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CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

*Special
Issue*



August 1992

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Introduction

This issue is the first one of the planned biannual English versions of the *Sociologický časopis* (Sociological Review), published by the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Prague on behalf of the Czech sociological community. The Sociological Review has appeared bimonthly from 1965. After November 1989, its editorial board, publishing policy and manner of production were completely changed, in order to be more critical and flexible.

Comparing with the other Central European countries, Czech sociology was perhaps the most devastated by the communist regime. Mistrustful Stalinist leaders had very good reasons for doing this, indeed. Both of democratic Czechoslovakia's prewar presidents were respected sociologists. The habilitation thesis of the first of them, professor Tomáš G. Masaryk, was concerned with suicide as a sociological problem (several years before Durkheim's *Le suicide*). The second of them, Edvard Beneš, was habilitated at Prague's Charles University as a docent of sociology and continued his courses even after he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Pre-war Czech sociology flourished in the Brno school - headed by Arnošt Bláha in a Durkheimian style and the rather more empirical Prague school of Zdeněk Ullrich, Otakar Machotka and others, most of whom emigrated after 1948. After a short continuation of this tradition in the post-war period, teaching and research in sociology were strictly prohibited in 1950.

It was only in 1965 that sociological research started to regenerate itself, but only for a short period lasting until 1969. In these years, the Institute of Sociology was established and the Sociological Review begun. A large survey on social stratification was collected and analyzed, several working teams were activated and some classic sociological books were translated (but never published). After 1970, sociology was "normalized" like the society as a whole, i.e. it was subordinated to ideological principles and party control. The Institute of Sociology became part of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology and research was concentrated on such themes as *The Rapprochement of the Working Class and Intelligentsia* or *The Cultivation of the Socialist Style of Life*. Only a few individuals tried to maintain some continuity, either pursuing seemingly neutral topics in the official institutions (e.g. urban sociology, educational mobility, wage differences), or publishing the samizdat quarterly *Sociologický obzor* (Sociological Horizons), oriented mostly toward political problems and the sociology of literature.

Lack of continuity and the coerced lowering of the prestige of sociological research caused the greatest problem we face after November 1989, when communist power was overturned in Czechoslovakia: the lack of qualified and motivated people. Moreover, due to the weight of political criteria in the student selection process, whole years of students who studied sociology in the 1970s and 1980s have virtually disappeared. Therefore, the renewed institutions can hardly find promising young people, especially as they are in competition with the private sector and state administration. Nevertheless, new studies in social and political

sciences were established (e.g. the new Faculty of Social Sciences of the University Charles, studies on the Central European University in Prague) and we can expect real improvement in a few years.

Challenges of the new Czechoslovak democratic era for sociological research are immense. First, due to absent freedom of research, the development of society in terms of social structure, national character, value system, way of life etc., remains mostly undescribed in the whole period after 1945. Second, the current transformation of society is conceived in the political and economic terms only and the sociological point of view is almost missing. Third, economic transformation causes formerly unknown social problems which should be described and analyzed. Czechoslovak sociology could only cope with these challenges in a close cooperation with Western scholars. Therefore, we are searching for possible contacts and synergy and this is also the reason the first review is being published in English.

This issue is a collection of articles mostly published in the Czech version of the Sociological Review. Without any intention, a majority of them were written by researchers of the Institute of Sociology in Prague. J. Musil's (director of this Institute in 1990-1992) article is about some general features of the Czechoslovak transition. The following four articles which stem from the 1991-1992 monothematic issues of the Sociologický časopis, focused upon areas of the political change (L. Brokl), social stratification (P. Matějů), welfare policy (J. Večerník) and local development (M. Illner). The last two articles present other sociological institutions, the Bratislava's and Brno's research centers. The first is oriented toward key political issues, the second is connected with sociological theory and family studies. In brief reports, we present commented data about recent development in Czechoslovakia. In the information rubric, we add some useful facts about the main institutions of sociological research.

We hope the Czech Sociological Review will find interested people and, through them, incentives to continue further.

Jiří Večerník

Czechoslovakia in the Middle of Transition

JIŘÍ MUSIL*

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Abstract: The article deals with the processes of the Czechoslovak transition from a soviet-type society to a democratic and liberal one. The transition is composed of three main, mutually interacting processes: 1. the constitutional change, i.e. the transformation of the political system and state identity, 2. the change of the economic system, i.e. the transformation of the planned economy into a market economy, and 3. the formation of a civil society out of an authoritarian and closed society. The relationship between the three mentioned changes belongs among the main problems of transformation. The coordination, harmonization and sequencing of the three transformations are being carried out without any previous experience and without the possibility of experimentation, or the time for careful testing of different options. The stabilization of the constitutional framework belongs among the preconditions for successful economic transformation. The Czechoslovak transition to a democratic society and market economy is complicated by unresolved problems in the constitutional sphere, i.e. by the unresolved relationship between the Czech and Slovak republics. The definite test of the success of the transition will be the formation of civil society. It is a long term process which will probably last many decades. It is the most complicated and precarious part of the transformation and is hampered by the value syncretism of the population, by efforts to combine opposing rules of social and economic behavior. The success of the transition depends to a large degree on the ability to mobilize the inner resources of the country. The mobilization processes are socially and culturally conditioned ones.

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Most authors commenting on the events in Central and Eastern Europe have arrived at the conclusion that the revolutions of 1989 had an undoubtedly epochal meaning, but at the same time lacked "the pathos of novelty", that, according to Hannah Arendt,¹ belongs among the essential features of modern revolutions. In their opinion these were revolutions without a revolutionary theory, without a historical model and without new goals. In fact, they endeavored to restore the ideals and claims of the Enlightenment, of the American and French revolutions, the Rights of Man and of Citizens and the sovereignty of the people. The political

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1) For a review of statement stressing the absence of novelty in the 1989 revolutions see the excellent study by Krishan Kumar [1991]. Kumar's paper was delivered at a course on post-communist societies at the Central European University in Prague, 1991.

earthquake of 1989, which certainly changed the world, was labelled by Jürgen Habermas [1990] as a "rectifying revolution", Alain Touraine [1991] considered it the movement of Central and East European societies towards "a normal situation from an abnormal one, which had been imposed on them", and Francois Furet, more radically, as the end of a "long and tragic deviation which had begun in 1917".²

Besides this stress on the *return* to traditional liberal and democratic concepts and institutions, the second most frequently mentioned feature of the 1989 revolutions is the fact that they mark the *end* of socialism.

And so, if we leave aside historical subtleties and mild differences in interpretation, most serious observers agree on combining both mentioned features: what happened in 1989 was in fact the end of socialism, and restoration of liberalism and capitalism will follow. The 150 year old rivalry between the two main theories that were the products of industrial society came to an abrupt end, in spite of the fact that for a long time - and even not so long ago - it seemed that socialism represented the winning side. The long-lasting competition resulted in the surprisingly rapid collapse of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union, within only two years.

Nevertheless, the experiences from the two years that have elapsed since the revolutions have shaken the validity of the idea that after the collapse of socialism the restoration of liberalism will necessarily follow. Of course, the institutional structures and official ideologies that were an integral part of the socialist ideocracies have indeed disintegrated. In the whole former Soviet bloc, as well as in Yugoslavia and Albania, the three pillars on which real socialism had been standing were removed: 1. the constitutionally guaranteed leading role of the communist party in all spheres of life, 2. central planning as the main instrument for organizing economic life, and 3. the ideological monopoly of Marxism - Leninism. However, as attention is beginning to shift from analyses of the revolutions themselves to issues concerning the further development of the post-communist societies, the original equation - that the defeat of socialism in its struggle with liberalism will automatically and necessarily lead to the introduction of liberal-democratic regimes - appears to be a dangerous simplification. What certainly is valid is the first part; statements on rectification, restoration and the return to liberalism, however, have become mere expressions of hopes - the probability of their realization differs from one post-communist country to the next. At present it seems evident that there does not exist an inner determination of the post-communist countries' development towards a democratic model. To establish permanent democracies in these countries will require a considerable long-term effort, even if some of them have better internal and/or external conditions in this respect. It is nevertheless possible that the post-communist societies may evolve in another direction. They may deteriorate into new forms of non-democratic, though not necessarily fascist, regimes. There exist other

²) Francois Furet is quoted in the Czech edition of Ralf Dahrendorf's *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* [Dahrendorf 1991: 28].

possibilities: almost imperceptibly there can emerge new forms of authoritarian "quasi-democracies", regimes with strong governments or strong presidents and with dirigist economies, populist neo-nationalisms or conservative forms of corporatism.

The Heritage and the Barriers to Transition

In hardly any country of the Soviet bloc was the official doctrine after 1968 so devoid of ideas, so sterile and irrelevant for solving any of the important issues of society and state as in Czechoslovakia. Hardly any country in the bloc was so resistant to new ideas in economics, sociology and political science as Czechoslovakia in the seventies and eighties. For instance, during that period not a single book by any western non-marxist author, dealing with one of the serious political or economic issues of the contemporary world, was published. While Polish, Hungarian and even Soviet intellectuals were able to get acquainted with at least the main trends of thought of the outside world, their Czech and Slovak colleagues were deliberately excluded from the international intellectual community. Not even the admirably ingenuous, perseverant and multiform *samizdat* was able to overcome this gap. The result was not only ignorance and lack of information, but also the gradual decay of analytical and theoretical thought and language. As a consequence of this deliberate "Biafra of the spirit" carried out by the Husák regime, even now many of the important discussions on political, economic and social issues going on in Czechoslovakia have a descriptive and rather technical character and do not penetrate into the deeper layers of the problems under discussion.

There exists however another type of barrier in understanding the essence of the transformation which Czechoslovak society is undergoing: this barrier is the product of the very nature and course of the 1989 "velvet revolution". A paradoxical side effect of the smooth, non-violent assumption of power by the democratic forces and of the civil, legal form of the 1989 events, is the illusion that transforming the society from real socialism to democracy will be relatively easy. The non-violent character of the revolution has probably helped the underestimation of the depth, difficulty and time-period that the transformation of the society will need. Though in a sociological interpretation, the situation of Czech and Slovak society can be compared to the situation after a war - and a lost war, for that matter - the stability and continuity of daily routine, the normal functioning of shops, services and the infrastructure during the political revolution, the absence of destroyed or damaged buildings and networks, etc., concealed the radical nature of the starting metamorphosis. They mainly concealed the complexity of the interrelationships between the political, economic and socio-cultural transformations. The leading personalities of the revolution, especially Václav Havel, probably realized within a short time how intertwined the changes were and what the risks of their simultaneity were. After the first parliamentary elections in June 1990 a large strata of the population also began to be aware of the unforeseen complexity of the transformation.

Gradually it has become evident that we face an enormous task: the complete reconstructing of an entire society. To build it up on the ruins of a system which was an unsuccessful attempt to combine certain forms of modernity with conservative ideas of the organization of society and with an unprecedented centralization of power. The Soviet type of society was an attempt to create a huge, well-integrated and harmonic *Gemeinschaft*, built on a kind of modern version of Durkheim's mechanic solidarity.³ This non-contractual, non-conflictual, but in fact also non-cooperative model determined the economic as well as political institutions of state-socialist societies:⁴ central planning instead of the market, a centralized and hierarchically organized power structure instead of decentralized and diffused power structures, an ideocracy instead of the competing plurality of ideas.

The societies of "real socialism," including the Czechoslovak variant, were often labelled by their internal and external opponents as strongly bureaucratic. The critics had in mind the considerable power of the party and state apparatus, plus various kinds of rigidity, red tape, the avoidance of personal responsibility and decision making (passing the buck) and the non-accountability of officials vis-a-vis the public.

In fact, however, when using Max Weber's classic criteria, in the socialist societies the properties of modern bureaucratic administration were absent; they were not genuine *Rechtsstaaten*, based on rationality and legality; they lacked the "principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is by laws or administrative regulations". They resembled rather certain pre-capitalist societies: "In all these cases the ruler executes the most important measures through personal trustees, table companions or court servants. Their commission and authority are not precisely delimited and are temporarily called into being for each case".⁵

Legal universalism, the clear delimitation of jurisdictional areas and the application of legal norms were substituted often not only in the political sphere, but also in the economy, regional and local administration, education, welfare institutions and many other spheres, by personal contacts, nepotism and ad hoc decisions. This resulted in a vague and non-transparent system of social relationships, combining semi-feudal dependency of a hierarchic nature with horizontal local power networks, or with local networks based on the exchange of services, scarce commodities, etc. Moreover, central planning, i.e. the central redistributive system which had replaced the market, was supplemented by local

3) The term *Gemeinschaft* is used here in Ferdinand Tönnies' original meaning, as expressed in his classic study *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* [Tönnies 1887]. The term *Gemeinschaft* stresses "natural", solidaristic community bonds as opposed to contractual ones. By Durkheim's term *mechanic solidarity* is meant solidarity based on likeness and not on the division of labor.

4) Most countries of the Soviet bloc have been correctly described by David Lane as "state socialism societies". See [Lane 1976].

5) The quotation is based on H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills' *From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology* [Gerth, Mills 1947, 196-197].

redistributive systems. And all this was even more complicated by the growing role of the informal economy and the black market. Through this a social system came into being, the unintelligibility of which will keep sociologists and political scientists busy for a long time.

What is of course more serious, is the fact that two generations - and in the Soviet Union even more - of citizens were obliged to conform to such a vague and irrational system. People's functioning in such a system brought about cultural patterns which turned many of the principles on which societies with liberal political institutions are built upside down. Today these internalized patterns of behavior remain probably the strongest and most difficult to overcome barriers on the road to civil society in the post-communist countries.

At this point, a short note on a specific Czech and probably also Slovak problem should be added. The vagueness and non-transparency of social relationships, typical for the societies of real socialism, is further multiplied by the discontinuities in Czech and Slovak history. During the twentieth century, as many as nine different political regimes have taken turns ruling over Czech territory. These nine regimes differed not only in their political forms and content, but also in their concepts of national and state identity. The consciousness of discontinuity and the longing for continuity, for more stable and solid frames, is therefore an essential element of life in this part of Europe. Towards the end of the twenties, T. G. Masaryk expressed this feeling in a well-known remark to K. Čapek: "I think we need some twenty, thirty more years for safeguarding the republic. Afterwards, I am not afraid for it anymore. At that time a new generation will be here, born in freedom. Certainly, that generation won't let anyone take the freedom away".⁶ In spite of the discontinuous nature of modern Czech history, there is no doubt that the event called the "velvet revolution" was also a "rectifying revolution". The Czech republic is consciously endeavoring to return to the evolutionary trajectory of its modern history, which stresses liberal democracy.

The Relationship of the Three Great Transformations

The rapid and complete collapse of the communist regimes in 1989 was due to the simultaneous disintegration of all their basic levels of decision-making. It is probable that, owing to their nature, i.e. to the strong interrelationship of their individual parts, the communist regimes could not end in any other way. The surprising quickness of the collapse was, for a certain time, a source of great collective euphoria. Its unexpected consequence was, however, the fact that all the post-communist governments were obliged, without having the possibility to prepare matters thoroughly, to make decisions in the three spheres which determine the nature of political systems very quickly: i.e. in the constitutional, economic and socio-cultural spheres. These decisions were to recreate three great regulation systems that would as soon as possible substitute for those which were disappearing. In this situation the burden and risks of decision making were - and

⁶) See Karel Čapek, *Čtení o TGM* [Čapek 1969: 18].

still are - heavy to an unprecedented degree, mainly because no theory was available for the transition from socialism to open society.⁷

In the first place it was necessary to define and re-define the identity of the state, to specify the citizens' rights and obligations, to decide on the structure of and rules for representative democratic bodies, on the administrative and regional structure of the state and on tens of other issues forming the constitutional framework of all modern societies. In the second place, the old and disintegrating mechanisms of central planning had to be substituted by functioning measures which would lead to a market economy. Within a few months, principles had to be laid for the difficult maneuver incorrectly labelled as economic reform; it is, in fact, a total economic restructuring of unprecedented extent and intensity. Finally, in the third place, the building of a reliable social and cultural framework for the new societies had to be begun - a framework which can be described as civil society. All this had to be done in such a way as to preserve, if not to improve, daily life routine, because an important implicit component in the thought of a large section of the population, legitimizing the revolutions of 1989, was the expectation that they would bring not only freedom, but economic prosperity as well.

Although each of the mentioned three transformations constitutes in itself a very difficult and complex operation, the success of the whole transition depends on the mutual harmonization, sequencing and dosing of the changes not only in the individual spheres, but in the whole system, so that they form a coherent and functioning whole. And this in a situation when, as Claus Offe has well put it: "... there is no time for slow maturation, experience, and learning along the evolutionary scale of nation-building, constitution making, and the politics of allocation and redistribution. And neither are there model cases which might be imitated nor, for that matter, a victorious power that would impose its will from the outside" [Offe 1991: 10].

The Importance of Constitutional Transition

The developments in Czechoslovakia are almost a textbook example of the importance of timely settled basic constitutional agreements for the transformation of post-communist societies. Indeed, the economic reform, the establishment of democratic political institutions and of civil society can be severely complicated or even blocked, if at the beginning of the whole process sufficient attention is not given to the constitutional foundations of the state undergoing such a major restructuring. Such agreements, expressed in a clear and concise legal form, should include the definition of national identity, of territorial, economic and cultural borders, the "competencies" in Czechoslovak terminology, of the existing or existence-seeking units. In this respect the main problem in Czechoslovakia has

7) The idea of analyzing the Czechoslovak transformation with respect to three regulation systems was stimulated by Claus Offe's study *Capitalism by Democratic Design?* [Offe 1991]. Ralf Dahrendorf [1990] speaks also about "three parallel processes which must develop on the road to freedom". Dahrendorf stresses as the third process the formation of civil society, Offe lays stress on the interaction of the incongruent changes going on in the global transformation and on the dilemma of the simultaneity of the changes.

become the relationship between the Czech and Slovak republics. The relationship between the two macro-regions of the Czech republic, i.e. between Bohemia and Moravia, does not include so many dangers of disintegration, although it also tends to divert attention and energy from economic reform and the building of civil society.

The history of the relationship of the Czechs and the Slovaks, two nations of the Western Slavonic group, would require a separate study. In the context of this essay, however, I would like to concentrate on developments since 1968. In that year, a formerly almost unitary state became a federation of two republics. This was the only realized, and by the Soviet Union accepted outcome of 1968 Prague Spring. The change undoubtedly meant an improvement in Slovakia's status in the state and at the same time weakened the political standing of the Czechs. An external, yet not negligible feature of this situation was the fact that a Slovak - Gustáv Husák - became president of the federal republic and, what was more important, the leading figure in the radically purged Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. A constitutionally unusual system of asymmetric arrangement was established, with, on the one hand, the central federal government and, on the other hand, the government of the Slovak republic. The Czech republic did not have a government of its own, there existed only an uninfluential parliament, the Czech National Council. In a similarly asymmetric way all other important institutions were organized. Moreover, the principle of parity was introduced in all federal institutions, in a situation where Slovaks represented only one third of the federation's population. In the economic sphere, the principle of Slovakia's rapid industrialization continued to be applied after the Soviet invasion in 1968; this meant relatively higher investment in the Slovak republic than in the Czech one. During the whole period between 1945 and the end of the eighties, Slovakia experienced an unusually quick process of industrialization and urbanization; differences between the two parts of Czechoslovakia were disappearing. For Slovakia this was a period of great social change, modernization, high mobility and also of an increasing living standard. The situation in the western part of the federation, mainly in Bohemia, was different: Bohemia changed from a core area of Central Europe into a periphery of the Soviet bloc on its westernmost borders. The western part of Czechoslovakia also became an example of an old decaying industrial area, with a stagnating population, an obsolete industrial structure, a very damaged environment and worsening health conditions.

In Slovakia, the Husák regime was slightly more liberal than in the Czech republic and in the years 1969-1989 there was even a certain cultural development, at least institutionally. The latent political tension between the two parts of the federation was suppressed as much as possible by the Soviets themselves, as well as by the local regime installed by the Soviets; yet it continued to exist under the surface.

During the 1989 revolution, Slovakia soon joined Prague in the movement towards democracy, and the common slogan, heard not only in the big gatherings in the streets but also in official political talks was "Strength in unity!"

After a relatively short time, however, i.e. in the first half of 1990, in the ideological vacuum accompanying the collapse of the communist *Supragemeinschaft* and its ideology, the situation in Slovakia began to change. A certain part of the population which wants to cooperate as closely as possible with the Czechs and which would even prefer a completely unitary state to a federation, still exists. However, there are more and more Slovaks who, while considering the federation as the most advantageous option, want to change its present form. They have adopted the slogan of "authentic federation". Some of these federalists have gradually shifted to the position of confederalism. Radical Slovak nationalists, whose ambition is to establish an independent Slovak state, have also reemerged on the political scene. They are internally divided into two groups: one, which wishes to achieve independence by constitutional methods (represented by the KDH - the Christian Democratic Movement) and another, which is willing to use non-constitutional procedures as well.

Thus the Slovaks are rather fragmented in terms of constitutional identity⁸ and this has brought about the Slovak crisis which is evidently spreading through the whole state. The heterogeneity of the political parties' positions is reflected in the differentiation of political attitudes among the Slovak population. According to representative social surveys (see [Aktuálne... 1991]), made in the middle of 1991, about 13 percent of Slovak citizens support the establishment of an independent Slovak state. A unitary state with the Czechs, with a single parliament, government and constitution, is acceptable for 16 percent of the population. As compared with the situation at the end of 1990, the proportion of supporters of such a unitary state has dropped by 6 percent. The most preferred constitutional form in Slovakia is a dualistic federation of the Slovak and the Czech republics: it has the support of 33 percent of the respondents. 14 percent of the Slovaks supported a trialistic federation (i.e. a state composed of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia), 11 percent a confederation, 6 percent the so-called *Bundesstaat*, 2 percent other arrangements and 5 percent were undecided. Studies analyzing the development of Slovak public opinion in 1990 and 1991 point out the characteristic long-term predominance of supporters of different forms of a common state with the Czechs. However, their number has a tendency to slowly decrease.

These data show that Slovak nationalism is rather confused and contradictory. Its motor certainly is the well-known conviction that without its own state a nation is incomplete. But in the Slovak case the question arises: which kind of state? The ambiguity is evident also in other respects. For example, public opinion polls show that a decisive majority (78-79 %) of Slovak citizens stress that the friendly links between the Slovaks and the Czechs should not be broken. At the same time, however, one can observe a growing feeling among the Slovak population that the Czechs do not treat them as equal partners, that in the

⁸) This feeling is shared by many Slovak politicians themselves. Recently the vice-president of the Slovak National Council, Mr. Ivan Čarnogurský expressed it in the following way "... Slovakia had not problems with the Czechs nor with Europe but with itself". Quoted from Lidové noviny, 3 January, 1992.

federation Slovakia is the worse off. A great part of the Slovak population also disagrees with the economic reform as worked out by the federal government, and requires specific changes. Generally, Slovaks desire the suppression of the power of federal institutions and the strengthening of the power of the national republics. This feature is very important. The Czechs identify themselves with Czechoslovakia, the Slovaks with the Slovak republic. A kind of Czech paternalism may be hidden in this attitude, but most differences, however, are due to the fact that in the building up of the new state, the majority of the Czech society prefers the civic, individualistic principle, and the Slovaks the national and solidaristic one.

So Slovak nationalism is of a specific nature and proves that the analysis of the new nationalisms emerging in the region of the disintegrated Soviet bloc has to respect their plurality. In addition to Gellner's well-known evolutionary typology [Gellner 1983: 88-109] of this phenomenon, it may be useful for understanding contemporary neo-nationalisms to keep in view their relationship to two sociological variables: 1. the degree of economic development of the nation or country, and 2. the power status of individual nations within multinational states.⁹ The four field matrix classifying nations as more or less developed, stronger or weaker, enables useful distinctions, e.g. of nationalisms of more developed nations with a weaker status, or on the contrary, nationalisms of less developed nations, but in dominant position, etc. Slovakia belongs to the slightly less developed and at the same time weaker national partners in the federation; such a combination is less explosive than the combination "more developed nation with politically weaker status" (e.g. Slovenia). This typology shows that the Slovak situation differs considerably from that in e.g. Croatia, Ukraine or Lithuania. There, the nationalists did not doubt, for example, that a referendum would bring them victory and wanted therefore to carry it out. In Slovakia, on the contrary, all the nationalist-oriented parties oppose a referendum which would decide whether or not to preserve the common state, because they fear that most voters would refuse to vote for an independent Slovak state. Thus, paradoxically, in the Czechoslovak situation, the senior partner offers the junior partner the possibility of a democratic choice, and the latter refuses to use it.

The Slovak crisis, which is beginning to become a destabilizing element in Central Europe, can be solved in three different ways. In the least favorable case, it can end with the disintegration of the Czechoslovak state into two parts. A somewhat better solution would be the establishment of a confederation, which however risks being unstable. The third and most desirable possibility is a functioning federation. The positive solution of the crisis still has a fair chance, but will need considerable effort, a lot of political tact and ingenuity, a bit of luck, and above all the willingness of both sides to make some compromises.

I have dealt at such length with the relationship between the Czechs and the Slovaks after the 1989 revolution in order to show, by this concrete example, how

⁹) The possibility of using these two dimensions for a typology of nationalisms was used by the author in an unpublished paper for the UNESCO conference *Europe in Transition: A Challenge for the Social Science*, Santander, Spain 24 - 28 June 1991.

important it is, at the very beginning of the transformation of post-communist societies, to create a clear and reliable constitutional framework, especially regarding the constitution itself. Without such a framework, economic restructuring and the building up of civil society becomes extremely complicated. Now, *ex post*, it can be stated that many problems which are impeding the transition to a democratic society in Czechoslovakia could have been prevented if, in the first phases of the transition, the acceptance of the Charter of Human Rights and some other partial constitutional principles had been immediately followed by the working out of a new constitution.

Economic transformation

Ralf Dahrendorf [1991: 85], when writing on the East European revolutions, used the term "valley of tears" when describing the economic transformation. To pass through this valley will take several years. As compared with the transformation of the constitutional and political framework and with the lengthy formation of civil society, economic transformation presents some specific features.

If, on the one hand, we can take for granted an almost universal acceptance of democratic principles by Czech and Slovak society, as well as the fact that basic democratic institutions have already been installed, that free elections were held, that human rights are being observed and that gradually new non-professional politicians are acquiring experience and skills, on the other hand the situation in the sphere of the second transformation is different.

The economic transformation is not only a valley of tears, but also a battlefield. After the problem of the relationship between the two republics, it is the most controversial and complicated issue in the public life of the country. The economic transformation is a political issue *par excellence*, even its description - let alone its evaluation - is blurred by political and ideological views. According to their various political affiliations, commentators "see" only certain aspects of the whole complex process. There is also another snag. The Czechoslovak economic reform began later than in Poland and Hungary and has been going on for only one year: that is too short a time for a reliable evaluation. The problems can however be better understood if I describe at least in a few words the main ideas of the restructuring and also the effects achieved so far.

The program of transformation was inadequately called a "scenario of economic reform", though in fact it was a blueprint for radical restructuring. It was indeed a victory for neo-liberal economists, who deleted the modifications to the program proposed by economists whose orientation was Keynesian, institutionalist or reform socialist. The scenario is based on price liberalization, on the liberalization of foreign trade, on the introduction of the inner convertibility of Czechoslovak currency, on macroeconomic stabilization based on restrictive budgetary policy and mainly on a radical change in ownership, i.e. on privatization. Nevertheless, as K. Kuehnel [1990] rightly observed, "the scenario is ... a centristic compromise and gives enough space for critical comments from the consequent liberal point of view..." The approved document does not represent an extreme

neo-conservative strategy, as it is sometimes supposed, and in any case its approach is, similar to the Hungarian one, gradualist.

To the basic philosophy of the scenario also belongs a separation of the economic and social spheres and the removal of what was described as a "economy of indolence" in which state enterprises degenerated into social institutions. This explicit separation necessitates the existence of a strong and relatively dense "social safety net". Part of such a net already existed in the past and new parts have been introduced, which concern mainly unemployment, retraining and homelessness.

After one year of transformation, positive effects can be seen, among them are a relatively low inflation rate (hyperinflation as in Poland or in the former Soviet Union has been avoided), the growth of private savings in banks and savings banks, the relative success of the "small" privatization, the gradual liquidation of some ineffective and ecologically harmful factories, a non-disintegrated domestic consumer goods market, growing foreign trade with hard-currency countries, a satisfactory balance of payments in foreign trade, the slow and moderate growth of foreign debt (among Central and East European countries, Czechoslovakia is still the one with the lowest foreign debt) and, last but not least, a balanced exchange rate for the Czechoslovak crown, the stability of the currency and the creation of the conditions necessary for its future gradual revaluation.

On the other hand, the transformation as it has been carried out up to now and its consequences are of course also subject to criticism - from the left as well as from the right. The left-wing critics - expressed in general terms - point out that the transformation is an excessive burden on the population. Moreover, they refer not only to hardships caused by the transformation, but also to systemic shortcomings. The price increase combined with restrictive budgetary policy has led to decreased demand for foodstuffs and industrial goods and to cuts in investments. On the other hand, expansion into foreign markets has not succeeded to the expected extent. As a result, production is dropping and unemployment growing: the rate of unemployment is 3.0 % in the Czech republic, 12.5 % in the Slovak republic and in some of the latter's districts it nears 20 percent. It is estimated that people have cut by 10 to 20 % their expenses for food, by 25 % expenses for services and by 33 % those for industrial commodities. Real incomes are decreasing faster than anticipated and according to some estimates dropped by one quarter or one third in 1991. Due to the fact privatization is proceeding slower than expected and many state owned enterprises still exist, the abolished central planning must be substituted by some kind of state regulation. Moreover, the super-monopoly structure still exists and its existence considerably modifies the reform process. The monopolistic state enterprises do not properly react to market stimuli and this, along with the other mentioned factors, "transfers" the costs of reform from firms to consumers. The solution is seen in the reduction of restrictive policies and in expansive stimulation of demand.

Right-wing critics point out that "the amount of people's tolerance towards further economic decline is rapidly dropping", but contrary to left-wingers who advocate more state regulation, they warn: "There is a growing danger of economic

dirigism which could again lead to various kinds of political totalitarianism".¹⁰ To foster economic growth, the right wing, besides supporting the consequent implementation of the accepted scenario of reform, calls for the following mistakes and errors to be rectified: the low level of support for the newly emerging small- and medium-size enterprises, the small number of private enterprises (during the privatization only one tenth of the planned enterprises has come into being), the ban on the sale of privatization vouchers, the fearful attitude of politicians, governments and parliament towards foreign capital (which is an expression of combined socialist and nationalist aversions) and the lack of support for the development of the banking, fiscal and mainly legal institutions that would make economic transactions easier and guarantee rights and protection to the new economic subjects. As well, many critics point out that in the transformation program, as well as in the real process, various forms of privatization overlap and the same applies to the process of the restitution of formerly nationalized property, which is colliding with privatization.

Nevertheless, the impartial observer has to say that the restructuring of the economic system does not have the character of a "shock therapy", that social peace is still maintained, thanks to the passable functioning of the tripartite system, which has neo-corporatist features and corresponds to some old Czechoslovak traditions from the interwar period. Paradoxically, social peace is probably also being kept as a result of the revolutionary situation. The economic transformation leading through the "valley of tears" is legitimized by the fact that it is part of the democratic revolution, and by people's awareness that the past system had neither results nor perspectives. People are ready to accept change, knowing that there is no other way to prosperity than that of integration into Europe; they have rationally accepted a rational explanation. Also, thanks to the relatively high standard of living in the households, there is still room to retreat (savings, living in privately owned houses, etc.)

Evidently, the impartial observer also sees the big problems and risks. Among them are the fact that the social situation is deteriorating and the living standard dropping to a greater extent than expected, that the pace of privatization is indeed slow, that the interest of foreign capital is (because of constitutional uncertainties and other reasons) not so keen as was hoped, that for internal and external reasons Czechoslovak firms are finding more difficulties penetrating foreign markets than they were prepared for and that the building up of the financial and commercial infrastructure is lagging behind the need for it.

Less attention is being given to the fact that the political and economic restructuring of post-communist societies is also stimulated or braked by accepted and practised values. Every large change requires the mobilization of inner resources or external support. A large change can be realized either by a group of devoted leaders who conduce - even with the use of coercion - the masses into the promised lands, or by the people themselves internalizing their determination to

¹⁰) From the statement of independent economists recently published in *Lidové noviny*, 31 December 1991.

achieve the change and being united by their idea and by inner discipline to accept personal sacrifice. European capitalism at its beginnings presupposed the existence of what was called inner-worldly ascetism¹¹ - postponed consumption and purposeful economy. This ethos helped to create modern European and American capitalism and liberal society. In one recent discussion, a Czech intellectual used the expression: "Through poverty to affluence". It is to some extent a parallel to puritan philosophy. Even the most perfect and technically best-elaborated scenarios of economic restructuring which do not take into account some kind of motivation for personal sacrifice, some kind of a new restraint, are likely to fail.

