The Impact of Group Fears and Outside Actors on Ethnic Party Demands
Comparing Sudeten Germans in Inter-war Czechoslovakia with the post-1989 Moravian Movement

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Abstract: This paper seeks to address a significant gap in the current nationalist literature that has insufficiently examined the conditions under which an ethnic group or region will radicalise or, conversely, moderate its demands against the state centre. This study introduces a bargaining model to explore the process by which ethnic groups are mobilised and then de-mobilised, such that the extremity of their demands shift over time. Two arguments are given here. First, a group’s structural characteristics (including its size and compactness) define the upper-limits of goals that groups are capable of pursuing against the centre. Second, the extremity of these claims is a joint function of: (1) the group’s expected political or economic benefits of exercising its ‘exit option’ (the independent variable), and (2), the bargaining power and activities of a group’s lobby state or organisation (the intervening variable). In putting forth this argument, I hope to explain how and why an ethnic group’s demands can shift from extreme goals, such as broad territorial autonomy, to very moderate goals, such as affirmative action policies, and vice versa. Finally, this study suggests ways in which international organisations may intervene to ameliorate the intensity of ethnic conflict.


I. Introduction
Modernisation theorists have long predicted that nationalism would fade away as a by-product of increases in democratisation, industrialisation, education and literacy rates throughout the world. The recognition that ethnicity has not declined in political importance, however, has spawned an entirely new research agenda which places an emphasis on investigating nationalism as a phenomenon in its own right, rather than as a mere indicator of the ‘actual’ causes of conflict. To this end, many scholars have contributed to our understanding of ethno-politics by creating typologies of different strains of nationalism, which are empirically associated with the creation of various types of states and societies [Gellner 1983, Horowitz 1985, Stavenhagen 1990], while other research hypothesises material conditions which lead a proto-nation or ethnie to assume nationhood in the modern sense [Smith 1989, Hobsbawm 1990, Nairn 1974, Gellner 1964]. However, these structural approaches fail to explain why nationalism emerges at one point in time rather than another. Structural theories also fail to explore the mechanism by which entire groups may become mobilised by nationalising elites. To address the latter gap in the nationalism literature, Anderson [1991] and Hroch [1993] have both elaborated upon the processes through which ethnic elites propagate national identities through successive

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social strata of an ethnic group.\(^1\) Meanwhile, elite-based approaches have demonstrated the ways in which ethnic mobilisation can be seen as a outcome of rational cost-benefit calculations undertaken by nationalising actors [Fearon 1994a, Weingast 1994].

Importantly, however, none of the above approaches can explain why some national groups advance claims of political independence while other groups seek more moderate goals of political or cultural autonomy within the confines of a larger political unit. These studies also fail to explore the conditions under which a national group’s political demands can become more or less extreme over time. I argue that this oversight is due to a lack of rigorous attention paid by scholars of nationalism to the process of bargaining between ethnic party elites and central state governments, on the one hand, and between these ethnic elites and their group constituencies, on the other. This paper explores the argument that political mobilisation of ethnic characteristics is positively correlated with the credibility of the threat posed by the central government toward the minority. The legitimacy of these threats increases when the central government fails to ‘credibly commit’ to protecting the group’s political and economic position within the existing state framework. In sum, as the credibility of the threat of the centre to the ethnic group increases, ethnic leaders tend to advance more extreme political demands, and vice versa.\(^2\)

In this paper, I put forth two main arguments. First, group structural characteristics (such as size and compactness) serve as preconditions to the dependent variable of the extent to which this group will advance claims representing exit from the existing system of representation. In order to test this hypothesis, I employ a typology of minority groups in East-Central Europe constructed on the basis of their structural features. These structural characteristics largely constrain the extent to which the goals of minorities can be sought outside of, as opposed to within, the existing system. Second, while particular structural characteristics serve as necessary but insufficient conditions to the advancement of extreme claims against the centre, the likelihood that a group will advance such goals is importantly influenced by (1) the group’s expected political or economic benefits of exercising its ‘exit option’ (the independent variable), and (2), the bargaining power and activities of a group’s lobby state\(^3\) or organisation (the intervening variable).\(^4\)

\(^1\) The terms communal or ethnic group refer to any population within which there is a shared perception of common salient traits – whether cultural, linguistic, religious, or otherwise – which sets this group apart from others [Gurr 1993: Ch. 1]; identification with a ‘group’ on the basis of any one or a number of these traits may be termed ‘ethnic identity’. While ethnic groups certainly predate the nation-state, it would appear that every group is to some extent transitory, as group identities shift and overlap throughout time. The existence of groups also depends upon the larger structure within which they are embedded. The existence of minorities illustrates this point nicely, since a group’s minority status is wholly contingent upon the relationship between minority and majority groups that co-exist within a state framework.

\(^2\) Here, extremity of demands is measured in terms of the extent to which fulfilment of such demands represents a separation or exit from the existing state framework.

\(^3\) A ‘lobby’ state or organisation can be defined here as those which regularly lobby on behalf of an ethnic group (e.g., Hungary in the case of the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe).

\(^4\) This model is not intended to explain ethnic identity formation, but rather, is an explanation of the conditions under which an existing identity will serve as a basis upon which a group will advance political claims against the state in which it resides.
The typology of ethnic groups used in this paper has been constructed solely on the basis of their structural features. In doing so, I draw from Gurr’s global classification of ‘communal’ groups, using only the structural components of his definitions. I will then attempt to deduce the types of goals that will likely be advanced by groups based upon my arguments concerning the degree of bargaining leverage groups with differing levels of compactness and size have vis-à-vis their respective state governments. This hypothesis will then be tested with two cases of ethnic mobilisation: the Moravians in post-1989 Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans in post-1918 Czechoslovakia, using evidence accumulated through interviews and archival work concerning the claims that have been advanced by the ‘ethnic’ elites in each of the two cases.

This study addresses an important gap in the dominant constructivist literature concerning nationalist activities. This literature fails to explain the wide variation in the claims made by groups against their governments, but rather focuses on uniformities in the nationalist rhetoric utilised by political elites across cultures. In contrast, my approach predicts variation in ethnic group demands as a joint function of group characteristics and the bargaining games played between these groups and their central state governments.

I set forth the argument as follows: In Part II, I briefly review the recent work on nationalism relevant to the study of minorities in post-communist East Central Europe; in Part III, I specify the above hypotheses in further detail; and in Part IV, I test the following hypotheses using longitudinal analysis of two cases of Moravians in post-1989 Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans in the First Czechoslovak Republic.

