66; Bokszanski 1990: 88-94].

In my opinion, both concepts – the one wherein identity is closely associated with a concrete social role, and the one which points to interaction as the basic factor determining identity – complement each other perfectly. An individual assumes a mask and performs a particular social role which gives them a proper identity, and then, during interactions, through so-called interpretative procedures (i.e. the stable cognitive schemes), a local "agreement" concerning the sense of an action takes place, a definitional consensus which fixes the individual's identity, is generated. E. Goffman writes *"this self itself does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene of his action, being generated by that attribute of local events which renders them interpretable by witnesses. A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation – this self – is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it"* [Goffman 1990: 244-245].

* * *

The girl and boy were two social actors who were not able to master the game they had started. Here it is useful to differentiate between analyses of interaction. On the one hand, there is interaction as the "game" which is performed by actors who are completely conscious of the fact of performing, that their behaviour is produced and who also take into account the expectations and reactions of a partner. On the other hand, there is interaction as a "performance" in which there is no obligation to be conscious of "acting" and the behaviour of partners can be perceived, both in reference to the interactor and to oneself, as "natural" [see Goffman 1990: 76-82; Tittenbrun 1983: 181-186].

Up until the moment when the girl decided to play the hitchhiker and the boy the strange driver, their interaction was a "conventional performance", in which the actors played the role of lovers, roles which provided them with a defined identity. From the moment the game was initiated, however, the roles which had been played up until that point were changed into those of the hitchhiker and the (initially) kind driver. The new roles provided them with new identities. It was not, certainly, a mere replacement of the old identities by the new ones, but a kind of diffusion, an overlapping of both identities,

which became the reason for their tragedy. The identities which were connected with the roles of the hitchhiker and driver were not immutable and rigid, but were constantly re-interpreted. It is significant how, as a result of the constant process of re-defining the situation, the gallant driver and flirtatious hitchhiker were step by step approaching the culturally defined boundaries of their roles, transforming themselves into the characters of a brutal, coarse conqueror-man and a vulgar vamp-woman. Language also plays a significant role in re-defining a situation and building different semantic fields, i.e. classificational schemes which generate a collection of meanings, for different things, phenomena or persons, which order one's social experiences. The semantic fields of the words "love" and "flirtation" are quite different; hence this sudden transformation of the nature of relations between the girl and boy caused so many tensions [Berger and Luckmann 1991: 49-61].

* * *

Here, a slight complication must be introduced. I think that the disturbances which emerged in the interaction between the boy and girl were caused not only by the simple change in their roles, which led them to a kind of identity schizophrenia, but also by the "structural jump" in the area in which identity manifested itself.

I now turn to E. Goffman's concept, in which he distinguishes three "incarnations" of a social actor's identity (they should not be treated as types or levels of identity). Those three "incarnations" of identity are social identity, personal identity and self identity.

- *Social identity* refers to the area of highly stereotyped categories which are based on socio-cultural patterns of classifying persons who are recognized as members of a particular group.
- *Personal identity* arises in the area of close and intimate interaction, and is tied up with an aspiration to treat a partner in interaction in terms of their non-recurring nature and the recognition of their unique individualities.
- *Self identity* consists of all the auto-definitions of an individual [Bokszanski 1987: 75-78].

I think that the last "incarnation" of identity will be the least useful in my analysis.

It can be observed that the relationship between the boy and girl was connected first and foremost with the sphere of personal identity. These young people treat each other not as "social types" but as peculiar and unique partners. In this area, the girl's identity is perceived (and therefore amplified) by her interactor in the context of such qualities as shyness, timidity, and purity. The boy's identity is characterized in his girl's eyes by responsibility, protectiveness and delicacy.

The relationship between the hitchhiker and driver was completely different. In order to perform their new roles the girl and boy had to use the stock of social categorization, knowledge which they had internalized through the process of socialization, which prompted them as to what the behaviour of a hitchhiker who chases men and a driver who has nothing against a "small adventure" should resemble. The alternation of roles transported the centre of gravity of their interaction from personal identity to social identity. This can be illustrated by the following scheme.

The relation between actors before they started the game:

	GIRL	BOY
PERSONAL IDENTITY	+	+
SOCIAL IDENTITY	-	-

The relation between actors during the game:

	HITCHHIKER	DRIVER
PERSONAL IDENTITY	-	-
SOCIAL IDENTITY	+	+

However, as I stated above, the new identities do not necessarily replace the old ones. They can settle near them or rather "on them". Hence, the real arrangement of roles and identities during the game could be different:

	GIRL HITCHHIKER	BOY DRIVER
PERSONAL IDENTITY	- +	- +
SOCIAL IDENTITY	+ -	+ -

Here, there is a role conflict and a double identity conflict. This mixture, extremely dangerous for the coherence of human relationships, necessarily destroyed interaction and, most importantly, made identity uncertain. Even more, the described conflicts could be of a deeper, latent character. There are a pair of very basic binary opposites in the story's structure and in the characters' behaviour which had a pre-defined hidden and unconscious sense of the interaction [my intuitions are based on C. Lévi-Strauss' hypotheses which are to be found in Lévi-Strauss 1972: 71-80].