Amid a consumption-oriented and a consumption-starved society it would certainly be unrealistic to expect that such motivation could be drawn from the principles which have been summed up as the "protestant ethic". Even so, the willingness to pass through the "valley of tears" has to lean on some support, it must be held and stimulated by something; even if they are pragmatic and worldly motives, they must contain hope, the hope that this society will overcome its obstacles, that in the not too remote future it will reach some level of affluence and will again become a part of Europe.

The Transition to Civil Society

The most lengthy part of the transformation will be the building up of civil society. The concept of civil society has been used in different contexts and its meaning has been in constant change throughout its history. Very often it is understood simply as a social organization of life, introduced by the bourgeoisie and fought for in the revolutions of the 17th - 19th centuries. Sometimes it means the opposite of anarchy or a society not dominated by the church; many authors understand civil society as an organization of social life, in which society is separate from the state and has an autonomous existence. In the latter meaning this concept was used as an instrument by dissidents in their fight against the communist state and has also become a part of the newly emerging democratic movements. To implement it, a rich network of independent institutions and organizations must be formed, which are neither state-directed nor state-controlled, being autonomous social, political and cultural subjects. For that purpose it is indispensable to break the *Supra-Gemeinschaft*, i.e. the idea of an organic merger of society and state into a kind of fully integrated, centrally directed big *Kombinat*.¹²

According to our experience, the prerequisites for breaking down the *Supra-Gemeinschaft* are threefold: 1. institutional changes, 2. changes in the structure and status of social actors, and 3. changes in cultural and behavioral patterns. In Western literature, discussions about this issue stress, in the first place, the institutional level and assume that when the plurality and independence of political

¹¹) The term was introduced in the social sciences by Max Weber in his studies on protestant ethics. See mainly the second part of his study *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* which is called *Die Berufsethik des Asketischen Protestantismus* (The Professional Ethics of Ascetic Protestantism) in [Weber 1920].

¹²) The term *Kombinat* for the description of the Soviet type societies was used by Ernest Gellner in his essay *Civil Society in Historical Context* [Gellner 1991].

and economic institutions are introduced and a rich network of associations and voluntary organizations are formed, the problem will be almost automatically solved. One of the important experiences acquired during the two years that have elapsed since the 1989 revolution shows that the institutional basis is, an indispensable, but by no means sufficient, condition for creating a genuine and robust civil society. The institutional conditions of civil society must be legally guaranteed and organizationally worked out as soon as possible - and in this respect models from western countries can indeed be very effectively adopted. These measures, however, must be followed by the considerably more complex process of forming a plurality of actors. In democratic societies, the basis of such a plurality, as Alain Touraine [Touraine 1991: 312] has expressed it, should be the relationship between the actors themselves and not only the actors' relationships to the whole society. In other words, the important thing is to achieve genuine social independence from the state, from the nation and even from the rules of the market. Seeking out and constituting the social, cultural and, of course, political forces which will gradually attain independence and balance is the very process that will decide the success of the road to democracy. This process should not include only those actors who represent economic interests. In all post-communist societies it is evident that the transformation will only succeed if a rich network of local, regional, religious, professional, interest, age and other groups and organizations comes into being. This, however, will be more complex and will require a longer time than the setting of institutional conditions.

The most complex part of forming civil society lies elsewhere, however. There exists a deep-rooted inertia vis-a-vis the changes started by the 1989 revolutions in the cultural sphere. Institutions, laws, rulers and actors can be changed, but the cultural and behavioral patterns that took decades to be formed will survive for decades, too. This is exactly the situation in the new democracies of Central Europe. The actors functioning in democratic institutions are often people with old views and habits, with value orientations formed in the past, often with confused syncretic systems of values;¹³ one can find among them members from the so-called "old structure", i.e. former members of the communist nomenclature.

Let us however have a look at some concrete facts in Czechoslovakia.

At a fairly rapid pace there have begun to emerge new independent professional, interest and cultural associations, foundations and charitable organizations. New laws are enabling the revival of local self-government, an institution which has, mainly in the Czech republic, a tradition dating from the 19th century, and unions of towns and communities as well as economic regions are spontaneously emerging. As far as political movements and parties are concerned, they are growing like mushrooms: in 1991 their number was about eighty. From several other symptoms it can be seen that the institutional plurality of independent subjects is rapidly spreading. This is, among other things, a reaction

¹³) One of the best studies on value syncretism by Elemer Hankiss was published in *Deidalus* in the Winter 1990 volume "Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe." See [Hankiss 1990].

against centralism and state control of all social and cultural activities and one of the most positive features in recent developments.

The more concrete and narrow the interests of the new social subjects are, the easier the emergence of the new institutional units which represent these interests will be. The situation of large and more heterogeneous social subjects is more complicated. One of the historically unusual features of the transformation is the fact that the large collective subjects, e.g. certain social strata such as entrepreneurs, tradesmen etc., come into being thanks to political acts and decisions. This could be described as the shaping of democracy, capitalism and even of their actors by means of political design and political mechanisms. In the past, it was practically always the other way round: political institutions and new mechanisms, formed by revolutions, were the result of the pressures of stabilized collective actors expressing their interests.

To the least easily surmountable barriers against civil society in post-communist countries belongs, as I have already mentioned, the inherited systems of values. A group of Czech sociologists has neatly expressed their content:¹⁴

1. Society should not be very differentiated and people's living standard should be as equal as possible;
2. One must work, regardless of whether one's work is meaningful and productive;
3. State institutions know best and satisfy best people's needs and therefore people need not care too much for themselves; and
4. The living standard need not be high, provided it is safe.

After 1989 this structure of values began to waver, but its inertia is still considerable. People often "add" new active value orientations to the old ones and want to put them together. This causes many discrepancies, often in the thoughts of the same persons, but also between various sections of the population or between various regions of the state. Most inconsistencies are to be found between the general acceptance of the principles of economic transformation and the views concerning concrete economic measures. So, for instance, according to a Czechoslovak social survey, 38 percent of citizens want the state to fully guarantee and finance a high standard of living for everyone, another 41 percent ask for that from the state at least partially and only 21 percent have enough self-confidence to be willing to take responsibility for their own living standard themselves. 40-46 percent of the respondents request that the state take full responsibility for employment; 47 percent want the state to provide and finance at least basic housing and only 22 percent were willing to assume every responsibility in this respect. As far as health care is concerned, 84 percent of Czechoslovak citizens

¹⁴) See the summary of a sociological survey carried out in the Czech city of Brno by Petr Mareš, Libor Musil and Ladislav Rabušic *Sociální změna očima české veřejnosti* (Social Change in the Eyes of the Czech Public) [Mareš, Musil, Rabušic 1992]. The concrete data demonstrating the inconsistencies in the values of Czech population are based on the sociological survey "Československo - květen 1990" [Boguszak, Rak 1990].

thought in 1990 that the state should provide and finance it to the full extent. This high proportion, it must be said, has decreased since, however.

Inconsistent attitudes can be found in other spheres as well. The overwhelming majority of respondents verbally stand for liberal democratic values, including tolerance, but a sociological study from 1990 shows that 75 percent of the respondents do not want to live in a neighborhood with Gypsies, 60 percent refuse to be neighbors of homosexuals and 50 percent refuse Arab neighbors. The deep impact of the past experience of fear, suspicion and intolerance - those integral parts of totalitarian societies - on the Czechoslovak population is also evident when comparing the level of trust among people in this country and in some western countries.¹⁵ The comparison is important, as it becomes more and more evident that trust among people is a necessary cultural prerequisite for democracy. In the Netherlands, in Great Britain, Belgium and Luxembourg 88-90 percent of respondents stated that "people can be trusted", while in Czechoslovakia only 30 percent. This is a serious symptom of a deep disturbance in interhuman relations. To heal this social disease will certainly not be easy and will require time and patience.

Evaluation of the Transition

What then is the situation in Czechoslovakia two years after the "velvet revolution"? Undoubtedly in the political sphere progress can be observed and the country is returning to its democratic tradition. However, the political changes are being accompanied by a deep crisis in the constitutional foundations of the state. The crisis is made more acute by the fact that the consequences of economic reform are hitting Slovakia much harder than the Czech part of the state. As a result of this, more people in Slovakia are dissatisfied than satisfied with the post-revolutionary developments.

The economic transformation which is entering its decisive phase has brought a decline in production and consumption, while maintaining macroeconomic stability and social peace. The transformation is proceeding according to set principles, and is sometimes accused either of excessive speed or of slowness. Quite often it is pragmatically supplemented with measures that "soften" it. If the political support, above all in the Czech republic, is maintained and if, with the help of tripartite agreements and of newly emerging social support institutions, the country succeeds in keeping social peace, Czechoslovakia's economic restructuring will be successful. The success depends to a large extent on preventing an excessive drop in the living standard.

¹⁵) The data on West European countries are based on studies carried out by [Inglehart 1990] and data on the Czech population on the survey summarized by [Mareš, Musil, Rabušic 1992: 709].

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Between November 1989 and Democracy - Antinomies of Our Politics

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Abstract: The essay formulates and analyzes the main antinomies of Czechoslovak domestic politics in the full two years since the "velvet revolution" of 1989 from the standpoint of the ambiguousness of democracy. The principle antinomy is found in the necessity of solving the social problems of the transition to democracy, which are solvable only by democratic mechanisms, at a time before the creation of these mechanisms and their proper functioning. The transition to political democracy can occur within the framework of a variety of hypothetical manners of arranging power. Our great politics is missing a conception of the transition, however. A formulation of a specific position of where we are coming from, the goals we want to reach, and the balance we can realistically achieve is missing. Our democracy did not originate in a natural way - from below. The legislature is neither sanctioning *a posteriori* some kind of already formed social structure, an already functioning economic power or institution, nor ethical or custom-based norms and values already functioning in reality. The adoption of legislative and organizational measures partly will create new situations and institutions and partly open space for the appropriate existing institutions, which have waited out the era of the totalitarian instrumentation of power in our country. This secondary effect of the opening of space for the functioning of institutions, belonging to the traditions of inter-war Czechoslovak democracy, is dismissed by our contemporary politics because our contemporary politics is above all great politics, in no way local and regional, and in no way popular, but rather continuing to be state-based politics.

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The comparison chosen here is not an evaluation of a definite result. It serves to remind us of the possible obstacles in various situations and the results of solving them on our way towards democracy. It is more of a memento, a reminder of the ambiguous character of democracy and the non-sovereignty of many cases of "masterful" behavior in many important political situations, the importance of which is, in the majority of cases, determined only afterwards.¹

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1) Only when a certain sum of observed events and individual experiences start to transform into history, and it is possible to confront the original efforts, aims and intentions with their results and consequences, are we able to peek a little bit into the deeper structure of events, their relationship, and, together with Hegel, understand that in history, through human actions, something different comes out than what people intend and what they achieve, something different than what they immediately know or want. They realize their interests, but through them something else is created, which is internally contended in their intentions, but which they did not intend. [Hegel 1957: 37].

1.

Hopefully we do not lack consciousness of the value of democracy, nor the consciousness that it is good in itself. The test, however, still lies ahead of us and it will be a test of the primeval choice between the equality of all and the freedom of all, a dilemma within the framework of which democracy and non-democracy has been balancing since the time of the Athenian polis. The present political and legislative processes are the foundation for an economic inequality to which we are no longer accustomed. We do not yet suspect the degree and extent of the inequality that is being born. If we succeed in the near future in institutionalizing the dynamic equilibrium between freedom and equality (inequality), which is a condition holding in the functioning democracies, yet another test will arise, coming out of the constituted economic power, its structure and its relationship to political power. The category of economic power does not yet appear in our considerations at all. We are still overwhelmed by the hum of political power, mainly by "great" politics. One of the main problems of democracy, the relationship between economic and political power, the political power of the rich and the political equality of rich and poor, is only met today in the individualized form of the participation of various politicians and officials of the power structure in the privatization process. The functional and structural depth of the problem for the functioning of political democracy is still undervalued and may surprise us, unprepared as we are, to the detriment of democracy.

2.

The main aim of the first free elections for 55 years² was to establish a pluralist democracy, but this was more a vague slogan than an aim that can be easily transformed into a firm, fully realized structure, an aim towards which we could plan out a trajectory by which we would achieve it. On top of this, this formulation evoked an image such that it seemed as if immediately after the fall of totalitarianism democracy started.³ We have not gotten further than this even after two years. Neither the political parties in their later programs, nor the governments, who should undoubtedly come up with competent conceptual images in front of the public, if only for the minimal reason of creating common consensus and expressing a united state, have advanced in this direction.

Great politics lacks concepts of the transfer towards political democracy - which should be preceded by adequate self-reflection on our situation - and of the conditions of this transfer, which should have been objectively worked out by our unprepared and undervalued social sciences. We did not formulate precisely the

²) We do not consider the elections of 1946 free but, on the contrary, a conceptually perfectly directed and manipulated attack on the part of left-wing totalitarianism. See [Broklová, Brokl 1991].

³) The basic possible types of the instrumentation of the conflict between equality, liberty and power in modern state societies can be formulated on a continuum between the extremes of right-wing totalitarianism and political democracy as follows: right-wing totalitarianism, left-wing totalitarianism, totalitarian democracy, social democracy and political democracy. This concept can manage without the category of the "third way". See [Brokl 1990].

position from which we are starting, the aim we want to achieve, or a consideration of the sources and capacities for this movement, including the potential trust and tolerance of our citizens. We lack a careful consideration of the possibilities of creating, mobilizing, and maintaining these social and political sources, as well as consideration of the possibilities for the realization of some variants of achieving the aim. This is not a longing reminiscence for socialist macro - social mechanical planning,⁴ it's just a reminder of a features of every intentional human activity: mobilizing the sources for achieving the formulated aims purposefully. The most successfully realized examples of such activity can be found in the reaction of the western democracies to the economic crisis of the 1930s, in the mobilization of the economy and institutions of the USA during the second world war and, especially, in the post-war development of many highly developed European countries, or in the catapulting of some third-world countries toward economic prosperity and democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. If the system of the functioning of political and state power with economic power is felt in our era in the highly developed countries as administrative, less flexible, less suitable and demanding relaxation, it is necessary to analyze very well our own situation before we decide to apply some model of the so-called "pure market economy".⁵ As political slogans, evoking the images of a capitalism of free competition with its "laissez-faire, laissez-passer" attitude, or of a restoration of certain conditions, in our transitional situation, when no naturally developed economic and political autoregulations exist, would be equally as dangerous and hopeless for our democracy as the images of the past state paternalism.

3.

Two objections could be formulated to the necessity of a conception of the transfer from the point of view of political theory. First, democracy is an empirical phenomenon. It has always developed more or less from the bottom, naturally, through the centuries, or on the basis of the development of production and exchange as the civic principle of the interaction of equal individuals. Its roots and functioning lay in the age-old tissue of the social stratification and value-hierarchy of capitalist societies. Even in ancient Greek democracy and the medieval municipal states, etc., we can find similar presumptions and values in the existence of relatively large manufacturing concerns and the exchange of goods. Conclusion: our democracy does not need any conceptions, it must grow from the bottom. Objection: yes, we need precisely the conception of developing democracy from the bottom, a conception which we lack. Second, democracy is and always has been a matter of form. As such it did not develop *a priori* according to a project or a plan,

⁴) On the contrary, it is possible to consider formulations including only one possibility as its mechanistic reminiscence. Achieving the aim, especially in democratic ways, always includes multifunctionality and the aim itself is always an internally structured number of possibilities.

⁵) Some of our present politicians' declarations about the necessity of the realization of a "pure market economy" have to be understood relatively and reservedly. First, they are made in a situation of quite strong state control of this sphere, and second they are made on the basis of various party (not independent) expert teams and in consideration of party aims.

it grew mainly as a formal principle, as a mechanism, as a certain kind of democracy, not as a qualitative content. This argument is rare, since the concept of democracy as a formal principle has not yet become familiar to us. This is what it's all about, however, the introduction of democracy as a formal principle and not as a certain kind of democracy intended *for* something or *against* something, but introducing it by means of the state constitution preceded by a philosophy of law.

Our various political representatives realize these large established truths of political theory, or at least have a vague intuitive notion of them, and they operate within them in a defensive stereotype against discredited socialist planning whenever there is mentioned the necessity of formulating the conception of our way to political democracy, without realizing the negative dependence on the past and automanipulation for the future they manifest by such an attitude.

4.

Our democracy is not coming into existence in a natural way. Legislation is not confirming *a posteriori* an already shaped social structure, a developing, already functioning economic power or institution, or really functioning ethical and custom-based norms and values, as it was in the past in the majority of today's democracies. In our present situation it is exactly vice versa: legislative and organizational regulations partly create new situations and institutions, and partly open space for the prospective revival of institutions that either survived⁶ the conditions of totalitarian society, or which were spontaneously reestablished after November 1989⁷ on the basis of a preserved tradition. But the opening of space for these institutions' activities (in our country they belong to the tradition of Czechoslovak democracy from the pre-war period) is a secondary consequence of the above-mentioned regulations and it is beyond the horizon of our present politics for the following reasons. Firstly, because our present politics are mainly great politics, not local or regional, not civic, but more state politics. And those institutions - municipal, local, self-governing, charity, cooperative, union, church, etc. - which support democracy and which came into existence right after November 1989, do not show up clearly in our new democracy because they do not belong to macrostructure of great politics, which exclusively dominates our political scene. On the other hand, in functioning democracies they form the micro- and

⁶) In 1968, the year of the reforms, the natural revival of numbers of frozen institutions (unions, common organizations, etc.), the attitudes and values of a market economy and political democracy was more distinct, because the "veterans" who remembered them were still alive. Today's situation could be worse, nevertheless it is a problem that deserves specialized sociological analysis.

⁷) Foreign projects for comparative research of the transfer to democracy presuppose in the majority only the creation of new democratic institutions and research only them. (Institutionalisierung demokratischer Strukturen in postsozialistischen Gesellschaften, Eine empirische Vergleichsstudie von symbolisch-integrativen Mobilisierungsstrategien neuer politischer Akteure in Polen, Ungarn, and der Tschechoslowakei, K. Werner Brand, K. Maenicke-Gyöngösi, M. Tatur, Jan. 1992, Projektworkshop in Berlin 17.-19. 2. 1992; Demokratisierung und politische Kultur in Ost-mittleuropa, P. Gerlich, F. Plasser, P. A. Ulram, in Projektworkshop in Wien 20.-21. 1. 1992, Ost und West nach dem Umbruch.)

inter-structural basis for great politics and support democracy. The fate of these structures today, that is to say their gradual extinction after a short awakening, is a result of one of the misunderstandings of great politics. On the one hand, great politics supposes it operates as far as the level of the microstructures, but on the other hand it supposes that these structures should gain the means for financing their activities from their own sources - which is impossible in our situation of the non-existence of adequate economic structures, which are just being created - or they have to accept limited allocations as not really independent subsidies of great politics. Also, municipalities are financially and in many other ways still dependent on the redistribution of sources from the central funds of the republics, which is, again, dependent on the leaders of district authorities appointed by the republic government. "Without consulting district authorities a municipality is not allowed to appoint even a deputy secretary of the local authority. Thus the party, which dominates the republic's government can put through its policy even in municipalities where it lost the elections" [Budování 1990]. Secondly, from the point of view of ideology, the real situation of the problem is beyond the horizon of great politics. This politics is held captive by the psychologically understandable, but unrealistic political "revolutionary" stereotype of self - serving immature negativism, which devalues in advance the possibilities for the activities of micro- and inter-structures by pointing at the excessive left - wing orientation of Czechoslovak democracy in the pre-Munich period. By this they neglect the principal of formal democracy that, to a certain degree enables, in a situation of totalitarian denial of basic democratic principles, the restratification of many formally democratic institutions and their further activities even within the imposed totalitarian functionalism. The restratification contains the prospective revival of today's conditions. In political practice we do not always realize the phenomenon of this "Sleeping Beauty" and we do not take advantage of its possibilities by specific arrangements.

5.

For two years we have been focusing our attention only on issues of the political power of great politics, its antinomies and their consequences.

First is the antinomy of establishing political democracy and its legislation on the basis of the old communist constitution. Second is the antinomy of strong republics and a strong federation, followed by the pre-election articulation of the moral superiority of non-political politics in the form of the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence - "we are not the same as them" - which enabled, by accepting the principle of proportional representation, the universally condemned communists to win the position of an important political force especially in economics, accompanied at the same time by the electoral rejection of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The antinomy of non-political politics and its movements manifested itself after the elections on one hand in the division of positions of power among the winners, and on the other hand by their considerations about keeping their promise from before the elections, that they

would dissolve themselves after the elections, and also considerations about the distribution of the gained mandate among other political subjects.

After the elections, after the short proclamatory offensive of the "second revolution" against "dark powers" and "mafias", the promising of postrevolutionary mobility, the securing of the coming of the new political order by good staffing and the substitution of administrative regulations for a "second revolution" caused a certain calming, perhaps the calm before the storm. During this period we probably also passed over the political and legislative opportunity to establish in local elections effective municipal self-government. This could have been the only mechanism holding together the state, both the Czech and the Slovak republics, because of the fact that at certain levels of power the self-governing power would be autonomous from both the great politics of the centers of political power and the pursuit of individual interest along with party disputes going on at the level of great politics. If self-government, which is one of the main supports of democracy, worked well, the focus of citizens' political attention and activity would quite naturally be their real political preferences [Herzmann 1992] and municipal and regional problems. If this were the case, the central organs could not intervene so much in local politics and the central problems themselves would have different instrumentation. The regional (associative) arrangement itself, which is a common organic basis of federalism, then would not have to be the ideal for the future. The disintegration of our state society, of our political and economic scene, which arises paradoxically from the sphere of antinomies in great politics, could be efficiently prevented (in a situation without the existence of the new links still to be brought by the market economy) only by the functioning autonomy of towns and villages.

Autumn local elections succeeded despite the time pressure. Only strange party coalition combinations and the quantity of communist mayors that came out of them caused slight surprise.

Only after the installation of the new political power, towards the end of 1990, could the antinomy of the non-political politics finally be fulfilled: the functioning of political and state power in the society and its carrier, a party or non-party, which was taken by surprise by the harsh manners of competence disputes, which called attention to the basic antinomy of the last fifty years of Czechoslovak existence; the Czech - Slovak relationship, which has further harmonized the cacophony of all our politics in a *tempo furioso* to the present day.

The antinomies of great politics and its monopoly in 1990 opened the Pandora's box of the basic political insecurities of the state's existence, restrained real and necessary public activities, delayed the launching of the economic transformation and blocked the adoption of a new constitution.

6.

This was the situation at the beginning of 1991, the year of the launching of the economic transformation. It was started by the liberalization of prices, the new functioning of banks and "small" privatization. The political events, successes and failures of 1991 were to a great extent predestined by the developments in 1990. The contradictions in the political reality in the CSFR after November 1989 are

determined by the transformation from totalitarian egalitarianism and the tension between the values of a civic society (in the Czech lands) and those of a national society (in Slovakia), both leading toward a different political expression. This contradiction was, in the preceding period, integrated by the asymmetry of state and political organs and the two-in-one existence of the communist party. After the collapse of the party's power, no real political power exists which can integrate the common state, except for the moral authority of president Havel. Further development will show to what extent moral respect can also be political power. The political representation gained a mandate for establishing a new democratic constitution and launching economic reform. Constitutional and legislative disputes and disputes arising from the contradictory basis of the situation in the two national communities came to the fore and showed in bright light the disintegrating influence of the basic antinomy of Czecho - Slovak coexistence. One way of resolving this antinomy was imposed on us by right-wing German national-socialist totalitarianism during the second world war, and the other way by left-wing Soviet totalitarianism after the war.

7.

The determining antinomy, which can be called the antinomy of aims and means, is the effort to solve problems that can be solved only on a democratic basis and by democratic methods and mechanisms, without the basis and mechanisms existing, before they have developed. The active basis of the different attitudes towards solving this dispute is either a tragic lack of understanding of the philosophy of democracy and its potential or, on the contrary, grasping the only suitable opportunity to realize some narrow political interests of the time, when valuable democratic chances for resolving these problems have not yet been created, while non-democratic repressive chances are already democratically tabuized. The fear on the part of some of the new political elites of the citizens' will, expressed by the means of a referendum about the issue, the only democratic mechanism available for today's new political democracy, and the growing divergency of the formerly unified value orientations and preferences of the representatives and the represented, does not convince us of the democratic orientation of some of the members of the new political elite.

In the declarations of some of the political powers we can see the intention of using the solving of this fundamental question as a subject in this year's elections, which could therefore take on the character of a "quasireferendum". This solution is presented by them as exclusively democratic. Rather than democratic orientation, this tells more about either the high political intuition of the manipulators or their unusually high political professionalism.

In democracies it is a rule that in electoral programs many things are brought together (in contrast to the issue of the referendum). The voters do not always understand exactly what they are voting for, and the parties do not always formulate their programs earnestly enough, as we can imagine without any special political experience. However, an active and positively-oriented citizen wants to vote, and he votes either for candidates if it's possible or for parties. He votes

consciously or unconsciously for what is offered to him and approximates best what he agrees with. An example of this is the elections of 1946. A close reading of the electoral program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia reveals that it not only wasn't communist, but was not even a socialist electoral program. That is why their list of candidates was acceptable to the wider public. The fact that they voted for what followed was then foisted upon the voters who voted for this program.

8.

A democratic political system is a function of the division of powers between parliament, government, and the president. In modern democracies the role of executive power, composed of specialists is growing. This is demanded by the complexity of policy in industrial state societies.

In our conditions, between November 1989 and our future democracy, especially in recent times, the situation is confused. It seems that the federal parliament reacts to the antinomies of non-political politics and cabinet politics, and to its former exclusion by this politics (especially in terms of solving the problems of state organization) by claiming the largest share of the powers, which is not an unusual tendency either in history or in present-day democracies. But it would be unusual and tragic for democracy to fail to hang the Sword of Damocles above their heads by threatening its dissolution, not only in the case of failing to approve the state budget, as is allowed by the still effective old constitution. At this point the parliament is going through its own test of maturity. The problematic functioning of a parliament approximately a year before elections and a year after them is a quite common thing in democracies. With respect to this fact and with respect to the unfortunate two year mandate that was given to our parliament, the situation could have been even worse.

The deadlock arrived at in the state arrangement antinomy caused the failure in the basic task that was entrusted to the parliament, the adoption of a new constitution. The validity of the present problematic constitution is a Trojan horse for the next post-election political representation mainly because as a constitution of a totalitarian regime it does not contain the safety measures and brakes on power that are necessary for a democratic system. Paradoxically, it could, before the article about the leading role of the communist party was included, have made the impression of being much more democratic than many other democratic constitutions. This is exactly how it could threaten the establishment of our democracy most in today's situation. Such a situation does not make it possible to solve problems that should have been solved long ago, and especially the problems that Slovakia is posing for the fifth time in our history, the solution of which was prevented last time by the military aggression of the Soviet Union and communist manipulations before that. On the other hand, this situation makes it possible to transpose the whole problem beyond the issues of democracy, beyond the problems of civic society and local and regional authority, to the level of the national state and maybe national democracy.

9.

In post-war Germany, which is not completely different from our situation today, three factors played a positive role in the establishing and functioning of democratic institutions and democracy:⁸

1. a positive economic balance;
2. the adoption of a constitution which fundamentally influenced political stabilization and civil security;
3. the rapid change in social and psychological orientation and feelings of the population from despair and catastrophic expectations connected with the war, insecurity, bomb attacks, migrations, diseases, material shortages, etc. to optimism [Almond 1987].

The results of our political development in the past two years are quite the opposite. From a united will and optimism towards break-up, a feeling of a split in the civic political will and its representation (namely parliamentary and party), towards insecurity and fear, whose legitimate basis calls out the questionable nature of the legal fabric of the state, of the constitution, its function, and the consequences coming out of it, by the present impossibility of solving this problem.

It is not clear what, in the first half of 1990, was in the way of solving this problem (for example, by adopting a temporary constitution), neither is it clear if this fundamental step was even under consideration by the renovated pre-election representation. The solution of today's and the future's insolvable problems, including the territorial organization of the state, could have been positively marked, if not found, by this.

10.

Also, the principal of proportional election, despite the warning voices, was more forced upon the society than adopted after the serious analysis of its known consequences.

The decline of the inter-war democracies and the following dictatorships were a reaction to the model of "the state of parties" and a phenomenon of the "crisis of democracy", a reaction to the paralysis of political life, the fragmentation of the political scene, the creation of uncertain governing coalitions which usually could not satisfy any big concrete interests, a reaction to the model that originated as a result of universally valid proportional elections. Proportional elections do not enable the will of the majority, which bound the government in the inter-war period, to be formed by the will of citizens in the elections. The creation of the will of the majority is transferred by proportional elections to the parliament and its representatives. Proportional election considers that the principle of representation, not the principle of decision should be formed by the majority. The

⁸) We totally agree with the reminders of the author of the review of our article, that the main factor could have been an unmentioned fact: the presence of a democratic winner in a defeated country and his influence on the economic and political processes of the growing German state society.

parliament usually fails, thanks to the mosaic of representatives, to decide, especially on the most important issues. The incapability to decide and to form majorities leads to exclusion of the parliament from political decisions and leads to a transfer of disputes from the parliament to the government, and to the breakdown of the government. It carries in itself the immediate danger of a political radicalization which threatens democracy. Democracies have often ended in political crisis when a radical right or left wing, as the communists have sometimes done, declared the necessity of uniting around one program to eliminate anarchy and the narrow-minded quarreling of parties, the necessity of governing in accordance with the people's will.

These problems are well-known, they belong to the ABCs of political science, but they got lost in revolutionary euphoria, in the prevailing lack of knowledge of real political mechanisms, in thinking which is more law-normative than functional, and in the illusion of "non-political politics" in the big social movements.

11.

The majority of our parties is still searching for the interests they should represent, and the larger part of them will find them only in the future, when on the basis of privatization, the system of social inequality, social stratification and a spectrum of different interests will be stabilized.

Our analysis has shown the diversity of the parties' electoral programs in 1990 [Řehák, Řeháková 1991], but the general conviction prevails that the electoral programs of the parties were almost identical. Our probe of the left-right spectrum of political parties [Hudeček 1992] has shown that the spectrum is quite differentiated although the consciousness generally prevails that it is not specified enough. We can find the explanation for this discrepancy, if we do not consider always possible and only sometimes refutable methodological objections, in differences in the cognitive aspects applied to the same subject of examination, where the object examined was, first, the electoral programs of parties, and second, the political spectrum of the parties. Our attitude evaluated in both cases the differences between programs and parties. Public opinion, the voice of the people, which represents the "voice of God", evaluates in both cases more what each program and party represents, what interest they stand for, and in what way they differ from one another. This point of view intuitively reflects the already mentioned fact that the parties do not have their bases in interests and the social structure of the society, and works with it in opposition to the applied techniques of sociology. The parties and their representatives first and foremost choose their position, they more aspire to it than really try to achieve it or be it. They choose it usually with respect to other determinants than structural ones. They especially make the most of the aspects of a position's supposed political success with voters, of attractiveness (in which the aspect of passing political fashions is also included), mutual party sympathies and antipathies (e.g. to be more to the right than these, more in the center than those, etc.). Only some of the parties, especially those of the Czech left, already have their position historically ascribed.

This unanchored system of parties will for a long time not be a support, but rather a danger for democracy. It is anchored neither in a social nor an interest structure, and that is why the parties do not have regular voters. A common citizen, as survey results show, knows what is going on, but he should use his knowledge for the good of democracy in political parties, although he is not especially fond of them, because democracy cannot be realized without them.⁹

12.

The development of the party political system in our country in the past two years is, in short, a repetition of the historical genesis of classical political party diversification.

The condensation of the historical development of the party system is represented by the role that was played by the movements which won the elections and which, by their break-up half a year after the elections, especially by its consequences in both small and great politics in parliaments and governments, showed the illusory quality of "non-political politics" and the impossibility of making politics in a state society in another way than by means of political parties.

These movements, like the first "parties" of the 19th century, after the establishment of universal male suffrage, enabled people who could not take part in elections for various reasons, especially financial, to be candidates. They mediated between the people's will and its implementation and representation in political power. Later, these parties changed from being mediators to being candidates for political power themselves,¹⁰ the candidates became first and foremost party members, parties wedged themselves between the represented and the representatives.

Our political parties do not in fact fulfil their basic function in the political system today, they do not guarantee that their representatives will fulfill the adopted party programs by their activities and they do not hold them responsible. The political movements are even less capable of doing this. Many surprises can be expected from the Slovak political scene from the leading movement, the Christian Democratic Movement, and from the potentially leading Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. The Slovak political scene is in contradiction with reality, only on the basis of the superficial impression coming out from its incomplete political spectrum is it generally considered to be more stable than the Czech political scene.

⁹) The question of how to rule without political parties has been thought over by many politicians and thinkers, also democratic ones. Recently A. Toffler in his vision of direct democracy without the mediation of political parties and representatives in parliaments, foresaw a network of personal computers owned by citizens, that would replace the role of the representatives in parliament and political parties and which would realize the sort of direct democracy of the Greek polis in the conditions of post-industrial, computerized and informationalized societies.

¹⁰) This fact is the basis for all the definitions of political parties: a political party is an organized group of people trying hard with the hope for success in gaining political power in a state.