II. Prior Research and Theory

Since there are a number of theories that treat ethnicity as problematic, it may be useful to exploit the insights of earlier works in creating a typology of ethnic groups. Raimo Vayrynen notes the existence of three broad approaches to the study of ethnicity: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism [Vayrynen 1994: 8], to which a fourth approach, structuralism, might be added. Primordialist scholars posit that there is some “immutable common ancestry, history and solidarity of the ethnie that are prior to any social interactions and structures” [Ibid.]. This approach treats the group as ontologically primitive and underviable. Primordialist explanations thus fail to take into account the ways in which the modernisation or industrialisation of societies create cross-cutting cleavages that break down or redefine ethnic communities. Further, they cannot explain how some ‘nations’ (e.g., Belorussians or Lithuanians) were artificially created by Soviet political elites [Suny 1993: 80]. Because of these empirical discrepancies, primordialism has been largely discredited in the academic community.

Pre-existing group identities appear, however, to play a role in nation-building. Miloslav Hroch and Eric Hobsbawm, for example, advance structural arguments to explain the ways in which nations are consciously constructed out of proto-nations or ethnies.  

5) ‘Ethnicity’ can be defined as the “communal identity of people who are classed together by common history, territory, social customs and physical traits” [Vayrynen 1994: 3]. I use the terms ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘communal groups’ interchangeably.

6) Smith’s “ethnie” (1989) or Hobsbawm’s “proto-nation” (1990) refer to the pre-modern ethnic community which may be distinguished in a number of ways, including size, attachment to territory, secular versus religious identity, language, culture, and so forth, and which provide the raw material upon which modern ‘nations’ can be based.
These studies hold that prior group traits provide *necessary but insufficient* bases for the emergence of full nations [Hobsbawm 1990, Smith 1989, emphasis added]. Hobsbawm notes that primordial theories identifying sufficient criteria for the establishment of a nation – such as common language, culture, and ethnic traits – are contradicted by a preponderance of empirical evidence suggesting that none of these traits alone constitutes a sufficient condition for the founding of a nation. However, some set of pre-existing group characteristics appears to be necessary for nation-building. Hobsbawm builds on primordialist theories by identifying the circumstances under which certain pre-existing group traits have enjoyed dominance over other traits in the formation of a nation. He argues, for example, that the growth of ‘ethnic’ as opposed to ‘civic’ nationalism in the period of 1870-1914 was an outgrowth of modernising forces such as urbanisation, migration flows and the resistance of traditional groups to the growth of modernity. Groups subjected to such conditions were more likely to listen to arguments that the disruptions in their lives were caused by a “non-Ruritanian state or ruling class” [Ibid.: 109]. The structuralist approach is flawed, however, to the extent that these scholars fail to explain why political elites would actually *choose* to undertake nationalising projects. More importantly, structuralists view nationalisation as a process of gradual evolution and therefore cannot account for the rapid mobilisation and de-mobilisation of ethnic groups.

The *instrumentalist* approach to ethnic conflict goes further to address this gap by demonstrating how the ethnic features of a group may be used to obtain material gains. In this formulation, violence is one such tool that can be used to acquire certain material benefits such as territory, political and cultural autonomy, and so forth. This approach lends itself nicely to formal modelling. For example, it is possible to use the instrumental approach to model a two-player interactive game in which Group A will fail to co-operate with Group B if the total gains obtained from repeated co-operative interactions are not expected to outweigh the gains resulting from a single defection [see Axelrod 1984]. Some theorists have emphasised that, in light of the fact that one player is likely to defect based on the perceived probability that another player will fail to honour his or her pledge to co-operate, the key to bringing about the emergence of co-operation is to create a credible commitment to co-operation on the part of the second player. This can be accomplished through the formation of institutions that work to increase the probability of repeated plays between players, thus increasing the value of extended co-operation over one-time defect strategies [Keohane 1984, Weingast 1994]. Although this approach is generally used to explain ethnic conflict where economic gains are the primary issue at stake, it can easily be applied to cases in which ethnic groups are mobilised for non-material purposes such as linguistic rights or cultural autonomy.\(^7\)

In this paper, I use a theoretical framework that joins certain aspects of the primordialist school (in terms of the role played by pre-existing identities) with an instrumentalist approach. My framework, consistent with the so-called *constructivist* position, holds

\(^7\) Importantly, however, a purely instrumentalist framework constitutes an incomplete account of the phenomenon of ethnic mobilisation, since political or administrative ‘choice’ is insufficient to explain nationhood. I posit that there do exist objective criteria or ‘proto-national’ preconditions upon which national consciousness must be based, such as a common history, language or religion [Hobsbawm 1990: 7-8]. Moreover, elite activities do not capture the relationship between national elites and the mobilised group; a national identity is importantly *negotiated* between elites and the populations they seek to mobilise.
that nationalism is not a natural consequence or outgrowth of a shared culture which is deeply rooted in history. Nations are not so much ‘discovered’ as they are consciously created by intellectuals or ethnic entrepreneurs [Eley and Suny 1995]. On the other hand, the choices made by nationalising actors are significantly constrained, as “nationalists make their own history, but not entirely as they please; not with cultures of their own choosing, but with cultures directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past” [Ibid.: 39]. Finally, in order to demonstrate the mechanisms by which groups are mobilised by their respective nationalising elites, insights will be taken from the sociological literature to demonstrate the importance that social organizations play in mobilizing ethnic populations in each of the two cases [Gamson 1975, McCarthy and Zald 1986, Kitschelt 1993]. Social organisations serve as important devices through which ethnic party leaders mobilise their populations in an attempt to signal to the centre that the elites enjoy strong constituency support within the group. The credibility of such signals is crucial to increasing and sustaining the bargaining leverage of ethnic elites in their negotiations with the centre.

III. The Argument

Dependent Variable:

1) The dependent variable in this study is ethnic group demands and the extent to which these demands are sought outside of rather than within the existing state framework.

As stated earlier, the dependent variable of group claims can be seen as a continuous variable in terms of the extent to which a claim represents an attempt to exit the existing state framework. For example, a group demand for language rights or affirmative action is one which could be easily accommodated under existing state institutions. In contrast, the claim for territorial autonomy constitutes a search for some degree of separation from the existing state apparatus. Finally, a group claim for secession represents the pursuit of absolute separation from the state framework. The demands advanced by ethnic groups may shift up or down this continuum in response to variation in the independent and intervening variables.

Enabling Conditions:

2) A group’s structural features serve as the enabling conditions for the advancement of certain types of group goals; these features function as limits on the extent to which these goals can be sought outside of the existing framework of representation.