Its external manifestations are visible if we compare the behaviour of the actors before and during the game. Before the game, the boy was protective and the girl innocent. During the game, the driver became aggressive and the hitchhiker a vamp. Before the game, we could observe male-female relations which were channeled by culture while during the game, unrestricted female-male behaviour gained the advantage. The elementary and primary contradiction between culture and nature is revealed here. This can be illustrated by the following scheme:

	HER	HIM
NATURE	vampishness (hitchhiker)	aggressiveness (driver)
CULTURE	innocence (girl)	protectiveness (boy)

Using a different pair of metaphors, we can say that the nature versus culture conflict, manifest in the experiences of the two lovers, was also a collision of the Dionysian and Apollonian myths. The Dionysian myth tells of sensual pleasure, the source of which is letting off steam, pleasure which is brief and often leaves a sediment of guilt (because generally finding an outlet for one's energy is connected with the rejection and violation of social norms and morality) but which is extremely strong, indeed total.

In the Apollonian myth, pleasure is not as sensual. Its main source is the experience of beauty which is like the soft wash of tides on the shore. It does not have the strength of a tempest but, in the long run, its impact is deeper and more effective. Harmony, modesty and wisdom are the most important qualities of the Apollonian myth [Nietzsche 1990].

The love between the boy and girl was flourishing under the patronage of Apollo, and, within his guardianship, bore wonderful fruits: attachment, confidence, care, and responsibility. Unfortunately, the devil or consumer society of the end of the 20th century was not whiling away its time. It prompted their souls with the diabolic temptation of conformism, of being like "everybody else", i.e. an adjustment to the cultural models of "normality". The pressure of uniformity made the girl lament her innocence and generated the desire to be like an attractive "dragon-fly". The boy felt "uncomfortable" performing the "old-fashioned" role of protector and dreamed of being a demoniacal seducer.

We should ask whether the situation described by Kundera is realistic, i.e. whether a situation like this could happen in reality and not only in the world of fiction. The author responds to this question: *"Even in a game there lurks a lack of freedom; even a game is a trap for the players. If this had not been a game and they had really been two strangers, the hitchhiker could long ago have taken offense and left. But there's no escape from a game. A team cannot flee from the playing field before the end of the match, chess pieces cannot desert the chessboard: the boundaries of the playing field are fixed. The girl knew that she had to accept whatever form the game might take, just because it was a game. (...) Just because it was only a game her soul was not afraid, did not oppose the game, and narcotically sank deeper into it"* [Kundera 1978: 20].

Paraphrasing the famous W. I. Thomas' theorem, one can add that when social actors define their game as real, the consequences of the undertaken game are always real, regardless of whether they are right or wrong. As Goffman would say, one cannot free oneself from the micro-social rules of a scene, one lacks free will, and when one performs a role one becomes its slave. One is but a performer of the character who was one's task [Goffman 1990: 244-247].

A game may be dangerous both for its participants and the entire social scene. Actors are menaced by disorganization or even the disintegration of their identity, and the scene is menaced by destruction of the performance. A game which reveals the artificiality of performance and which makes actors aware of the fact that they are just actors, not free human beings who behave naturally, may, through this de-mystification, destroy the obviousness of the "Lebenswelt-performance". A game is like cancer. Just as cancer cells do not stop themselves because their unlimited growth will cause the destruction of the whole body, and with it, they themselves, so a game does not take into account the fact that its success can demolish the whole theater. The roots of social order are based on human interaction; therefore a stoppage of discourse may mean the "destruction of the world".

* * *

At several points, both the boy and girl tried to negotiate a return to the "normal" definition of the situation, but unfavorable circumstances seemed stronger [Halas 1987: 114]. Unexpected events undermined the frame of their relationship. As Goffman writes, *"I*

assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame" [Goffman 1986: 10-11]. The frame organizes meanings of particular events and responds to the question "What is going on here?". These "carbon-copies" of previous experiences mediate in communication between individuals. We can see in Kundera's story a conflict of frames. The frame which accompanied the boy-girl relation was different to the one in which the hitchhiker-driver relation took place. Moreover, the former was to some extent produced by the lovers themselves while the latter is a completely social and stereotyped construction.

* * *

The plot of Kundera's story can also be described in terms of the breakdown of the most comprehensive, the highest level of legitimation of the institutional order and the individual's biography. Here I mean the symbolic universe, which Berger and Luckmann define as *"bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality"* [Berger and Luckmann 1991: 113]. One of the most crucial functions of the symbolic universe is re-establishing order in the individual's subjective perception of their experiences; in particular, the so-called marginal situations, i.e. those which are not included in the reality of everyday existence in society. Berger and Luckmann give examples of marginal situations such as dreams and reveries [Berger and Luckmann 1991: 114]. I think that it is possible to extend this category to games: games are a peculiar "practical" attempt to make dreams of being somebody else real. An efficient symbolic universe should allow one to return to reality and to the subjective individual's identity. Berger and Luckmann write that *"the symbolic universe establishes a hierarchy, from the "most real" to the most fugitive self-apprehensions of identity. This means that the individual can live in society with some assurance that he really is what he considers himself to be as he plays his routine social role, in broad daylight and under the eyes of significant others"* [Berger and Luckmann 1991: 118]. The boy and girl found themselves alone in a marginal situation which they had initiated. They were neither *"under the eyes of significant others"* nor *"in broad daylight"* and the pressure of uncommonness and extraordinariness "produced" by the game exploded the symbolic universe.