Measured by the principal of formal democracy, with the help of proportional voting rights (which parties only rarely allow to be replaced by a different one, less advantageous for them) our condensed development will lead, although today we perceive this development still as a consequence of other determinants, again towards a "state of parties", a "crisis of democracy" and the collapse of the state.

13.

The central points of the political antinomies - the non-existence of a philosophy (a conception) of politics, a philosophy of law, etc., the lack of philosophy in our posttotalitarian life in general, including shortcomings in political mechanisms - were up to now successfully substituted for by the moral authority and political activities of president Havel. The analysis of these activities will need a certain distance and especially more information.

The preferences and value orientations of the population found out by IVVM and AISA¹¹ show that in the limelight are not the values dominating the great political scene, values of state organization and national states, but economic transformation, democracy and ecology. These values, however, lack programmatic articulation and mobilization. The original consensus still works. This consensus will function as long as the population's patience with and tolerance of the vaudeville burlesque of our political scene with its frequent *faux pas* continues. This consensus is not positively politically utilized enough yet, but can be a source of relative optimism. The people (citizens) who have been preserving democratic values for two or three generations through informal structures and family heritage (literature, attitudes, tradition) have only a very small tendency towards party particularism and disputes, and all in all they are more reasonable than a major part of their political representation.

This positive aspect is, on the other hand, negative for the functioning of political democracy, because then the citizens trust their political representation only to a limited extent (except for the president) and especially because they do not trust the political parties, and mainly because they refuse to take part effectively and actively in politics through the political parties, which are the only permanent democratic possibility of enforcing public will. Therefore, the political will of the citizenry does not have any efficient political articulation and opens space especially for individual party interests which they refuse. It is only thanks to the fundamental consensus of the population and the president's activities, which positively correspond with this consensus and which are applied always at the last moment as the catharsis in the political drama, that the situation is not worse. But

¹¹) This is proven by as yet not analytically examined empirical data, beginning with our own research of the MPs of the federal parliament of 1990 (200 respondents) [see Rak 1992], showing the former consensus in the value orientations of the represented and the representatives, followed by two year's continuous research on election preferences done by the Institute for Public Opinion [see Herzmann 1992], and completed by research on the political climate in Czechoslovakia, done by AISA for the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, January 1992.

this provisional arrangement, based on the president's activities along with the real powerlessness of the presidential office, cannot last for long and cannot guarantee a functioning democracy.

14.

The burden on today's concepts of legality, the juridical system and law, arising from the validity of the problematic constitution and the concept of the legal state, can be seen especially in the attempts at solving Czech-Slovak relations¹² and also in solving many court cases, especially those of political nature (still solved according to the rules of the socialist law) in the past two years and especially now. More than two years after November 1989 it is still not clear what the philosophy of our legal system is. In the mass media many of our political representatives sermonize that the law is the one which is enacted, but the heritage of the wisest thinkers, despite the distance of centuries, tells us that law is being looked for and found all the time. There rises the question of whether the "philosophy" of the contemporary law itself is not only an echo of totalitarian consciousness and a summary of the postulates learned in the university lecture halls of the period of normalization, and if, according to the same philosophy, the political activity of November or December 1989 or the spring of 1990 could not also at any time quite legally be prosecuted.

A social-psychological consequence of the unsolved philosophy of law is the growing feeling of living in legal vacuum and arbitrariness. Yet it would not be so difficult to find the solution in the depths of history. The problem of Nazi crimes that, similar to the crimes of the communists regime, had legal legitimacy is very similar. One of the subjective keys to understanding the situation may lie in the law-normative and sterile way of thinking and reflecting on reality of some of the members of the new political elite instead of sociological or political functional thinking. The activities of the "dark forces" are, with respect to this, only secondary because it is in fact being made legitimate by the ruling philosophy of law.

The coming elections could in this situation and in case these tendencies continue, end up very similarly to the elections of 1946, not in outer attributes but in functional terms, that is, predestined by a purposeful philosophy, again different in the Czech Lands and Slovakia:¹³ to offer to the citizens, positively motivated by ideals, values and feelings of the exceptionality of the historic situation in which they are taking part, a spectrum to choose from that is incomplete, shaped in advance and shifted to the left or to the right, to offer in party programs a formulation which cannot be disagreed with, as was done by the Communist Party

¹²) This philosophy of law, based on the principal that law is what is enacted and only the present law represents the legal state (in which we were interested in opposition to totalitarianism), has been blocking and will be blocking the search for effective solutions to the problem of relationship between the Czechs, Slovaks and Moravians and also other problems. Most recently it has manifested itself mainly as lack of openness to Slovak interests.

¹³) In 1946 the Democratic Party won the elections in Slovakia with 62 % of the votes cast. It was probably the only party with nationwide activity which could have competed with KSČ, which received 43 % of the vote in Bohemia, and 34 % in Moravia.

of Czechoslovakia in 1946. In Slovakia it could easily be some formulations about the sovereignty of Slovakia.

A democracy that states the formal principals of the political system cannot lack philosophy. "We'll never have the democracy we wish to have, if we rely on the law" (T. G. Masaryk). Democracy has never been and never will be obvious.

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Beyond Educational Inequality in Czechoslovakia

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Abstract: This paper addresses questions of the applicability of the meritocratic thesis to the explanation of educational inequality in Czechoslovakia. I defend the hypothesis that "non-meritocratic" or even "anti-meritocratic" processes might have generated patterns of social fluidity almost identical to those based on meritocratic selection. The arguments backing this thesis come from comparative research in educational mobility and inequality, and from the first wave of the longitudinal survey "Family 1989" started in Czechoslovakia in January 1989, almost a year before the November revolution. This survey, among other things, dealt with strategies for life success among teenagers and their parents. A "non-meritocratic" hypothesis is discussed, which might explain the relatively strong direct effect of social background on educational attainment in Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries. The hypothesis is based on Bourdieu's concept of "social capital". It argues that, because of bureaucratic rules applied in admission policy, the spontaneous tendency of higher social strata to use their "social capital" and to pass on social advantages to their offspring in socialist countries seems to be less restricted by meritocratic competition than in advanced capitalist countries. Some preliminary results from the survey "Family 1989" show that this hypothesis might be plausible.

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Comparative research on occupational mobility has always been focused on the question of the relationship between mobility rates and the social, economic and political attributes of social systems. Much less attention has been paid to the question of whether the processes that generated more or less similar patterns of occupational mobility in different social systems were also similar or at least of the same character. This question is obviously at least as important as the first one but unfortunately much more difficult to answer.

The question of the underlying process is still relevant, even after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, because it opens the important theoretical question of the compatibility of bureaucratic redistribution and meritocratic selection, as well as the very practical question of the effect of inherited structures and patterns of behavior for the present "post-communist" transformation. In this paper I try to demonstrate that mobility patterns in state

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socialist countries, which might formally show a degree of fluidity similar to that of advanced industrial countries (see e.g. [Erikson and Goldthorpe 1987; Boguszak 1990]), have not been "produced" by selection mechanisms identical or comparable to those that have been at work for decades in advanced capitalist countries.

Specifically, I will demonstrate that "non-meritocratic" or even "anti-meritocratic" processes in Czechoslovakia might have generated patterns of social fluidity almost identical to those based on meritocratic selection. Data backing this thesis come from available comparative research in educational mobility and inequality, and from the first wave of the Czechoslovak longitudinal survey "Family 1989" which, among others things, dealt with strategies for life success among teenagers and their parents.

I assume that rather "anti-meritocratic" processes such as positive and negative political discrimination ("nomenclature"), bureaucratic mechanisms for the allocation of manpower, forced downward educational mobility based on a "quota" system, etc., have been at work in former socialist countries. It is widely accepted that these processes brought about a deep erosion of open competition and meritocratic selection, which are supposedly the major underlying processes generally governing the stratification process in market economies.

1. Is the "meritocratic thesis" always a good theoretical background for comparative analyses of occupational and educational mobility?

Research on social stratification and mobility has been oriented either explicitly or implicitly toward the examination of the meritocratic thesis. In fact, the majority of studies in mobility and attainment processes verify or challenge the meritocratic thesis. Though some specific assumptions and implications of the meritocratic thesis have long been questioned (see for example [Kerckhoff 1976; Griffin and Kalleberg 1981; Grusky 1983]) the general assumption that "a fundamental trend toward expanding universalism characterizes industrial society" [Blau and Duncan 1967: 429] seems to be accepted among scholars of social stratification. In other words, it is assumed that the relatively high social fluidity in Western democracies has its roots *primarily* in a great deal of universalism and meritocracy in the selection and allocation processes.

The "meritocratic thesis" as a theoretical background for research in social stratification was consistently formulated by Blau and Duncan [1967]. They interpret the development of industrial societies as the gradual expansion of universalism, or - as other scholars prefer to call it - the expansion of meritocratic principles of selection. The core of the meritocratic thesis, as accepted by most scholars in social stratification and mobility, can be summarized in the following way:

The meritocratic system of stratification is an essential condition of efficiency in the identification, development and exploitation of scarce human resources. Universally accepted, objective criteria of evaluation shape the process of the selection of people into occupational positions. Where ascription dominated in the past, individual effort, ability and achievement have become the dominant criteria of success. This is because the "standards of efficiency are applied to the

performance of tasks and the allocation of manpower for them" [Blau and Duncan 1967: 429]. Formal education, as a credential for labor market skills, gradually has become the decisive criterion for selection and allocation. Consequently, "superior status or top occupational position cannot be directly inherited but must be legitimated by actual achievements that are socially acknowledged" [Blau and Duncan 1967: 430]. Therefore, the degree of social fluidity in industrial societies becomes an indicator of the "meritocratization" of the society.¹

In this context I propose to analyze the development of social stratification in state socialist countries before the collapse of their communist regimes as a process of "*de-meritocratization*" and "*de-stratification*". These terms will be used to denote a process of the disintegration of the relationship between ability, effort and performance on the one hand, and social status, reward and prestige on the other. In other words, "*de-stratification*" means that particularistic criteria of evaluation penetrate the process of the selection of people into occupational positions, and that individual effort, ability and achievement relevant to the efficiency of the system play only a minor role in individual success. This is due mostly to the fact that ideological myths and visions rather than standards of efficiency are applied to the performance of tasks and the allocation of manpower.

A problem for the comparative analysis of mobility is the fact that "*de-stratification*" can be manifested by patterns of occupational and educational mobility similar to those generated by a meritocratic stratification system. To get more insight into this specific problem of educational mobility and inequality, it might be useful to begin with a short overview of results from comparative analyses of social mobility.

Regarding the evaluation of mobility in a comparative perspective, two operational assumptions might be derived from the meritocratic thesis:

- 1) the link between educational credentials and occupational position becomes stronger (or at least remains stable); and
- 2) the effect of social background on educational attainment decreases as the role of ability, motivation and other achievement criteria become dominant over the role of ascriptive criteria.

It follows from the two assumptions above that as society moves toward more meritocracy, educational and occupational mobility increases. Therefore, the level of educational and occupational mobility is used as an indicator to evaluate how close society is to the meritocratic model of selection. In comparative analyses, a country with higher fluidity is considered more "meritocratic" than a country with lower fluidity.

In the area of occupational mobility, cross-national comparative studies do not provide much support for the thesis that advanced industrial countries are on the way toward more meritocracy. Though some trends in gross mobility rates have

¹ For example, Featherman and Hauser [1978] demonstrated that the role of social background in educational inequality has decreased in the United States in the recent past while the role of formal education in job assignment has become stronger.

been identified, related to the periods of rapid industrialization, *relative* mobility chances (fluidity) do not indicate any significant trend. The Featherman-Jones-Hauser hypothesis, assuming the existence of a common "genotypical" pattern of mobility regimes in all industrial nations with market economies and nuclear family systems, has been ascertained by most comparative analyses. It seems that a strong meritocratic backbone of social stratification in advanced industrial nations was created in the period of industrialization and the creation of democratic political systems. This is, probably, the main reason why *significant* trends in fluidity in advanced capitalist countries can hardly be identified over the past several decades. The same holds for *significant* cross-national differences.

However, the most relevant question is whether the above conclusion holds true even when East European countries are part of the analysis. Evidence has been scarce so far, but some studies [Grusky and Hauser 1984; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1987; Boguszak 1990] support the conclusion that state socialist countries do not produce a specific "pure socialist" pattern of social fluidity. Erikson and Goldthorpe reformulate the FJH hypothesis to specify the role of state apparatus, but not specifically the "socialist state apparatus".² They use more often the general expression "modern state apparatus" rather than "state socialist state apparatus" because some socialist countries (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia) clearly show deviations from the "core pattern" that were identified also in the case of some non-communist countries (in the case of Sweden for example). In fact, these results support the hypothesis of the positive effect of long-run systematic state interventions into mobility processes. Clearly, state apparatuses both in communist regimes and in Sweden exercised a strong influence on mobility. But are we in a position to conclude or even hypothesize from these results that state intervention into mobility in these two groups of countries were of the same kind?

Indeed, *the results that generally make it possible to reject the hypothesis of the existence of a typical "state socialist" mobility regime should not lead to an absurd conclusion about the similarity of social systems.* I strongly agree in this respect with Erikson and Goldthorpe who claim that considerable similarity of social fluidity "must be taken as initial, and crucial, explananda," because "sociologists should not neglect the prior question of why these phenomena exist, and persist, in their general form, and should not make the error of assuming that the same factors will be at work in the one case as in the other" [Erikson and Goldthorpe 1988: 34].

2. Did "state socialism" bring about a reduction in educational inequality?

One may argue, however, that all the above assumptions about social stratification in state socialism may be ideologically biased. Undoubtedly, one of the aims of socialist reforms was to reduce educational inequality, particularly among social

2) Erikson and Goldthorpe expect a similarity of mobility regimes "across all nations with market economies and nuclear families where no sustained attempts have been made to use the power of state apparatus to modify the processes, or the outcomes of the processes, through which class inequalities are produced and intergenerationally reproduced." [Erikson and Goldthorpe 1987: 162].

classes. If that really happened, it could explain relatively high social fluidity in state socialist countries, because the link between educational attainment and occupational position was very strong there, particularly due to bureaucratic rules that, in fact, substituted for labor market mechanisms.

Unfortunately several comparative analyses of educational mobility [Simkus and Andorka 1982; Peschar, Popping, and Mach 1986; Boguszak, Matějů, and Peschar 1990, etc.] did not confirm the assumption about a substantial decrease of educational inequality. On the contrary, the results of these analyses contradict the hypothesis about a link between the transition to state socialism and the trend toward greater quality of educational opportunity.

The results of analyses of educational mobility call into serious doubt the assumption that the "equality of conditions" based on radical educational reforms and the bureaucratic redistribution of resources was the key to greater equality of relative educational chances. This conclusion should not be understood as meaning that the effort of the state apparatus to reduce educational inequality by administrative measures has had no effect on the development of educational mobility, however. The redistributive policy has given rise, at least in Czechoslovakia, to a very unusual pattern of development: a rapid increase in downward educational mobility between father and son was accompanied by stability or even decrease in upward mobility. *Educational mobility in Czechoslovakia has stagnated over the past several decades (it actually dropped during the 1980s), and the so-called "democratization" of education has been realized there by downward rather than upward educational mobility.* It means, in fact, that instead of a son attaining *higher* education than his father, the probability has increased over the past several decades that a son will not even reach the educational level of his father (see [Boguszak, Matějů, and Peschar 1990]).

This could happen mostly because of a unique educational policy based on redistributive measures and applied under conditions of very limited growth in general educational opportunities. As Boguszak, Matějů, and Peschar [1989] show in their study, the educational structures of capitalist and formerly socialist nations have not been becoming more alike over time. On the contrary, their results show evident "cross-system" divergences: an upward shift from elementary education has been achieved in former socialist countries more because of the growth of educational opportunities at lower levels (vocational training) and less because of the growth of opportunities at higher levels (secondary and college education). In advanced industrial countries the reverse has been true.

Forced downward educational mobility, particularly between generations of men, was the price paid in some state socialist countries for the *stability* of relative educational inequality at about the same level as in advanced industrial countries. This very unusual pattern of the "democratization" of education could not leave untouched the process of educational and occupational attainment,³ the nature of inequality, the quality of education, etc.

3) One of the first indications of significant differences in the attainment process between Czechoslovakia and the United States has been found in the results of a reanalysis of Šafář's

However, stability of educational inequality in most formerly socialist countries is not an astonishing fact. We face this phenomenon in many advanced industrial countries as well. It is often explained as a result of a mutual "neutralization" of two trends: a decrease in the *direct* effect (sometimes called "secondary") of social background on educational attainment, and an increase of the effect of scholastic ability on educational attainment.⁴ As scholastic ability is related to social background, the *indirect* effect of social background is increasing as well. Because of this mutual neutralization, the overall level of relative educational inequality is rather stable in advanced industrial countries. Some scholars [Dronkers 1983; Dronkers and Bakker 1989, etc.] stress that this stability in educational inequality actually masks the reinforcement of the "hereditary meritocracy", described by Michael Young some 30 years ago [Young 1958].

One may argue that the stability of educational inequality in East European countries can be explained exactly the same way as in the West, i.e., by a decrease in the direct effect of social background and an increase in its indirect effect (via ability). Provided that there has been a very strong effort in the former socialist countries to wipe out so-called "unfair class inequality of the capitalist era", the proportion of the indirect effect of social background there should be even higher than in capitalist countries. This is a serious argument that should be taken into account, because - if it appears defensible - then the hypothesis about the "softening" of the meritocratic backbone of East European societies during the last few decades must be rejected or at least revised.

In order to evaluate the "neutralization" hypothesis, a model of educational attainment has been developed and tested on data from four nations - the Czech lands, Slovakia, Hungary and the Netherlands [Matějů 1990].

The idea behind the model was quite simple. In East European countries evidence on the role of ability in educational careers is rare, particularly in combination with other social indicators. It is widely accepted, however, that there is a high correlation between the quality of socialization within a family and educational performance (school success). As a proxy for the quality of socialization, the cultural capital of the background family has been used in explanatory models. If this assumption is correct, then the cultural capital of a family should predict the educational attainment of its children much better than the social status of the family itself, particularly in the formerly socialist countries, where radical educational reforms and special measures were introduced to reduce the "direct" effect of social background on educational opportunity.

However, the analysis of data from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Netherlands has produced results that contradict the above hypothesis. First, there was no great variance in the total effect of social background on educational attainment among nations (in all nations being close to 0.6). Second, there was

replica of Blau-Duncan's model done by using Machonin's data from 1967 (see [Boguszak, Gabal, and Matějů 1990]).

⁴) The terms "primary" and "secondary" effects of social class on educational attainment were introduced by Raymond Boudon [1974].

some cross-national variance in the mediation role of cultural capital, but this variation clearly did not follow cross-system boundaries (we find two clusters: the Czech lands with the Netherlands in one of them, and Slovakia and Hungary in the other). Third, in all nations the direct effect of social status on educational attainment remains remarkably high, particularly when compared with the direct effect of cultural capital.


The results of the comparative analysis based on this model apparently did not provide much support for the conclusion that the proportion between the direct and indirect effects of social background on educational attainment showed any significant cross-national and cross-system variation.

In any case, this was not *stricto sensu* verification of any counter-hypothesis. Unless we include ability (IQ) and other important variables (aspirations, grades, value orientations, etc.) in the model, we cannot decide effectively in favor of any explanatory scheme. The only outcome of this analysis actually was that the results did not eliminate the possibility of setting up some alternative hypotheses for explaining the relatively strong direct effect of social background on educational attainment in the former socialist countries. One of these hypotheses, corresponding to the "non-meritocratic" thesis, might be put this way:

In order to eliminate the class dimension of educational inequality, the role of hereditarily influenced factors (like ability, aspirations, etc.) was significantly reduced by reinforcing the role of administrative measures (the quota system, preferential admissions policies, discrimination toward applicants of former ruling class parents - mostly well-educated, etc.). In such a way a considerable space was created for the operation of bureaucratic measures. It is true that these measures were originally implemented to open the educational system to children from lower social strata, but they very soon became the mechanism used by the new elite to secure access to higher education for their own children without any control being exerted by meritocratic competition.



In short, competition based on meritocratic criteria was largely replaced by bureaucratic measures making room for those with higher "social capital". Thus, the system of favoring higher social strata (employees of the state apparatus, bureaucrats, high-level managers, etc.) who possess higher social capital, has been secured even in former socialist countries. The only difference from capitalist countries lies in the low corrective influence of ability and effort on educational careers. In other words, the spontaneous tendency of higher social strata to pass social advantages to their offspring in socialist countries seems to be less restricted by meritocratic competition than in advanced capitalist countries.

**Figure 1a.: High school plans of eighth graders by father's SEI and IQ
Spring 1989**



Family 1989

**Figure 1b.: High school admissions
by father's SEI and IQ
Fall 1989**



Family 1989

Some preliminary results from the survey "Family 1989"⁵ show that this hypothesis may be plausible. Figures 1a and 1b, for example, make it clear that in 1989, after four decades of socialist educational policy in Czechoslovakia, the net effect of social origin on high school aspirations and admissions was remarkable, and at least as high as in other industrial countries (see e.g. [Boguszak, Matějů, and Peschar 1990]).

It follows from the above results that the slightly higher social fluidity in East European countries cannot be attributed to the decrease in educational inequality, or - in other words - to the further reinforcing of meritocratic criteria of selection. Also, it becomes clear that the attempts of the state apparatus to introduce social justice through an egalitarian approach (i.e. via redistribution) might even create the illusion of a meritocratic society. This illusion is, however, relatively short-lived (if we accept that twenty or thirty years of social development is a relatively short historical time). As shown by the history of East European countries, this illusion died as soon as it became apparent that the general inefficiency of the system, rooted among other factors in general redistribution, was the most serious limit to general growth.

It may be concluded that the level and trends in social fluidity and educational inequality in the formerly socialist countries were similar to those identified in advanced industrial countries with market economies. At the same time, we may suspect that this similarity was not generated by identical or similar mechanisms and social processes. A review of the comparative analyses of educational mobility and the results from analyses of educational attainment point to the fact that it may be risky to interpret phenomenological similarities as generated by similar attainment processes.

The initial hypothesis of this paper was that the "de-stratification" stemming from the softening of the meritocratic backbone of the stratification system in Eastern Europe could produce a mobility regime phenomenologically similar to that found in advanced industrial nations. This is not to say, however, that there is any evidence strictly verifying such a hypothesis. Nevertheless, there are various indirect indications that such a hypothesis might be plausible: a) the general decline in the economic efficiency of state socialist countries; b) the extremely weak position of education in the system of distribution (wage and income differentiation); and c) the ambiguous position of education within the "strategies"

⁵ The survey was launched in January 1989 using a sample of 3,700 children (pupils of the highest class in elementary school) and their parents. Children were exposed to a long questionnaire and to a personality test that included an ability test [Cattell & Cattell 1968]. Teachers were interviewed about characteristics of the children, and parents were exposed to an extensive questionnaire asking questions not only about their children but also about their own lives and "strategies". An attempt was made to measure the economic, cultural, political and social capital of the background family. Children were asked about their own perceptions of success and aspirations, and a "cultural test" was given to them at the end of the questionnaire. At the end of 1990 children were asked in a mailed questionnaire whether they had succeeded in their first educational progression (from elementary to secondary school), and contact with them was secured for the future.

for life success. Economic inefficiency in formerly socialist countries is not subject to question. Its link to the devastation of human capital, including the production and exploitation of education, is also clear. However, the evaluation or quantification of the economic consequences of a specific educational policy is not an easy task. Let us concentrate on the last two issues, for which evidence seems to be at hand.

3. Did education pay off in the redistributive economy of state socialism?

In his controversial book *IQ and Meritocracy*, Richard Herrnstein [1973] raised the question of what would happen in a society if the gradient of rewards were inverted by government fiat. He admits that it is difficult to imagine, for example, a situation in which bakers and lumberjacks received higher rewards than engineers, lawyers, etc., because that would call for the inversion of the scale of prestige, respect, social standing and the resulting sense of social utility, as well as the scale of income. After giving other examples of what could happen in such a "science-fiction society", the author concludes:

But no government (let alone the people themselves) is likely to conduct such an experiment, for it is not a sensible allocation of a scarce resource like high-grade intelligence. Nor could a government long equalize the gains from all occupations. The lure of greater rewards (financial and otherwise) for certain jobs directs the flow of talent as the consensus dictates, like a labour pump. Without the pump, society would annul its influence over the allocation of talent, which it cannot and should not do. [Herrnstein 1973: 148].

Unfortunately, governments in Eastern Europe actually conducted such an absurd experiment. How well Herrnstein's description fits the situation in Czechoslovakia, the most egalitarian country in Europe, is shown in a number of studies of income differentiation. Večerník [1990] demonstrates the extent and consequences of the "wage revolution" in Czechoslovakia in the 1940s and 1950s. He shows that the situation implemented at that time has never been reversed. In his recent study he argues:

During the "wage revolution" at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s a far reaching transformation had occurred in the rewarding of manual and intellectual jobs, in the gains from different levels of education, and in the special promotion of some jobs. Over that brief period, earnings relations were completely reversed to the benefit of industry and to the detriment of almost all other branches. The pay of miners and workers in heavy industry exceeded the earnings of university graduated personnel. The spheres with the highest concentration of highly educated labor (health services, education, culture) fell sharply below the national average [Večerník 1990: 4].

The results of other analyses do not indicate any trend toward higher differentiation, namely toward an improvement in the position of education in the distributive system. Večerník's study, for example, demonstrates that some improvement in the relative position of women was the only clearly positive trend we can identify in income differentiation. The rest is a rather sad story:

1) economic returns on university education were steadily decreasing;⁶ 2) the relative position of the tertiary sector (trade and services) and quaternary sector (education, science, health care) was declining, while the primary and secondary (agriculture and industrial production) sectors moved up on the scale; and 3) the "gerontocracy" reinforced its position against "meritocracy", i.e., the relative position of young job-holders declined while older employees improved their position.

Though the egalitarian policy in Czechoslovakia has been the strongest among East European countries, its situation, regarding the "devaluation" of education, is not unique. Gorniak [1989] comes to similar conclusion for Poland:

The diminishing role of higher education can be illustrated by the following data: in 1964 the average wage of a person with higher education was 1.78 times higher than the average for the country, in 1968 1.77, in 1980 only 1.11 and then it fell to the level of 0.91 (or 0.79 if a different method of calculation is applied) and it remains at this level. Such a structure of wages certainly has a strong influence on the choice of future education and job. According to the recent survey the significance of education as a social value has considerably decreased (on the list of the most appreciated social values, education fell from fourth position at the beginning of the eighties, to eleventh position in 1988). This negative process is accompanied by a widespread lack of desire for further and higher education. [Gorniak 1989: 136].

Comparative analyses (see e.g. [Večerník 1990]) show how much the distributive system in Czechoslovakia differs from the model more or less common among advanced industrial countries. For example, the net effect of a college diploma on income in France was found to be almost twice as much as in Czechoslovakia.

Many other analyses would show that the experiment Herrnstein calls absurd because it devastates the most important resources of social and economic development was in fact conducted by the governments of East European countries. The case of Czechoslovakia probably shows the most consistency.

In my view we touch here one of the most important problems in Eastern Europe, especially for its future economic and social development. Most likely, we are dealing here with some measure of consistency between the economic and cultural *devaluation of education* and the development of a distributive system that systematically reduces the economic returns on education. No matter what direction causality takes, the system seems to be highly consistent, at least as far as the two above-mentioned processes are concerned.

⁶) The adjusted deviation of gross earnings of university-educated employees from the national mean decreased between 1970 from 39 % to 25 % in 1984. Thus, in the mid eighties the relative distance between the earnings of employees with the lowest and the highest education (elementary only vs. university) was in Czechoslovakia about 31 % of the national average (30 % in Poland, 58 % in West Germany, 37 % in Canada, 70 % in the United States, etc.).

How people themselves perceive these processes, and to what extent their behavior and evaluations are consistent with the macrosocial environment is another relevant question we must raise in order to understand the specific features of educational mobility and inequality in East European countries. The unfavorable position of education among factors of wage and income differentiation undoubtedly has its impact on the perception of education, skills and related work performance as potential tools and strategies for life success.

4. Education and life success

To understand and interpret stratification and mobility in Eastern Europe, it is extremely important to know how people responded, via their individual life strategies, to their social environment, to state policy or system interventions. Consequently, the interpretation of results we obtain from the comparative analysis of educational and occupational mobility cannot be appropriate without taking into account cross-national and, particularly, cross-system differences in the strategies people might, or are allowed to, use to obtain similar or formally identical outcomes or achievements. In other words, as far as the formerly state socialist countries are concerned, it is necessary to acquire at least elementary empirical evidence about how people adapted themselves to a social environment in which a transparency of relations between ability, effort and social reward has nearly disappeared.

To understand stratification systems as they have crystallized in Eastern Europe during the last four or five decades, we should introduce and elaborate the concept of life strategies. It holds specifically when we attempt to properly interpret educational mobility and inequality. Without taking these aspects of social stratification and attainment process into account, we face serious danger in the interpretation of cross-system similarities in patterns of mobility as similarities in stratification systems, which would apparently be the wrong conclusion.

One of the things we learn from the meritocratic thesis is that the typical or prevailing pattern of individual life success in Western democracies builds more or less on the strong relationship between ability, effort and work performance. In words borrowed from Blau and Duncan [1967], *socially acknowledged economic rewards* are closely linked to *socially acknowledged achievements*. This means, among others, that there is implicit expectation of a transparent link between individual performance and the efficiency of the system. Therefore, socially acknowledged economic rewards (generally perceived as an individual success) would be *ideally* given to all individuals of the same occupational position *and* of the same work performance.

I use here the concept of an "alternative strategy" to denote a life strategy leading to individual success (particularly, but not exclusively, economic success) which **does not** build on the above-mentioned transparently meritocratic relationship. It builds rather on formal credentials not necessarily backed by real competence, merit or skills, then - of course - on advantages and privileges coming from political commitment, from informal relationships securing advantages on the labor market, from redistributive practices typical for a shortage economy allowing

profit from the holding of a position from which decisions can be made on the allocation or "re-allocation" of scarce resources, etc. In short, *alternative strategies might bring individual economic assets without being part of socially acknowledged achievements or without taking a part in social and economic processes that contribute to the efficiency of the system.*

Alternative strategies might be individually effective substitutes for meritocratic strategies under the following conditions:

- a) the allocation of people to occupational positions is strongly contaminated by non-meritocratic criteria (nomenclature, devaluated educational credentials, networks of informal relationships, seniority, etc.);
- b) the society rewards positions rather than outcomes from work performance in a given position; and
- c) the market has all the attributes of a "shortage economy", i.e. there are scarce commodities, services or other highly valued resources (like for example free education). This situation enables an individual to take advantage of his/her specific position simply by the illegal distribution of the scarce commodity (regardless whether the profit is directly economic or in the form of social capital).

An economy of scarcity accompanied by a general redistribution and bureaucratic allocation are the main factors that create opportunities for alternative strategies that offer equal or even higher rewards than careers that build on ability, performance and the contribution to the general efficiency of the system. No wonder people are lured to follow alternative strategies regardless of their ability, social background or other personal characteristics.

It is not easy to identify strategies people choose for achieving success in their lives. In the first place, life success undoubtedly has a variety of meanings and interpretations among people. We face difficulties even if we reduce the meaning of success to economic achievement or prestige. These difficulties are particularly serious if a society faces a deep erosion of "universalism" by strong interventions by the state apparatus into the allocation and distribution processes. In other words, the elementary question is: "What defined success in a society where competence, performance and work commitment did not play a key role in the competition for social positions and rewards?"

The empirical analysis of life strategies is extremely difficult. A deep analysis of life careers that combine economic, social and psychological approaches probably would be the most effective research strategy in this field. The longitudinal survey, "Family 1989", which started in the spring of 1989, is designed to provide data for such an analysis. The design of the survey follows the social psychological paradigm introduced into social stratification research by Haller, Portes, Sewell, Hauser and other scholars who have been participating in the development of the Wisconsin model. However, the scope of our survey is broader, particularly regarding the possibility of evaluating the role of specific forms of "capital" (political, social, cultural, etc.) in the attainment process.

The only data so far available come from the first wave of the longitudinal survey, so we may analyze only the determination of aspirations rather than the determination of the educational career, but even these data indicate that the stratification process in the former state socialist countries cannot be effectively described, understood and explained without an analysis focusing on individual life strategies and concepts of success developed to overcome or benefit from the social setting of a totalitarian political regime. In the next section some results will be presented to clarify this view.

Educational aspirations and educational attainment represent the key antecedents in stratification models. No matter how many independent variables precede educational variables and what proportion of their variance is explained, their central role in the attainment process is not subject to question. Indeed, educational aspirations are closely linked to occupational aspirations, and both educational and occupational aspirations are strongly correlated with income expectations. These three aspects of aspiration and life plans make up the essence of a concept of individual success, namely because education is strongly predicted by ability and school performance, and educational credentials represent for employers individual competence, knowledge and labor market skills. These elementary relationships, despite some cross-national variation in individual correlations, are the implicit premises of the analysis of educational mobility and inequality.