A. Size. I posit that, other things being equal, the larger a minority group is relative to the state population, the greater the capacity of the group to exit or fundamentally alter the existing state framework. In making this argument, I draw analogies from the international relations literature that holds that larger states have greater say in determining the structure of international institutions [Waltz 1979, Snidal 1993]. Similarly, the greater a group’s size relative to the dominant group of a state, the greater the minority’s consequent bargaining leverage relative to that of the dominant group in negotiating over state institutions. The absolute size of a minority also appears to matter, as there appears to be a size threshold below which, other things being equal, a minority group is less likely to pursue sovereign state status. This is likely due to the recognition among national leaders of small groups that the minority in question is ‘too small’ to muster adequate military
defence against potential foreign attacks; likewise, small groups are unlikely to possess a functionally-differentiated economy capable of self-sufficiency. B. Density. I hypothesise that groups that are highly concentrated are also vertically and horizontally integrated such that they constitute potentially self-sufficient social and economic regions that can feasibly lay claim to political independence based on some degree of ethnic homogeneity within their borders. A group that does not constitute a clear majority within its borders is unlikely to seek political independence since it is unlikely to achieve electoral victory under minimally democratic elections. Further, if the said minority is not highly concentrated, then it is unlikely to sue for political independence upon a given territory, given its perception that the central government is unlikely to respond positively to its claims. A classification of various ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and the goals they are likely to pursue on the basis of their structural characteristics is given in Figure 1.

Independent Variables:

3) The dependent variable of extremity of group claims is importantly impacted by at least one independent variable, which influences the extent to which group goals are sought outside of as opposed to within the existing system of representation. This variable consists of the political/economic costs and benefits of opting out of the existing system. This has at least two possible variants:

3.A The ability of the state to ‘credibly commit’ to preserving the political or economic rights of a minority within its borders. If the discretionary power of a state is not limited, the consequent inability of a state government to make its promises credible to a minority regarding the preservation of its political and economic rights will increase the probability that the group will pursue goals outside of the existing state framework in order to protect its rights from potential violations by the state [Root 1989; Weingast 1995, Weingast and Schultz 1996].

8) The existence of international organisations such as NATO and the EU likely mitigates the extent to which a community must be economically and militarily self-sufficient to become a viable state in the international system. If this is true, then the actual ‘size’ threshold for statehood is probably lower today than it was in the past.

9) This is because states are disinclined to permit the separation of a territory upon which many members of the majority group reside. Moreover, governments are generally unwilling to accept the loss of their territory for economic reasons as well as the fact that regional secession can be seen as a threat to the integrity of the state itself.

10) Weingast demonstrates the logic of the ‘credible commitment’ problem in a variety of different contexts, including political development, democratisation and ethnic conflict. For example, he notes that a central dilemma faced by governments is how a government strong enough to protect property rights can credibly commit not to confiscate the wealth of its citizens. He argues that “market-preserving federalism” serves as one institutional solution to this problem. In brief, the central government ‘ties its hands’ by devolving authority to local units, thus establishing a degree of regional autonomy on the local level. This induces competition among lower units of the federal structure, leading them to implement policies favourable to their local economies, thus promoting growth. The additional tax revenue generated through this economic growth means that it is in the central government’s interest to preserve these federal arrangements. Thus, the central government has effectively made a credible commitment not to confiscate the wealth of its citizens — the institutions are self-enforcing [Weingast 1995].
In the context of this project, it is important to understand exactly how a credible commitment to non-aggression is made. I will determine the means by which a government makes its promises credible by investigating conditions under which governments have succeeded in scaling back the demands of national minorities as well as those in which the central government has failed to do so. ‘Success’ will be measured as cases in which a national minority has both the capacity and incentive to seek some separation from the state framework, but does not advance these claims due to promises made to this minority by the central government. A commitment to non-aggression can also be made more credible over time, as a government capable of aggressing against a minority is observed to fulfil its promises to protect the economic and political status of its minority. Under such circumstances an ethnic group will be less likely to pursue protection from the central government through some measure of separation from the state. The impact of this independent variable can best be measured through intensive case analysis.

3.B Perceived value of an ‘outside option’. The greater the perceived rewards relative to costs of exiting the state framework, the greater the likelihood that the group will pursue this goal. Conversely, the higher the relative costs of opting out of the system, the higher the probability that this group will choose to pursue its goals within the context of the existing framework of representation [Vayrynen 1994: 18].\footnote{This is a different phenomenon from the credible commitment problem, in that there are cases in which the perceived value of an ‘outside option’ is so great that a minority will seek to exit a state framework regardless of the existence of a credible commitment on the part of the host state. Slovenia appears to be one such case, in the sense that Slovenia appears to have made the calcula-}
above requires that the minority group and central government have a shared interest in maintaining the integrity of the state framework, the second variant accounts for cases in which there is no such shared interest. Rather, the national minority in question perceives that the minimum rewards of exiting the state framework are absolutely greater than the maximum rewards that can be achieved by remaining within the bounds of the existing state. Credibility of promises made by the government to protect the minority’s status is thus irrelevant to this set of cases.

Intervening Variable:

3) The bargaining strength and activities of an international organisation or a lobby state with which a group identifies:12

If the lobby state has bargaining power vis-à-vis the group’s host state (through, for example, possession of an ethnic minority belonging to the host state) and if the lobby state acts to support separatist or irredentist aspirations of the group, this will increase the likelihood that the group will assert its goals in a way that challenges the existing state framework. If, on the other hand, the lobby state has minimal bargaining power or fails to support separatist/irredentist or broad power-sharing goals of the group, this works to decrease the probability that the group will seek to advance its aims outside of the existing system.13 Here, I will examine the ways in which an international organization or outside lobby state can assist a central government in making promises to protect the rights of its national minorities credible. See Figure 2 for a schematic depiction of these variables.

The interaction of the above variables and their impact on group claims is illustrated in Figure 3. There are two broad routes to the pursuit and radicalisation of group claims. In the first case, exiting the existing state may be the outcome of calculations by elites, and by the population at large, that the minimum expected economic and/or security rewards of exiting the state framework exceed the maximum expected costs of remaining within the borders of the existing state. If the expected costs of exiting the system are not prohibitively high (as in costly warfare with the rump state) and the expected benefits of exiting clearly outweigh the costs, the group is likely to advance more radicalised ethnic claims such as secession or irredentism. The actions and bargaining power of an outside lobby actor can act to moderate or radicalise these claims. A good

12) This variable has an important interaction effect with the above variables, in that the value that a group places on an outside option of irredentism is importantly mediated by the availability of that option. For example, following World War One, the Sudeten Germans placed a high premium on joining the Austrian state, but this possibility was ruled out soon after the peace settlement by the war-weary Austrian government.

13) Another possible activity undertaken by lobby states (as seen in the case of Hungary and ethnic Hungarian minorities abroad) is that of pressing for greater territorial or political autonomy for minorities that exist outside of one’s borders. Although this may not directly challenge the integrity of the state’s authority as would the support of irredentist or separatist impulses of minority groups, such goals constitute a less extreme, yet significant, challenge to the structure of the state in its existing form.
example of this phenomenon is the secession of Slovenia at the start of the 1990 Yugoslav War.