Conclusions

Milan Kundera's story is a typical tragedy of our times. It shows the "mechanization" of human behaviour, the syndrome of "insatiability", the advantage of non-authenticity, *das Man*, over the pursuit of originality and making one's peculiarity real.

In my article, I sought to show some complications of Kundera's story by using elements of certain sociological visions of the social world. I "exploited" the concepts of social role, identity, interaction, the definition of situation, game and performance. I discussed the issue of semantic fields, structural oppositions, frames and the symbolic universe; the whole arsenal of sociological weapons. Did this measure up to expectations? The right of appraisal belongs to the reader. In my opinion, nevertheless, this sociological apparatus (probably not always graceful and elegant) made it possible to raise some "curtains"and come closer to the "truth". For me, the truth is the appeal of "recognizing

oneself" and discovering the rules which control human behaviour. This knowledge is necessary for that consciousness of one's limitations without which there is no freedom.

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Jiří Kovtun: Tajuplná vražda. Případ Leopolda Hilsnera (A Mysterious Murder. The Case of Leopold Hilsner)

Praha, Sefer 1994, 574 s.

At the beginning of this century, the state of Czech sociology could easily have been worse. In 1900, its foremost (and indeed almost only) representative entered the fight against so-called ritual superstitions, joining the struggle to save an unknown young Jew, Leopold Hilsner, who was accused of having killed 19-year-old Anežka Hrůzová in Polná on 29th March, 1899. Hilsner's accusors were unsure whether he had acted alone or with accomplices but had no doubt of the motive: to use Anežka Hrůzová's blood in their rituals. The murderer was never found and to this day the case has not been solved and has never failed to arouse interest in academics and journalists – whether from a pro-Masaryk, an anti-Masaryk a neutral or, inevitably, a radically anti-semitic perspective – and as the "history of real life". It could well seem that there is nothing left to be said; Jiří Kovtun (a historian, poet, translator, Slavonic scholar and journalist born in 1927), however, disagrees. He took this story, which can be seen as a symbol of the "century of the holocaust", and has produced a book of more than 550 sometimes dramatic and sometimes drawn-out but always compelling pages. The compulsion comes from its many layers, which (as with Umberto Eco's famous criteria) allow it to be read in many different ways and from various points of view – almost always a sign of a good book.

Kovtun's book can be read as a well-documented account of a relatively well-known history or as a book on Czech and European anti-semitism; it can also be read as a response to the atmosphere of the fin de siecle, as an important study of how ordinary people lived at the turn of the century, as a demonstration of how history and biography are interwoven and, of course, as yet another contribution to the almost never-ending series of works on Masaryk. Hana Housková's review in *Labyrint* examined the book's "Jewish" dimension in detail ("Opus magnum s pihami na krase", in *Labyrint*, 1995, no. 6), concentrating (a trifle unjustifiably) on Kovtun's misplaced modernisation of the story, but primarily on the idea, probably first raised in Tramer's book *Prague – The City of Three Peoples* (London 1964), of the three nations living in the Czech Lands (Czechs, Germans and Jews) which arouses such interest today. Housková implies that Kovtun paid insufficient attention to the Jewish population's attempts to assimilate and particularly that he overlooked the Czech-Jewish element both in the Hilsner case and in general. These are serious reproofs, but Kovtun's failure to explain Zdeněk Auředníček's involvement in the case seems even more so. Kovtun fails to mention that Auředníček's wife was a Jew and in doing so, however unintentionally, helps to fabricate anti-semitism: if Kovtun has "concealed" Auředníček's motives then they cannot have been entirely honourable etc. As Kovtun himself describes it with reference to Gavin I. Langmuir, anti-semitism is a *socially significant chimera of hostility*, which is based on the commonly held idea that Jews are endowed with characteristics which have never in fact been demonstrated but are sufficiently repugnant that they invariably arouse resentment. This irrational position is beyond the limits of logic and faith and nothing should be done to support it in any way. In addition, it can be seen from one of the central moments of the trial that the Jews of Polná could quite easily have saved Hilsner if they had sworn a "simple declaration" that he was in the synagogue at the time the deed was done. They did not do this, however, simply because Hilsner was not in the synagogue at that time...

Kovtun's book is certainly a valuable contribution to the history of Czech Judaism and to the knowledge of the roots of anti-semitism and of the various forms it can take. He provides a more or less detailed account of both the theoreticians of anti-semitism (Rohling, Eisenmenger) and its practitioners (Leuger, Box or the Breznovský glove-makers). He did, however, overlook Karl Tschupik's important work *Die Christum seit Schatten*, which is an attempt to provide a theoretical grounding for Austrian anti-semitism and to legitimise catholic anti-semitism.

Kovtun's book can also be read in quite another light as its "Jewish" dimension has considerable sociological value in itself. It can

be read as a response to Masaryk's view of sociology as a science and at the same time as an "account" of Masaryk as a modern intellectual, "modern" in the post-modern sense and "intellectual" in the sense the word is understood by conservative critics of "social engineering".