We should not make the mistake of assuming that the same relationships that have formed educational aspirations and mobility in Western democracies for decades have been at work in the formerly state socialist countries. Following earlier indirect argumentation based on the analysis of the objective aspects of the problem, a more direct argumentation, which aims to show its subjective dimension, will be pursued.

Table 1 displays frequencies of choices from the "instruments" of success we offered to our young respondents (see Appendix 1). The distribution of choices cannot not directly support or contradict any of our hypotheses. Indeed, the relatively high proportion of children that did not chose competence (62 %) or education (44 %) shows that the importance of some instruments that belong to "meritocratic" strategy is rather low, but on the other hand, the importance of "hard-work" is fairly high, and such strategies as "political commitment", "money" and "friends" apparently do not play dominant role.

If there is any disintegration of the values and expectations traditionally linked to educational attainment, we can find it only in the relationship between these items. A simple analysis has shown the following facts:⁷

- a) More than a quarter of the children in our sample (26.5 %) rejected both education and competence as potentially effective strategies leading to success; 62 % of the children did not think at all that higher competence is a good

⁷ The answers to two questions concerning strategies of success, one for a child and the other for one of his/her parents, are analyzed here (see Appendix 1 for the exact wording of the questions).

strategy; the same opinion regarding education was expressed by 44 % of the children. Only 20 % of the children thought that education *and* competence belong to the best instruments of success, while 36 % of our young respondents thought formal schooling need not be accompanied by competence in order to succeed.

- b) Almost a third of the children in our sample who expressed in the spring of 1989 the highest educational aspirations (college plans) did not choose education as an effective tool for success. Competence was rejected by more than half of this particular group.
- c) Among those who expressed high ambitions to succeed in their lives, only 40 % choose higher competence as an effective strategy. Formal education was chosen by 60 % of this group of children.

Table 1. Instruments of success among children

Item	First choice	Second choice	Third choice	Not chosen
Relations	27.5	17.1	20.9	34.5
Competence	13.7	12.5	11.8	62.0
Money	0.6	1.2	2.7	95.5
Friends	5.4	16.0	18.1	60.5
Education	20.4	23.5	12.1	44.0
Work well	30.7	26.6	24.1	18.5
Political commitment	1.5	2.8	10.2	85.5

To capture what lies beyond educational aspirations some simple log-linear models were tested (see Table 2). There were two groups of models: a) models of the relationships between educational aspirations (A), ambitions to succeed in life (S), and the tendency to see competence as a potential instrument for a successful career (C); and b) models where competence from the previous models was replaced by formal education (E).

Table 2 gives simple but relatively clear results. Model 7 in the upper panel of the table in fact says that "success requires competence" (represented by the term S^*C) and "competence depends on education" (A^*C). In this respect this model may represent the "meritocratic hypothesis". Unfortunately, this model gets the poorest support from our data (it clearly returns the highest value in BIC statistics). On the contrary, the model that returns the best fit with the highest parsimony (according to BIC) is the model where competence is excluded from all the associations (Model 2). Model 6, with the second lowest BIC, may actually compete with this preferred model, but it only allows the "importance of competence for success" (C) to affect "educational aspirations" (A), but still leaves the "importance of competence" separated from "ambitions to succeed" (S). In other words, the association between ambition to succeed and the evaluation of competence as a potential instrument of success (S^*C) seems to be the weakest association of the model. The lower panel of the same table provides statistics for models where

competence was replaced by education. Here again, the models that *exclude* the association between ambitions to succeed and evaluation of education as an instrument of success (S*E) give relatively good results in terms of BIC. In turn, models that include this association usually yield poorer results. As expected, the relationships that build on formal requirements and rules appear to be fairly strong (A*E and A*S).

Table 2. Instruments of success and educational aspirations among children

Model	L2	df	p	BIC
1 A S C	172.6	28	.000	-49.2
2 A*S,C	60.5	24	.000	-129.2
3 A*C,S	122.8	22	.000	-51.0
4 S*C,A	153.5	22	.000	-20.3
5 A*S,S*C	46.8	18	.000	-95.4
6 A*S,A*C	18.1	18	.446	-124.0
7 S*C,A*C	113.0	16	.000	-13.4
8 A*S,S*C,A*C	12.0	12	.445	-82.8
1 A S E	282.3	28	.000	60.8
2 A*S,E	158.3	24	.000	-31.6
3 A*E,S	125.4	22	.000	-48.8
4 S*E,A	239.8	22	.000	65.2
5 A*S,S*E	134.8	18	.000	-8.2
6 A*S,A*E	18.9	18	.393	-123.3
7 S*E,A*E	103.2	16	.000	-23.4
8 A*S,S*E,A*E	10.5	12	.571	-84.3

Variables in models:

A: Educational aspirations (1=vocational, 2=secondary, 3=college)

S: Ambitions for success (1=very strong, 2=strong, 3=weak)

C: Competence among instruments of success (0=not chosen, 1=third choice, 2=second choice, 3=first choice)

E: Education among instruments of success (0=not chosen, 1=third choice, 2=second choice, 3=first choice)

The confirmatory factor analyses of the two questions for parents and their children about their attitudes towards various "instruments" for life-success reveals more general patterns of life strategies that may help to explain such an unusual structure of choices among children. The analysis of parents' evaluations (Figure 2, Table 3) clearly confirms the existence of three strategies.

Figure 2
Measurement model for parents




Figure 3
Measurement model for children




Table 3. Parameter estimates - model II. for parents
(standardized solution)

A. Factor loadings and correlations between factors

Observed variables	P1		Latent variables P2		P3	
	par.	T-val	par.	T-val	par.	T-val
01 Education	.585	15.9	-	-	.068	2.5
02 Languages	.937	21.9	-	-	-	-
03 To assert	-	-	.135	4.2	.368	12.7
04 Friends	-	-	-.229	-5.3	.730	18.9
05 Hard work	-.025	-0.9	.404	12.8	-.065	-1.7
06 Polit. commitment-	-	-	-	-	.402	16.9
07 Money	-.364	-8.9	.503	11.8	.411	10.6
08 Abroad	.197	5.5	-	-	.379	11.4
09 Inconspic.	-.131	-4.8	.227	7.4	.080	2.6
10 Selfsuffic.	-.303	-8.9	.511	16.6	-	-
11 Principles	-	-	.573	13.1	-.338	-7.4
P1	1.000	x	x	x	x	-
P2	.313	6.7	1.000	x	x	-
P3	.426	13.1	.412	6.4	1.000	-

B. Correlations between errors of measurement observed variable

Observed variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
01	.620										
02	x	.122									
03	x	x	.805								
04	x	x	x	.552							
05	.109	x	.060	x	.856						
06	.053	x	x	x	.090	.838					
07	x	x	x	x	x	x	.517				
08	x	.068	x	.051	x	-.057	x	.753			
09	x	x	-.085	x	x	x	x	x	.937		
10	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	.075	.744	
11	x	x	x	x	x	x	-.144	x	x	x	.717

Diagonal numbers represent errors of measurement.

Model statistics: N = 2614, df = 19, L2 = 20.26, prob = .379

goodness of fit = 0.999

adjusted goodness of fit = 0.995

The first strategy, identified by the first factor (P1), might clearly represent the meritocratic alternative (high loadings to education and foreign languages), but apparently lacks a positive correlation with work performance. At the same time, this strategy is not linked to economic success. Actually, the loadings show it is the other way around (negative loading to "earn money").

The second strategy, identified by the factor P2, is the only one based on work performance. Unfortunately, this strategy does not build on education or the skills provided by schooling. Heavy emphasis on self-sufficiency might help to interpret the positive link to economic success (money). It seems that economic success, as it is defined within this strategy, really does not build much on meritocratic relations governing the labor market (i.e., on the chain education - labor market skills - work performance - income). Rather, it builds on self-sufficiency, on participation in the informal economy, etc.

The third factor (P3) clearly represents the strategy typical for former communist countries: the inclination to use influential acquaintances and advantages from political commitment (which does not allow one to "stick to one's principles") as the principal instruments for the pursuit of an occupational career seems to shape a very consistent strategy of success (not excluding its economic dimension).

Similar conclusions can be drawn from the factor analysis made on the data for children (Figure 3, Table 4). Due to the "ipsative" property of variables, the model looks different from the one specified for parents (there are additional "latent" variables F1-F7 solving the ipsative property of measured variables) but, in fact, the differences are small.

Table 4. Parameter estimates - model for II. children
(standardized solution)

Factor loadings and correlations between factors

Latent variables						
Observed K1 K2 K3 variables	par.	T-val	par.	T-val	par.	T-val
01 Knowledge	.122	3.2	.107	2.6	-	-
02 Money	-	-	.904	9.9	-	-
03 Friends	-.407	-10.1	-	-	-	-
04 Education	.621	9.9	-	-	-	-
05 Work well	-	-	-.132	-4.1	-	-
06 Polit.commitment-	-	-	-	-	.761	27.6
K1	1.000	x	x	x	x	x
K2	-.150	-	1.000	x	x	x
K3	.082	-	.016	-	1.000	x

Model statistics: N = 2900, df = 3, L2 = 3.68, prob = .299

goodness of fit = 1.000

adjusted goodness of fit = 0.997

Again, three distinct strategies were identified. The first builds on education, which - according to our expectations - does not assume or imply competence (knowledge) and money. Economic success (money) represents a strategy that does not build on education (negative loading), competence or work performance.

The third strategy represents again a career that builds on political commitment (without any link to education, competence, etc.).

The results, though they are rather tentative, make it clear that the "science-fiction" experiment described by Herrnstein and realized by communist governments has led, at least in Czechoslovakia, to a deep disintegration of the concept of success. The link between life-success and education or competence is rather weak, and higher competence and education are primarily perceived as instruments of avoiding hard work, etc. It explains, among others, the tendency of high status parents to get their children the highest possible education, even if it is not rewarded as in advanced industrial countries. The only relationships that remain strong are those based on formal credentials, administrative measures, etc. Using measures representing predominantly these relationships to show similarities between societies developed under state socialist political regimes and social systems based on political democracy, market principles, competition and meritocratic selection, though far from being ideal, can lead us to very bizarre conclusions, like the one mentioned at the beginning, that Czechoslovakia and Sweden are close to each other because their mobility regimes show high degree of similarity.

5. Conclusions

The principal conclusion documented in this paper is, in fact, very simple: we should not disregard the definition of success and the strategies people use to succeed in the analysis and interpretation of educational and occupational mobility in comparative perspective. Regarding the study of educational stratification and inequality, we should not ignore the *context* and the *content* of educational mobility in different socioeconomic systems. Even though these different contexts might converge quickly in the future because of the political changes in Eastern Europe, the change in the content of education (curriculum, quality of education, aspirations, etc.), in values and value orientations, or in life-style patterns will take a much longer time. That is why scholars of education and educational mobility should invest much more energy in comparative analyses of these underlying processes. In my view, comparative analyses of educational mobility will not bring more **understanding** of the reality in countries with different political pasts without concentration on the **resources** of inequality. However, this is a difficult task. As already stressed, we should improve the explanatory power of attainment models, particularly by implementing social-psychological dimensions that - besides aspirations and the influence of significant others - would cover values, value orientations, preferences and attitudes that most likely form specific meanings and patterns of success. At the same time these models should cover specific *channels* of or *constraints* on success (different forms of capital: social, cultural, political, etc.). I believe this should be in the mainstream of social stratification research in a comparative perspective in the near future. As Campbell argues [Campbell 1983], we are at the end of the beginning in this respect.

Appendix 1: Questions about success for parents and children**1. Question for parents:**

What do you think your child should have or know in order to be successful in life?

Label	Formulation in the questionnaire
01 Education	(the highest possible education)
02 Languages	(knowledge of foreign languages)
03 To assert	(know how to assert him/herself)
04 Friends	(influential friends)
05 Hard work	(work hard)
06 Polit. commitment	(commit him/herself politically)
07 Money	(know how to earn money)
08 Abroad	(the chance to work abroad)
09 Inconspic.	(to be inconspicuous)
10 Selfsuffic.	(to be handy and self-sufficient)
11 Principles	(to adhere to his/her principles)

Rating scale: 1. definitely yes; 2. perhaps; 3. rather not or definitely not.

If you were to name the three most important of these qualities, which would you choose?

in the first place:

in the second place:

in the third place:

2. Question for children:

What should one do, in your opinion, to be successful? You are asked to choose three out of the seven possibilities given below, putting first the one you think is the best strategy leading to success.

Label	Formulation in the questionnaire
1. Relations	(be on good terms with everybody)
2. Competence	(be more competent in some respect)
3. Money	(know how to earn a lot of money)
4. Friends	(have influential friends)
5. Education	(get the highest possible education)
6. Work well	(work hard and well)
7. Polit. commitment	(commit yourself politically)

Fill the vacant spaces in the following sentence with the respective numbers:

In order to become successful, the best thing is to _____, it is also useful to _____, and it probably pays off to _____.

New variables were created by the following transformation: 1. all variables were set equal to zero; 2. if a particular item was chosen for the first place it was

set equal to 3. Values 2 or 1 were assigned to variables if the corresponding item was chosen for second or third place.

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The Labor Market in Czechoslovakia: Changing Attitudes of the Population

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Abstract: Changes in the labor market are observed on the base of recent surveys from various points of view: 1. the production and utilization of human capital; 2. work incentives and rewards; 3. private ownership and job allocation; 4. work perspectives and unemployment. The transitory period will be very confused. The labor market will be segmented and the development of individual segments will be uneven. Already now, new temporary borderlines are being created. The transformation of the post-communist countries is being carried out in a period when the era of market regulation is over in the West and many securities of the labor market are being eroded. Rather than uniform regulation, the dynamics of individual segments and flexibility in work engagement are needed. The results of our surveys show that the population is not very much troubled and that is aware of the depth of the necessary transformation only to a certain degree.

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The road from state dirigism to a market economy is, among others, the road from state administration of work to the labor market and from state paternalism to individual responsibility. An inevitable consequence of establishing a labor market instead of maintaining fully protected employment is that a permanent labor shortage is replaced by unemployment.

Under the communist regime, the state bureaucracy had absolute control over the labor force, beginning with planning the schooling of future workers and ending with detailed wage tariffs and rules for reward. In fact, the right to work was outweighed by the duty to work for the adult population as a whole. Limited liberty in job choice and the weak relationship between performance and reward produced a lack of interest in investing in human capital and indifference toward the results of work. The forced employment of women necessarily produced not their emancipation, but their overburdening and exploitation with harmful effects for the family. Not work but jobs, not performance but positions, not efficiency but the fulfilment of the administration staff's plans were important.

The administration of labor under the communist regime had several long-term consequences. On the one hand, the large supply of cheap labor supported the technological backwardness of all branches and the expansion of a large bureaucratic system, on the other hand, the utilization of the actual labor capacity of the population was low and has shown a continuing decrease through individual periods of the "building of socialism". Bureaucratic control of the "adequacy of

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qualificational prerequisites" only camouflaged real under- and misuse of the existing human capital. All reforms of the wage system (each heralded as "strengthening the motivational capacity of wage") only conserved income levelling. The status of work has inevitably decreased as the links between ability, performance and reward (in terms of functional arrangement) has weakened or even disappeared.

Economic statistics generally view the labor market as aggregates of employment and unemployment, but we should look at it from the other side, from the viewpoint of its internal problems and tensions. In the process of transformation from a closed (bureaucratic) system to an open (market) system, old habits compete with new rules. Conflicts between old and new tendencies arise, as far as the production and use of human capital, the system of reward, the system of ownership and patterns of employment are concerned. The reality of the emerging market is even further from our theoretical pictures than we are willing to admit. Rather than a unique and adaptable labor market, a fragmented and in many segments very rigid one can be expected in the near future. Important changes are taking place not only in our society: in Western countries also, the erosion of many former securities is occurring or is expected. With a view to this, we can anticipate unrealistic expectations on the part of the population and equally unrealistic promises by some political parties.

1. The production and utilization of human capital¹

Before World War Two, Czechoslovakia (especially its western part) belonged among the well-developed European countries, with a qualified working class and creative intelligentsia. The socialist orientation of both of these social groups was unprecedentedly misused by the communists on their road to totalitarian power in the 1945-1950 period. Thereafter, the population's high level of skill and education was rather a disturbing factor for both political and economic reasons, i.e. as a latent source of discontent and criticism. The pre-war system of differentiated schooling was transformed into an unified one and the emphasis on classical education was replaced by a mixture of ideology and lowest pragmatic skill. Instead of the diploma, the "political sense" of the working class was valued. In the rapidly transformed educational system, secondary education was emphasized over university training. The low percentage of people with higher education represented a specific feature of Czechoslovakia, even in comparison with other countries passing through a period of "real socialism".

The precious heritage of a generally high cultural level, professionalism and work responsibility was systematically destroyed by the regime. Rather than the best workers, the most obedient and willing ones were rewarded, and respected professionals were replaced by freshly trained "working class cadres". The main functions of the family in rearing children were restrained as well, to attenuate or

1) The concept of "human capital" is used here as defined by Becker [1964] or Mincer [1974]. According to it, productivity is produced by individual workers who can increase it by higher education and accumulated experience.

even avoid the inter-generational transmission of cultural capital. Three waves of emigration especially affected the upper classes, but the general cultural level, occupational skills and work values vanished also as a result of the passing of time and normal demographic change. Now at least two generations have been educated by socialist schools and fully absorbed the communist climate of thinking and working, largely benefitting state paternalism, the use of double-talk and pretending to work.

The change in the evaluation of good, creative, qualified work is well indicated by the low prestige professional occupations and intellectual work hold. We can look at the population's opinions from two sides. On the one hand, responsibility and high knowledge are placed among the top criteria for the evaluation of a job's prestige, as one of our surveys has shown (see Table 1). On the other hand, looking at the same data from another point of view, we learn that only 62 % of respondents place "high knowledge" in one of the three top positions and only 57 % place such importance on "responsibility". One year after the "velvet revolution", public opinion is still very dispersed as far as the criteria for job evaluation are concerned and the position of the main work values does not seem dominant at all.

Other evidence relates to the divorce between school education and job competence, which is continuing in both consciousness and behavior. According to a panel of children leaving elementary school, only a minority of children and their parents understand the importance and interrelation of education and job competence for life success. In the autumn of 1989, competence was an important instrument of success only for 47 % of children, and education was important for only 61 %. The situation has not changed very much since then, as in the spring of 1991 competence was important for 54 % and education for 62 % of children.²

Success in the competitive labor market requires some dispositions and abilities that were methodically suppressed under communism: competence, education, adaptability and mobility. The communist system was based on pragmatic training and having one job for life. In addition to the fact that people are not used to changing their jobs, the shortage of housing also represents a great barrier to the territorial motion of the labor force. The same is true for linguistic ability. Whereas before the war most of the Czech population spoke German or (intellectuals) French, the knowledge of Western European foreign languages is rather poor now, after forty years of compulsory schooling in Russian.³

² The results of the survey "Family 1989" are based on the following question: "What does it mean to you when you hear someone being described as a successful person?" Proposed attributes were: 1. famous, 2. well-educated, 3. rich, 4. competent (able), 5. hard-working, 6. adaptable, 7. popular [Matějů 1990].

³ According to the survey "Transformation of the Social Structure", 17 % of respondents reported having fair or good knowledge of German, 6 % English, 2 % French and 36 % Russian. There is little difference between men and women (in favor of women) and a big difference between the Czech and Slovak republics (in favor of the Czechs).

Unfortunately, it is not possible to examine the level of human capital: there are no clear criteria (educational credentials in post-communist societies are even more inadequate than those of market societies) and there is no chance to test them among the active population. However, sociological inquiries about people's feelings about whether their qualifications fit the new, i.e. market conditions are helpful. According to the survey on "Economic Expectations", only 18 % of people are sure their qualifications are suitable (Table 2). A detailed analysis (Table 3) shows that younger and especially university educated men are more confident than others about their qualifications.⁴ Nevertheless, 23 % of men and 16 % of women with the highest educational level are skeptical about their qualifications. Educational level is also the main factor in the willingness to undertake managerial responsibility or to invest in their own qualifications. The Czech population seems to be more receptive to being trained or working longer, if the work will be better paid.

As a result of past developments, there is an absolute scarcity of highly competent and efficient workers. Instead of unemployment, the unsatisfied demand for good workers and erroneously occupied positions should be considered the main problem and biggest failure of the labor market. The solution lies in motivating investment in human capital, renewing the functional interrelation between competence, performance and reward. Without a doubt, the new, freer space of activity and new incentives could cause an improvement in qualificational levels in a relatively short period. Individuals' initiative might be faster than reforming the educational system and awaiting the real change in the educational level of the population. Nevertheless, forty years of devastation will take a very long time to redress.

2. Work incentives and rewards

The range of income inequality in Czechoslovakia has been extremely small and almost stable over the last forty-five years. The leveling trend started already during the Nazi occupation and continued after 1945, due to the postwar need for reconstruction and the overwhelming influence of socialist ideology. The most important changes, however, occurred during the Stalinist transformation of 1948-1953, when restrictions on the standard of living were closely aligned with militant stress on equalization policy.

All the basic features of earnings inequality established in the initial period of the 1950s were also firmly fixed for the future. In the general pattern of distribution, no real change has occurred over the past thirty years, except for some minor movements in the bottom and top 5 % of workers. Despite the demonstrated (or rather assumed) effort to increase earnings differences

⁴ In Tables 3 and 7, some results of the Anova procedure of SPSS^x are used. In the upper part, deviations from the average in percent are presented. Since individual deviations are adjusted to all other variables they are additive. Coefficients beta are standardized regression coefficients in the sense used in multiple regression: β^2 indicates the proportion of additional variance explained by each factor. R^2 indicates total variance explained by all factors.

according to qualifications and performance, no substantial change in the wage system occurred until the mid-1960s. The reform tendencies of this period were too hesitant to bring about significant changes in the economic mechanism and wage system, however. Nevertheless, there were some attempts to enlarge wage differences and motivate more highly qualified labor, with the result that qualificalational differentials slightly enlarged at the time.

For the 1970-1988 period, we gathered extensive evidence on changing patterns in earnings distribution (Večerník 1991). Whereas the range of earnings distribution remained the same and the gap between men and women has not changed, the lowering of the relative position of 1. higher educated, 2. service- and welfare-sector, and 3. younger workers continued. These patterns and tendencies from the past are unlikely to change rapidly.

In the transition period, contradictory tendencies rather than a consistent development towards greater and more functional inequality might reveal themselves. Considering the range of earnings distribution, it seems to have diminished for a considerable part of the labor market (except the new private firms), due to restrictive economic policy, the establishment and raising of the minimum wage and strict control over the wage fund. Except for the small private sector, earnings inequality remains much lower in Czechoslovakia than, for example, Hungary, Poland or the Soviet Union (Szirácki 1990). Some changes could be brought about by the liberalization of wages which will be introduced in the near future. However, it is a question of which type of characteristics will be strengthened: rather than the role of a person's attributes (especially vertical dimensions), sector, enterprise or regional differences (i.e. horizontal variation) could be strengthened. The exclusivity of the reward level in foreign firms may be reduced but probably not fully eliminated.

Let's take the mentioned dimensions of earnings inequality one after another, and consider their prospects in the near future. From the point of view of education, the labor market is not yet ready to receive and utilize highly qualified work on the one hand, and the workers' actual qualifications do not correspond to the new requirements on the other. Consequently, one can hardly assume that the mechanism for the production of and returning to human capital will be established soon or that qualificalational differences will be increased in the near future. This will only be true for a small number of professionals employed by foreign or mixed firms or by some dynamic domestic organizations. Survey data from the latest period reveal a diminishment rather than an increase in the impact of educational differences on reward, net from other factors.⁵

The continuation of the previous tendencies is seen in the division by sectors. The earnings level of the most important branches in the service sector has not only not increased but relatively even lowered. Education, state administration and health and social services suffer from a shortage of people due to earnings which

⁵) When comparing results of the social stratification surveys from 1984 and 1991, we discover a further fall in the income position of especially the university-educated. The question remains whether it happened before November, 1989, or after.

are significantly lower than in manufacturing industries. On the other hand, banking and some segments of the private sector (retail trade, catering) have seen considerable improvement.

As for demographic divisions, the greater vulnerability of women and young people in the labor market could lead toward an even bigger disparity of earnings between the genders and a further fall in the wage position of younger generations, compared to the "old holders" of economic and social capital.

Without a doubt, significant changes in earnings inequality will come. Two years is too short a time for the transformation of the distribution machine, even in a period of restrictive financial policy. For the economic reform to succeed, the creation and entrenchment of a liberal and anti-equalizing climate (contrary to the consciousness internalized during communist rule) is necessary. The observations of our surveys are a bit confusing in that sense. A considerable (even slightly decreasing) percentage of the population is at least verbally ready to accept a much greater earning differential (Table 4A). A similarly sized, but rapidly diminished part of the population is sure that differences in earnings should be increased (Table 4B). Most people feel that social inequality has increased since November, 1989, and that it is too great for the times.⁶ The "counter-levellers" are mostly young, and well educated people, rather men and inhabitants of cities than women and inhabitants of towns and villages.

For the near future, it is still an open question whether the difficulties inherent in the start of economic reform will maintain or even strengthen the old climate of equalization and attitudes characteristic in a socialist system of "social guarantees". The balance between the welfare state and market incentives and between functional and unjust inequality is very precarious everywhere. It is even more shaky in the post-communist societies where the old communist structure of inequality is trying to reproduce itself and enter onto the new stage of the market economy. The population's views are rather ambiguous in that sense, because people ask for more incentives for market behavior and more social security at the same time. Professionals' thinking has either a market or a social orientation. A synthesizing overview and awareness of the close links between the efficiency of the economic system and the amount of redistribution are still missing.

3. Private ownership and job allocation

Under the communist regime, a huge bureaucratic apparatus ruled over the placement of workers beginning with quotas for different schools and ending with the allocation of workers according to "qualificational requirements" or "political prerequisites". A labor market existed only for a marginal group of poorly qualified

⁶) In the survey "Transformation of the Social Structure", to the question "Do you think that inequalities between people have rather increased or decreased in the past two years?", 44 % of the respondents answered "certainly increased" and 49 % "rather increased". To the question on the characterization of the inequalities, 45 % of the respondents answered that they are "too great" and 41 % "rather great".

job-changers who profited from the labor shortage and were overpaid by managers in order to complete the personnel plans of their enterprises.

This situation has changed, but not very dramatically as yet. The labor market cannot develop too much due to the continuing dominance of the state sector and its priorities. On the one hand, big state firms can pass the costs of their inefficient production on to customers, thanks to price liberalization and enduring monopolies. On the other hand, the state bureaucracy and confusing laws manifest themselves as great barriers for entrepreneurs who have to battle through a jungle of prescriptions on their road toward flexible forms of business. On top of this, networks of former communist technocrats still have great economic power and successfully try to hamper private entrepreneurship, e.g. by distinguishing between private and state firms when selling materials or products.

Also on the side of labor, many workers feel themselves to be better protected against market forces by large organizations and trade unions. One half of respondents answered in June 1991 that a good government has to ensure jobs for everybody. Nevertheless, the rapid increase in the cost of living (55 % in 1991) pushed some workers into the dynamic private sector with much better earnings. This pressure will soon be supported by the first bankruptcies of big state firms. However, for many workers self-employment is only an involuntary solution after being fired from the state sector.

For the time being, the most frequent model of household behavior is a compound of employment in the formal economy and the receipt of extra money from moonlighting or other secondary activities (see Tables 2C and 5). Expecting higher earnings or seeking a better paid job is a dominant variant among individuals' coping strategies. Only 11 % of households see the solution for their financial troubles in private business. This is the least probable solution among five options, following solving the problem within the formal economy, within the informal economy or through employment abroad. In the half-year covered by our latest surveys, the giving of preference to alternative, supplementary or temporary ways (second job, work abroad, private firm) has rather declined.

Changes in property relations are just starting. The overwhelming majority of "private firms" are only the part-time jobs of craftsmen, construction workers, sellers, lawyers, consultants etc. The possession of a business licence has been a condition for employment in many private firms in 1991.⁷ As a result of this, the number of private organizations (over 800 thousand in Czech republic alone) is significantly exaggerated. According to our surveys, 22 % of the respondents between the ages of twenty-five and sixty (or another member of their family) had permission to engage in private business in June 1991 and 25 % in December of that year. One could estimate that hardly one-third of them have basic equipment and are undertaking serious business. It is a promising start, but an essential step will be the so-called "large privatization" of the big state enterprises. However, even greater should be the anticipation of changes arising from workers, like changes in their openness to work mobility, flexible or combined employment, etc.

7) This practice has been hampered by the new business act, in effect from January, 1992.

As it is with greater inequality in earnings, private business also needs favorable public opinion. What is interesting is that acceptance of full freedom for private entrepreneurship has been significantly decreasing over the latest period (Table 4D). One reason might be that whereas at the start of economic reform, private ownership was presented as a panacea for all problems, now people rather feel that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Another reason could be that the first successes of entrepreneurs is producing a certain social envy. At the same time, the conditions for private business are estimated rather skeptically (Table 4E). Important laws and administrative and economic institutions are missing or are not trustworthy, credit is rare and the state bureaucracy is not very active in supporting the development of new firms.

Not only consent, but also suspicion and social envy accompanies the new capitalists on their difficult journey. A decreasing but still considerable part of the population desires the maintenance of state control over the economy (Table 4F). However, we can hardly distinguish what part of this desires the realistic requirements of legal regulation of the economy and what part is urging control over the "enrichment" and full protection of labor.

Private ownership and an open labor market are two sides of the same coin. Before the private sector expands, the supply of new jobs will be only sporadic. The increasing diversity of ownership relations and the temporary character of some of them will search for and require a diversity of labor conditions. After forty years of the "obligatory right to work", people must learn to be free also in terms of employment. For most of them, it is a new situation that they never thought they would have to cope with. It is, then, a source of skepticism and fear, especially the fear of unemployment.

4. Work perspectives and unemployment

One of characteristic features of labor allocation in the centrally planned economies was a permanent shortage of labor accompanied (and, surely, produced) by its inefficient or even wasteful use.⁸ Communist Czechoslovakia was the country with the highest employment rate for women in the world. From the early 1950s, women were forced to be economically active not only by law, but mainly by economic necessity. Without two earnings, many households would fall under the subsistence minimum. Similarly, Czechoslovakia was a country with a virtually non-existent private sector, and did not have as important an informal economy, as compared with Hungary or Poland. This increased the dependance of population on centrally administered work and job allocation.

Artificial overemployment, low qualifications and the inefficient use of labor inevitably turn into unemployment, once market criteria are introduced. The rate of unemployment in Czechoslovakia is not dramatic at the moment, but it is very

⁸) See [Oxenstierna 1990] for a comprehensive analysis of the main features of the "labor market" under communism and the paradoxes of the "centrally planned" economy. Czechoslovakia had to adopt the Soviet system as a whole, but its effects were not so fatal due to better starting conditions and work morale.

unevenly distributed (4.1 % in the Czech republic and 11.8 % in the Slovak republic at the end of 1991). The process of the renewal of the economic system, and ownership and the managerial reconstruction of large-scale production, however, has only started.

The possible scope of the unemployment problem is shown in Tables 6 and 7. In December, 1991, only 17 % of the active respondents considered their firms to have good economic prospects and 23 % were sure about the prospects of their occupations (only response "definitely yes" are used throughout this discussion). Due to this, 22 % fear seriously for their employment. Of the population aged twenty-five to sixty, 22 % are willing to work for even a lower wage in order to maintain their jobs, 15 % for the minimum wage and 5 % for a wage even lower than the minimum. The rate of pessimism is positively correlated with age and negatively with education. Personal economic outlook is significantly worse in Slovakia but willingness to be employed for a reduced or the minimum wage is also lower. Peasants are a special group which is skeptical about their firms, but not about their jobs. What is encouraging in this otherwise gloomy picture is that the occupational perspectives, as reported by respondents, seem to be significantly more optimistic in December than in June of 1991. If it is an indicator of greater adaptivity and a more active approach, this would surely be positive.

The future rate of unemployment will be influenced by contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, we might expect a rapid increase in unemployment due to the privatization of big state firms in the near future, at the same time when "social employment" will be considerably reduced. On the other hand, the opacity of the labor market induces an exaggeration of the actual rate of unemployment and the overburdening of the state budget. A considerable percentage (estimated at about 15-20 %) of the officially unemployed have sufficient resources from private activity, the informal economy or personal wealth. The poor acting of revenue offices and institutions of social security make this abuse easy and the intrinsic communist mentality of a paternalistic state serves here as a strong motivation.

The main factor in further tendencies will be the effort and ability of new private entrepreneurs to increase the number of jobs and motivate a rise in the qualifications of their personnel. Until now, new entrepreneurs have not been especially interested in expanding the labor market and, on the contrary, try to avoid paying the payroll tax (50 % of the wage amount) and social security. It has to be said that in the project of economic reform, the employment problem remains only a secondary one and no special scheme was focused on its solution. Nevertheless, some pragmatic measures outside the main "economic strategy" seem to be efficient in braking the rise of unemployment at least in the Czech republic. In spite of these, the ownership transformation of the state sector will call forth the need for a much more active employment policy.