The second route – and one that more broadly concerns this study – involves cases in which the group has a clear economic and/or political interest in remaining within the state framework, but cannot be assured that the central government will not aggress against them. In other words, the group and the state have a shared interest in remaining united. The central government therefore has an interest in credibly commitment to protect the status of the group. Uncertainties generated by radical regime change or by a shift in political power from one communal group or class to another, however, often lead to ethnic mobilisation based on fear of the majority. This in turn generates a political elite who capitalise upon such fears who campaign upon the danger of government discrimination against the group. This elite will attempt to persuade its constituency that it is necessary to protect against government aggression through some degree of group autonomy.
When groups are successfully mobilised, the salience of ethnic cleavages increases, thus heightening fear on the part of the majority and, in turn, increasing the potential for actual government discrimination against the group. When awareness of potential discrimination is thus supplemented by acts of aggression against the group, minority fear of the centre is thus legitimated and the cycle is repeated. In this way, ethnic mobilisation escalates, leading to the advancement of political demands by ethnic elites who can now legitimately claim to represent the interests of the entire group. These demands become more radicalised with the escalation of this cycle of ethnic mobilisation. The actions and bargaining power of a lobby state or organisation then act as an intervening variable to either radicalise or moderate the extremity of ethnic claims. If, however, the cycle of ethnic mobilisation is broken through, for example, a lack of observed acts of aggression by the centre against the group, then members of the group will tend to politicise along dimensions other than ethnic identity. The political claims advanced by the ethnic leaders, now lacking support within the group, will tend to moderate and may even disappear. (The case of the Moravian movement of the early 1990’s in Czechoslovakia illustrates this point nicely.) Further, unification of ethnic representation is impacted by the level of political mobilisation within a group. When a group’s fear of discrimination by the government or majority is high, members of the group will tend to vote for ethnic parties, which typically form ‘ethnic’ platforms in an effort to attract the votes of the median member of the group. As fear of the centre dissipates, however, ethnic parties appeal to other identities in an effort to compete for the support of a group that has begun to vote along economic – as opposed to ethnic – dimensions. See Figure 4 for an illustration of this model.
IV. Testing the Hypotheses

A. Sudeten Germans:  

At the time of the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, the Sudeten German minority numbered over 3 million, constituting 23 per cent of the state population [Bugajski 1994: 294]. Within the German-speaking Sudetenland, Germans made up an overwhelming majority, making up 90 to 100 per cent of the population in many districts [1921 Czechoslovak census figures, as cited in Essler 1938: 1]. Given their structural features, this group had the capacity to seek extreme group goals of complete exit of the existing state framework.  

Having established that the Germans were capable of pursuing the most extreme form of autonomy on the basis of its structural features, we can now attempt to predict the circumstances under which the group would actually advance such goals. I argue that the first route to advancement of political claims as represented by ‘perceived rewards of exiting the state framework’ in Figure 3 does not usefully apply to the Sudeten German case because it is clear that the group had a clear interest in remaining within the Czechoslovak state. Particularly in the years following World War One, it became apparent to German industrialists – and to German workers – that the Czechoslovak government was

14) The term ‘Sudeten Germans’ has, since World War Two, been used to refer to Germans within the borders of the Czechoslovak state [Wingfield 1989: xv.]. I have adopted this definition for the purposes of this paper.

15) Although the geographical concentration of the Sudeten German group along the borders of Bohemia and Moravia effectively prevented the group from realistically pursuing goals of political unification necessary to achieving sovereignty, this group was capable of suing for extreme political separation in the form of irredentism, as Sudetenland bordered upon the co-ethnic states of Austria and Germany.
far more likely to protect the interests of industry than either Austria or Germany. These two states were mired in social and economic instability, threatened as they were by communist forces, which industrialists in particular viewed with mistrust. Further, Sudeten German industries and their workers produced materials for an internal Czechoslovak market, thus depending for their livelihoods upon the cohesion between the Sudetenland and the Czech interior. Most Sudeten German industrialists also wished to avoid competition with the Reich’s industry and therefore opposed the separation of ‘Deutschböhmen’ from Czechoslovakia [Kopecek 1996: 67; Lidové noviny, 9 December 1918]. In fact, the growing influence of German bourgeois interests ultimately provided crucial support to pro-capitalist German parties such as the Agrarians, the first Sudeten German party to lobby for true co-habitation within the Czechoslovak state.

Disincentives to remaining within the Czechoslovak state primarily involved fears that the new government would discriminate against the Sudeten German minority on an ethnic basis. The Sudeten German case thus follows the second route to advancement of ethnic claims, given the failure of the Czechoslovak government to credibly commit to preserving the economic and political rights of the Sudeten German minority. This commitment problem was all the more salient given justifiable fears that the Czechs would utilise their new-found power to redress the perceived inequalities between Czechs and Germans under the Habsburg Monarchy.

Sudeten Germans enjoyed extensive economic, cultural and political privileges over Czechs under the pro-German monarchy. Although the working class in the Czech lands was composed of both ethnic groups, Sudeten Germans dominated ownership and management positions and held a disproportionate share of the wealth in the region [Wingfield 1989: 5]. Further, those without a command of the German language were barred from the better-paid civil posts and more prestigious occupations, over which German government officials and businesspersons enjoyed a near monopoly. The Sudeten Germans also had significant electoral advantages in both the Bohemian Diet and in the Reichsrat; German votes were weighted in such a way that they would never be out-voted by Czech deputies in the Bohemian Diet. They were thus in a position to use their dominant political power to protect their economic privileges in the Czech lands.

Sudeten Germans’ economic privileges under the Habsburg regime were therefore contingent upon their political dominance, which in turn was due to: (1) pro-German domination of the territory in which they resided, and (2), their numerical majority relative to the Czechs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire at large (and therefore within the Reichsrat). I hypothesise, therefore, that the Sudeten Germans would be likely to advance claims outside of the framework of representation (through irredentism or broad territorial autonomy) once these conditions no longer held, largely because the Sudeten Germans could not be certain that the Czechoslovak state would not infringe upon their pre-World War One economic, political or cultural status. The extent to which this group will seek such claims, however, is importantly mitigated (1) by the activities, and (2) power of a ‘lobby state’ (in this case, Germany and Austria). In other words, as the lobby states’ bargaining power efforts to secure autonomy for the minority increase, Sudeten German claims should become more radical, and vice versa. Having established that the Sudeten

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16) As mentioned earlier, I argue that separatist goals were unlikely to have been advanced by the Sudeten Germans. This is due to the impracticality of such a goal given the geographical spread of the Sudetenland.
Germans were likely to attempt to exit the Czechoslovak state at the close of World War One, I will now test this hypothesis against the evidence.

The Sudeten Germans, anticipating the creation of a pan-German state that would encompass the Sudetenland, were stunned by the rapid political events that reduced them to a national minority in the newly-formed Czechoslovak state. Only months after Allied recognition of Czechoslovakia in 1918, the Czechoslovak government began to occupy all the German towns in the Sudetenland. In the meantime, the Sudeten Germans set up provisional governments in Reichenberg, Troppau, Krumau and Znaïm. These governments were conceived as transitional arrangements until the hoped-for Anschluss between Austria and Germany was to occur, at which time the Sudeten Germans would be incorporated into a new pan-German state. Some of these regional governments requested “negotiations” with the Czechoslovak state in order to “sustain peace and order between the two nations” [Lidové noviny, 8 November 1918].