Masaryk saw his role in the Hilsner trial simply and unqualifiedly as an organic part of his scientific work, and did not see his social commitment as being in conflict with his scientific concerns. Quite the reverse: he claimed that his criticism of the Polná trial was no less scientific than any other work he had done. He distinguished at least four sociological dimensions par excellence (as he termed them) in the Hilsner trial, which justified his involvement *as a sociologist*: 1) the phenomenon of prejudice (or superstition, as sociological theory of the period termed it) as a universal phenomenon which must be constantly struggled against ("superstition turns the human heart into stone and transforms the brain into sawdust, superstition blurs the vision and makes men blind, superstition lures people into injustice and dishonesty"); 2) the fact of the deformed national auto-stereotype (the Czechs' tendencies to self-idealisation and to self-flagellation – in this case, the former); 3) the process of forming public opinion and the idea of public opinion as the final arbiter of justice ("those people who are better and more prone to thought will ask themselves what in fact public opinion is and how indeed people create this public opinion, and they will openly ask whether the consent even of the whole nation is a guarantee of justice"); and 4) the role of the intelligentsia in the life of the nation in both a positive and a negative sense.

This last point is fundamental: Masaryk did not look at the superstition of ritual murder as a popular superstition but as a failure of the intelligentsia, which is under an obligation to use its mind for the interests both of itself and of its nation. The spur to the false "popular interpretation" of the fact of the murder was simply a medical opinion and the entry into the arena of lawyers, priests and journalists appearing entirely *within their own spheres*. It is important to remember this so that we should distinguish them from those chimerical intellectuals so beloved in the Czech Lands today who move out of their original spheres and legitimise their public involvement with a narrow expertise that is not related to the matter in hand. The problem is not that the intellectuals failed at a point where they should not have, that is, on their own ground. Masaryk said that he was not concerned with the Jews but with the Czech intelligentsia and with our Czech conscience. For Masaryk, the Hilsner case was a symptom of the nation's pathological state and, in that sense, his involvement in the affair fell clearly into the overall context of his attempt to reform and revive the nation.

Masaryk himself emerged as a modern intellectual in this conflict, and however unwilling he may have been to see it in these terms, it was inevitable given that such categories were already used in journalism and in public debate. Paul Johnson, a not unknown authority in this field, described in his 1988 book *Intellectuals*, an intellectual as someone who believes that it is possible to change the world through the power of the intellect, someone who believes in the category of ideas, concept and truth, someone who is convinced that it is possible to create a better society through the power of ideas, someone who succumbs to the temptation to make use of the capital which they have acquired through an expert knowledge of their field in order to acquire a forum for their own ideas in public affairs. For Johnson, the prototypes of such intellectuals as Sartre, Russell, Brecht and Chomsky are, of course, mostly ranged on the political left. Johnson seeks to show that modern intellectuals have failed not only in what they believe but also because they have not lived in accordance with their own pronouncements, because they have not practised what they preach.

Masaryk, however, as the Hilsner case clearly showed and Kovtun convincingly demonstrates, was a prophet and founder, a national teacher by profession. It was because he believed in the power of rational behaviour over people that he became involved in the Hilsner affair, because for him "people must accept what is right". He wanted to solve the legal case like a "scientific" example, since he was convinced that belief in ritual murder cannot be dispelled by common cultural historical or

moral interpretations, but only by particular, precisely demonstrated examples. Masaryk did, however, use it as an instrument to demonstrate the power of Ideas, Truth and Reason against Superstition, Prejudice, Error and Untruth. For him it was not fundamentally – and this is one of the leitmotifs of the book – a matter of one man, but of principles and of the start of a great struggle. It was only this that left Masaryk with a sense of victory at the end of the affair, even though Hilsner's little world was for long decades turned into a microcosm of the whole. Kovtun maintains that the public did not really understand Masaryk's universalist point of view, which was not infrequently seen as intellectual arrogance: the concrete person was included in this standpoint but it was sometimes difficult to identify him, so well was he concealed behind great principles. Hilsner himself would have had great difficulty in understanding the role his personal fate played in Masaryk's intellectual victory and rethinking of culture...

There is no conflict between Masaryk's role in the Hilsner affair as the typical European intellectual, as the representative of modernity, and everything that goes with it: the "naive epistemology" of Truth, faith in the power of ideas and, of course, in the persuasiveness of reason, the conviction that human affairs could be changed for the better, the fixed, transcendentally anchored morality whose principles are not to be doubted, faith in the inevitability of progress... Masaryk was by no means uncritical either of his own time or of his own efforts, but nor was he a sceptic, a relativist or an individualistic egoist. There is one point in which he did not fulfil Johnson's (and not only Johnson's) idea of the modern intellectual: Masaryk was no hypocrite and his personal morality has never been cast in doubt. The question which Kovtun's book raised for me was whether Masaryk's involvement in the Hilsner process was a model case of a "modern intellectual" going beyond his own sphere of competence, or whether it was a model case of courageous civic and human involvement which was only superficially legitimised by the fact of scientific competence, its real legitimacy arising from a sense of responsibility towards national solidarity or towards the ideas of Reason, Truth and Justice. Or was it just an interesting episode in our national cultural history which, in hindsight, we have endowed with a much greater significance than it would have had without Masaryk's subsequent presidency and the holocaust.

I myself tend towards the idea that there is another lesson to be learned from Masaryk's commitment – and not only in the case of the Polná trial: things are very different with the modern intellectual. But in what way?

Miloslav Petrusek

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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Recent Czech Sociological Publications in 1995

The number of Czech books on sociology (and here we are concerned only with books) is rising and is gradually providing an effective complement to the already wide range of translations of philosophical and sociological texts. Publications over the last few years (1990-1995) show certain distinctive features which are also evident in the works published during recent months:

1) There is still very little pure sociological literature, with most books lying somewhere on the boundaries between sociology and philosophy, aesthetics, history, political science or even theology.