5. Conclusion: homogeneity or segmentation, unity or fragmentation in the labor market?

In the period of transition, there is a lot of naivete about market forces. Through repetition, many people in power have merely changed their vocabulary instead of their reasoning: the "invisible hand of the market" is understood by them as the equivalent of the "iron laws of history" drilled into them by lectures in Marxism-leninism; after the failure of the "soviet model", the "Western model" should be adopted by introduction from above. A mixture of theoretical liberalism and pragmatic control should replace the old administrative allocation of jobs. Two ideas lie behind this: that the labor market is and remains homogeneous (according to neoclassical theory) and it will be more or less regulated (according to reality in the West). In fact, modern economics and sociology have shown that the real market is not homogeneous but heterogeneous. According to the theory of labor market segmentation, it is only the external market (or secondary sector) that is characterized by an open supply/demand play whereas the internal market is treated as "an administrative unit ... within which the market functions of pricing, allocating, and often training are governed by a set of institutional rules and procedures" (Doeringer, Piore 1971:1,2). Between the primary and secondary sectors, the essential differences lie in working conditions, principles of allocation, return on personal investments and rules of promotion.

The division of specific areas under the communist regime might be seen as a counterpart to such segmentation. We witnessed here at least four relatively autonomous distributive subsystems that can be presented in a two-dimensional paradigm: the one dimension reveals the apparent or hidden character of distribution, the other its legal or illegal form (see Figure 1a). Unlike the labor market segments, participation in more subsystems could be multiplied and produce extensive inequalities. From these segments, only the first was statistically observable (cell 1). According to job specification, we can only speculate about the intensity of informal economic activities, i.e. paid work for other people, done very often during official working hours and with stolen materials (cell 2). Very soon, documentation may be gathered to show the official but strictly confidential "fringe benefits" of positions in the party and state bureaucracy to their true extent (cell 3). However, nobody will be ever able to learn everything about the immense flow of money, goods and services from the "people's ownership" into the private accounts of its true keepers and managers (cell 4).

The transitory period will be very confused. The labor market will be segmented and the development of individual segments will be uneven. Now, new temporary borderlines are being created (Figure 1b). The first one is connected with the introduction of small private firms into the hitherto centralized system. In the initial period, there are small private firms established on previous (family, black market, communist) wealth or on entrepreneurial courage and credit. The second one is represented by the introduction of Western firms and foreign capital. In both cases, common relations and forms of reward are broken, unlike in the big firms that are preparing for de-etatization, in which low and equalized wages continue. Whereas the reward policy in state firms produces further equalization

(low wages rise faster than high wages, to maintain the standard of living of the lower-paid workers), small businesses and Western firms introduce a considerable inequality of earnings. Pay differences within individual sectors are certainly lower than differences between them.

The transformation of the post-communist countries is being carried out in a period when the era of market regulation is over in the West and many securities of the labor market are being eroded. At the same time as Western scholars are studying the change of "welfare capitalism" into "market capitalism" and the transformation of a rigid market into a flexible one (Lane 1989), politicians in the post-communist countries are fixated on the golden 1970s and assume they will establish a well protected and universally accessible labor market. In fact, we have to take into account that the labor market in the East might be much more eroded and fragmented than in the West. Such a development is inevitable due to problems on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market. On the side of supply, various conditions will be offered as far as job, employment, reward and other securities are concerned, if the economy will ever start. On the side of demand, thoroughly diverse abilities and activities will be offered, caused by an incalculable mixture of inherited cultural capital and personal work motivation on the one hand, and acquired human capital and actual performance on the other.

In the West, the fragmentation of the labor force is occurring, which is "characterized by distinctive strata with cumulative advantages or disadvantages, the spread of labour insecurities to groups that had grown used to the prospect of a steady improvement. This has been associated with a rethinking about the nature of the welfare state, seen by many as excessively bureaucratic and, worse, in many respects redistributive manner" (Standing 1991: 8). When we put instead of "improvement" stability and instead of "welfare state" paternalism, the situation in the post-communist societies might be described by such terms quite properly.

As the social strata with distinctive patterns of labor security or insecurity, G. Standing distinguishes - among others - the "proficians", "capitalist employees", "flexiworkers" and the "detached stratum" (underclass). Also in the newly "capitalist" Czechoslovakia, we have to expect the emergence of extremely distant groups, despite the democratic traditions and equalizing past of the country. Prewar Czechoslovakia was overwhelmingly a middle-class society, with a negligible great bourgeoisie and an almost absent underclass. Now, there is a high probability that Gypsies will form a separate underclass, that communist political power and wealth will be transformed into new big ownership, or that some participants in the "voucher" privatization might constitute something like a stratum of "capitalist employees". To insist on universal protection of the market in such a situation could become fatal for both the economy and the society. Rather than uniform regulation, one needs the dynamics of individual segments and flexibility in work engagement. The results of our surveys show that the population is not very much troubled and that it is aware of the depth of the necessary transformation only to a certain degree. This is very good for maintaining social peace, but it is less good for radical change in economic behavior.

Tables

Table 1. Standards for the estimation of a job's prestige (%)

Criterion	Rank order		
	1.	2.	3.
1 High knowledge	25.2	22.3	14.4
2 Responsibility	23.6	19.0	14.0
3 Importance for society	20.2	19.1	15.1
4 Practical usefulness	9.8	9.6	10.9
5 Manual difficulty	7.9	5.4	6.7
6 Workmanship, know-how	4.7	9.0	14.7
7 Special talent	2.7	4.6	8.4
8 Scarcity, exclusivity	2.1	3.4	4.8
9 Ease to make money	1.2	1.2	2.9
10 Opportunity to manage people	1.4	3.5	3.9
11 Independence	0.7	2.9	3.7
12 Other	0.5	0.1	0.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Survey on Social Differences and the Prestige of Occupations,
November 1990 (N = 1320).

The question was:

"People estimate the prestige of an individual occupation according to different criteria. Choose three of the following criteria which you consider the most important."

Table 2. Feeling about respondent's own qualifications and willingness to work hard (%)

	Qualifications 1	Manager 2A	10 hours 2B	Training 2C	Language 2D
definitely yes	18.0	19.6	41.2	36.9	25.2
rather yes	35.7	20.5	34.2	33.8	29.2
rather no	31.5	30.4	14.5	18.5	22.3
definitely no	14.9	29.5	10.1	10.8	22.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Survey on the Economic Expectations and Attitudes, December 1991
(N = 1450, population 25-60 years only).

The questions were:

1. "Do you consider your qualifications to be pertinent to and sufficient for a market economy?"
2. "If somebody were to offer you a job with double earnings, would be you willing to:
 - A. take a managerial position;
 - B. work 10 hours per day;
 - C. train for more than 6 months;
 - D. learn a foreign language within one year."

Table 3. Feeling about respondent's own qualification and willingness to work hard (multiple classification analysis)

	Qualification 1	Manager 2A	10 hours 2B	Training 2C	Language 2D
Mean	18.0	19.6	41.2	36.9	25.2
Adjusted deviations (in % of mean)					
<i>Sex:</i>					
male	2.1	4.4	8.3	2.3	0.3
female	-1.9	-4.0	-7.7	-2.1	-0.3
<i>Age:</i>					
20-29	-4.0	0.6	-0.4	2.4	9.0
30-39	2.3	1.7	4.5	5.6	3.3
40-49	0.9	1.4	4.2	4.0	-1.6
50-59	0.2	-4.1	-9.0	-13.1	-11.5
<i>Education:</i>					
elementary	-7.6	-9.4	-5.6	-11.1	-10.0
vocational	-0.9	-2.4	1.0	-2.6	-4.5
secondary	3.2	7.2	1.8	6.9	8.3
university	14.1	13.7	3.8	19.6	20.2
<i>Republic:</i>					
Czech	0.9	-0.9	4.0	1.7	1.0
Slovak	-1.6	1.7	-7.4	-3.1	-1.9
Coefficients beta:					
Sex	0.05*	0.11**	0.16**	0.05	0.01
Age	0.06	0.06	0.11**	0.16**	0.17**
Education	0.16**	0.19**	0.06	0.19**	0.22**
Republic	0.03	0.03	0.11**	0.05	0.03
R²	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.09

Source: Surveys on the Economic Expectations and Attitudes, December 1991 (N = 1450, population 25-60 years only). In the analysis, only answers "definitely yes" have been considered.

*) coefficient significant at < 0.005

**) coefficient significant at < 0.001

The questions were:

1. "Do you consider your qualifications to be pertinent to and sufficient for a market economy?"
2. "If somebody were to offer you a job with double earnings, would be you willing to:
 - A. take a managerial position;
 - B. work 10 hours per day;
 - C. train for more than 6 months;
 - D. learn a foreign language within one year."

Table 4. Responses to several statements on earnings, private business and unemployment (% of responses "definitely yes")

	May 1990	December 1990	June 1991	December 1991
<i>A. "It is desirable for really competent people to have a lot of money, even millions."</i>				
Czechoslovakia	38.3	42.9	43.5	37.8
Czech republic	40.3	47.3	49.5	45.0
Slovak republic	34.3	35.2	32.5	25.0
<i>B. "Differences in earnings have to be increased."</i>				
Czechoslovakia	56.5	51.6		41.5
Czech republic	57.8	55.5		46.9
Slovak republic	48.0	43.9		31.9
<i>C. "For your household, extra incomes are important."</i>				
Czechoslovakia		34.4	33.7	
Czech republic		30.1	30.5	
Slovak republic		42.5	39.4	
<i>D. "There must be absolute freedom for private business."</i>				
Czechoslovakia	45.5	41.6	35.6	25.0
Czech republic	49.7	45.8	40.0	28.3
Slovak republic	37.3	33.5	27.6	19.1
<i>E. "Good conditions for private business have already been established."</i>				
Czechoslovakia		2.7	4.4	5.6
Czech republic		2.1	3.8	4.3
Slovak republic		3.8	5.7	7.9
<i>F. "The economy should remain under state control."</i>				
Czechoslovakia	52.6	40.7	38.9	38.8
Czech republic	52.0	39.7	39.0	37.3
Slovak republic	53.9	42.7	38.7	41.4
<i>G. "We have to avoid unemployment at any price."</i>				
Czechoslovakia	6.3	4.9	3.8	4.7
Czech republic	4.9	4.2	3.9	4.2
Slovak republic	9.0	6.2	3.5	5.7

Sources: Surveys on the Economic Expectations and Attitudes of the Population 1990-1991 (Population 25-60 years only).

Table 5. Strategies for coping with household financial troubles (%)

	More money 1	Better job 2	Second job 3	Work abroad 4	Private firm 5
definitely yes	32.6	30.5	21.5	9.9	11.4
rather yes	25.8	30.5	37.6	11.8	13.7
rather no	18.9	20.7	17.4	23.7	25.0
definitely no	22.2	18.2	23.5	54.5	49.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Survey on the Economic Expectations and Attitudes of the Population, December 1991 (N = 1283 population 25-60 years only).

Question and variants of answers:

"Imagine your family falls into a very difficult financial situation, due to external circumstances. Which of the following solutions would be for you convenient?"

1. *Try to get more money from the job you have.*
2. *Find a better paying job.*
3. *Find a second job, moonlight.*
4. *Go to work abroad.*
5. *Establish a private firm."*

Table 6. Feeling about respondent's employment perspectives (%)

	Perspective of occupation 1	firm 2	Fear of unemploy- ment 3	Willingness to work for wage lower 4	minimum 5
definitely yes	22.5	17.2	22.5	22.2	15.9
rather yes	35.1	35.0	26.6	45.0	30.8
rather no	29.5	30.1	31.9	19.1	25.4
definitely no	13.0	17.7	19.0	13.7	27.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Survey on the Economic Expectations and Attitudes of the Population, December 1991 (N = 1450, population 25-60 years only).

The questions were:

1. *"Do you consider your occupation to have a good perspective from the point of view of the contemporary changes?"*
2. *"Do you consider your firm to have a good perspective from the point of view of the contemporary changes?"*
3. *"Do you fear unemployment?"*
4. *"If your job were in danger, would you be willing to work for a lower wage than you now have?"*
5. *"If your job were in danger, would you be willing to work for the minimum wage?"*

Table 7. Feeling about respondent's employment perspectives
(multiple classification analysis)

	Perspective of occupation	Perspective of firm	Fear of unemploy- ment	Willingness to work for wage lower	Willingness to work for wage minimum
	1	2	3	4	5
Mean	22.5	17.2	22.5	22.2	15.9
Adjusted deviations (in % of mean)					
<i>Sex:</i>					
male	3.8	0.5	-2.6	-1.8	-5.9
female	-3.5	-0.4	2.4	1.7	5.4
<i>Age:</i>					
20-29	2.9	-0.5	1.2	-4.9	-2.3
30-39	1.8	0.4	2.4	0.3	0.3
40-49	-0.9	3.6	0.2	-0.1	0.4
50-59	-4.4	-3.4	-4.4	4.6	1.6
<i>Education:</i>					
elementary	-8.7	-4.7	3.1	1.8	7.4
vocational	-1.0	-2.7	1.7	-3.8	-3.6
secondary	2.7	3.3	-1.4	3.0	-0.4
university	19.2	13.7	-11.1	2.0	-3.6
<i>Republic:</i>					
Czech	3.0	1.7	-5.0	1.5	1.2
Slovak	-5.5	-3.1	9.4	-2.8	-2.3
Coefficients beta:					
Sex	0.09**	0.01**	0.06**	0.04*	0.16**
Age	0.07*	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.04
Education	0.18**	0.15**	0.10*	0.07*	0.12**
Republic	0.10**	0.06*	0.17**	0.05*	0.05*
R²	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.05

Source: Surveys on the Economic Expectations and Attitudes of the Population, December 1991 (N = 1450, population 25-60 years only).

In the analysis, only answers "definitely yes" have been considered.

*) coefficient significant at < 0.005

**) coefficient significant at < 0.001

The questions were:

1. "Do you consider your occupation to have a good perspective from the point of view of the contemporary changes?"
2. "Do you consider your firm to have a good perspective from the point of view of the contemporary changes?"
3. "Do you fear unemployment?"
4. "If your job were in danger, would you be willing to work for a lower wage than you now have?"
5. "If your job were in danger, would you be willing to work for the minimum wage?"

Figure 1. Main dimensions of the distributional system

A) UNDER THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM

	APPARENT	HIDDEN
LEGAL	1 Rewarding by wage system in formal economy	2 Benefits, bonuses and privileges of the "ruling class"
ILLEGAL	3 Rewarding of private activity in the informal economy	4 "Plus-value" from party, state and economic management

B) IN THE STARTING PERIOD OF TRANSITION

	NEW CAPITALISTS	OLD BIG OWNERSHIP
DOMESTIC	1 Entrepreneurship with domestic capital	2 Hired labor in past state enterprises with low wages, higher security
FOREIGN	3 Entrepreneurship with western capital	4 Hired labor abroad or by foreign firms with high wages, lower security

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Surveys used:

- "Social differences and job prestige": November, 1990. Sample: 1320 adult economically active people.
- "Family 1989": observing 15 year-old children in Autumn, 1989, as a panel over for several years.
- "Economic expectations and attitudes of the population": May, 1990; December, 1990; June, 1991; December, 1991. Sample: 1650-1800 adults over 18 (some questions concern also the situation of the household).
- "Transformation of the social structure", September-October, 1991. Sample: 2850 adults.
- All surveys were carried out by the Survey Center STEM at the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.

Continuity and Discontinuity. Political Change in a Czech Village After 1989

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Abstract: Political transformation of local society in post-communist Czechoslovakia during the two years that followed November 1989 was monitored in a village near Prague. The results of this case study are presented in the paper. The restructuring of political parties, social organizations and local government as well as the 1990 parliamentary elections are described. More detailed account is given of the 1990 municipal elections and of the conflicts facing the municipality. The institutional foundations of local democracy were laid during the two years covered by the study. However, the time of real local politics is yet to come as local society becomes more differentiated, the middle class is reborn and clearly defined group interests begin to surface.

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The local scene, especially that of rural and small urban communities, deserves as much attention in the analysis of social and political change in the Czech Republic after the collapse of the Communist regime as does the macro-stage of the large urban centers.

Rural and small urban communities have always played an important role in Czech life. The importance of the small community factor is underscored by the peculiar pattern of the settlement system in the Czech Republic, which is marked by a dense net of villages and small to medium-size towns with only a few big cities.

During the last two years, the local stage has been responding to the political and social change initiated on the global-level, i.e. mostly in big urban centers, in its own way and with considerable delay. This has been caused not only by sheer physical distance, but also by the different social and cultural profile and the different mode of functioning of smaller communities in comparison with big cities.

There are different possibilities for analytically grasping this change; the author of this paper has chosen the case-study approach. Events in a village near Prague are described to document the political transformation of local society during the two years that followed November, 1989.¹ Although difficult to

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¹) The case study was part of the research project "Transformation of Local Communities in the Post-Totalitarian Era" carried out by a team of sociologists from the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in 1990-1991. Daniel Hanšpach, Eva Heřmanová, Ondřej Hubáček, Jiří Patočka, Zdena Vajdová and the author were members of the team. The main method used was the longitudinal observation of a panel of 35 municipalities (villages and small towns) based on diaries kept by local collaborators, on periodical surveying and on analyses of written documents. In two municipalities, one of which was N., the survey

generalize, the case study offers insights not attainable by a more quantitative procedure. In a situation of rapid change this is a considerable advantage.

The Stage

N. is a semi-rural community, some 25 kilometers from Prague, easily accessible by train. It has 2500 permanent residents and 570 houses. About 50 % of the active population commutes daily to Prague, the rest are employed locally - in nearby villages and in the adjacent district center. There is a fair proportion of white-collar workers with intensive extra-local links who import urban values, life styles and social innovations. Only a small part of the active population (7 %) works in agriculture, about one third in industry. Local jobs are available in a small factory, in quarries, agricultural cooperatives and in services.

N. has an elementary school, a kindergarten, a school for handicapped children, a retirement home for the elderly, a medical center, cinema, sports hall and other sport facilities, public library, church and a hall for cultural events. An empty dilapidated castle is waiting for its new function. Residents are serviced by a modest supermarket, four shops and four unattractive pubs.

Political life in N. before November 1989

Until November 1989, the only relevant political force in N. was the local organization of the Communist Party. In addition, there were also local chapters of the satellite parties - the People's Party and the Socialist Party - the existence of which was more-or-less symbolic. All important issues of municipal life had been decided by the local or district Communist Party committees, which communicated their opinions to the chairman or secretary of the municipal council - both Communist Party members.

The local government² had an elected body, in which the majority of councillors were Communist Party members, and an administrative office with three administrators. An executive board, headed by the chairman and assisted by the secretary, was in charge of the operating management of municipal affairs. The real decision-making was mostly done by the chairman and the secretary, both paid officials. The councillors had some real chance to influence municipal affairs by

was supported by participant observation of key political events and by additional interviews. The author is indebted to his local collaborators in N. for their help.

2) The foundations of the former system of territorial government and administration in Czechoslovakia - the system of "National Committees" - were laid down in 1945, and this system has gradually been molded into a soviet-type totalitarian structure, much the same as in the other former socialist countries. The main features of this system were a) the transfer of real decision-making power within the territorial units to the Communist Party bureaucracy, b) a centralism that excluded any authentic self-government, c) the amalgamation of the state administration and of self-government functions and structures into a single system founded on the ideology of "democratic centralism", and d) the dominance of vertically organized and centrally controlled economic structures (of economic ministries and their subordinate units) over territorial government and administration, which resulted in the general subversion of the territorial system of social and political organization of the global society.

their participation in committees authorized to give opinions and to initiate action in different fields (culture, health care, etc.).

The municipal government worked with mixed success and had some moderate accomplishments in improving the ecological situation in N.

Municipal elections were held every four years, the list of candidates was formally prepared by the National Front (a convention of official political and social organizations), but in reality by the Communist Party committee. The list was pre-structured into quotas according to sex, age, social group and the political affiliation of candidates. Municipal elections used to be a purely formal affair, more a manifestation of political loyalty than decision-making by the voters. Only very seldom were any negative votes cast.

There was also a net of relatively well functioning social organizations - the sport club, the fishermen's, gardeners', gamekeepers', firemen's and animal breeders' associations and the women's league - the traditional pillars of any local social life, as well as the not-so-well functioning youth association and the union of army friends. The leadership of most social organizations was controlled by Communist Party members. N. had its own children's choir and a monthly local journal.

The municipality as well as individual citizens reacted to totalitarian malformations partly by bending to them, yet also by eroding and adapting them to their own benefit and by developing protective and substitutive mechanisms. As far as the citizens were concerned, these included disengagement from local political participation and flight into privacy, and the adoption of extra-legal methods and procedures - notably bribery and contempt of local politics and politicians.

The municipal government resorted to extensive lobbying for additional resources from the regional authority, to mobilizing the local Communist Party's support and to involving local enterprises and important personalities in local development. It sometimes also resorted to adopting shadowy procedures, including barter deals with potential patrons and extorting voluntary work from the citizens. The prestige of local politics had fallen, as a predominantly negative selection was taking place in the recruitment of local politicians. In fact, the term "politics" itself assumed a negative meaning.

Political change in N. after November, 1989

The events in Prague in November, 1989 were closely followed in N. and reported by the commuters. At first, no local action was taken and the local Communist Party as well as the municipal government were flexing their muscles. People sat by the TV or travelled to Prague to participate in the mass rallies but remained silent at home.

In December, 1989 the local Civic Forum was established and since that time the revolution entered N. From the outset, Civic Forum in N. was predominantly a white-collar organization, recruiting its activists mostly from intellectuals working in Prague (teachers, a philosopher, a historian, a nurse, technicians, students). There was no registered membership in Civic Forum, activists joined and left, only



the nucleus - the Coordination Center - was more-or-less stable. Popular support was measured by attendance at public meetings, which were rather frequent and stormy during the first months of 1990. As a rule, some 200-300 people came, ten times more than pre-November public meetings could have attracted. An immense surge of interest in municipal affairs was obvious.

Soon, the two former satellite parties (the People's Party and the Socialist Party) also showed new life, changing their leaders and attracting some, though not many, new members, most of which were elderly citizens. In the winter of 1990 the Social Democratic Party and later the Republican Party (extreme right) were established, again with very few members. The Communist Party has twice changed its committee and lost a number of younger members, but it has regained new people transferred from the work organizations. It has mostly operated out of public sight.

As a locally specific organization, "Society N." was established later in the year, with the aim of promoting local culture, the knowledge of local history and environmental protection. It appeals to local patriotism and tradition, stating in the preamble of its program: "Society N. is not a political association. A non-political, strictly local movement with quite concrete goals has to step in where political parties failed. While the party system divides, Society N. unites." This is the kind of argument frequently heard in Czechoslovakia during the early post-November period. It reveals a distrust of political partisanship and a belief in "non-political politics". The founders of "Society N." were a caucus of young intellectuals and a couple of skilled workers with strikingly innovative thinking. The Society initiated several successful events and became an important actor in local life.

Municipal government was reconstructed in March, 1990 to break the monopoly of the Communist Party. The change was negotiated between Civic Forum and the local Communist Party cell. Some 50 % of the councillors - mostly Communist Party members - resigned and new people were coopted into their places. The reconstructed council (45 members) consisted of 20 % communists, 20 % members of the two former satellite parties and 60 % councillors without party affiliation (including Civic Forum supporters). The chairman was a Civic Forum man, the deputy chairman and the secretary were communists. A few months later the chairman resigned after obtaining a government job. His successor was another local resident - a Prague university lecturer of mathematics.

A new chairman was elected in the local agricultural cooperative and a new director appointed in the kindergarten.

Municipal elections in November, 1990

N. witnessed two elections in 1990. During the parliamentary elections in June the festive mood of the "Velvet Revolution" was still surviving and the elections, as well as the preceding campaign, were more-or-less a demonstration of the rejection of the totalitarian system. The campaign was peaceful and the parties contested mostly by the number, size and colours of their posters. According to unverified reports, Communist Party activists tried to persuade elderly citizens with gifts and horror stories about the future under the non-communist government. Several

public rallies were held and the parties presented their programs on local broadcasting.

The turnout at the polls was 98 % and the Civic Forum scored a conspicuous victory.³

More important in the local context were the municipal elections in November 1990, which brought new life to the local scene after the sleepy summer. New local government had to be elected according to the new Act on Municipalities which renewed the democratic system of local authority in the Czech Republic.⁴ Also the elections themselves were conducted according to new democratic rules.⁵ Their official preparation began some ten weeks and the election lists had to be submitted eight weeks before election day.

³) The election results in N. (the vote for the Chamber of the People of the Federal Assembly) were as follows: Civic Forum 68.3 %, Communist Party 8.8 %, Christian Democratic Union 7.3 %, Social Democrats 4.8 %, Socialists 4.2 %.

⁴) The new Act on Municipalities (on the municipal system) was passed in September, 1990. The decentralization, deregulation and de-etatization of public administration were the dominant principles of the reform. In urban and rural municipalities, territorial self-government has been introduced. Public administration was separated from self-government. The municipality manages its property, establishes organizations and facilities, takes stands on the intentions of other organs and organizations concerning the municipality, maintains public order, administers pre-school facilities and elementary schools, fulfills certain functions in social welfare, administers and maintains local communications, public lighting, trash collection and street cleaning. It can also undertake entrepreneurial activities or participate in them and has some other discretions.

The reform has introduced a new structure of municipal organs. The highest is the municipal council (local parliament) directly elected by the citizens for a period of four years. The council has between seven and eighty members (councillors), depending on the municipality's population. The executive of the council is the municipal board headed by the mayor. The mayor and the board members are elected by the council from its membership. The board has 5-13 members. Municipal matters are managed by the municipal office consisting of the mayor (who is also the head of the office), deputy mayor(s) and administrative officers. In larger and in urban municipalities a municipal secretary is also appointed.

The municipality has its own property and resources. The revenues of the municipality consist of subsidies from the state, income from municipal property, local taxes, fees and dues, shares of taxes levied by the state and some other sources.

⁵) According to the new Election Act, permanent residents of the respective municipalities (with some specific exceptions), 18 years of age and older, can participate, both as voters and as candidates. Candidates may be nominated by "electoral parties", i.e. by registered political parties and political movements or by their coalitions, by independent candidates or by their groups. Elections are conducted by secret ballot.

The electoral system follows the rule of proportional representation. The voter can choose from three options: 1. he or she can select individual candidates from all the lists proposed; 2. he or she can select one of the party lists (electoral parties); or 3. he or she can combine both procedures.

The seats are distributed among the lists proportionately according to the number of votes received. Within an individual list candidates are ranked according to the number of votes they received - both as individuals and as members of the respective lists.

1. The actors

Seven electoral parties were registered and forty-two candidates were proposed for the posts of fifteen councillors. The highest represented social groups among the candidates were white-collar workers and professionals commuting to Prague. Seventeen of them were university educated, mostly in engineering. Their average age was 47 and eleven were female. Two types of candidates can be distinguished:

1. "Newcomers" elevated by the post-November political change, who were mostly professionals and white-collar workers who lacked previous experience in local politics. Many of them had never before occupied any managerial position. Their willingness to become local councillors was motivated more by universal abstract values (a feeling of responsibility to the community, the promotion of democracy, etc.) than by concrete locally bound interests.
2. "Old soldiers", mostly officials who held second and third-rate positions in the old establishment and were now willing (or interested), in their late fifties or sixties, to have a say in municipal affairs. They had managerial experience and expert knowledge but only to a degree corresponding to the low-level positions they occupied.

With the exception of Civic Forum and the Communist Party, all electoral parties were locally specific. Civic Forum proposed fifteen candidates, mostly "newcomers". They were young and middle-aged persons with secondary or university education, employed outside the village and without previous experience in government, but with a lot of enthusiasm. None of them had ever been a Communist Party member, a fact which was proudly stated on the Forum's poster.⁶

The Communist Party proposed seven candidates, mostly middle-aged secondary-educated people, some with earlier local government experience, many of whom were women. They were a mixture of the "old soldier" and "newcomer" types. Surprisingly, two of them had never been Communist Party members.⁷

Other political parties - the two former satellite parties (the Socialist Party and the People's Party) and the Social Democratic Party - formed a coalition which they called the Democratic Bloc. The Bloc nominated twelve candidates of the "old soldier" type. They were mostly officials (active or retired) in technical professions, all over the age of 50, with a somewhat rigid mentality. Several of them were members of the old local government or participated in other ways in the old establishment.⁸

⁶) The fifteen Civic Forum candidates were, on average, 37 years old, and three of them were women. They included one worker, three private entrepreneurs and one university student. The rest were professionals and white-collar employees (physician, architect, university lecturer, sociologist, chemist, social worker, etc.).

⁷) The seven Communist Party candidates were, on average, 42 years old, and four were female. They included one worker, one student, one pensioner, the rest were white-collar employees.

⁸) Among the twelve Democratic Bloc candidates there was only one woman and their average age was 58. Two were workers, three were retired and seven were active officials (post-office clerk, technical designers, railway technician, etc.).

A rather untypical actor in the municipal elections was Society N., whose candidates were in their late twenties (university lecturer, entrepreneur, head of a maintenance crew) and were probably the most dynamic and original "newcomer"-type personalities in the election campaign. Finally, there were the independent candidates, two of them running individually and a further three on a common list as an Association of Independent Candidates. All of them were the "old soldier" types.

2. The election campaign

Three weeks were reserved for the election campaign. Electoral parties organized public rallies, some of them jointly (six public meetings were held in N. during the four weeks preceding the elections). The series was opened at the end of October 1990 by a rally organized by the municipal government during which the election campaign was officially opened, its rules announced and the candidates and platforms of all parties introduced (about 170 citizens were present). Individual rallies attracted audiences of different sizes, with the largest number of people - some two hundred - attending the meeting organized by Civic Forum, while only about thirty visited the communists' meeting. The rallies had a similar program and did not differ much from one another. As the most successful was appreciated the joint meeting of "Society N." and the independents, where the main problems of N. were systematically discussed. Neither was there much difference between the individual election programs. The programs (they were distributed in printed form and also published in the local newspaper) contained many general, locally unspecific goals such as "To guarantee personal safety, protection of property, assistance in illness and old age for all citizens" or "To guarantee that municipal issues will be decided according to the opinion of the majority of citizens". The Civic Forum rally especially suffered from vagueness of presentation and from the inability of candidates to clearly define local problems. Its election program contained a lot of high-brow statements, non-digestable for most of the local electorate.

On the other hand, the programs also enumerated very concrete (and money-demanding) measures like "To complete construction of the new sewage system, to reconstruct public lighting, to find a new source of drinking water..." (one of the independent candidates), without specifying any idea how means and financial resources should be provided.

The most distinctly profiled was the program of "Society N." It stressed tradition and the popularization of local history, support of local businesses, urban renewal, local culture and environmental improvement. To quote a programatic statement of one of its candidates: "My grandfather was local miller and owned the power-plant, he was a well-known local politician... My aim is to take up the tradition of my ancestors and to help remove the sediment of the last forty years... I intend to promote entrepreneurship, development of private sector... The more prosperous the local firms and local entrepreneurs are, the more affluent the municipality will be".

In general, the programs suffered either from abstractness or from exaggerated concreteness. They were marked by many moral appeals, romantic pictures of a happy community and positive references to the pre-war situation. Very little was said about how all the goals would be implemented, about municipal finances and the long-term perspectives and strategies of the municipality. Since the potentially conflictual issues were by-passed, there was little difference between what the individual election parties proclaimed. Their programs were more-or-less apolitical and it would be impossible to locate them on a left-right continuum. Rather than the programs, it was the personalities of the candidates which mattered the most. As a result, the election campaign was meek and mostly peaceful, without a confrontation of opposing goals.

Four factors contributed to the consensual, apolitical character of the election campaign in N.:

1. The immaturity of the global political scene in the Czech Republic as well as of local politics in N. one year after the revolution. Group interests were not yet clearly defined and the parties not profiled. They differed more in names than in programs, which overlapped a lot.
2. The central political parties were not able to think locally. They did not formulate locally relevant programs, nor did they translate their global goals into a language that could address the local electorate.
3. Most of the candidates in the local elections were newcomers to local politics who did not have previous experience in running local affairs nor sufficient knowledge of the local situation. They frequently were not able to define local problems and outline their solutions.
4. The community factor - the integrative influence of common local interests that tended to smooth out political cleavages and to dismiss differences among local electoral parties as something externally imputed - was very important.

3. The elections

On election day (November 24, 1990) 80 % of the voters came to the polls. When coming to the polls, most of them had already decided whom they would give their vote. Their choice was based on personalities, not on partisanship. They knew most of the candidates personally or through other persons and had clear opinions on their characters and abilities. The relatively complicated voting procedure was not perceived to be a problem. The municipality was divided into four precincts, each with one polling station (in a school, the sport hall, the motel and the training center for managers). The atmosphere during the polls was peaceful and orderly and the polls were carefully supervised by observers, ready to intervene in case of any unexpected event.⁹ About forty local citizens volunteered to be observers and organizers of the polls.

⁹) It took only fifteen minutes for a member of the research team to be reported to local police as a "suspicious foreigner", since he began interviewing voters who had left the polling station. The xenophobic instinct of local community in N., cultivated by the previous regime, has apparently survived.