The Sudeten German people supported these governments and their goals of joining Sudetenland with Austro-Germany. Despite this, when the Czechoslovak authorities occupied the Sudetenland and dissolved the governments, the ethnic German population acquiesced peacefully. There are two main reasons for this. First, the Germans were profoundly war-weary following the close of World War One, as Bohemian Germans had shouldered a disproportionate amount of the war burden relative to their Czech compatriots. More importantly, the German population clearly calculated that engaging in violence against the Czechs would damage their case for irredentist arrangements at the Paris Peace Conference which was already underway [Campbell 1975: 52; Wiskemann 1938: 84]. Despite their failure to rise forcefully against the Czechoslovak ‘occupiers’, ethnic Germans supported their leaders’ irredentist goals regardless of class. Even German industrialists, for whom separation from Czechoslovakia represented serious economic costs, came out in favour of national self-determination during a meeting of leading German industrialists in Liberec. Clearly, the prospect of becoming a national minority in a Slavic state must have been extremely unattractive – and the pressure from their fellow Germans at the time extremely strong – for Germans who had a clear economic interest in co-operation with the Czechs to advocate separation following the establishment of the Czechoslovak state [Campbell 1975: 50]. Radicalisation of the Sudeten German minority was thus a clear outcome of a commitment problem on the part of the Czechoslovak government at the close of World War One.

The threat of the centre was doubly salient following the overt establishment of a “Czechoslovak” national state. Although he later proved himself a defender of national minority rights, Czechoslovakia’s first president Tomáš Masaryk confirmed Sudeten German suspicions that the new Czechoslovak state was hostile to their interests when, in his first political message upon returning to Czechoslovakia from the Peace Conference, he referred to the Germans as “immigrants and colonists” [Lidové noviny, 23 December 1918]. In response to this, the Prager Tagblatt wrote that there was nothing for the Germans to do at this point but wait for the final outcome of the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, the Bohemian-German Territorial Assembly called the central government occupation of the Sudeten land “illegal,” vowing that the German minority “would fight until victorious” [Lidové noviny, 29 December 1918]. During this time, Sudeten German leader Rudolf Lodgman called on the German population to resist the construction of a Czechoslovak state. Obstructionism among Sudeten Germans was perhaps at its peak during this time and reflected the very visceral reaction of ethnic Germans to the estab-
lishment of a national state ostensibly for Czechs and Slovaks over citizens of other nationalities. No matter how liberal, no minority treaty could neutralise the threat implicit in the construction of such an explicitly exclusionary state. Sudeten German fears were given further validation during the failed negotiations between ethnic German leaders and the Czechoslovak government in 1918 when Czech leader Alois Rašín supposedly greeted German Social Democratic Party (DSAP) leader Josef Seliger with the remark, “We don’t negotiate with traitors!” Seliger later used Rašín’s remark to successfully rally a German audience against the Czechs several days later. By continually reminding their constituency of such incidents, Sudeten German leaders thus evoked secessionist interests even among Germans who stood to lose by separation from Czechoslovakia.

Social organisations served as important mobilising devices in this context, as evidenced by the German Social Democratic Party’s overwhelming victories in the Sudetenland in both the 1919 communal elections and later in the 1920 national elections. DSAP success cannot be explained merely by an attractive electoral platform, as virtually all Sudeten German parties advocated the same goal: national self-determination. Rather, having taken the lead in establishing the regional Sudeten governments, the DSAP already held dominant positions in local government, press and community organisations. Control over these social networks critically assisted them in maintaining a lead position in the Sudeten German nationalist movement, – the DSAP leadership could use these resource networks to draw on the support of their constituency when needed [Kitschelt 1993].

Although the Czechoslovak government had promised to preserve the economic and political rights of the Sudeten Germans on September 1919 in the form of a minority treaty that gave ethnic Germans the right to hold public office, receive education in their native tongue, and conduct official business in their native language [Wiskemann 1938: 93], promises to preserve Sudeten German rights were clearly not perceived as credible among the Sudeten Germans, the majority of whom, “regardless of their politics and class background, wanted to remain part of Austria” [Wingfield 1989: xiv]. At the same time, it had become increasingly evident to the Sudeten Germans that the Czechoslovak government was not about to permit the Germans to pursue irredentist goals. The Czechs had demonstrated that they would use military force to ensure that such aspirations be held in check. More importantly, the Austrian and German governments had responded negatively or not at all to the Sudeten Germans’ irredentist claims. After Sudeten German ‘authorities’ attempted to arrange for German military assistance against the Czechs in 1919, they were told by the war-weary Reich that “the Sudetendeutschen must satisfy themselves with (territorial) autonomy” [Wiskemann 1938: 95].

Austria, whose premier persistently appealed to Peace Conference powers for unification with Germany as well as the Sudetenland, had meanwhile been forbidden by the Allies to create a pan-German state. The Allied powers maintained that Austria must remain a neutral state under the supervision of the League of Nations [Lidové noviny, 5 May 1919]. Significantly, when Germany and Austria signed the Treaty of Versailles in the summer of 1919, surrendering territorial claims upon Czechoslovakia, Sudeten German parties and local German representatives uniformly scaled back their political demands against the state from irredentism to territorial autonomy. During this time, the Sudeten German newspaper **Morgenzeitung** wrote that the Germans must fight to the last moment against being united with Czechoslovakia, but that if the Peace Conference decided against them, they would have to fight for autonomy within the boundaries of
Czechoslovakia [Lidové noviny, 3 May 1919]. Other Sudeten German representatives echoed this sentiment, saying that “nothing now remained for the Germans but working to achieve autonomy and civic freedom (within Czechoslovakia)” [Lidové noviny, 11 May 1919]. Even Lodgman, the radical proponent of ‘Deutschböhmen’ and Sudeten irredentism, proclaimed that territorial autonomy was now the only viable option for the Sudeten Germans.

Irredentism had thus been ruled out by the German minority and its leaders as a viable option. Indeed, by 1920, aside from a few renegade bases in Bohemia aided by pan-German military extremists on either side of the German border, the majority of Sudeten Germans had resigned themselves to residing within the borders of the Czechoslovak state [Bugajski 1994: 295]. The extent to which this minority sought to exit the existing state framework had been clearly circumscribed by the activities of their potential lobby states, Germany and Austria. Despite this, the Czechoslovak government had yet to credibly commit to protecting Sudeten German rights within the Czechoslovak state. The German minority therefore continued to seek protection from the state through territorial autonomy, as a lesser protection than complete separation. As the most popular Sudeten German party during this period, we can use DSAP claims as a loose proxy for the goals sought by Sudeten Germans as a whole. The DSAP party program of 1919 supported the borders of the existing Czechoslovak state, but called for extensive autonomy for the state’s national minorities. DSAP Chairman Josef Seliger advocated the creation of a “corporate body through which each nationality would govern itself by means of a national council and a government.” These ‘governments’ would be responsible for “legal regulation of the nationalities, administration of the educational system, and maintenance of ethnic culture” for each nationality. The DSAP platform thus favoured broad territorial autonomy on the part of the Czechoslovakia’s national minorities, confirming the above hypothesis. In fact, the majority of Sudeten German parties echoed these goals in their electoral platforms.