2) There is still no systematic study of the process of transformation of Czech society (*Pavel Machonin's* book on this subject has not yet been published). There is a lack of basic theoretical work and as yet there are no books dealing with the history of sociology as a whole, or with major figures in world sociology.

3) The demand for popular guides and simple works of introduction is gradually being met and there are many such works on the market; while the need for such works is undeniable, there are still no specialist monographs on the horizon.

4) There is a much needed move towards a greater variety of paradigms within the sociological community – the "monolithic" Marxism (to which most good authors paid only lip service) is giving way to more clear-cut theoretical and methodological approaches. (Indeed the polarized scientism once "standard" in the West – interpretation, value neutrality, political commitment, etc. – is now rather belatedly making itself felt in this country.) This process is, however, only marginally reflected in books produced and then generally only in aesthetic terms.

Back to Our Roots

In 1955 the path of the development of Czech sociology was forcibly disrupted when administrative limitations were placed on its existence. It is therefore easy to understand why a certain part of sociological work is turning back to the *Czech sociological tradition*, and to its most noted figures, looking there for lessons and methods for developing *current discussions and debates*. This return to history is not just a self-seeking aggrandizement but rather a very functional return. Such sociology was always within the political *milieu*, Czech sociologists were generally *political* thinkers and some of them raised problems which have still not been solved and Czech society (in public debate) is once again confronting these same current problems. On the other hand nor is it an attempt to create an artificial mythology of some (non-existent) "great Czech sociology" which was destroyed by the evil communists and the insensitive Marxists. They "only" tampered with standard central European sociology, so that Czech sociology did have the opportunity to compete with Polish and Hungarian equivalents.

Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937), the first Czech sociologist and the first Czech president, is quite understandably the primary point of reference for both the Czech sociological tradition and for Czech sociology today, and literature on him multiplies year by year, culminating in the publication of Masaryk's *Spisy* [Writings]. The T.G. Masaryk centre under the direction of Jaroslav Opat first released Masaryk's *Juvenilia* (Ústav TGM, Praha 1993), Masaryk's short studies from the 1870s and 1880s, in which the influence of Auguste Comte is evident but in which Masaryk (albeit under Comte's influence) formulated his ideas on the relationship between sociology and politics, his vision of "politics as practical sociology". Their next publication was the third volume of Masaryk's "presidential writings": *Cesta demokracie* [The Path to Democracy] (Ústav TGM, Praha 1994, 420 pp.) to follow on from the first two volumes released half a century ago. While most of the texts deal with the politics of the era, Masaryk's unfailing interest in developments in Russia and in all the fascist and fascistic tendencies of the period is very clear. As early as the 1920s Masaryk clearly identified the direction in which the world was moving and the overall danger to Europe. Was this because he was a sociologist? It should also be noted that Masaryk was a systematic

(anonymous) reviewer of works of literature which, to the end of his life, he saw as a basic source of sociological information.

A good example of works on Masaryk is *Filosof T.G. Masaryk: Problemové skici* [T.G. Masaryk the Philosopher: An Outline of the Problems] (Doplněk, Brno 1994, 156pp.) by the Brno philosopher Lubomír Nový. The most interesting section of the book is *Rusko a Evropa – K vnitřní logice Masarykova myšlení* [Russia and Europe – The Inner Logic of Masaryk's Thought], an excellently systematic overview of the question. Radim Palouš also looks at the young Masaryk in his study, *Masarykovo filosofické mládí* [Masaryk's Early Philosophy], published as part of a larger work entitled *Česká zkušenost (Komenský – Bolzano – Masaryk – Patočka)* [The Czech Experience (Comenius – Bolzano – Masaryk – Patočka)], published by Academia (1994, 176pp.). Palouš's study (originally written in 1948) is a noteworthy commentary on Masaryk's *Juvenilia*. It focuses on Masaryk's concept and description of suicide – a key theme in his thought at that time. It is a pity that Palouš's commentary could not take note of Anthony Giddens' very interesting preface to the English edition of Masaryk's *Suicide* (1970). Gordon Skilling's work *T.G. Masaryk: Against the Current 1882-1914* has been released in a Czech translation (Práh, Praha 1995, 245pp.). This is both a superb introduction to Masaryk's way of thinking in the context of his public and political activity, and an original view of the man in its stress on his so-called first life, i.e. his life prior to the first world war (his second life was during the war and his third the period of his presidency). Skilling's basic thesis is that even if Masaryk had died in 1914 or had not gone into exile, his ideas and writings would have been worthy of analysis in themselves. Masaryk's works are not valuable just because of his presidency – they were its logical culmination.

It seems that all theoretical sociologists and sociologically inclined philosophers in the Czech Lands still feel the need to in some way "compete" with Masaryk. This is the case with thinkers from the first half of the century, most of whom were studied under Masaryk or under his pupils. Three interesting monographs have recently appeared, the first of which (a collection of texts) offers us a closer look at the highly inspirational and at the same time highly controversial philosopher and sociologist, Josef Ludvík Fischer (1894-1973). In *Hledání řádu skutecnosti (Sborník k 100. výročí narození Josefa Ludvíka Fischera)* [In Search of an Order of Reality (A Collection In Memory of the Centenary of Josef Ludvik Fischer's Birth)], published by the Masaryk University Press, the Brno philosopher Jiří Gabriel has collected a number of thought-provoking studies, showing Fischer as an analyst of the crisis of European culture (Holzbachová), as an analyst and critic of proto-fascism, fascism and nazism, (Kudrna), as a sociologist (L. Nový), and as a philosopher (Šmajs, Corduas, D. Machovec, Gabriel). Fischer's "structural philosophy" is in its way a precursor of Parson's structural functionalism, and his superb analysis of the lights and shades of democracy is one of the high points of Czech sociology, making a return to it seem both understandable and justified.