The candidates of Civic Forum won by a large majority. The Democratic Bloc ranked second, Society N. third, and the Coalition of Independent Candidates and Communists fourth and fifth, respectively.

Election results in N. (for comparison percentages of votes in the Czech Republic are also indicated):

	% of votes in N.	% of votes in CR	seats in the council
Civic Forum	41.0	35.6	6
Democratic Bloc	18.6	-	3
Society N.	14.7	-	2
Coalition	12.3	16.5	2
Communist Party	6.8	17.2	1
Independent cand. A	4.0	10.6	1
Independent cand. B	2.6	-	
Total	100.0		15

The quiet atmosphere of the elections was disturbed by a conflict that broke out on election day. The candidates of the coalition presented a complaint against violation of election rules. They objected to a local broadcast, wherein - two days before election day, after all campaigning according to the election act had to terminate - one senior citizen announced who were his preferred and non-preferred candidates. He also suggested that other citizens vote in the same way. This well-meant pedagogical exercise was considered to be an illegal influencing of the ballot. After several hours of negotiations with the district supervisory committee the complaint was withdrawn.

The new municipal council had 15 members, of which 6 represented Civic Forum, 3 the coalition, 3 the independent candidates, 2 "Society N." and 1 the Communist Party. Six councillors were university-educated, five had secondary education and four were skilled workers. With only two women members, the council was mostly a male affair.

In early December, after preliminary negotiations between the electoral parties represented on the council, the mayor and the remaining four members of the municipal board were elected by the municipal council. The discussions were not entirely smooth because the former partners - Civic Forum and Society N. - came to grips, both claiming for themselves the key posts on the municipal board. The new mayor was chosen from three candidates. He was aged 54, secondary-school educated and had until then worked as an administrator in the public sector. On the council he represented the coalition and was one of the typical "old soldier" characters. Of the remaining board members, three belonged to Civic Forum, one was independent.¹⁰

¹⁰) Two of them were university-educated, one had secondary education, one was a skilled worker. Their average age was 43.

N. after the elections

The municipal elections and the establishment of the new local government closed the busy period of the first post-revolutionary year. They were decisive steps in the democratization of the local political system and they meant, in a way, a return to normal business in local politics.

However, most of the other relevant issues of transformation in N. were still ahead. They included:

- the renewal of local private business;
- the privatization of the housing stock, of real estate and of some other parts of state property, including parts of the public sector;
- the restitution of private property confiscated by the Communist regime; and
- the reinstatement of municipal property, as well as other issues.

Three major issues dominated political life in N. in 1991: the conflict between the mayor and the municipal board; the split-up of Civic Forum - the winner of the municipal elections; and the first wave of the privatization of state property.

The conflict between the mayor and the municipal board's Civic Forum majority was fought over the insufficient flexibility of the former in coping with the changing environment of local development and over the running of the inner business of the council. The *casus belli* was the unbalanced municipal budget and the need to reduce municipal expenses as well as to pressure for an increase in the state grant.¹¹ The mayor was not very efficient in dealing with these issues and after a protracted conflict he had to resign. He was replaced by one of the independent board members, significantly again an "old soldier" type, an experienced technician who had worked in the municipal office for many years. Though born by the revolution, the council was quick to acknowledge the advantage of continuity and professional experience in the mayoral post.

The split of Civic Forum was the local echo of a process that was taking place on the national level. There, the movement which was the flag-bearer of the revolution quietly dissolved into two successor parties, one to the left and the other to the right of center. The issue, much discussed in N., was whether to follow this model or if, perhaps, to preserve the local Civic Forum - the symbol of the revolution and of the new local integration, irrespective of what happened in the capital. A conflict between the polarizing effects of global politics and the more integrative tendencies of local politics was taking place. The outcome was a compromise: the local Civic Forum withered away, but the councillors elected on its list stayed on the council as independents. A local chapter of one of the successor parties was founded but has not obtained many members.

Privatization was by far the most important change taking place in N. during 1991. Practically all of the shops and service centers were sold or leased to private

¹¹) Expenses of the municipality were estimated at 2,850,000 Kčs (1,140 Kčs per head), while revenues were estimated at 2,500,000 Kčs. Locally derived revenues were 600,000 Kčs (25 % of the total). The largest portion of expenses (1,600,000 Kčs) went to the local elementary school.

persons in public auctions and by other arrangements. The highest bid was obtained at the auction of a simple news-stand in front of the railway station (apparently this is where money is made). Several new private shops were opened. A considerable part of the housing stock and land that was nationalized after the communist takeover in 1948 or confiscated thereafter was returned to its former owners or to their heirs and families. The more complicated or controversial private claims are waiting for decisions by the courts. The municipality too was returned some of its original property - public buildings and some houses. Its claims concerning forest land and real estate are pending.

The symbol of N., the castle, which is depicted on all post-cards, is also changing its owners and will be returned to the church order that held it until 1949. It is a rather small order, which lacks financial means and is still deliberating what to do with its reclaimed property. In the meantime the desolate castle continues to dilapidate, while enjoying state protection as a historical monument.

All the changes in ownership rights and in the distribution of property are bound to bring about new, deeply-rooted group interests and change the social and political differentiation of the local society in N. which, no doubt, will be reflected in local political life. The time of genuine local politics is, therefore, yet to come.

The more serious tests of the new municipal government and of the municipal system in general are also yet to come. The new municipal council was endowed by law with a broad range of responsibilities, and is facing the high expectations of its electorate. Its capacity to satisfy such responsibilities and expectations is, however, seriously limited, mainly because its freedom to act in economic matters remains restricted. Until 1993, when a new fiscal system is to be introduced nationwide, the financing of local governments is provisional and the old centralized redistributive system has basically been preserved.

Conclusions - discontinuity and continuity in local development

N. is certainly no average rural village - its political and social climate has been strongly influenced by the nearby capital. In spite of that, the above picture well illustrates the character of local political transformation during the first two years after the collapse of the old regime. The story of N. demonstrates the extent and pace of the change and indicates also that these were just the first steps of a long and dramatic process.

There is no doubt that what we are witnessing on the local stage is a true revolution, albeit a non-violent one, a clear discontinuation of the previous system. Yet, at the same time, it is also possible to recognize certain elements of the continuity of pre-November patterns, suggesting that the change has not involved all dimensions of local society equally. While the formal institutions - political parties, the electoral system, local government, social organizations, ownership rights, etc. - were profoundly transformed in a relatively short time, the more informal aspects of local society - the political culture and values, social networks, the way of life, etc. - have been altered to a much lesser degree. A gap has opened between the pace of institutional and of cultural change.

There is, however, yet another element of continuity in the recent developments, though of a different historical dimension: the recent transformation of N. has sometimes been accompanied by the re-emergence of pre-war institutions, interests, values and symbols - or at least by their imitations - and by the comeback of some of the old pre-communist elites. Partial evidence of such phenomena was mentioned in the above narrative.

Several analysts of post-communist societies, generalizing on such tendencies, came to the conclusion that post-1989 developments marked the end of a historical deviation, bringing these societies back to where they had been before the communist takeover [Touraine 1990]. In our opinion, both the continuity and the discontinuity models of local development in post-communist society are one-sided. The "rectifying" forces of the revolution interact with the legacy of the old regime to produce a reality that, most probably, will be different both from the pre-November and the pre-war situations.

All in all, it can be said that the institutional foundations of local democracy - political pluralism and local self-government - have been laid since 1989. The new economic policy has opened the road for the re-birth of the middle class, local interests have begun to surface and localism as well as regionalism have spread as influential political movements.

Still, much more has to be accomplished. The following can be singled out as the most relevant barriers that have to be surmounted. None of them can be dealt with immediately, a longer span of time will be needed to do away with them:

1. The absence of a locally anchored middle class as the backbone of local political and social life. However, a still scanty group of private owners and businessmen has already originated in N. and tried to find its way into local politics. Many of them chose "Society N." as the appropriate channel.
2. The persistence of a political culture characterized by the separation of private and public spheres, by the passivity and alienation of citizens from public involvement, and by the expectation of paternalistic care from the authorities. The euphoric atmosphere of 1990 vanished after the elections and it has become again difficult to attract larger audiences to public meetings. The pool of people willing and capable to actively participate in local politics and to work in the new municipal government is modest and shrinking: eligible activists are being permanently lost to central political and administrative functions and to private business.
3. The absence of knowledge and skills concerning the operation of local government in the decentralized system and in the conditions of a market economy. The council in N. was caught unprepared when it came to formulating policies in the spheres of the municipal economy and environmental protection and was nearly helpless in matters concerning municipal property.
4. The political and administrative fragmentation of municipalities, which makes it extremely difficult for the smallest units to meet public needs and to run any

meaningful economy.¹² However, a spontaneous tendency to reintegrate on the basis of common interests can already be observed: municipalities of the region around N. founded an "Association for the Renewal of Towns, Villages and of the Landscape" focusing on recreation, environmental protection and local marketing.

5. The general weakness of municipal budgets, arising from the tension between political decentralization and the still centralized distribution of finances.

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¹² In 1989, 96 % of the 4,104 municipalities in the Czech Republic had less than 5,000 inhabitants and 67 % less than 1,000 inhabitants. Their respective shares of the total population were 32 % and 12 %.

Wariness Towards Jews as an Expression of Post-Communist Panic

The Case of Slovakia

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Abstract: The study analyzes the problem of anti-Semitism in Czecho-Slovakia, with special emphasis on Slovakia, where the manifestations of anti-Semitism after the "velvet revolution" have been more numerous. It perceives these manifestations as the tip of an iceberg of historically accumulated prejudices against Jews rooted in the culture. Issuing from the findings of several representative surveys, the study proves the higher wariness towards the Jews among the population of Slovakia in comparison with the Czech lands. Similar to other countries, this wariness has features of an "anti-Semitism without Jews", as, due to the holocaust and several waves of emigration, the number of members of the Jewish community in Slovakia has rapidly decreased. The revived anti-Semitism in Slovakia is interpreted within the context of the "post-Communist panic" accompanying the intricate process of transition. Following the description of the specific features of traditional Slovak anti-Semitism, as well as empirical analysis of the value background of the present anti-Jewish prejudices, the conclusion is formulated that in the anatomy of Slovak anti-Semitism there have not been, despite the passing of decades, substantial changes. Anti-Jewish attitudes can be seen as a metaphorical and condensed expression of an anti-liberal orientation, lying behind which there are social and political insecurity, frustration, authoritarianism, cultural isolation, as well as general national intolerance. In order to come to terms with anti-Semitism in Slovakia, it is necessary to re-assess the period of the Slovak State (1939-1945) in view of the share of responsibility of Slovak political representatives and the general public for the tragedy of the Slovak Jews. Issuing from the empirical findings, the study shows the unsatisfactory state of the critical historical consciousness of the Slovak population.

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1. Half a century after the Holocaust: The fading of historical memory

The desecration of Jewish cemeteries; anti-Semitic inscriptions; claims about the so-called "Auschwitz-lie"; the re-issuing of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*; the distinct election success of the extreme right in some European countries; computer games modelled on the concentration camps; the interpretation of political events as the results of a Jewish-Free Masonic plot - all of these provide

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evidence that not even the most drastic vaccination, by the holocaust, has been sufficient to prevent anti-Semitism [Beunruhigender 1991; Gitelman 1991; Karsai 1991; Maimannová 1990; Pfahl-Traugher 1991]. Eye-witnesses are dying, historical memory is fading, and the trauma of Auschwitz after which it was "no longer possible to write poetry" (Adorno) is being overlaid by dozens of other worries.

In the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe the manifestations of anti-Semitism are all the more serious because they are part of the so-called "refrigerator phenomenon": the situation in which many significant social problems that were "frozen" by the Communist dictatorships are re-appearing now and are all demanding to be solved at the same time.

The famous dissent philosopher Milan Šimečka several months before the revolution pointed at the share Czechoslovak intellectuals' had in making the Jewish problem taboo [Šimečka 1991]: "The intellectual atmosphere of a decent country between the two world wars... ordered every decent man to ignore the origin of assimilated Jews and to respect their Jewish orthodoxy. I perceived this tradition as the best response to Jewishness even later, when the holocaust and the totally changed situation placed everything in a different moral perspective... The experience of other Central Europeans shows that openness, continuous discussions and historical study are more beneficial to the health of the national spirit".

The manifestations of anti-Semitism have not avoided Czechoslovakia either. Soon after November, 1989, the obscure interpretation of the "Velvet Revolution" as a plot on the part of dissidents and the former top communists, covered up by an international Jewish-Free Masonic mafia, was spreading [Dolejší 1991]. The Czech public has been disturbed by anti-Jewish articles in the journal *Politika* and the vilification of the Jewish cemetery in Příbram by school-goers.

The manifestations of anti-Semitism in Slovakia have been more numerous than in the Czech lands. The problem of coming to terms with anti-Semitism is deeply tied up with the issue of national emancipation. One part of the Slovak press and some politicians look back with hope to the only period of Slovak independence, the Slovak State of 1939 to 1945, which, however, is inevitably associated with the deportations of the Slovak Jews. There have been attempts to rehabilitate its president, the Catholic priest Jozef Tiso, and reduce his share of responsibility in the fate of the Slovak Jews.

A different attitude has been adopted by those Slovak politicians and intellectuals who do not deny the anti-Jewish policy of the Slovak State, but rather try to minimize the current manifestations of anti-Semitism as the excesses of marginal groups in the population. They claim that these manifestations have no resonance in the Slovak public and will fade away of their own accord - provided they are not artificially dramatized.

Finally, a third interpretation perceives the manifestations of anti-Semitism as the tip of the iceberg of historically accumulated prejudice against Jews, as a consequence of stereotypes rooted in the culture. In this interpretation, the

manifestations of anti-Semitism are set into the wider context of being a threat to democratic development in general.

2. The case of Slovakia: Increased wariness towards Jews

The inhabitants of Slovakia react very sensitively to statements characterising anti-Semitism in Slovakia as "endemic". They also reject generalizations accusing the Slovak nation of having an inherent tendency towards anti-Semitism, similar to that of the Polish nation. Results of several surveys imply that the general labelling of Slovaks as anti-Semites is inadequate. At the same time, however, they also provide evidence that manifestations of open anti-Semitism spring from a wider background that could be characterised as increased wariness towards Jews.

This increased wariness is indicated by the results of several international and local studies. According to the survey carried out by the Time Mirror Center in September 1991 every third adult in Slovakia, again similar to Poland, has a negative attitude toward Jews [The Pulse... 1991]. According to the findings of the Prague Association for Independent Social Analysis (AISA), in January 1991 the social distance towards Jews was less significant in the Slovak Republic (hereafter SR) than in Poland, but higher than in the Czech Republic (hereafter CR) or Hungary: 32 % of the respondents in Slovakia would rather not have Jews as neighbors, versus 40 % of Poles, 17 % of Hungarians and 20 % of Czechs. 51 % of the population in the SR would not mind Jews as neighbors as opposed to 66 % of the respondents in the CR, 65 % in Hungary and 51 % in Poland [The Results of a Comparative... 1991].

The results of the survey of the Center for Social Analysis in Bratislava (CSA) from January 1992 are, in principle, very similar: one third of the population of the SR (33 %) would definitely not want to have Jews as neighbors, as opposed to 17 % of the citizens of the CR [Aktuálne... January 1992].

The increased wariness towards Jews in Slovakia is also proven by a whole range of other findings. For example, according to a survey taken by the Prague Institute for Public Opinion Research (IVVM) in November 1991 a great majority of people in the SR (85 %), as well as in the CR (88 %) takes the attitude that the Jews are equal to other citizens; however, only 46 % of the inhabitants of the SR as opposed to 64 % in the CR agree with this statement unconditionally [The Results of a Survey... 1991]. The opinion that Jews behave in a way that raises hostility was denied by 51 % respondents in the SR and by 69 % in the CR.

These differences are also portrayed in the less frequent categorical condemnation of the holocaust [The Results of a Survey... 1991]. The extreme statement that the Jews deserved their fate was rejected by 78 % of the respondents in the CR, as well as by 74 % in the SR. While the premise of a "just punishment" was unambiguously rejected by 63 % of the respondents in the CR, in the SR it was rejected by a mere 38 %. The atrocities committed on Jews during the second world war were condemned as criminal by 86 % of the respondents in the CR and 81 % in the SR; but even in this point definite condemnation was more frequent among Czech respondents (70 % in the CR in contrast to 43 % in the SR).

3. Anti-Semitism as a "cultural code"

This revived anti-Semitism, an unintentional and ironic consequence of the "Velvet Revolution", is taking place against the background of what Václav Bělohradský called the "post-Communist panic". The society struggling with the first stage of its transition has become unintelligible for many [Bělohradský 1991]. The rapid economic, legislative and political changes are coming into conflict with value orientations and norms of behavior carried over from the society of "real socialism", as well as from the more distant past. The abandonment of the state's paternalistic practices, the development of a market economy, the rehabilitation of parliamentary democracy - these requirements present a great social challenge. The re-definition of the codes of behavior [Mareš, Musil, Rabušic 1992], the adaptation to the "new rules of the game", is being accompanied by feelings of insecurity, a lack of self-confidence and a fear of failure.

Data from surveys in Czechoslovakia [Aktuálne... 1990, 1991, 1992] show the generally widespread feeling of the alienation of the "new power elite" from the everyday needs of the people. It is joined by the syndrome of impoverishment: the fear of the coming of ruthless capitalism and merciless competition, which will lead to social inequality. Strong also is the fear of negative economic, political and cultural consequences from the overcoming of autarky. The general feeling of insecurity is magnified by worries about the escalation of national and racial hostility. Trust in parliamentary democracy has been low so far; the disillusionment arising from the hitherto weak functioning of the democratic regime is leading to a well-known nostalgia for authoritarianism [Bútorá 1992].

These feelings are more frequent in Slovak than in Czech society, a fact to which the harsher impact of the economic reform on the Slovak population (an approximately three times higher rate of unemployment, problems with the conversion of military industries, the loss of the Eastern market, etc.) has undoubtedly contributed. They may become more significant as a substantial part of the Slovak population finds the explanation for the current difficulties in one common denominator: the perception that the social transformation threatens the national interests of Slovakia.

In every situation involving profound social change, a need appears to find the simplest possible explanation for complicated problems. Among such "explanations" is the search for an enemy,¹ for scapegoats, which has traditionally been suitable ground for reviving prejudice against Jews. People adversely affected by change - whether materially or ideologically - have a greater chance of succumbing to these prejudices: those who feel personally threatened by the disintegration of traditional values and links; those who are searching for new possibilities of identification and orientation; and, finally, those who have what have been called authoritarian personalities [Pfahl-Traugher 1991].

¹ The syndrome of the enemy image includes the following elements: distrust, placing guilt on the enemy, negative anticipation, identification with evil, zero-sum thinking, de-individualization and refusal of empathy [Spillmann, Spillmann 1991].

The appearance of modern anti-Semitism in Europe was historically associated with a similar situation of revolutionary change, i.e. the disintegration of feudal society and the coming of liberalism and industrial urban society. Doing away with the Jewish ghetto and emancipating the Jews were both aspects of creating a modern civic society [Rürup 1990]. The process of the emancipation of the Jews, however, came into conflict not only with prejudices rooted in the national and religious culture, but also with the strong resentment of the middle classes who sensed economic competition. Modern anti-Semitism, Michael Riff claims [Riff 1990], was thus "more than just a racially, culturally and religiously motivated hatred of the Jews. It became a cultural code for the rejection of bourgeois liberalism and industrial society".²

Anti-Semitism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had some additional specific features. It was incorporated in the appearing process of national self-consciousness and emancipation. In oppressed nations Jews were often identified with the ruling elite of the dominant nation. Thus they appeared to others both as exploiters and national oppressors.³

As Eduard Goldstücker says, "in the course of national emancipation, the nations of Eastern Europe had to form a class that would run the economy and start by accumulating capital. The new middle class had to take certain posts in economic life and the first ones were in village trade, which was in Jewish hands" [Goldstücker 1991].

In the liberal conditions for economic development in Hungarian-controlled Slovakia, Jews had achieved success in banking and trade, industrial and agricultural production, as well as in the free professions - as lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians, journalists and artists. In fact their competition had become omnipresent. The inhabitants of this region perceived this competition much more than the objective contributions of their Jewish fellow countrymen to the society's progress. As it is summarized by I. Kamenec, anti-Semitism in its conscious or unconscious form thus gradually developed in practically all classes of Slovak society, in which it had predominantly an economically defensive character and a strong national and anti-Hungarian accent. It was precisely this kind of anti-Semitism that brought success to Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, which was

the most skillful in playing the anti-Jewish card... encouraging the economically and socially frustrated petty bourgeois and middle classes, as well as the intelligentsia which had been waiting in vain for its full self-assertion. This was also the breeding ground for criticism of the "liberal capitalism" that enabled Jews to take strong positions in economic and public

²) The connection between anti-Semitism and an anti-liberal orientation escapes the attention of J. M. Bochenski, who restricts the causes for anti-Semitism to personal qualities, the abilities of the Jews and their share in power in Communist parties [Bochenski 1991].

³) The Slovak literature of the last century and the beginning of this one is full of genre scenes depicting Jewish pub owners who were turning Slovak villages to alcoholism and destroying them economically. In the period of intense and forceful Magyarization, Jewish pub owners had become a reliable support-group for the ruling power. The appearance of specific "anti-pub owner anti-Semitism" can be dated back to that period [Bútora 1989].

life. The People's Party also made the most of the surviving elements of religious anti-Semitism, passing itself off as a defender of the Slovak nation not only against its economic and national adversaries but also against religious enemies [Kamenec 1991].

The official policy of the Slovak state then completely deleted from memory any Jewish economic and cultural contribution to the development of Slovak society, and finally escalated through laws discriminating against non-Aryans to labor camps and deadly deportations.

4. The anatomy of present-day anti-Semitism in Slovakia and the Czech lands: Similarities and differences

Too successful, too influential

In the minds of a large majority of the population, Jews currently appear as those who "can always obtain decent living conditions for themselves". This is the view held by 83 % of the respondents in Slovakia and 75 % in the CR [The Results of a Survey... 1991]. The Jewish issue is perceived, particularly in Slovakia, as one relating to their excessive share in power.⁴ According to AISA findings [The Results of a Comparative... 1991], the conviction that Jews have too strong an influence on the economic life of the society was held by 42 % of the population in the SR in contrast to 12 % in the CR at the beginning of 1991; the influence of Jews on political life was considered too big by 38 % of the inhabitants in the SR in contrast to 9 % in the CR. The share of people convinced of too large of a Jewish influence on culture was substantially lower (20 % in the SR and 10 % in the CR).

Regarding the future, the inhabitants of Slovakia admit more frequently the possibility of an excessively strong Jewish economic and political influence and express worries about it: in May, 1991, 60 % of respondents admitted such fears, while 36 % expressed them with full decisiveness. By January, 1992 the share of persons fearing Jews had decreased slightly (53 %), but nevertheless remained three times higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands (16 %) [Aktuálne... 1991, 1992].

The anti-Semitic vision also affects, to a considerable extent, the interpretation of the "Velvet Revolution": 24 % of the inhabitants of Slovakia assumed (in May, 1991) that lying behind the events of November 1989 were Jews, who influenced the course of the events much more distinctly than other groups of the population; according to 13 % the Jews profited most from the breakdown of the Communist regime. For 20 % of the adults in Slovakia, the Jews present a

⁴) The conviction of an excessively strong Jewish influence can be found in the background of anti-Semitism in other countries as well. For example at the time of the Great Depression in the USA, when anti-Semitism flourished, every third American assumed that the Jews had too much power (Le Nouvel Observateur, quoted according to [Antisemitizmus 1991]). According to the findings of the Center for Public Opinion Research 20 % of people in today's Poland are convinced that Jews have the greatest influence on government activity and one third consider the Jewish influence too big (Życie Warszawy, quoted according to [Antisemitizmus 1991]).

danger for further political development (although for only 4 % in the CR) [The Results of a Comparative... 1991].

The conception of the Jews as too successful and influential contributes to the wariness towards them much more significantly than the perception of their racial difference.⁵ As well, their religious difference is also a rather marginal characteristic for the inhabitants of Slovakia.⁶

Epidemiological Findings

Which groups of the population are more likely to share in anti-Jewish attitudes? Repeated surveys [Aktuálne... 1991, 1992] confirm that the prejudices find more fertile ground among older people,⁷ those with lower education,⁸ unqualified manual workers and inhabitants of small rural areas in Central Slovakia. It can be assumed that anti-Semitism in Slovakia is connected with inertia, cultural backwardness and isolation. All these links proved to be statistically significant for the social background of anti-Semitism in Czech society as well.

An increased occurrence of anti-Jewish attitudes is recorded among citizens of Slovak nationality in comparison with those of the Hungarian minority. The more moderate attitude of the Hungarians towards the Jews may be caused by the awareness of the more intensive participation of the Jews in the development of Hungarian culture [Kárady 1991].

It can be further stated that people of the Catholic faith succumb to anti-Jewish prejudices more frequently than Protestants, atheists or people with an unclear attitude towards religion. This finding suggests that the Catholic Church and politicians are insufficiently participating in the process of overcoming anti-Jewish prejudices and creating a positive image of Jews.⁹ There is also insufficient

⁵) Unfortunately we are not familiar with any Czechoslovak surveys devoted to a more profound analysis of the racial aspects of this phenomenon. Findings of this kind are available from Poland [Antisemitizmus 1991]. Although the awareness of the racial difference of Jews is considerably developed (one half of the Poles consider Jews to be a different race), in most cases it does not induce a feeling of the superiority of the Aryan race (only 4 % of the Poles classify the Jews as the "worse" race).

⁶) The extent of religious tolerance towards the Jews is slightly lower in Slovak society than in Czech. According to the findings of AISA [The Results of a Comparative... 1991], 73 % of the inhabitants of the SR, in comparison with 89 % in the CR, agreed with the view that Jews should have a chance to practise their religion quite freely; only 43 % of the inhabitants of the SR, in comparison to 69 % in the CR, agreed with it unconditionally.

⁷) Our findings do not confirm the conclusions of the Times Mirror Center [The Pulse 1991], according to which the greatest hostility against the Jews is found among middle-aged persons.

⁸) A similar connection was also revealed by the Times Mirror Center [The Pulse 1991].

⁹) It would be useful to focus sociological analysis on the formation of attitudes to the Jews during primary and secondary socialization. The Polish sociologist K. Daniel has studied the participation of the Catholic Church and the school in the formation of xenophobic, nationalistic and anti-Semitic attitudes among school-goers. She claimed that the Church prefers a simplified, out-dated view on the Jewish issue: the priests concentrate only on biblical topics and the crucifixion of Jesus. In her opinion the Polish Church does not

resolve for coming to terms with the character of the Slovak State and the inhuman solution of the "Jewish question" of those days [Frišová 1991].


Who needs the "image of the enemy"?

(The value background of anti-Jewish attitudes)

More than by social-demographic characteristics, people with anti-Semitic prejudices are determined and united by their specific value background [Aktuálne... 1991, 1992].

1. They are more frustrated by the developments after November 1989 and stress the shortcomings of the present political regime, as compared with the communist one.


Chart 1. Are you Afraid of Too Strong of a Jewish Influence?
- according to attitudes to the regime in Slovakia (CSA 1992)



2. They more often experience social and economic uncertainty; they are more pessimistic when evaluating their personal chances under the conditions of radical economic reform; they emphasize all its potential negative impacts, especially the deepening of social inequality, as well as the sale of national properties to foreign capital. They prefer state ownership of companies and believe in the capabilities of a centrally managed economy. They are sceptical about the chances of being successful in the labor market as a result of individual effort and skills and more frequently give their allegiance to the political left.

participate in creating a positive image of the Jews in terms of the Declaration of the Bishops Conference Nostra Aetate from 1965 [Daniel 1991].

Chart 2. Are You Afraid of Too Strong of a Jewish Influence?
- according to attitudes to the reform in Slovakia (CSA 1992)



3. They accept to a lower degree the necessity of overcoming economic, political and cultural autarky and feel increased worries of American and German influence and the loss of national identity and culture in an integrated Europe. Their mistrust is also higher towards the European Community and NATO. The interconnection between anti-Semitism and anti-western isolationism is apparently also a consequence of the brainwashing against Zionism practiced for many decades.

Chart 3. Are You Afraid of Too Strong of a Jewish Influence?
- according to SR citizens' fears of too strong US influence





Chart 4. Are You Afraid of Too Strong of a Jewish Influence?
- according to SR citizens' fears of too strong German influence




4. People with increased wariness of Jews more frequently share the conviction that the new power elite has become alienated from the interests of the rank and

file. They feel politically threatened and insecure and have a higher distrust of all the top political institutions of executive and representational power. They incline to authoritarianism, desiring more than others a strong leader who would guarantee order and prevent chaos, even at the cost of restricting citizens' rights. The appeal for order is linked with stronger political radicalism, i.e. with a higher readiness to join economic and political strikes.

5. Anti-Jewish prejudice goes hand in hand with more outspoken nationalist tendencies. The data for Slovakia show that prejudiced individuals express an almost narcissistically weakened sense for criticism of their own nation and a higher intolerance towards others - the Czechs, the Hungarian minority, the Gypsies and foreigners. As far as the Czech society is concerned, the people with anti-Jewish attitudes share a more negative attitude towards the Germans: they emphasize their feeling of superiority, geo-political and economic threats and the impossibility of mutual forgivingness.
6. In Slovakia people with increased wariness towards the Jews differ from others also by their interpretation of history. They have a more favorable view of the Slovak State and its president, minimizing the fate of the Jews during the second world war. To a higher extent than others they describe Czech-Slovak coexistence as permanently disadvantageous for the Slovaks. More often they reject the first Czechoslovak Republic and its President, T. G. Masaryk. They blame the Czechs for enthroning Communism and deforming the federation declared in 1968. They stress the unequal position of Slovakia within the framework of the CSFR and support loosening the links between the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Chart 5. Prejudices Against the Jews
among SR citizens with different attitudes to J. Tiso (CSA 1992)



Such is, in rough outlines, the value background of anti-Semitism in Czechoslovakia. If we focus on Slovakia and compare the present anti-Semitism with the quoted characteristics of anti-Semitism in the past, we can say that in the anatomy of this phenomenon there has not been, despite the passing of decades, substantial change. Even today anti-Jewish attitudes seem to be a metaphorical and condensed expression of an anti-liberal orientation, behind which lie social and political insecurity, frustration, authoritarianism, cultural isolation, as well as a general national intolerance magnified by these circumstances.¹⁰

5. Critical historical consciousness as a prevention against prejudice

We are speaking about the need to come to terms with anti-Semitism in spite of the fact that, similarly to many other countries and due to the holocaust and several emigration waves, the number of members of the Jewish community in Slovakia has rapidly decreased. Out of approximately 100,000 Jews who were living in this region before the second world war, there remain today, according to the minimum estimate, 3000, and according to the maximum 7000 to 10,000. Thus we are witnessing - similar to elsewhere - an "anti-Semitism without Jews": the concrete home subject of the hostility has disappeared, the real Jew has been replaced by an imaginary Jew [Špitzer 1992]. More irritating for the militant anti-Semites are the concrete public personalities who express allegiance to their Jewishness.

The reaching of a consensus in rejecting anti-Semitism in Slovakia is not possible without a critical re-assessment of the Slovak State in view of the fate of the Slovak Jews. The post-November period has brought to the surface several pieces of evidence showing the self-sacrifice of non-Jewish fellow Slovaks towards their neighbors carrying the yellow star, even proving the help of part of one group of the clergy and some political representatives. It cannot be claimed that the Slovaks as a nation did not show sympathy and compassion in those tragic times. Even more, however, it is necessary to see things truthfully and speak about the crimes, indifference or support of evil where they happened.

Critical national self-reflection has been prevented until recently by the Communist regime. For decades the representatives of Tiso's regime were condemned predominately for their clericalism and anti-Communism, while the totalitarian character of the regime was, for obvious reasons, avoided by Communist interpreters.

The fall of censorship made it possible to do away with this taboo. Simultaneously, however, efforts glorifying the Slovak State were gaining publicity. The dispute about the Slovak State has become one of the key points in the discussions about the national character of the Slovaks, their national identity and the spiritual streams that form the foundation of Slovak history.

¹⁰) A similar cluster of attitudes was found among Muscovites by R. J. Brym. Anti-Semitism is overlaid with authoritarianism, anti-western attitudes and extreme Russian nationalism [Gitelman 1991].

It seems, however, as if these discussions did not touch the historical consciousness of the general public. As has been shown by repeated surveys in October 1990 [Aktuálne... 1990], May 1991 [Aktuálne... 1991] and January 1992 [Aktuálne... 1992], the distribution of opinions about the Slovak State shows a remarkable stability: only 39 % of the citizens of the SR ascribe to the Slovak State more negative than positive features; according to 33 % the merits of the Slovak State outweighed its shortcomings; 28 % are not able to take any evaluating stance to this period. The distribution of opinions on the historical role of J. Tiso is similar: only 42 % of the adults in Slovakia assume a critical approach towards him; on the other hand, 29 % interpret him as a positive historical personality and for the rest of 29 % he has remained a vague and indistinct character (data from January 1992).