Due to their growing recognition that continued lack of participation in Czechoslovak politics was hurting their cause, Sudeten German parties ultimately decided to run in the 1920 national elections, winning seats in the Czechoslovak National Assembly. However, continued obstructionism toward the Czechoslovak government, together with calls for broad territorial autonomy from the Czechoslovak state, continued until 1922. At this point, Sudeten German parties representing industrial interests broke with more radical nationalist parties over co-operation with the Czechs. The move toward greater co-operation by moderate German parties was largely in response to the state’s proven commitment to protecting industrial interests in the Czech lands, in contrast to shakier relations between the state and private enterprise in Austria and Germany. The government’s pro-market track record gradually decreased the perception among Sudeten Germans that the centre represented a threat to German industrial interests. This led to a split in the Sudeten German parliamentary club over the desirability of co-operation with the Czechoslovak government.

17) The German Social Democratic Party enjoyed the most significant political support among the Sudeten Germans at this time, capturing one-half of the German vote in Bohemia in the first Czechoslovak communal elections of 1919 and taking control of several municipal governments [Wingfield 1989: 14-15].
The Czechoslovak government was finally able to fully commit to protecting the Sudeten German minority in 1925. This commitment provided the basis for an overall moderation in Sudeten German claims, and was accompanied by the relative political demobilisation of the German ethnic identity. Just weeks before the 1925 national elections, Germany concluded a treaty with France (Czechoslovakia’s political patron) and Great Britain. The treaty included a timetable for Germany’s entry into the League of Nations. This ushered in a period of German-French rapprochement. With the growth in Berlin’s diplomatic power and consequent Czech concern over the reliability of their French ally as a balance against Germany, the Czechoslovak government had a clear incentive to court Germany’s favour by seeking to improve relations with Sudeten Germans. This could best be achieved by drawing the Sudeten Germans into government. Czechoslovakia’s new international constraints thus provided a credible promise to the Sudeten German minority that the government would protect the group’s political and economic rights with certainty. The results of the November 1925 elections demonstrated that the Sudeten Germans now viewed the central government as non-threatening and consequently favoured co-operation with the Czechoslovak state. Indeed, the most pro-Czechoslovakia German party achieved a huge victory in 1925, while pro-autonomy German Nationals and German National Socialists lost support. Interestingly, though extremist Sudeten German leaders continued to rail against the Czechoslovak state and the danger of co-operating with Czechs, the most extremist parties lost electoral support in the 1925 elections. This demonstrates that elites by themselves cannot mobilise a population if there is no sound basis for believing in the ‘threat’. The state’s credible commitment to protect the Sudeten Germans resulted in the further fracturing of Sudeten German political representation, as ethnic German voters began to vote along economic as opposed to purely ethnic dimensions. Sudeten German platforms consequently multiplied in an effort to compete for the German vote [Wiskemann 1938: 131]. Further, the most popular Sudeten German parties during this period generally sought more moderate claims against the state including linguistic rights and cultural autonomy for the German minority, revealing a further moderation of minority claims against the state in line with a radically diminished Sudeten German fear of the centre. Electoral support for Sudeten German parties in the First Czechoslovak Republic is given below.

Table 1. Election Results to Czechoslovak House of Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1935</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Social Workers Party</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(later Sudeten German Party)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Nationals(^1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Social Democrats</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bund der Landwirte</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Christian Socials</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) These parties remained negativist in their approach to Czechoslovakia.

Source: 1938 Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook.

The above chart illustrates the impact that ‘fear of the centre’ had on the mobilisation and demobilisation of the Sudeten German identity. The Germans voted as a bloc in 1920 for German parties calling for broad territorial autonomy from the Czechoslovak state during the time that fear of the state was high. Results of the 1925 elections – when fear of the
state was relatively low – demonstrates the phenomenon of relative ethnic demobilisation as Sudeten German parties began to advance a variety of different platforms in order to attract a constituency that had begun to vote along an economic dimension. Interestingly, the Sudeten German minority voted again as a bloc for the extremist Sudeten German Party in the early 1930’s, as the credibility of Czechoslovakia’s promise to protecting Sudeten German rights faltered in the wake of worsening relations between Prague and Berlin. This was largely due to the resurgence of Germany as an expansionist power, accompanied by calls for annexation of ethnic German areas. The destabilisation of the centre's commitment to this group thus re-mobilised the group, while the world recession created the basis for Sudeten German fears that the Czechoslovak government would react to economic difficulties by violating the rights of its German minority.

This analysis of the Sudeten German claims demonstrates that the above two variables, (1) the credible commitment of the centre toward protecting group economic and political status, and (2), the activities and bargaining power of the group’s ‘lobby’ state(s), had a significant impact on the extremity of group claims advanced against the centre. In examining the Sudeten German case immediately following the establishment of the Czechoslovak state, I was able to control for such variables as group-specific traits, leadership, and other cultural variables in order to assess the independent effect that bargaining relations between the centre and the group as well as the activities of outside actors had on the extent to which this group would seek to exit the existing state framework. The effects of the above two variables on group claims in this case are significant and in the predicted direction.

B. Moravians

Moravians constitute 13 per cent of the population of the Czech Republic according to the 1991 Czechoslovak census. Moravia is one of the two Czech ‘historical lands’, and makes up the eastern half of the Czech state. Historically, the two regions have coexisted peacefully, and in 1918 the Moravian and Bohemian Czech lands merged with Austrian Silesia and the territories of Slovakia and Ruthenia to create the Czechoslovak Republic. The Moravian region is sufficiently large – according to the above model – for the advancement of more extreme claims against the state, but it is difficult to determine how “compact” the group is given the weakness of ‘Moravianness’ as a political identity. Traditionally, Moravia has been perceived as a mere region within a homogenous Czech nation. However, according to the 1991 Czechoslovak census, 13 per cent of the Czech population declared themselves to be “Moravian” for the first time since World War Two [Bugajski 1994: 293]. The remaining indigenous inhabitants of Moravia overwhelmingly claimed Czech nationality (roughly half of Moravian inhabitants declared themselves to be “Czech” in the 1991 census). In sum, while this ‘group’ is sizable, ‘Moravianness’ does not appear to be an identity uniformly felt among inhabitants of the region. Therefore, unlike the Sudeten Germans, the Moravians can only be loosely categorised as a large ethnic group based upon its structural characteristics. Consequently, a complete exit of the system is probably not feasible for the Moravian minority. I will now investigate the Moravian group in post-communist Czechoslovakia in terms of the above two vari-

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18) The Moravian identity did, however, gain salience in the region after the fall of communism, primarily in the regional capital of Brno and surrounding area of South Moravia [Bugajski 1994: 111].
ables in order to determine the extent to which this regional group is likely to advance goals outside of the framework of the Czechoslovak state.