The same publishing house has released Jiří Sedlák's attempt at a monograph on the founder of the so-called Brno school of Sociology, Inocenc Arnošt Bláha (1979-1960). I use the word "attempt" since rather than focusing on an analysis of Bláha's sociological works (Bláha was a "pure" sociologist, unlike Masaryk or J.L. Fischer, who made no attempt to hide the philosophical roots, tendencies and interests), this is rather a memoir of a friend and a welcome selection from Bláha's work. The authors do not just claim but rather show how Bláha was not a "provincial sociologist" but rather a "national sociologist" in the spirit of his times (that is to say that he concentrated on real problems of his national or state community, e.g. the crisis of the family, the psychology of the city, the role of intellectuals in society, the process of secularisation, etc.). He also had a wide knowledge of world sociology (German, English-language and particularly French, but not ignoring Yugoslav, Polish, Italian and even Russian – he regularly reviewed books in all these languages for almost forty years). Finally, in 1994, Šimona Loewensteinová published *Filosof a moralista Emanuel Rádl (1873-1942)* [Emanuel Rádl, Philosopher and Moralist] (Klub osvobozeného

samizdatu, 115pp.). Many reviewers have criticised both the book and its young author, particularly for the failure to point out Rádl's debt to Masaryk, but the book is nonetheless more than welcome today when Rádl (unlike Bláha and J.L. Fischer) is once more being read. Although primarily grounded in philosophy, Rádl's work has a certain sociological dimension, particularly in his analysis of democracy, the nation and nationalism (anti-semitism and xenophobia) and particularly of the relations between Czechs and Germans. Rádl placed this major, traumatic and still relevant subject within a historical, philosophical and sociological context, something for which there is still a real need today.

One last work of fundamental importance is the massive collection of essays *Spor o smysl českých dějin (1895-1938)* [The Controversy Concerning the Sense of Czech History (1895-1938)] (TORST, 866pp.). The initiator, editor and author of the foreword Miloš Havelka opens with the sentence "It would be difficult to find another nation in Europe which would devote so much intellectual effort to philosopical-historical reflections on itself, one which would, even after a period of 150 years, search so deeply for the reason behind its very existence as do the Czechs". This volume is a "historical complement" to the more general discussion on the "Czech question", which is now drawing participants both great and small, penetrating and limited, open-minded and arrogant. From this whole spectrum, Havelka has chosen the liveliest, the most inspiring and sophisticated (the philosopher and sociologist Masaryk as a start, the historian Pekař as the counterweight, and a whole constellation of authors such as Kaizl, Herben, Nejedlý, Krofta, Rádl, Fischer, Šalda and Slavík, who have played a significant role in the cultural and political life of the Czech nation). The need for selection has taken away none of the drama of the dispute, nor lessened the value of this volume as a source of information. It is no exaggeration to say that without Havelka's important book (and without his inspiration and massive heuristic work, this book would never have come into existence) there could not be any serious discussions of Jan Patočka's question "What are Czechs?" It is barely necessary to mention how such subjects of contemporary relevance as liberalism (the "textbook democrat" Masaryk as "anti-liberal") or the influence (on a theoretical level) of the here little discussed Max Weber and his thought. On Czech historical thought appear in a particular historical light.

Textbooks and Study Texts

Brno University lecturer Jan Keller is undoubtedly the most quoted Czech sociologist today. There is good reason for this – he is erudite, he has ideas and he knows how to write. While his latest books *Dvanáct omylů sociologie* [Twelve Errors of Sociology] (SLON, 1995, 167pp.) has not completely abandoned his primary interest in the environment (early made clear in his collection of essays *Až na dno blahobytu* [To the Bottom of Affluence], Doplněk, 1993), it concentrates more on his professional interests – sociology. He has taken a less common approach which Pitirim Sorokin and Stanislaw Andreski and recently Peter Berger have also adopted (as well as the small and wicked essays by Zdeněk Konopásek, who even founded the *Society for the Protection of Society against Sociologists*). He has attacked sociology with its own weapons and in the pertinent (although somewhat affected) attempt to show how far sociology has erred in its development, has rendered the readers an inestimable service by introducing them to some of the forms of sociological thought and showing that while as a discipline sociology may not be free from conflict, it is decidedly worthy of respect. Keller works with some key concepts and themes, particularly with the idea of inappropriate expectations, with the critically conceived idea of social life as one great marketplace where everything can be bought and sold, and with the somewhat provocative thesis that the way the world is today arouses not interest but a lack of interest in everything: people both close and distant, public matters and primarily of course the natural environment. Keller is something of a sociological warrior, a knight in today's world, fighting on two fronts: against the excessively enlarged state with its all-powerful bureaucracy (this undoubtedly reflects his "French" experience, both personal and intellectual) and against ex-

aggerated individualism with its arrogant self-centredness. Keller's book is disturbing, provoking and stimulating, but still awaits a critical reception. The most important thing, however, is that it is a good read and is not boring, something which is not only unusual within the bounds of Czech sociology, but is indeed almost a sin from the point of view of the "dominant paradigm"; sublime boredom has in some way become a synonym of the really "scientific". Here in the central European Czech burrow it has not yet fully dawned on us that things have already long been different "in the world outside". So Keller's *Twelve Errors of Sociology* has more to offer than the majority of standard textbooks (including those of Western provenance).