The defenders of the Slovak State stress mainly the state is independent and the relative material prosperity of the non-Jewish population. They interpret fascism in Slovakia as something imposed from the outside.¹¹ How incomplete the knowledge of the character of the Slovak State is, can be illustrated by the distribution of opinions on the fate of the Slovak Jews in the second world war: 63 % of respondents were aware that Jews were afflicted more than other people; a further 37 % either rejected this (18 %) or had no knowledge about it (19 %).

6. Conclusion

The health of every society depends on its ability to maintain its memory. An old historical proverb says that those who turn a blind eye to the past become blind to the present as well. Those who are reluctant to remember inhuman conduct are prone to a new dangerous infection again (Weizsäcker - [Mareš, Musil, Rabušič 1992]).

In view of all the mentioned facts, the attempts to minimize the manifestations of anti-Semitism as a marginal phenomenon must be rejected. The idea that for the suppression of anti-Semitism it would suffice to introduce legal sanctions against those who openly propagate it must also be seen as simplistic. Legal sanctions without widely shared moral condemnation can call forth counter-productive effects and cause a shifting of anti-Semitism into the hidden, latent positions in which it has been surviving for decades.

The increased wariness toward Jews, as well as the lenient attitudes to the Slovak State should be interpreted as a cultural code, a symptom of the critical state of a Slovak society that has not, by far, won the struggle for its efficient functioning and moral health.

¹¹) This fact is also obvious in the distribution of opinions on the Slovak National Uprising of 1944 (SNU) [Aktuálne... 1991, 1992]. On the one hand, the majority of the population (77 % in January 1992) accepts the SNU as a manifestation of resistance against fascism. On the other hand, however, the recognition of the anti-fascist character of the SNU shows only a relatively weak connection to the critical assessment of the character of the Slovak State: a positive relation to SNU is to be found not only among the majority of critics of the Slovak State (approximately 80 %), but also among a majority of its admirers (approximately 65 %).

The forty years of taboo on this discussion did not teach Czechoslovak society how to "handle" anti-Semitism, how to come to terms with it. Therefore it is a task of topical relevance to stimulate the capacity of the general public, media, courts and political representation for facing this and other forms of prejudice and to prevent national/racial discrimination.

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Unmarried Cohabitation in Czechoslovakia

IVO MOŽNÝ*

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Abstract: Our paper tries to answer the question of whether there is or is not the phenomenon of unmarried cohabitation in Czechoslovakia. Despite the character of relevant demographic data (i.e. the relatively low mean age at first marriage, low proportion of children born out of wedlock and high nuptiality rate) we argue that in terms of their trends they provide us with indication that there are more and more women and men for whom the traditional pattern of family formation does not hold any longer, and that living together unmarried as an early form of family life-course or as an alternative to previous experience with marriage is something that can be found in Czechoslovakia. To support our hypothesis we conducted two surveys among partners applying for marriage licenses in 1985 and 1990. Results showed that 31 % and 37 % of couples contracting their first marriage lived together in 1985 and 1990, respectively. The proportion of cohabitants among couples contracting a second or third marriage was 73 % and 77 %. Our conclusion is that unmarried cohabitation in Czechoslovakia does exist. It is not of a Scandinavian type, however. We call it "engaged cohabitation", which is oriented toward marriage.

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Nowadays, there are many ways of setting up a household. The usual one, getting married and having children, has become only one among a wide variety of living arrangements and life styles [Macklin 1983] in the developed countries of Europe, North America and Australia. The demographic behavior of the populations of these countries has been undergoing a fundamental change during the last three decades: nuptial and fertility rates have decreased, mean age at first marriage and mean age at the birth of the first child have increased, and the divorce rate has increased as well.

All these facts are well known to demographers and sociologists. Factors considered by the literature as potential causes of the phenomena vary. Generally speaking, they can be clustered into three types: economic factors, advocated by Becker [1981], Easterlin [1980], Ermisch [1981], etc.; contraceptive technology factors, being stressed for instance by Westoff and Ryder [1977]; and last, but not least, value system factors. The focus of interest on value systems, though recent in

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demographic analysis, has produced several important insights: (see e.g. [Preston 1986; Lesthaeghe 1983; Hoffmann-Nowotny 1987; van de Kaa 1987]). The value change conceptualized for instance by Inglehart [1977; 1990] as a "silent revolution" or more broadly as a "culture shift", is thought to be connected with the new functioning of individuals in post-industrial societies. This change in values generally means a shift from traditional value patterns which stress material well-being and physical security (i.e. "materialist values") toward "post-materialist values", i.e. greater emphasis on the quality of life, on needs of belonging, self-esteem and self-realization.

The autonomous progression of an individualist-oriented Western value system [Lesthaeghe 1983] coincides with population changes in the Western world: as van de Kaa [1987] put it, we are witnessing shifts from marriage towards the cohabitation of unmarried persons, from children to the adult couple as the focus of the family, from contraception as a means of preventing unwanted pregnancies to deliberate self-fulfilling choices whether and when to conceive a child (with voluntarily childlessness as a frequent outcome), and from uniform to widely diversified families, households and life-styles.

Such ordering has its inner logic. When we look at it from the point of view of individuals' life courses, the shifts can be seen as a sequence that begins with unmarried cohabitation. In the late 1960s, young men and women, healthy and biologically mature, living in a world of unprecedented prosperity, with open access to high schools and universities, gradually came to the conclusion that marriage (and the family) was not a necessary condition for their happiness. They postponed it but, at the same time, they were not willing to postpone their sexual life. Since social norms concerning pre-marital sexual behavior had been already loosened (see e.g. [Schmidt, Sigush 1972; Yankelovich 1981; Scanzoni, Scanzoni 1988]), the separation of sex from marriage became widely accepted. The contraceptive technology of the 1960s (and the liberal abortion laws of the 1970s) also made it possible to separate sex safely from procreation, thus setting favorable conditions for the emergence of alternative life-styles and the creation of diversified forms of households.

This process has taken different forms in different countries. Whatever their form, however, the new approaches to partnership that have been recorded in so many countries until now are obviously important indicators of a general value change in Western society.¹

The literature on cohabitation is quite extensive (see e.g. [Gwartney-Gibbs 1986; Macklin 1978, 1983; Scanzoni, Scanzoni 1988; Siew-Ean 1987; Thornton 1988; Trost 1979, 1988; Wiersma 1983; Teachman, Polonko 1990; Spanier 1983; Bejin 1985, White 1987], etc.). All the authors agree that cohabitation is a

¹) One would find, I believe, a strong association between the existence of unmarried cohabitation and, for instance, the rate of post-materialism. According to Inglehart's [1990] analyses, the most post-materialistic countries are the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. These are also where we also find high unmarried cohabitation rates.

consequence of socio-cultural changes, and that its development has been quite rapid. It is characterized as a partnership which is individualized, oriented towards self-fulfillment, which enables the feeling of independence, but gives at the same time a sense of personal identity and intimacy. In many countries the perception of cohabitation by the general public has changed: the formerly "deviant" behavior has become a tolerated (or at least not opposed) social institution. Experts on cohabitation also generally agree that it is difficult to measure or evaluate the phenomenon since it is missing as a demographic classification in the vital statistics of many countries.

Nevertheless, demographers and sociologists have so far been able to collect some data concerning the rate of cohabitation in the West. We know that cohabitation is quite common in Nordic countries, but also in the Netherlands, the FRG, France and Great Britain. Though cohabiting dyads do not form a large group within the adult population at any particular point in time, the proportion of age-specific cohabitation (among young adults) is relatively high. There are also growing numbers of young people who have cohabited for a certain period of time and also growing numbers of people living together as unmarried couples after a previous divorce.

In the former "socialist" countries cohabitation has been recorded only in Hungary [Carlson, Klinger 1987] and East Germany, where it used to be relatively high. Does it also exist in Czechoslovakia?

The answer is not easy to determine. As is well known, Czechoslovakia shares some demographic similarities with the West, but also possesses some unique characteristics. As in the West, the fertility rate has been low (TFR was 1.95, the net reproduction rate 0.92 in 1989) and the divorce rate has been high (33.7 per 100 marriages in 1989). On the other hand, nuptiality has also been high (the marriage rate was 7.5 per 1000 population in 1989) and the mean age at first marriage has been relatively low (it was 21.8 for females and 24.4 for males in 1988) as has been the mean age at the birth of the first child (21.8 in 1970, 22.5 in 1989).

Nevertheless, we were able to observe certain trends in the last decade indicating the evolution of new, culturally legitimate patterns of family formation. The mean age at first marriage has been slowly rising (it was lowest in the 1960s: 21.06 for females in 1966 and 23.75 for males in 1969; the corresponding figures for 1988 are 21.8 and 24.4), the continuous decrease of the never married has stopped (in the 1960s 6 % of men and 3 % of women had never married at the age of 50; in 1988 the corresponding proportions were 12 % and 6 %), the proportion of children born out of wedlock has been on the increase (7.6 % of all children born in 1989), and the share of children conceived by unmarried women has been increasing as well (these were 44.4 % of the first children born within 8 months after wedding in 1970, 49.5 % in 1980, and 56.6 % in 1989).

We believe that all these trends are mutually dependent and it seems that there are more and more women and men for whom the traditional pattern of family formation:

falling in love	going steady	getting married	living together with regular sex	children
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does not hold any longer. Getting married is not a precondition for having sex or conceiving a child. Marriage often becomes only a consequence of a regular sexual life: young couples often get married when they realize that they are expecting a baby; the widowed and the divorced do not enter new marriages and live together instead. Thus, despite the rigid and oppressive Communist ideology penetrating all spheres of Czechoslovak society, the general social climate concerning sexual and marriage behavior has been more or less permissive.²

As sociologists, we are convinced that unmarried living together as an early form of family life-course or as an alternative to previous experience with marriage is something that does exist in Czechoslovakia.

Demographers generally agree that one of the indirect indicators of changes in family formation and reproductive behavior is an increase in the proportion of children born out of wedlock. For 110 years, it has been gradually decreasing in Czechoslovakia: from 15 % in 1860 to 6 % in 1950; the absolute minimum (4.4 %) was reached in the Slovak republic (SR) in 1969, in the Czech Republic (CR) in 1974 (4.4 %). Since then, the rate has gradually increased to 7.9 % in the CR and 7.2 % in the SR in 1989. This parallels the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1980 [Bartoňová 1991]. When we take into consideration that the nuptiality of the unmarried decreased during the 1980s (6.30 in 1980 and 6.07 in 1989 per 1000 population), the mean age at first marriage increased, and the fertility rate of unmarried women - despite a general fertility decrease - increased as well, we can venture the hypothesis that there is a growing group of young people (especially those aged 20-24) who live more or less in marriage-like unions, who postpone their marriages until they expect a child; then they usually get married.³ If a woman does not get married at that stage, she often bears her child out of wedlock.

The fact that about half of all children were either conceived or conceived and born out of wedlock in 1988 can be interpreted in two ways: 1) those children were conceived by chance or as a matter of bad luck; they were an outcome of unplanned and uncontrolled behavior. We do not regard such an "explanation" plausible. On the contrary, our hypothesis is that: 2) the growing proportion of children conceived and/or born outside marriage is an indicator of a growing

2) When the latter of the authors of this paper introduced the concept of "unmarried cohabitation" into demography in Czechoslovakia (see [Rabušic 1986]), the board of editors felt it necessary to append their comment at the end of the paper, saying that "only a marriage as the legal arrangement of the relationship of a man and a woman creates the conditions for a responsible relationship of parents to their children. (...) Therefore our society does not support the formation of unmarried cohabitation in any area" (p. 138).

3) About 93 % of all children are born to married couples.

proportion of non-maritally cohabiting dyads who stay and live together, have a regular sexual life, common economy and common plans for their future.

We believe that our hypothesis is also supported by the fact that the parents of the 57 % of children born within eight months after the wedding cannot simply start their reproductive periods "by mistake". Our empirical experience suggests that unmarried cohabitation consists very likely of three types:

1. cohabitation considered as "de-facto marriages" by Czechoslovak demographers. As Bartoňová [1984] maintains, this type of cohabitation is practiced mainly by people of middle and older age, mostly divorced or widowed. The dyads are registered as common-law marriages. According to the 1980 Census (the latest data from the 1991 Census are not yet available from the Federal Statistical Bureau), the median age of de-facto marriages was about 42 and their proportion was low: 3.3 per 100 marriages. Their characteristic feature is that they do not bear children nor do they entertain the possibility of getting married.
2. cohabitation which we can call "engaged cohabitation". The analysis of demographic indications has led us to the conclusion that Czechoslovak women (mostly in urban areas) enter the reproductive process after a shorter or longer period of sexual relations with their prospective partners which includes the sharing of an apartment and a way of life. Here, prevention against conception weakens with the growing mutual trust of the partners. After a period of time, they do get married; the women's pregnancy may speed up the dyad's decision to marry.
3. cohabitation of single persons of the opposite sex who do not intend to marry (i.e. "real" cohabitation of the Scandinavian type). Here, women have "illegitimate" children. From the Czechoslovak 1961, 1970 and 1980 censuses, we know that the proportion of never-married women aged 30-34 having children is growing: the respective figures are 16.6 %, 17.6 % and 22.1 %.

Besides these three forms there is also a dynamic group of "cohabitating divorcees". These cohabitants' partnerships usually develop into one of the three mentioned forms. An important intervening variable determining which form it takes is the age of the partners: the young divorced will very likely legitimate their relationship by marriage after some time (especially when a child is conceived). Older partners may live in de-facto marriages or declare their unions common-law marriages.

To obtain reliable information with regard to unmarried cohabitation, we carried out two consecutive surveys among all partners (no sampling) coming to Brno⁴ to apply for marriage licenses in June 1985/May 1986 and in June 1990/May 1991. We realize that by interviewing the population applying for marriage license we cannot record "real" cohabitation. On the other hand, the life-long unmarried population is not numerous yet.

⁴) Brno is the second largest city in the Czech Republic, with a population of about 400,000. It is the industrial, cultural and scientific center of Moravia (the eastern part of the Czech Republic).

In the survey, the existence of unmarried cohabitation was indicated by the answer: We've stayed and lived together more or less as married for some time before marriage. Those who said they had lived together only during holidays and vacations or only occasionally were classified as non-cohabitants. Our results were quite surprising for a country where unmarried cohabitation was considered to be practically nonexistent (see table 1).

Table 1. Proportion of unmarried cohabitation in Brno 1985/1986 and 1990/91 (in %).

Cohabitation	1985/1986	1990/1991
We've lived together more or less as married for some time	45.5	47.8
We've lived together but only during holidays or vacations	17.8	22.1
We've lived together only occasionally	29.6	20.2
No, we haven't lived together, we were just going steady	7.2	9.8
	N = 1562	N = 1384

Currently, the proportion of people in Czechoslovakia who have some experience with cohabitation is high, close to 50 %. However, our hypothesis expected to find at least two types of cohabitation: the "engaged cohabitation" of singles, and the cohabitation of those who have already had some experience with marriage. Our surveys show that the proportion of cohabitation depended on whether it was the first or a repeated marriage (see table 2).

Table 2. Proportion of unmarried cohabitation by first (1st.m.) or repeated marriages (r.m.) in Brno 1985/86 and 1990/91 (in %).

Cohabitation	1985/1986		1990/1991	
	1st.m.	r*.m.	1st.m.	r*.m.
We've lived together more or less as married for some time	30.9	72.8	37.4	76.3
We've lived together but only during holidays or vacations	23.8	6.7	26.7	9.0
We've lived together only occasionally	35.8	16.7	23.9	10.4
No, we haven't lived together, we were just going steady	9.6	3.8	11.9	4.4

N = 1066 N = 536 N = 999 N = 367

* if either the bride or the bridegroom or both established a repeat marriage

First Marriages

The observed length of unmarried cohabitation prior to marriage confirms that the term "engaged cohabitation" is appropriate. Its average duration was 12.3 months in 1985/86 and 12.0 months in 1990/91. About 47 % of the cohabitations did not last more than 6 months in both surveys. The relatively longest cohabitation was in the 25-29 age group of both brides and grooms (15 months). We did not find support for the hypothesis that unmarried cohabitants will establish marriages more often than noncohabitants because of the pregnancy of a bride. The proportion of pregnant brides was lower in cohabiting dyads than in non-cohabiting ones (32 % : 42 % in 1985/86, and 30 % : 38 % in 1990/91). Thus, unmarried cohabitation does not increase the probability of pregnancy.

We also did not find support for the generally held idea that cohabitation is more widespread among people of higher educational attainment. The opposite is true in Czechoslovakia. Our data reveal an indirect association: the lower the educational attainment of both the mother and father of a bride,⁵ the higher the proportion of cohabitation. The same was true when we considered the socio-occupational status of brides and grooms (see table 3).

Table 3. Unmarried cohabitation by socio-occupational status and by sex in Brno in 1985/86 and 1990/91, first marriages (in %)

Status	1985/86		1990/91	
	bride	groom	bride	groom
unskilled worker	64.5	62.8	61.8	64.7
apprentice	.	19.6	.	42.1
skilled worker	31.1	28.5	39.2	41.3
student of secondary school	25.0	24.0	.	29.6
employee with secondary education	26.0	27.8	37.8	33.6
student of higher education	25.0	17.2	34.1	27.3
employee with higher education	25.5	30.9	31.9	37.3

Similar results are reported from Hungary (see [Carlson, Klinger 1987]).

Repeated Marriages

If marriage is repeated for at least one of the partners getting married, cohabitation prior to marriage is quite typical behavior: in 1985/86, 73 % of such partners were cohabiting, in 1990/91, 76 %. The average length of cohabitation was almost twice as long as those in "engaged cohabitation": 21.2 months and 22.3 months in the respective years. 57 % were cohabiting for at least a year.

The length of cohabitation was strongly associated with the age of brides and grooms. In both years the younger dyads (i.e. brides not older than 24, grooms not older than 29), having a mean duration of cohabitation of about 14 months, remind

⁵) We analyze brides' characteristics more often since parents are, for obvious reasons, less permissive with their daughters than their sons in Czechoslovakia.

one of "engaged cohabitants". The older cohorts cohabited on average between 24 and 30 months. Our hypothesis about the mixed types of cohabitation of the divorced or widowed is thus supported. Among the young never-married, cohabitation is regarded as a "test marriage". Among the older ones, it is regarded as a regular union leading to marriage only after a longer time of living together; their propensity to marry is not strong and in many cases they do not establish a new marriage at all (statistics reveal that about one half of divorced women will not remarry). Those people, however, could not be reached by our survey. Their existence is, nevertheless, indicated by the fact that about 40% of children born out of wedlock are born after divorce.

Discussion

Our survey indicated two things. First, it brought support for our idea that a significant proportion of the population starts their family life by means of a shorter or longer period of unmarried cohabitation. Second, unmarried cohabitation in Czechoslovakia is not of the Scandinavian type; it is not a new social institution substituting for marriage among the young. It is instead "engaged cohabitation", oriented (so far) toward marriage. It has been an alternative path towards marriage, not an alternative to marriage itself. The question is whether it can become the alternative to marriage in the near future in Czechoslovakia.

Hoffmann-Nowotny [1987] rightly maintains that the spreading of unmarried cohabitation can be perceived as an attempt to merge the *Gemeinschaft* features of family structures that hold them together through "mechanic solidarity" with the features of the *Gesellschaft* which are typical for modern societies (having "organic solidarity"). Bejin [1985] showed that contemporary juvenile cohabitation could be understood as an attempt to create a synthesis out of the almost irreconcilable features of love in marriage and love outside marriage [Aries 1985, Flandrin 1985]. Those are significant variables which will have to be taken into consideration when trying to make predictions about unmarried cohabitation in Czechoslovakia. Assuming that individual life-styles are to a certain extent influenced by social change on the macro level, we can hypothesize that unmarried cohabitation will become as normal as anywhere else. Czechoslovak political and social changes will certainly influence Czechs' and Slovaks' paths to marriage.⁶

⁶) Social policy together with (pronatalist) population policy successfully lured young people into getting married through a system of subsidies, long maternity leaves, advantageous marriage loans (extremely low interest rates and partial loan forgiveness after the birth of the first child), etc. They also pushed them into parenthood by the high taxation of childlessness and, perhaps most effectively, by the practical impossibility of getting an apartment for unmarried and/or childless couples (and single persons as well). There were no alternatives to married life: it was impossible to travel or to start a business, and access to colleges and universities was limited by a strict *numerus clausus*. It was hard to pursue a dynamic career. Political activism (of a civic nature, not the "official" one) was dangerous and having a family was actually the only source of authenticity in a world of public hypocrisy. The last fifty years of political instability and discontinuity have made mutual understanding between generations difficult and driven the young to an early departure from their parents, who were often perceived as morally discredited by self-preserving compromises. At the same time, however,

Political changes have increased life opportunities in Czechoslovakia. Higher numbers of the young will enter colleges and universities, most of the young will take advantage of the possibility of traveling, more and more of them will devote their energies to establishing and maintaining private businesses. Life will become more individualized. Getting married and starting a family will cease to be the only realm of authentic and independent decision-making for young individuals. Their value systems will shift⁷ and create the necessary conditions for new life-styles.

One of the obstacles to unmarried cohabitation in Czechoslovakia has been the housing shortage. The housing policy of the "socialist" state in fact discriminated against single persons. Nevertheless, we found in our survey that having an apartment and engaging in cohabitation were associated: the difference between the cohabiting and non-cohabiting dyads who would have a place to live after marriage was almost 20 % (50 % : 32 %) in the group of first marriages and about 30 % (83 % : 52 %) in the repeated ones. Since housing policy is on the agenda of the government now, we can expect radical changes also in this respect. Since "ideational" conditions for unmarried cohabitation already exist, real unmarried cohabitation is an available option in Czechoslovakia today.

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the economy of young families, necessarily based on two incomes, could hardly survive without the lasting support of (and dependence on) their family of origin. Such dependence was not only economic. The young also needed their parents' support in child care and their social (and political) capital, i.e. their connections, social networks and informal influence.

⁷) In another survey of a representative sample of the Brno population we found out there had been a striking difference in the rate of post-materialism among young age cohorts in comparison with older ones. While the rate of postmaterialists to materialists was 1:1 in cohorts born after World War II, it was about 1:3 in the older age groups.

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The Results and Consequences of the 1992 Elections

I. The Spectrum of Political Parties in the 1992 Elections¹

There were 120 political parties and movements in the CSFR at the time of registration for the parliamentary elections of 1992 (April 1992). The main information resource is data from the parties about themselves. For this reason, the information has a selective character, is tendentious and some facts, e.g. the quantity of members, the finance of the electoral campaign and other facts are kept rather secret. The place on the political scale is not given by the place on the spectrum of interests determined by social stratification, which is just being created through privatization, but is often determined by the efforts of a party to set itself off from its opponents in some direction, to align itself at the place on the political scale to which the party (and especially its leaders) aspires. In spite of this it usually does not correspond either to its political program or the tenor of its members. The boards of directors of the parts system in existence in the CSFR have a relatively free zone of activity. This situation can be dangerous for a political democracy still in the process of being created.

With these reservations, we can classify political parties in the CSFR as follows :

1. Parties and movements active across the CSFR (50 parties):

- 1.1. Right-wing parties and movements (22 parties);
- 1.2. Parties and movements in the middle (20 parties);
- 1.3. Left-wing parties and movements (8 parties).

Among the parties with activity only within a single republic is a group of parties which has a definite nationalist accent.

In the Czech Republic in the parliamentary elections of 1990 only the Movement for Local Authority - Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS) came close to this viewpoint. In some electoral districts it was even more successful than the winner of the elections of 1990, Civic Forum (OF). This party, however, from the beginning by its Moravian accent stressed region rather than nationality, federalism and civic society rather than a separate national state. This orientation of the party was strengthened in the 1992 elections. The original marginal national articulation of "Moravian nationality" has weakened over the last two years and it almost did not exert itself in the 1992 elections.

This tendency in Slovakia is inverted. The parties with a national orientation grew and the national aspect, in relation to the state-legal arrangement, also become the basic differentiating element on the Czech/Slovak political scene.

2. Political parties and movements active in the Czech Republic (24 parties):

- 2.1. Nationalist-oriented parties and movements (4 parties);
- 2.2. Right-wing parties and movements (6 parties);
- 2.3. Parties and movements in the middle (12 parties);
- 2.4. Left-wing parties and movements (2 parties).

3. Political parties and movements active in the Slovak Republic (33 parties):

- 3.1. Nationalist and national parties (10 parties);
- 3.2. Right-wing parties and movements (8 parties);
- 3.3. Parties and movements in the middle (8 parties);
- 3.4. Left-wing parties and movements (7 parties).

Before November 1989, ten of these parties existed and some of them were active before

¹) An extract from the study "Der Parteienspiegel in der ČSFR vor den Wahlen," by L. Brokl, Z. Mansfeldová, *Aktuelle Analysen*, 29. Mai 1992. Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln.

1948. Many political parties were founded in 1990: 38 of them, registered after the elections of 1990, it is possible to call new parties.

In the parliamentary elections of 1990 there were 22 electoral candidates (parties, movements, alliances). In 1992, 39 political subjects offered candidates, 35 for the Federal Assembly. The rest are parties competing only for the Slovak National Council (the Movement for the Liberation of Slovakia, the Party of Freedom - Party of National Unification, the coalition composed of the Magyar Christian-Democratic Movement Együttélés and the Green Party). The first three of them belong among the nationally oriented parties, they did not stand candidates on the basis of their conception of the state-legal arrangement.

There is no party in the Czech republic which offers candidates only for the Czech National Council.

Seven parties that participated in the elections of 1990 did not offer candidates in 1992. They split, were dissolved or formed coalitions. Instead of these electoral coalition-based subjects many individual electoral subjects appeared in the elections of 1992 (Original party: resultant parties):

Civic Forum: Civic Movement, Civic Democratic Alliance, Civic Democratic Party, Club of Engaged Non-party-Members, Gypsy Civic Initiative;

Public Against Violence: Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Christian Democratic Union;

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia: The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, The Party of the Democratic Left;

The Christian Democratic Movement: The Christian Democratic Movement, The Slovak Christian Democratic Movement;

The Green Party: The Green Party in Slovakia and The Green Party (offering

candidates only for the Slovak National Council). In the Czech Republic the Green Party is in a coalition named The Liberal Social Union.

Originally independent political parties include the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian Party and the Greens in the Czech Republic (within the Liberal Social Union coalition). Some political subjects stood candidates in electoral coalitions in the elections of 1990 and participated independently in the 1992 elections, while their partners from the coalition did not compete in the earlier elections.

II. Parties that received over of the 5 % vote necessary for representation

ODS-KDS: Civic Democratic Party - Christian Democratic Party (alliance);

LB: Left Bloc (an alliance between the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Democratic Left of the CSFR);

ČSSD: Czechoslovak Social Democracy;

SPR-RSČ: Coalition for the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia;

KDU-ČSL: Christian and Democratic Union - Czechoslovak Peoples' Party;

LSU: Liberal Social Union (an alliance of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Agrarian Party and the Green Party);

ODA: Civic Democratic Alliance;

HSD-SMS: The Movement for Local Authority - Society for Moravia and Silesia;

HZDS: The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia;

SDL: The Party of the Democratic Left;

KDH: The Christian Democratic Movement;

SNS: The Slovak National Party;

MKDH-ESWS-MLS (M-E-M): an alliance of Magyar parties, composed of The Magyar Christian Democratic Movement, Coexistence and The Magyar Peoples' Party.

III. The Results of the 1992 Elections

In the Federal Assembly

In the Czech Republic

	Assembly of Nations %	mandate	Assembly of People %	mandate
ODS-KDS	33.43	37	33.9	48
LB	14.48	15	14.27	19
ČSSD	6.8	6	7.67	10
SPR-RSČ	6.37	6	6.48	8
KDU-ČSL	6.08	6	5.98	7
LSU	6.06	5	5.84	7

In the Slovak Republic

	Assembly of Nations %	mandate	Assembly of People %	mandate
HZDS	33.85	33	33.53	24
SDE	14.04	13	14.44	10
SNS	9.35	8	9.39	6
KDH	8.81	9	8.96	6
M-E-M	7.39	7	7.37	5
SDSS	6.09	5	-	-

In the Republic Parliaments

In the Czech Republic

To the Czech National Council

	%	mandate
ODS-KDS	29.73	76
LB	14.05	35
ČSSD	6.53	16
LSU	6.52	16
KDU-ČSL	6.28	15
SPR-RSČ	5.98	14
ODA	5.93	14
HSD-SMS	5.87	14

In the Slovak Republic

To the Slovak National Council

	%	mandate
HZDS	37.26	74
SDE	14.70	29
KDH	8.88	18
SNS	7.93	15
M-E-M	7.42	14

IV. The Consequences of the 1992 elections

In the Czech Republic 6,485,739 citizens (85.2 %) voted, in the Slovak Republic 3,088,426 citizens (84.2 %). There were no surprises in the elections, with the exception of the gains of ODS and HZDS, which are explicable by the sudden inclination of undecided voters towards the expected winners of elections (on April 7th, these

represented 31 % in the Czech Republic and 12 % in the Slovak Republic).

The middle part of the political scale, represented by the Civic Movement, has disappeared. All subjects without a relatively strong organizational structure fell in the elections, including the governing Civic Movement.

The elections confirmed the hypothesis that, in spite of the resistance of citizens to political discipline (partisanship), only a

classical model of the political scene, especially in the Czech Republic,² can be successful in understanding the present situation. The elections also confirmed the hypothesis about repetition in the development of the historical system of political discipline since the 19th century: large civic movements (Civic Forum and Public Against Violence) acted similar to the first political parties of the 19th century in the 1990 elections, which were able to stand candidates who alone have no chance of successful competition. Civic Forum and Public Against Violence became, however, government parties in 1990 without the necessary features of political partisanship. These movements were not able to function in the present conditions like modern movements in some Western countries, and today are worse off for misconceiving and failing to respect these differences. Particular political subjects since the elections of 1990 have liberated themselves from these large movements and have constructed partial hierarchical organizational structures of their own. They regrouped their power in the parliament, as representatives (deputies) joined the differentiating parties (e.g. the non-parliamentary social democratic party) with regard to the parties on whose behalf they were elected as representatives. They also created many new clubs. By this process, parties entered the assembly which did not overcome the 5 % clause, as well as new parties created by splits that at the time of the 1990 elections did not yet exist. The political system in creation developed in a rapid abridged evolution spanning two years that, because of proportional representation, found itself suffering from the classical phenomenon of the inter-war democracies: a

state of parties and the consequent crisis of democracy.

In the elections of 1992 an extreme right-wing party, the SPR-RSČ, from the Czech Republic that, by its eccentricity, was deemed untrustworthy for a long time, also gained entrance to the parliament. The left has also gained. In the Czech Republic the right wing won convincingly (ODS, whose chairman is the minister of finance V. Klaus), while in the Slovak Republic, on the contrary, HZDS, whose chairman V. Mečiar was pressed to resign the post of premier of the Slovak government by the Slovak National Council in 1991, won a resounding victory. HZDS is considered to be left-wing but identifies itself as lying on the left part of the middle on the political scale. They demand the repeal of some of the most recent laws and the overhaul of the economic reform. They strive for "a common state of two sovereign republics with mutually independent juridical subjectivity". Many HZDS voters think, due to the terminology, that they voted for a common state of Czech and Slovaks. The HZDS is the last of the large movements on the political scene in the CSFR, comprising many internal factions and it is possible to expect its decomposition into smaller parts. The Party of the Democratic Left, the former communist party, clinging to the ideas of social democracy and to a possible convergence with that party, achieved second place in the Slovak Republic. Standing to the left of the Party of the Democratic Left are two communist parties without any significance. The third-place party in the Slovak Republic is the Slovak National Party, which is extremely and romantically nationalistic. In their program they call for an independent national state.

For all practical purposes a traditional right wing is missing in the Slovak Republic. The KDH - The Christian Democratic Party - is the closest to being right-wing on the Slovak political scene, but due to their social program they are often considered left-wing, and the Democratic Party, which is in coalition with ODS did not overcome the 5 % clause.

² The HZDS, led by V. Mečiar, originally created by the split in the VPN, acts, to a certain extent, like the two political movements of two years ago, and its change as it begins acting in its new role as the governing party of Slovakia is anticipated, assuming the possible problems, isolation and the resultant creation of an external enemy.

The winning right-wing citizen-Christian alliance requires ten additional votes in the Assembly of the People of the Federal Assembly to gain a sufficient majority. In the Czech part of the Assembly of Nations they have a sufficient majority, but the Slovak parties rule in the Slovak part of the Assembly of Nations. If the value of votes is one in the Assembly of Nations, then due to the principle of parity and the ban on the majority of one nation, the value of each Czech vote is 0.5 to the value of the Slovak vote. This fact, in spite of its principal importance for the functioning of political democracy or for the fate of the common state, never became a matter of considerable political battle or emotion. If the Slovak representation can block the parliament in its part of the Assembly of Nations, the Czech right-wing representation (ODS-KDS with KDU-ČSL) has the same possibility in its part of the Assembly of Nations. In the presidium of the parliament, which can govern in the case the representation is not functioning, the left wing will have a weak majority, which is a significant stimulus for the Czech right-wing representation to consider splitting the state (which they refused to consider before the elections) in

order to maintain the pace of the economic and political transformation of the Czech lands.