To begin with, the first route to the advancement of ethnic claims does not apply to the Moravians, primarily because a complete exit from the Czechoslovak state is not a feasible goal for the group, given: (1) the weakness of the Moravian identity following the Velvet Revolution, (2) Moravia’s geographical location sandwiched between two constituent members of a ‘federal’ state, and (3), Moravia’s economic dependence on the larger Czechoslovak market. The Moravian case thus applies to the second route of nationalism, provoked by fear of government discrimination against the region. Advancement of ethnic claims in this case therefore crucially depends upon the ability of the Moravian political elites to mobilise the population upon fears of the central government. Success of this mobilisation, in turn, depends upon substantiation of the perception of government threat, through actual acts of government discrimination against the group. However, unlike the Sudeten German case – in which successive land, educational and economic reforms fed the perception that the central government constituted a threat to the Sudeten Germans – the Moravian political elites had little concrete evidence of government persecution against the region that could be used to substantiate claims of discrimination. As seen in the chart given below, unemployment differentials between Moravia and Bohemia (the other ‘historical’ Czech land) at the time of the fall of the communist regime were negligible.

Table 2. Unemployment by region in the Czech Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czech Republic</strong></td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Bohemia</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Bohemia</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bohemia</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bohemia</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bohemia</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Moravia</strong></td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Moravia</strong></td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The absence of clear economic inequities between the Moravian and Bohemian regions meant that political elites could only mobilise the group on the basis of fears of future economic shocks to the region resulting from post-communist reforms.

A second constant on Moravian nationalism is that it has no lobby state that ethnically identifies with the region and that is committed to lobbying on its behalf. In the early 1990s, either Czech or Slovak Republics could have lobbied for Moravian autonomy within the Czechoslovak federation, but such support occurred only when it was perceived to serve the interests of one or both sides in the context of Czech-Slovak negotiations over the construction of a new federal state. This contingency means that the window of opportunity in which Moravian political elites could obtain broader goals – such as tri-federalism – was limited to the 1992 deadline for establishing the new federal constitution. The unconsolidated nature of Moravian political identity – together with the absence of an outside state or organisation that consistently lobbies on its behalf as well
as the lack of evident discrimination on the part of the state – leads to the prediction that this group is significantly less likely than the Sudeten Germans to pursue ethnic claims outside of the existing state framework.

In their efforts to mobilise residents of this region after the fall of communism in 1989, Moravian political elites have in fact accused the central government of “regional discrimination”. These elites have consistently maintained that, although Moravia contains 39 percent of the Czech population, the region receives only 32 percent of state subsidies [Bugajski 1994: 307]. In reality, however, there is no concrete evidence indicating that Moravian districts are systematically discriminated against when compared to Bohemian districts.19 Further, since the Moravian economy is structurally similar to that of Bohemia, it was well-positioned to benefit economically from free market reforms. Consequently, the prospect of continued liberal market reforms (an expected outcome of the post-1989 era, given the electoral strength of pro-reform Czech parties) did not pose the same level of threat to Moravia as they did to Slovakia. Unlike Slovakia, Moravia was not expected to suffer under market liberalisation.

In order to examine the variation of Moravian claims against the state, I will use as a proxy the demands advanced by the HSD-SMS (Movement for the Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia), which was the party with the most significant electoral support in Moravia (representing fully 10 per cent of the vote in the entire Czech Republic in the July 1990 general elections). This party was formed with the primary aim of replacing the dual Czechoslovak federation with a tripartite system in which Moravia and Silesia20 would together constitute a third “autonomous republic”, receiving a proportionate share of state funds. Indeed, the realisation of a ‘just distribution’ of state allocations was the primary component of the HSD-SMS 1990 campaign platform.

By most accounts, Czechs were surprised by the relative success of the movement in 1990. As in the Sudeten German case, the success of the movement depended critically upon the organisational structures of HSD-SMS – an outgrowth of the Moravian cultural organisation (MOH). MOH had been established well before 1989 and was headed by Dr. Boleslav Bártá, who was held in high esteem by Moravian inhabitants as the historic champion of Moravian regional interests. Bártá, widely viewed as ‘the father of Moravian nationalism’, had pushed for a Czech-Moravian-Slovak tri-federal state during negotiations over a new federal constitution in 1969. With this legacy, Bártá was seen as the champion of Moravians interests, while other post-communist leaders – themselves involved in internecine fights within the Civic Forum – were viewed as self-interested Prague centralists. With “autonomy from Prague” as his rallying cry, Bártá successfully organised meetings and protests in Brno – the capitol of Moravia – at which Bártá and other regional elites argued for the establishment of Moravian regional autonomy along the lines of what was enjoyed by the Slovak Republic. One observer of the Moravian movement recalled rallies organised in the months leading up to the 1990 elections in which people proclaimed that “what those people do in Prague (in the revolution) is in

19) Interview, Professor of Sociology Tomáš Sirovátka, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic 9 February 1998.
20) Silesia forms another ‘historical land’ within the Czech lands, comprising the farthest northeast corner of the Czech Republic.
Prague. We have our fields and our factories and wine. Let Moravia be for Moravians.” During this time, Moravian political elites continually made anti-Prague statements on the television and radio, claiming that Moravia was economically better-off than Bohemia, and that more money in taxes was sent Prague than was returned in the form of state subsidies. Political elites argued publicly for the establishment of autonomous political and economic institutions as well as an independent tax authority for Moravia, so that “what was produced in Moravia would remain in Moravia.” These public statements, appearing continually in the newspapers and on television, arguably resulted in the questionable belief by a majority Moravian inhabitants that Moravia was making net transfer payments to Bohemia, and that Moravian political autonomy would result in greater regional prosperity. Further, the desire for regional autonomy was linked with a feeling of ‘Moravian identity’ in the minds of most of the movement’s supporters. In fact, there is a positive correlation between self-identification as ‘Moravian’ in the national census and support for HSD-SMS in 1990 national elections. Also, the highest concentrations of HDS-SMS support and Moravian identification were to be found in the Brno area, which was HSD-SMS’s organisational base. This clearly demonstrates the importance that organisational resources play in fomenting social or, in this case, ethnic movements [McCarthy and Zald 1986: 20].