Keller's *Úvod do sociologie* [An Introduction to Sociology] (SLON, 1994, 250pp.) aroused considerable interest among the general public, more as a textbook than for its unusual format and overall highly original conception, and has already reached its third edition. The chapter titles alone are highly illustrative: Sociology as a Product of Crisis, Basic Problems for the Survival of Sociology, The Cultural Approach to Problem Solving, Basic Paradigms of Sociological Thought. Something of a final chapter to Keller's *Introduction* came with the publication of *Sociologické školy, směry, paradigmata* [Schools, Trends and Paradigms of Sociology] (SLON, 1994, 250pp.) which was conceived and largely written by Miloslav Petrusek for the series *Sociologické pojmosloví* [Main Areas of Sociology]. After the meta-theoretical introduction (what are the schools, trends and paradigms and their possible typologies) the book turns to an explanation of the major concepts that have influenced sociology (sociology as an exact science – neo-positivism, behaviourism and interactionism, society as a structure, system and order – structural functionalism, society as conflict and difference – critical sociology and neo-marxism, society as significance, interpretation and meaning – phenomenological sociology and symbolic interactionism, society as the everyday – ethnomethodology, dramatic and existential sociology, naturalism redivivus – sociobiology and the post-modern trend in sociology). The explanations are systematic, forming a "dictionary" of contemporary sociology which well fulfills its aim of providing information.

Ivo T. Budil's work *Mýtus, jazyk a kulturní antropologie* [Myth, Language and Cultural Anthropology] (Triton, Praha 1995, 240pp.) bears a certain similarity to the above work, being an outline of the history of social and cultural anthropology in close connection with sociology. It provides detailed explanations of certain old and new concepts (semiotics, cognitive etc. anthropology). Another such dictionary-like work is *Sociální a kulturní antropolgie* [Social and Cultural Anthropology] edited by Ladislav Hrdý, Václav Soukup and Alena Vodáková (SLON, 1993, 157pp.) in the series *Sociologické pojmosloví.* Budil's work is however more rigorous and contains some new information. Univerzita Karlova [Charles University Press] has published Václav Soukup's *Dějiny kulturní a sociální antropologie* [The History of Cultural and Social Anthropology] (1994, 225pp.), which is factually solid and well-informed about the most recent literature. It must be said, however, that work on the confines of sociology and social anthropology in this country unfortunately lags behind that in Poland (take, for example, Ewa Nowicka's textbook *Świat czlowieka – świat kultury* [The World of Man – The World of Culture], 1991, or Marian Kempny's excellent and provocative work *Antropologia bez dogmatów – teoria spoleczna bez iluzji* [Non-Dogmatic Anthropology – A Theory of Society without Illusions], 1994).

The SLON publishing house has done a superb job of public education with their study texts in the field of social work and policy, including, in 1994, Oldřich Matoušek's *Rodina jako instituce a vztahová síť* [The Family as an Institution and a Network of Relationships] (125pp.), Miloš Večeřa's *Sociální stát: východiska a přístupy* [The Social State: Starting Points and Approaches] (103pp.), Ivo Řezníček's *Metody Sociální práce* [Methods of Social Work] (75pp.) and Petr Mareš's *Nezaměstnanost jako sociální problém* [Unemployment as a Social Problem] (151pp.). In 1995 they published Martin Potůček's *Socialni politika* [Social Policy] (141pp.), *Oldřich Matoušek's Ústavní péče* [Institutional

Care] (140pp.) and Jan Gabura and Jana Pružinská's *Poradenský proces* [The Counselling Process] (145pp.) The original series of textbooks is virtually entirely sold out – it seems that society is more interested in practical guidance for action than in theoretical reflections. All the texts are well up to the European level and most take into account the specific features of Czech society at the end of the century.

Between Nature and Television

The next group of books do not fall into any simple category, either of subject or genre. Stanislav Komárek's *Sto esejů o přírodě a společnosti (Doudlebia a jiné fenomény)* [One Hundred Essays on Nature and Society (Doudlebia and Other Phenomena]) is published by Vesmír. It is a solid volume of 170 pages, comprising extremely creative reflections on all matters possible and impossible – from reflections on theories of development, through an analysis of the "Russian soul", to mini-studies on sociological science (on science as an institution and on the behaviour of scientists as "organisers"). Komárek's essays are both superb literature and a source of an inconceivable wealth of information, both general and detailed, about the environment, science, history and sociology, all offered with a dazzling degree of imagination and metaphor. It is a great and sometimes dangerous playground of wonderful ideas, analogies and parallels, which in true post-modern fashion show social life, inter-personal relations and the behaviour of major social systems in a quite unexpected light. It is not, of course, post-modernism par excellence, but rather a first book by a Czech author who has some real knowledge of sociobiology and the modern and "post-modern" forms of Darwinism, and even more of sociology.