The division of the CSFR could lead to the disappearance of the European arrangement created by the Versailles system, the bond of which Czechoslovakia was usually considered, and this system was also the guarantor of the new state, having the consequence of the revision of the borders of many Central and East European countries. In 1866, Chancellor Bismarck thought about the danger of these changes in Central Europe in the following way: "He who rules Bohemian, rules Europe. Hence, Europe cannot allow any other nation to rule there than the Czech, because this nation will not try to rule over others. The border of Bohemia is the guarantor of European security, and he who crosses it leads Europe to disaster". This consideration can seem, from the point of view of the West, anachronistic. Eastern and Central Europe, however, thanks to a half-century of totalitarianism both leftist and rightist, is not too far from the thinking contained in this view from the nineteenth century.

Lubomír Brokl

Declared Occupational Mobility and the Change in the Role of Achievement Principles in Four Nations of East-Central Europe

In October 1991 the sociological survey *"The Dismantling of the Social Safety Net and Its Political Consequences"* was carried out in three formerly communist countries of Europe: Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.¹ The principal purpose of the survey was to assess the effect of the gradual dismantling of various forms of the social

safety net typical for state socialism on the political attitudes and behavior of different groups of the population in the three countries (four nations).

In addition to political attitudes and behavior, the questionnaire contained indications of some other aspects of social transformation, including the subjective evaluation of changes in the respondents' occupational status during the post-communist transformation² and the

¹ The survey was coordinated and financed by the Institute of East West Security Studies, New York. Four national analytical files were created: Czech lands (1187), Slovakia (817), Hungary (1500) and Poland (1491), as well as a merged multinational data file containing 4995 cases.

² We asked: "Now, think for a moment of the time two or three years ago when the major political change started in our society. Since then, have you experienced any important change in your occupation, your job or in your position in the company? We are not asking you about any kind of change, but only about a change that markedly influenced your career and life situation." If the

perception of change in the role of various factors of life success. In this brief report we will focus on the question of cross-national differences in occupational mobility and the revitalization of meritocratic principles of social stratification.

Figures 1 and 2 display the extent and structure of occupational mobility as declared by the respondents themselves. There is no significant cross-national variation in the *extent* of mobility in Eastern Europe: one fifth of the population declares a marked change in occupational status during the transformation. There is, however, a significant dissimilarity in its structure (Figure 2). The Czech lands show the strongest tendency towards upward mobility into higher managerial positions and the strongest outflow of manpower to the private sector. Respondents in the Czech lands also experienced less unemployment than all other nations in the region. Slovakia, in turn, experienced the strongest downward mobility, while unemployment has been at a level typical for the whole region there. Two tendencies were typical for Poland: the highest level of unemployment in the region and the lowest outflow to the private sector. Hungary doesn't show any significant deviation from figures typical for the region as a whole.

Table 1 displays the results of the factor analysis of eight factors determining the chances of getting ahead ("life success"). As expected, two principle factors were extracted: one rather "meritocratic" (we labeled it "ACHIEVEMENT") and the other rather "particularistic" (we borrowed the label "ASCRPTION"). These two factors explained 42 % of the common variance of variables in all four nations. Due to the clear interpretation of factors we proceeded by calculating factor scores (regression method), and by analysis, arrived at the following components of variance of the two

factors: nation, education, and declared change in the occupational status since the beginning of the transformation (Table 2, Figure 3 and 4).

The results of the analysis of the first factor ("ACHIEVEMENT") show:

- a) The strongest source of variation in this factor is national. Its net effect is by far the most significant among the variables in the analysis. The nation with the strongest tendency to perceive the transformation process as a shift to more universalism and meritocracy are the Czech lands (+0.46). Slovakia and Hungary, with a much weaker level of such an evaluation of the change in social stratification, represent the "core" of the region (close to the average). Apparently the weakest tendency to meritocracy and achievement principles was found in Poland (-.70).
- b) There is empirical evidence supporting the thesis that experienced occupational mobility has only a weak effect on the evaluation of the change in the role of achievement factors for getting ahead. Figure 4 clearly shows that the effect of nation is dominant over the net effect of experienced mobility, except for the effect of being a "mover" to the private sector.
- c) Education shows a slightly higher significance in its effect on the evaluation of the progress in the role of achievement in life success. The higher the respondent's education, the stronger is his/her belief that the society is becoming more "meritocratic". There is, however, significant cross-national dissimilarity in the effect of education on this attitude. Figure 4 displays regression lines of the attitude on education for individual nations. The effect of education proved to be significant only in Czech lands and Slovakia.

The results make it clear that the social transformation in Eastern Europe is a unique but not universal process. It is quite obvious that individual nations are experiencing different political developments and different strategies of the economic reform. Our brief report is based on the data from one of the first comparative research projects carried out in Eastern Europe in the

respondent reported a change, he/she had to mark whether it was a) a move up to a higher managerial position, b) a move down from higher managerial position or its loss, c) the loss of a job, or d) a move to the private sector (either to one's own business or as an employee).

middle of its transformation and aimed at the assessment of dissimilarity in the component countries' social transformation as perceived by their populations. It seems to be empirically defensible to conclude that the socioeconomic transformation in the Czech lands has been opening more room for universal and meritocratic principles of social stratification than in other nations. The question remains, however, whether this is due to differences in the present policy or due to distinctions in the original ("pre-revolutionary") situation. It has been proven

by other analyses that the egalitarian ideology and policy orientation were stronger in Czechoslovakia than in the other state socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Therefore, it seems quite understandable that the results of our analysis show that the reform in the Czech lands is generating far stronger beliefs that the transformation is bringing the revitalization of meritocracy and universalism as major principles of social stratification.

Petr Matějů and Milan Tuček

Table 1. Results of the factor analysis on the change in the roles of various determinants of getting ahead in four nations of Eastern Europe

Question: *Do you think that in comparison with the previous (communist) regime there has been any change in the importance of factors influencing life success? I am going to read a list of various things that might be important for getting ahead. Can you tell me for each of them whether it is more important, less important, or about the same?*

Scale: 1 - less important, 2 - about the same, 3 - more important

Factor Analysis on Multinational Sample
(Czech lands, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland)


Item	Factor 1 "ACHIEVEMENT"	Factor 2 "ASCRPTION"
Ambitions	.725	.003
One's hard work	.723	-.210
Education	.531	.042
Willingness to take a risk	.520	.153
Political connections	-.114	.798
Knowing the right people	.281	.604
Coming from a wealthy family	.057	.524
One's religious commitment	-.321	.420

Method: Principal components, oblique rotation (method "OBLIMIN", correlations between factors $r = -.008$). Table displays the pattern matrix.

Table 2 Results of analysis of the variance of the factor
"ACHIEVEMENT" - MCA table
(adjusted deviations from the grand mean and beta-coefficients)

	deviation	N	beta	sig. of F
NATION				
Czech lands	0.46	1057		
Slovakia	0.07	709		
Hungary	0.06	1134		
Poland	-0.70	855	0.42	>0.000
EDUCATION				
elementary	-0.08	904		
vocational	-0.02	1256		
secondary	0.06	1156		
college	0.09	439	0.06	0.001
REPORTED CHANGE IN STATUS				
no change	-0.01	3104		
upward on managerial hierarchy	0.00	105		
downward on manag. hierarchy	0.03	50		
lost a job	-0.06	309		
moved to the private sector	0.25	187	0.06	0.003

Figure 1
Change in occupational status since
the beginning of the transformation
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland
October 1991




Source: "Dismantling of the social
 safety net: Czechoslovakia
 Hungary and Poland" 1991

See Figure 2

N=4540

Figure 2
Change in occupational status
during the transformation - by nation
MOVERS ONLY



Residuals larger/smaller than 1.96 (+/-)
 are significant at the level 0.05

Figure 3
Change in the role of achievement
by change in occupational status





Figure 4
Change in the role of achievement
principles by education



Are the Czechs and the Slovaks different?

Basic Value Preferences in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic
(A Research Note)

The most recent political developments in the CSFR explicitly show the divergence between the two nations that comprise the country, Czechs and Slovaks. The question of the substantive differences between the two must naturally be posed, but it can hardly be answered completely. This research note is intended to contribute to this question, showing two fragments of value system differences. It is based on a study coordinated in the CSFR by the Department of Sociology and Social Policy of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague. The study has been a part of a broad international project organized by the European Value System Study Group. It deals with complex value systems, and covers, in detail, individual value dimensions; it is based on various theories and repeats a similar study done in 1981 (the CSFR did not take part in it at that stage).

The data were collected and the fieldwork was provided by the A.R.C. Research Consortium in Prague. The complex random sampling design was created from the Central Register of Citizens

and contained stratification allowing for the comparison of three parts of the CSFR (Bohemia, Moravia and the Slovak Republic) which, according to the hypothesis, would differ in value systems considerably. These three equal size strata are further stratified by region, size of the town, and the sex and age of respondents. The two stages of the cluster selection have been given by counties within the region and by the administrative parts of the towns (villages) within the county. The data was collected between April and October 1991. The project "The Value System in the CSFR" has been supported in part by the European System Study Group and by the Bishops' Conference of the CSFR and has followed the methodology, instruments and approach of the international team.

In this short account it is only possible to display very basic data and point out only the main and selected differences at the descriptive level. The data presented in table 1 are based on the introductory question of the research instrument, asking for the rank of importance of six selected value system dimensions: work, family, friends, leisure, politics, religion. The difference between the Czechs and Slovaks will be shown by comparing education categories, thus presenting differentiation by one of the most important structural categories.


Table 1. Value profiles for educational levels in both republics
(mean values on the importance scales 1-4)

	family	work	friends	leisure	politics	religion
Czech, basic	3.80	3.55	2.88	2.84	1.92	2.30
Czech, qualified	3.83	3.60	3.02	3.00	2.25	1.92
Czech, high school	3.88	3.52	3.03	2.92	2.41	1.87
Czech, university	3.91	3.59	3.05	2.99	2.56	1.91
Slovak, basic	3.88	3.53	3.11	2.95	1.90	3.20
Slovak, qualified	3.83	3.66	3.10	3.15	2.16	2.53
Slovak, high school	3.90	3.63	3.15	3.04	2.28	2.31
Slovak, university	3.92	3.61	3.29	3.09	2.43	2.12
Czech republic	3.85	3.56	3.00	2.95	2.26	1.98
Slovak republic	3.37	3.61	3.14	3.06	2.16	2.60
CSFR	3.86	3.58	3.05	2.99	2.23	2.19

The preference order is uniform (with a minor exception in the group of qualified Slovaks) among the items "family-work-friends-leisure-politics". The very high differentiating effect of religiosity has to be analyzed separately in detail (the effect of both nation and education is clearly seen). The religion scores are negatively correlated with politics and these two are

complementary in the value system. The directly visible traits of the profiles are, however, accompanied by a latent structure of typical deviations of individual groups from the common profile in CSFR; it can be displayed in the profile correspondence map (religion is omitted from the picture because of its dominating interaction with the group of Slovaks with basic education).

Correspondence between education levels in Czech and Slovak Republics and basic dimensions of value profiles (mean scores).



Remark: The profile has been reduced by the dimension of religiosity, since it shows an overwhelmingly strong interaction with basic education in the SR

The correspondence graph provides a visual summary of two distinguished features: a) the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are clearly separated; and b) education groups are ordered by level in both parts of the CSFR but they show quite distinctive patterns of their own differentiation. In the Czech Republic, education is correlated with preferential emphasis on a scale 'work - family - politics'. In the Slovak Republic, the educational scale circles and concentrates around the dimensions 'leisure - friends'. With the same preference order, the nations differ in subtle emphasis: Slovaks stress social life and the activities of leisure time while Czechs weigh the remaining items more. Religion (not included in the graph) might be the complex dimension covering the items explicitly

stressed by the much less religious Czech republic separately in individual dimensions. On the other hand, the election results and political development in the two parts of the country support the findings. Slovaks are backing away from the new rapid changes simply because of different emphasis on dimensions in the value system. Another important viewpoint that can explain the different speed of political, economic and social development, and the different determination for radical changes within the CSFR is the different perceived geo-political affiliation in the various regions. For a more complete differentiating picture, four geographic areas are used in this comparison, namely Prague, Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia.


Table 2. Parts of the CSFR by geo-political affiliation: row percentages of preference and simultaneous significance of cell interactions (Question: Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?)

Parts of CSFR	Affiliation to:					N
	locality	CR/SR	CSFR	Europe	world	
Prague	23.9 %	18.1 %	41.5 %	4.8 %	11.7 %	188
	---	0	+++	+	0	
Bohemia	40.4 %	20.8 %	30.2 %	1.8 %	6.6 %	873
	0	0	0	0	0	
Moravia	39.3 %	12.8 %	38.6 %	1.8 %	7.4 %	1030
	0	---	+++	0	0	
Slovakia	45.4 %	36.1 %	11.4 %	1.2 %	5.9 %	1116
	++	+++	---	0	0	
Total	40.8 %	23.4 %	27.0 %	1.8 %	6.9 %	3207

Remark: + + +, --- = .001 level, + +, -- = .01 level, +, - = .05 level, 0 = insignificant; the inference on adjusted residuals follows the Holm method

The interactions of table 2 can be decomposing the log odds using the program mapped to the correspondence graph (by LINDA).

Correspondence map of CSFR parts and affiliation to the geopolitical level (Question: To which of the geographical groups do you belong first of all?)



Remark: capital letters show the parts of the CSFR (respondent groups), small letters indicate the preference of affiliation place

The graph displays a clear picture of preferences that are typical for the groups. While Prague, Moravia, and Slovakia give quite evidently definite choices differentiating them unambiguously, Bohemia is in the center of all, closest to

"locality". The matrix of perceived distances can be derived from this picture describing the pattern quantitatively. The perceived distance matrix indicates how far or near (relatively to other parts) people are subjectively to Europe, among others.

Table 3. The perceived distances of inhabitants of various parts of the CSFR to levels of geo-political hierarchy

	•	locality	republic	CSFR	Europe	world
Prague		1.62	1.46	.98	.22	.68
Bohemia		.54	.87	.70	.88	.45
Moravia		.85	1.35	.33	1.00	.73
Slovakia		.82	.23	1.69	1.48	1.09

The contrasts in both the value-system dimensions and placement with respect to the geo-political hierarchy of the world are remarkable and correlate with the present political development in CSFR. The value system displays the basic influences in the process and points out the root of diverging attitudes and activities. In spite of a great

simplification and the fragments used, even these two simple tables give very clear evidence about the existence of differences between the two nations. More analytical work is, of course, necessary to capture the subtle details and to come to more relevant conclusions.

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The Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences was reestablished in February 1990, after twenty years of very limited autonomy of sociological research during the period of the so-called "normalization" after 1968. The original Institute of Sociology, established in 1965, was abolished in 1970 for political reasons. The continuity of research in sociology, which flourished between the two world wars, was disrupted and this discipline was one of the country's most damaged humanities.

I. Scholarly Program

The most important feature of the Institute of Sociology as an institution with a theoretical focus in the field of sociology is its long-term program, which aims to contribute - along with our universities - to the development and reconsolidation of this field.

The integrating axes of research projects in the next several years, including international comparative research projects, will be the sociological understanding of the "post-communist" transformation, in both its general and country-specific characteristics. The building of a middle-range sociological theory of the transition toward a pluralistic type of society and a general theory of the formation of post-industrial society will be supported by the following long-term research projects:

a) *A sociological theory of the development of the political system, changes in power structures and political behavior.* This research project uses empirical analysis of the movement of Czechoslovak society from a politically totalitarian system toward a democratic system. It is supported by

analysis of the development of the political culture, the structure of power elites and the formation of political parties. Power mechanisms, from the standpoint of the articulation and assertion of specific interests, will also be analyzed. Current research examines all phases of the parliamentary elections - their preparation, running and results.

Foreign cooperation: University of Pittsburgh, Sociology Department.

Director of the research project: Lubomír Brokl.

b) *Social aspects of economic transformation, problems of the emerging labor market, strategy of social policy.* This project also focuses on the analysis of earnings and income distribution, poverty, coping strategies of households and broader questions of the introduction of market-oriented principles into the Czechoslovak economy. The research team is cooperating with the Bureau of Statistics for using microdata on incomes and expenditures and with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs for preparing expertises on current problems. Data for the special survey on "Economic Expectations and Attitudes of the Population" are gathered bi-annually.

Foreign cooperation: Luxembourg Income Study; The Institute of Fiscal Studies, London; Erasmus University, Rotterdam.

Director of the research project: Jiří Večerník.

c) *Transformation of the social structure and changes in social stratification during the transition period.* This research project focuses on the analysis of the development of educational, occupational and economic inequality during the period of transition, on the perception of changes in inequality and stratification, on the analysis of the role of the family and schools in the process of the revitalization of meritocratic principles, etc. A large international comparative research project will start in 1992 on changes in social stratification after 1989 in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

Foreign cooperation: University of California in Los Angeles; University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Director of the research project: Petr Matějů.

d) *Changes in local communities, regional structures and changes in the functioning of municipal systems as a result of political, economic, constitutional and executive changes.* Major questions addressed in this project include: analysis of the new local government and of other institutions of local democracy; clarification of local interests and local self-identification; and new expressions of localism and regionalism and their political representation as a result of the establishment of self-rule, economic transformation and overall political decentralization.

Foreign cooperation: University of Amsterdam; Norwegian Council for Applied Social Research.

Director of the research project: Michal Illner.

e) *Women in the Social Structure.* The research project focuses on the formation of new paradigms in the nineties and their effect on political development, the working system, educational culture and the family. The investigation, covering both republics, established a network of female respondents willing to cooperate in the implementation of further projects, including longitudinal research. Preliminary results' signal that women have a significant incentive for personal and group self-development in the creation of their own political élite, new leading personalities and inspiring ideas. In the future, the results of this work are envisaged to be used pedagogically, including the creation of a program to study problems of gender and feminism.

Foreign cooperation: George Washington University, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Director of the research project: Marie Čermáková.

f) *Revival of private enterprise.* The main questions being studied in the initial phase are the social and motivational background and mechanisms of recruitment of the new entrepreneurial generation, its social and psychological profile and the changing

economic and social role of small- and middle-scale private business.

Director of the research project: Jana Vítečková.

Within the Institute there also operates a small group of demographers who focus on the historical analysis of demographic development in the Czech lands. *The research project is directed by* Ludmila Fialová. It cooperates with the INED in Paris and is responsible for publishing the yearbook *Historical Demography*.

The Institute is also taking part in the general reconstruction of the discipline, particularly with its long-term project of the publication of an extensive *sociological dictionary*.

Director of the project: Alena Vodáková.

The Institute of Sociology also pursues short-term goals, that is, expert activity for various state organs, for example the Parliament, the Czechoslovak National Council, advisers to the president of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, and individual government ministries. Institute staff members are also on various expert committees and take part in solving topical problems.

II. Research facilities

The Institute has access to a nationwide interview network that enables it to carry out representative sociological surveys. In order to make nationwide random samples for its surveys, the Institute contracted the Central Register of Population to provide necessary sampling information.

As a member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, the Institute has free access to the Academic Computer Center (ACC), equipped with a IBM 4361 mainframe computer. The ACC also serves as a local node for BITNET/EARN academic communication. In fact it was the Institute of Sociology that initiated the connection of Czechoslovakia to academic communication networks in the spring of 1990, when political obstacles disappeared. The Institute of Sociology was among the first Institutes of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences that had access to international academic communication networks.

At present, the Institute has remote terminals to the ACC. The Institute also coordinates the academic license for major statistical software (SPSS) and provides consultation to users from other research institutes.

In the spring of 1991 the Institute received a significant grant from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to establish a Center for Environmental and Social Studies (CESS), which is functioning within the Institute in close cooperation with Institute's library and study center.

III. Educational Activity and Publications

The Institute is also taking part in the reconstruction of sociological education which includes: 1. the building of a continuing system of sociological education in the form of post-graduate study; and 2. cooperation with institutions of higher education in the form of pedagogic activity by Institute staff at these schools, the participation of students in the Institute is research projects and cooperation in the preparation of textbooks and other written educational materials.

The Czechoslovak Sociological Review (Sociologický časopis) has been the major journal of Czechoslovak sociologists since 1965, when it was established. It is published bimonthly with typically 140 pages per issue. Since 1990 it has been published exclusively by the Institute of Sociology, which receives significant financial support for its publishing activities from the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. All articles have an abstract and summary in English. The profile and content of the journal have changed significantly since 1989 under the new editorial leadership of Jiří Večerník. The last few volumes have been devoted to the major problems of the

transformation of Czechoslovak society (social stratification, poverty and social policy, elections and political culture, etc.). Beginning in 1992 the Institute will publish two special issues of this journal per year in English.

In the fall of 1989 the Institute began producing two series of working papers, one in Czech, one in English. Working papers are distributed free on request. In the fall of 1991 the Institute began publishing a bulletin, "Data & Facts", in which the most important results from new sociological surveys are presented. The bulletin is sent to professionals in the press, media and state institutions.

IV. Organizational Structure of the Institute

The Institute employs about fifty people, of which about 35 are scholars engaged in research (these figures describe the situation in the spring of 1992). The scientific work of the Institute is organized in temporary research teams. The teams are formed with the purpose of taking part in specific research projects of a limited duration, usually two to three years. Projects and team members are selected via an open interview process. Teams have considerable independence in selecting work methods and tools. Since the spring of 1989, several research projects have been financed through the internal grant system of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

With the director of the Institute, the Institute's scientific board, which selects a chairman from its members, decides fundamental principles related to the Institute's scientific activities and its organizational matters.

Petr Matějů

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General Information

The Institute of Social and Political Sciences was reestablished in 1990 after a twenty-year interruption as a part of the new Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University, Prague. Institute members are engaged in

quantitative and qualitative research about the transformation of Czechoslovak society, the mapping of social and political trends, and social policy. Institute members collaborate extensively with many institutions and research units in Czechoslovakia and abroad. The institute established the foundation Film and Sociology.

Research activities

Within the research project "The Transformation of the Social Structure of Czechoslovak Society", these topics are presently being investigated:

- theoretical questions of social structure and mobility development;
- the social characteristics of labor, professional structure and mobility, labor-market formation, employment and unemployment questions;
- the national and international contexts of transformation processes;
- the standard of living, social context of consumption and the formation of consumer behavior; and
- prognostic concepts.

The questions of life style and value orientation are being investigated with the assistance of external researchers.

Connected to the above-mentioned project, the research project "The Youth in the Transformation Process", covering a population of 16-18 year-olds (about 3000 respondents), has been carried out.

The research team is participating (together with the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences) in the extensive international research project entitled "Social Stratification and Mobility in Eastern Europe after 1989".

Another of our research projects, "The Labor Market Formation in the Process of the Transformation of Czechoslovak Society", is being carried out with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic. This project is compatible with the project "Employment in Britain" being coordinated by prof. D. Gallie (Nuffield College, Oxford).

Czechoslovak society is a unique model situation for the study of relations between biographies, generations and history. A

historical and particularly generational continuity and discontinuity became the focus of the project "History - Generations - Biographies". The spiritual father of this project, Josef Alan (director of the institute) helped create the set of biographical studies. Its first result is the project "Who We Are". The work should progress through a step by step layering of genealogical data, personal stories and family histories. The material obtained will be discussed and interpreted continuously. The project "Who We Are" is a kind of perpetual "work-shop" that has the character of methodological and interpretational practice. It is evident that the special character of this research demands minutely detailed internal rules for the chronological order of individual stages, for the handling of the data (the research can clearly not be considered "anonymous"), etc.

The progressive thematization of further partial tasks utilizes the process of collecting biographical materials. Some themes have already been worked into the form of projects (Us and the Germans, The Germans and Us, Opposition Movements in the Czech Republic after 1948: The Role of Personalities and Communities, The Rebirth of the Czech Entrepreneur: Restitution - the Revolution in Family Life), others rather as outlines for research themes (the phenomenon of poverty, destinies of the intellectual élite, lifestyle and its transmission, forming of generations, new political élites). The research will converge into a communicative and interesting statement about this society, about the world of today and about the time spent with each other.

The political research unit, with only a few full-time senior research fellows, is basically oriented towards selected issues from the domestic political scene. The backbone of its current research activity is a project covering this year's parliamentary elections, which are understood as an important, and perhaps crucial, political event within the tangled, shifting development toward the stabilization of the new democracies of Central Europe.

This main collective research project is focused on the analysis of all the substantial

socio-political aspects connected with political background, electoral law, political parties and their programs, candidates, voting patterns, election campaigns and their outcomes, post-election scenarios, citizens' reflections, media influence, role of polls, etc. The research field is systematized according to the two cross-section criteria of state arrangements (federal or other) and economic reform. The project "Election Czechoslovakia 1992" is scheduled to be completed by the end of this year and the results published shortly afterwards.

Among the preliminary research now under way - which stems from the personal

political science interests of individual unit members, the studies of political élites in post-communist countries (including empirical surveys of the domestic scene), the study of the forms of participatory democracy, and introductory comparative studies of policy-making systems should be mentioned. These topics provide an initial choice for later, more comprehensive projects, conditioned by consistent information exchange and requires an inevitable strengthening of the unit's research staff.

Eva Stehlíková, Pavel Kotlas

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About the department

The department was founded in 1923 by professor I. A. Bláha, a disciple of Emile Durkheim, as a department of sociology with a strong orientation towards social problems. Closed in 1939 by then Nazis, it was reopened in 1945 by Bláha, closed in 1949 after the Communist coup d'état, reopened in 1964, closed in 1969 after the Russian invasion, and finally reopened again in 1973.

In 1990 the former Department of Sociology was enlarged, becoming the Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, and started to offer not only a M.A. degree in sociology (a five-year course) but also a B.A. in social work (a three-year course).

The department's reputation both for research and teaching is outstanding in Czechoslovakia. The research orientation follows a relatively long sociological tradition in Brno, started by the founder of the Sociology Department professor Bláha, whose stress on the necessity of field-work resulted in the "Brno Sociological School". The Department of Sociology, after its re-

establishment in 1964, set up a research unit, The Laboratory of Sociological Research, which conducts at least three social surveys annually. Some of the research topics are based on the demands of various institutions (local government, industry, cultural and health institutions), but the majority of them are conducted in the context of the research interests of the academic staff. Thus, topics researched recently include the areas of family sociology (Czech paths to marriage, non-marital cohabitation), the sociology of social change (social and cultural aspects of Czechoslovakia's transformation), social problems (teen-age pregnancy and marriage, social determinants of abortion), the sociology of work and unemployment and social ecology. Results have often been presented at international conferences in Brno, organized bi-annually from 1982. The department has good contacts with various foreign universities and department members often lecture abroad and take part in international conferences. Some of the teaching activities in the sphere of social policy and social work programs will hopefully be funded by TEMPUS, in which we will co-operate with Dutch and British colleges. The aim of the department is to become an organic part of the international sociological community.

Course structure

Sociology

Introduction to Sociology, History of Sociology (19th cent.), Research Methods I, Urban Sociology, Demography, Statistics, General Sociological Theory, Research Methods II, Data Processing, Sociology of the Family, Sociology of Work and Industry, Contemporary Sociological Theories, Sociology of Culture, Sociology of Public Opinion, Sociology of Knowledge, Social Ecology, Sociology of Politics.

Social policy and social work (combined with sociology)

Introduction to Social Policy, Social Policy in Czechoslovakia, Methods and Institutions of Social Work, Introduction to the Czechoslovak Legal System, Social Psychology, Social Pathology, Social Gerontology.

Academic staff (and their research interests and foreign scholarships)

Ivo Možný (1932), Head of the Department, Associate Professor, Vice-President of the Masaryk Sociological Association, Prague.

Sociology of Marriage and the Family, Sociology of Social Change, Social Demography.

Visiting scholar in Vaestoliitto, Helsinki (1987), Fellow in residence at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies, Wassenaar (1990-1991).

Jan Keller (1955), Associate Professor.

Contemporary Sociological Theory, Theory of Bureaucracy.

Visiting scholar at the University of Bordeaux III (1985), the University of Marseille (1988), and the Sorbonne-Paris (1991).

Hana Librova (1943), Associate Professor. Social Ecology, Demography, Environmental Ethics.

Petr Mareš (1948), Senior Research Fellow. Sociology of Work, Social and Cultural Aspects of Social Change.

Libor Musil (1959), Assistant Professor. Sociology of Work, Social Ecology, Social and Cultural Aspects of Social Change.

Liliana Nerudová (1947), Assistant Professor.

Family Sociology, Social Deviance, Social Policy.

Visiting scholar at the University of Munich (1982).

Pavel Pacl (1932), Senior Research Fellow. Sociology of Leisure, Sociology of Mass Communication.

Svatomíra Přadková (1940), Associate Professor.

Sociology of Youth, Theory of Management.

Ladislav Rabušic (1954), Assistant Professor. Social Demography, Family Sociology, Sociology of Values, Social and Cultural Aspects of Social Change.

Visiting scholar at the University of Copenhagen (1984), the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, (1989); visiting lecturer in Beijing Foreign Studies University, China (1985-1987).

Jaroslav Střítecký (1941), Associate Professor. History of Sociology, Sociology of Culture. Humboldt Grant, Munich (1969, 1987).

Ladislav Rabušic

The Institute of Central European Studies (ICES) and The Centre for Social Analysis (C.S.A.), Bratislava

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After November 1989 a change in the problem orientation of a certain part of Slovak sociologists took place and this led to the origin of some new research institutions.

Among them are the Institute of Central European Studies at the Faculty of Management of Comenius University in Bratislava and the private association The Centre for Social Analysis in Bratislava.

The Institute of Central European Studies (ICES)

The Institute of Central European Studies (ICES) at the Faculty of Management of

Comenius University in Bratislava was founded as a scientific and educational institution on January 1, 1992. It is oriented towards theoretical and empirical research of the social, cultural and political processes of the transition of Czecho-Slovak society within the context of the Central European region. The institute consists of 10 specialists, a translator and a secretary. The head of the institute is Soňa Szomolányiová, PhD.

The research activities of the ICES have been profiled by two research projects:

1. "Social Problems of the Post-Totalitarian Society: Connections of Privatization": The research team: S. Szomolányiová (Project Leader), Vladimír Krivý, Iveta Radičová.

The work on the project started in 1991 when the team was part of the staff of the Department of Sociology at the Philosophical Faculty of Comenius University in Bratislava.

2. "Development of the Political Scene within the Context of the Social and Economic Transformation of Slovak Society". The research team: Zora Bútorová (Project leader), Ivan Dianiška, Mario Dobrovodský, Pavol Frič, Oľga Gyarfášová, Tatiana Rosová, Marian Timoracký. The work on the project started in 1991 in the Institute for Social Analysis at Comenius University in Bratislava.

The ICES cooperates with several research teams in Czecho-Slovakia and abroad (Institute of Social and Political Sciences at the Charles University in Prague, Centre d'analyse et d'intervention sociologique de CNRS in Paris, East London Polytechnic, London).

The results of the ICES are published in professional journals in Czecho-Slovakia and abroad (*Sociológia*, *Sociologický časopis*, *Journal of Communist Studies*, *Uncaptive Mind*, *East European Reporter* etc.), presented at international conferences and made available to the public by means of the mass media and journals (*Národná obroda*, *Smena*, *Lidové noviny*, *Přítomnost*, *Kultúrny život*, *Respekt*, etc.).

The sociologists of the ICES participate in educational work within the framework of

Comenius University, in teaching general sociology, methods and techniques of sociological research, the history of sociology and the theory of social change, the sociology of social problems and movements, the sociology of public opinion, and the sociology of science.

The Centre for Social Analysis (C.S.A.)

is a private association oriented towards social and political research and public opinion polls. The C.S.A. was founded at the end of 1991. Its director is Tatiana Rosová, and the C.S.A. team of specialists includes Zora Bútorová, Ivan Dianiška, Mario Dobrovodský, Pavol Frič, Oľga Gyarfášová, Marian Timoracký.

Originally the C.S.A. team was working within the framework of the Research Centre for Social Problems at the Coordinating Centre of VPN (Public against Violence; February - August 1990), then at the Comenius University in Bratislava within the framework of the Institute for Social Analysis of Comenius University in Bratislava.

Since the beginning of 1990 the C.S.A. team has carried out a series of representative sociological surveys concerning the attitudes of the population of Slovakia, as well as of the ČSFR as a whole towards topical social, political and economic problems of the transition. The clients and customers of the studies produced by the C.S.A. team have been the Office of the President of the ČSFR, the Government of the ČSFR, the Government of the Slovak Republic, the Presidium of the Slovak National Council, the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of Privatization of the Slovak Republic, the Ministry of International Relations of the Slovak Republic, the Freedom House Foundation (USA), the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, etc.

The recent representative surveys of the C.S.A. concern the following problems:

1. The social and political climate, attitudes of different categories of the population towards the post-communist regime.

2. Political preferences and social background of supporters of the different political parties.
 3. The confidence of citizens in the top political institutions and personalities.
 4. The hierarchy of social problems in the opinion of the population.
 5. The lay-out of national and racial prejudices and intolerance in the different strata of the population; social and value background of these phenomena.
 6. The relations between Czechs and Slovaks; autostereotypes and heterostereotypes of the national character.
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