Having galvanised substantial regional support for their aims, HSD-SMS obtained 22 seats in the Czech National Council in the national elections of 1990 and was invited into the Czech government. In August 1990, the party put forth a proposal for the establishment of Moravia as a constituent member of the federation. This proposal was rejected, although their coalition partners assured party representatives that Czech leaders were in favour of Moravian regional autonomy [Mareš 1998]. Meanwhile, articles ran in the mainstream Czech press throughout the early 1990s, calling the movement ‘artificial’ and arguing that ‘Moravian’ identity did not exist any more so than did ‘South Bohemian’ or ‘East Bohemian’ identities [Lidové noviny, 31 January 1990, 17 March 1990].

In the face of Czech opposition, splits thus began to appear in Moravian political representation as well as within HSD-SMS itself. Controversy emerged over Bárt’s suspected collaboration with the StB (the communist-era secret police), as well as over the desired goals of the Moravian movement. Ivan Dřímal, chair of the Moravian National Party (MNS), and Bárt disagreed over the best means of achieving a working tri-federation. Bárt supported a more gradualist approach of obtaining Moravian territorial autonomy within the framework of the Czech Republic, while Dřímal favoured the more radical approach of seeking tri-federal status for Moravia as an independent member of the new federation. Some deputies from the Slovak Republic (including future Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar) openly supported the more radical approach inviting Dřímal and a delegation of Moravian political elites for discussions in Bratislava with an aim of jointly agreeing on some tri-federal structure. This was done in the hope of drawing Mo-

21) Interview, Professor Miroslav Mareš, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, 10 February 1998.
22) Interview, Professor Tomáš Sirovátka, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, 22 December 1997.
23) Although the party also won seats in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, the party was relatively weak in the bigger body and thus constrained in its efforts to carry out the goals of the movement.
ravia into the Slovak camp, thus diluting Czech political influence in a ‘2 against 1’ tri-federal system. In the end, Bárta’s more gradualist approach (which the Czechs favoured) prevailed within the Moravian movement, with the result that Moravian elites completely lost Slovak support. This was due to the Slovak perception that this seemingly pro-Czech gesture meant that Moravia would be allied with the Czechs on all substantive matters in a de facto ‘2 against 1’ “anti-Slovak” tri-federation (Interview, Ivan Dřímal, 10 February 1998). Ironically, the Czechs harboured similar fears. Although Czech deputies paid lip-service to the ideal of achieving greater Moravian autonomy, Czechs were haunted by the prospect of a Moravian-Slovak coalition, which could reduce their power to one-third under a tripartite system.

Support for HSD-SMS – and for Moravian parties in general – thus began to decline with clear emergence of both Czech and Slovak opposition to a tri-federation. Continued conflicts in HSD-SMS, again surrounding Bárta, resulted in further division of the party into two parliamentary clubs: HSD-SMS1 and HSD-SMS2 in early 1991, after which Bárta withdrew from the ČNR government coalition, reasoning that he could better mobilise public support for the Moravian movement outside the Czech government. In April 1991, Bárta led demonstrations in Brno in support for Moravian autonomy, claiming that Moravia was losing its critical chance to obtain political power under new federal structure. This bid for public support temporarily boosted HSD-SMS’s standing with the government. However, their small increase in support was cut short with Bárta’s subsequent death, after which the Moravian movement lost the core of its support with the loss of Bárta’s charismatic leadership [Mareš 1998]. HSD-SMS again won seats in the Czech National Council in the June 1992 elections, but public support for the movement in Moravia continued to dwindle, dropping to just over 2 percent of the vote in communal elections in the fall of 1992. Following June 1992 Mečiar-Klaus talks, resulting in the dissolution of the federation, Moravian political elites accordingly scaled their political claims back to regional autonomy within the framework of the Czech state. In the meantime, the Moravian movement continued to lose support in Moravia as its inhabitants viewed the Czech-Slovak split as an object lesson on the negative consequences of ethnic mobilisation. These views were continually reinforced by articles in mainstream Czech press.

Perhaps most importantly, however, the central government’s economic reforms had so far failed to produce a clear economic cleavage between Moravia and Bohemia. The lack of evidence of regional discrimination by the central government thus disrupted the cycle of ethnic mobilisation in Moravia, and its inhabitants increasingly began to vote along economic and social – as opposed to ethnic – lines. In an effort to attract the votes of their former constituency, Moravian parties began to multiply, split and form new coalitions with various other parties. In the elections of 1996, Moravian parties finally failed to meet the 5% threshold for entering Parliament and disappeared from the Czech political scene.
Table 3. Moravian Parties and Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HSD-SMS</td>
<td>10% to ČNR; 8% to SL and 9% to SN</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5% (coalition with MNS)</td>
<td>0.8% (now Czech-Moravian Party of Middle – ČMSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSMS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4% (coalition of members from MNS and ČMSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH-KDU</td>
<td>8% to ČNR (MOH got only one mandate)</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Miroslav Mareš, Czech Statistical Yearbook 1996.

The above chart illustrates the growing competition among Moravian parties, as their leaders attempted to attract voters in the context of dwindling support for the Moravian movement. As seen in Figure 4, unification of the Moravian movement disappeared as relative distrust of the central government decreased. This case also demonstrates the important role played by a lobby state in the success of this movement, as Czech and then Slovak opposition to the tri-federation – and ultimately the Czech-Slovak split – led Moravian political elites to scale back their demands to regional autonomy within the framework of the Czech state. The cycle of political mobilisation in the case of Moravia was thus ultimately disrupted by the Czech-Slovak split, in the context of a lack of evidence that government reforms were harming the Moravian economy. For these reasons, the Moravian-Czech cleavage lost salience in post-1989 Czech politics.

VII. Conclusions

I have argued that ethnic goal differentiation is a function of both differing structural characteristics and the implicit bargaining games that take place between the central government and its national minorities. In testing these hypotheses, I have utilised longitudinal analysis in the cases of Moravians in post-1989 Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans in the First Czechoslovak Republic in order to examine the causes of shifts in ethnic claims. This analysis has ruled out pre-existing cultural variables such as ethnic identity, leadership skills and historical grievances as alternative explanations for these shifts. Instead, the radicalisation of ethnic claims can be seen as a function of variations in (1) a group’s perceived political and economic cost-benefit calculations to remaining within the state framework, and (2) the actions and relative bargaining power of lobby states on behalf of the group.

In testing these hypotheses against the above two cases, I address an important gap in the nationalism literature that has failed to examine the reasons as to why one ethnic group seeks guarantees of cultural autonomy from its state government while another minority attempts secession. This study has also shown how an ethnic group’s claims against its central government may become more or less extreme over time as well as how elites utilise social organisations and fears of the centre to mobilise a population.
along ethnic lines. I argue that an understanding of the causes that produce a shift in group claims of secession to milder demands of cultural or political autonomy will afford insights into how a central government may act to moderate a minority’s demands such that ethnic interests can be peacefully accommodated within existing states.

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*Lidové noviny* 1919.

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