The work of the Brno sociologist Ladislav Rabušic, *Česká společnost stárne* [The Aging of Czech Society] (Masaryk University in collaboration with Georgetown Press, 182pp.) falls into quite another category, in terms of both genre and content. He is concerned with the specific idea of the "aging society" in the Czech situation, and moves across the boundaries between demography and sociology, combining the tradition of positivist methodology with a modern approach to explanation. Both the subject and the solid way it is dealt with are outstanding although not uncontroversial.

It would certainly be a transgression against good manners if sociology totally disregarded the most common form of our times – the interview. *Josef Alan* has collected his interview with important intellectuals and public figures from the Czech Lands or who have links with this country. The book is entitled *Dialogy o občanské společnosti* [Dialogues on the Civil Society] (SLON, 1994, 254pp.) and is divided into major thematic sections: Democracy and Power (e.g. Bělohradský, Cepl, Stráský), Political Culture (Kroupa, Bayer), History Today (Třeštík, Křen, Tigrid, Bútora), The World Picture (Macura, Hvížďala), Economic Transformation (Večerník, Mlčoch), and Between East and West (Rupnik, Křen, Dienstbier). While this is not "pure" sociology, the basic angle, the way the questions are asked and the subjects that are dealt with are sociological – and who today is going to quarrel about the borderlines between disciplines?

There is a particular sub-group of works by authors of Christian or directly Catholic persuasions which is worth considering as it is the best demonstration of the emergence of a world view and a theoretical pluralism. Two of the works that have appeared recently are particularly interesting from a sociological point of view: *Petr Fiala's Katolicismus a politika (O politické dimenzi katolicismu v postmoderní době)* [Catholicism and Politics (The Political Dimension of Catholicism in the Post-Modern Era)] published by CDK and Patriae (1995, 335pp.), and *Víra a kultura (Pokoncilní vývoj českého katolicismu v reflexi časopisu Studie)* [Faith and Culture (The Post-Conciliar Development of Czech Catholicism in the Eyes of the Magazine *Studie*)] by Tomáš Halík (a psychologist, sociologist and Catholic priest) (Zvon, 1995, 207pp.)

The subject of time – social and historical – receives a very personal treatment in the work of the Czech historian, archaeologist, philosopher and literary critic *Zdeněk Vašíček*, now living in France, *Obrazy minulosti (O bytí, poznání a podání minulého času)* [Pictures of the Past (On Being, Knowledge and Explana-

tion of the Past)] which is the author's own translation of the closing section of a larger work *L'Archelogie, L'Histoire, Le Passé*. While this work does not fall simply into any one discipline, its theory and methodology undoubtedly have something to offer sociologists (and not only those concerned with history).

Last in this section there is *Bohuslav Blažek's* collection of essays *Tváří v tvář obrazovce* [Face to Face with the Television Screen] (SLON, 1995, 200pp.), the first original Czech contribution to sociology of the mass media. The book focuses on a subject that has received much attention from the Czech public – that of the filming and broadcasting of violence. Blažek has used all his sociological and journalistic erudition to write a highly readable work whose message should be easily grasped by the general public.

A Touch of the Post-Modern

There are certainly few of the flood of works which seek to reflect on the "post-modern turning point" in philosophy and sociology that are worth bothering with. Perhaps for this reason Stanislav Hubík's complex, well-grounded and informative book *K postmodernismu obratem k jazyku* [The Post-Modern Move in Language] (Albert, Boskovice 1994, 218pp.) is so welcome. Hubík is well-grounded in post-modern thought although he does present it from his own point of view, which may seem to have little relevance to sociology, even if we accept that it is not possible to understand anything of the post-modern without at least an elementary knowledge of what has happened with language (from Saussure and Wittgenstein to Derrida). The second work considered here comes from the pen of the geologist *Jiří Krupička*, who lives in Canada, and is entitled *Renesance rozumu* [The Renaissance of Reason] (Český spisovatel, 1994, 556pp.) and is an impassioned and well-argued defence of reason, a dramatic debate with the post-modern infection, a major rejection of post-modern relativism, cynicism, the post-modern "fog of words" and the dangerous anti-scientific trend. The text is wise and balanced with a good foundation in the enormous literature available and in the writer's own research work in the exact sciences.

It is worth remembering that it was probably not by chance that President Václav Havel listed Jiří Krupička's book as his "book of the year" in answer to a question from the newspaper *Lidové noviny*. Havel's public statements and speeches from 1995 have been collected and published under the title *Havel 95* and represent a very Czech contribution to the debate on the state of the world and society. Havel belongs to the tradition of great Czech moralists, philosophizing politicians and sociologically influenced thinkers who can say even today that "politics is merely service to the community, practical morality. And how better to serve the community and practice morality today than for a politician to seek his global political responsibility in the global and globally threatened civilisation, that is to say a responsibility for the very survival of the human race?" It is far from unlikely that with the course of time it will become clear that one of the most important Czech sociologists of the end of this century was in fact Václav Havel. It is not the simple mastery of methodology that determines the value of a sociological statement, nor the grandiloquent theoretical rhetoric of the post-modern "fog of words", but rather the gravity of the subject and the individual way it is understood. The value of this idea is well demonstrated by Ernest Gellner's very serious comparison of Havel's and Masaryk's philosophical and sociological premises. But we will come back to Havel on another occasion.

Miloslav Petrusek

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