

pact this activity is having on him, and by extension, on everyone else. Even as he draws upon neuroscience which is imputed with general validity, Carr is really writing to and about a world of individuals. But in so doing he might well get far closer to the significance of the internet than Baricco. Carr is writing to and for his peers, whereas it is hard not to conclude that Baricco is actually rather disappointed in all of us who might prefer Hollywood wine to a 'top-notch Barbaresco'.

The internet is reducing experience to the a kind of *Erlebnis* for which even Benjamin's 'certain hour' is likely to be regarded as a tediously long time. But the internet is not doing this on its own. It is important to try to think about what or who will benefit from this reduction of the human compass. As soon as thought turns in this direction, a direction stimulated by Baricco and Carr but one taken by neither of them, the stakes of the internet-driven transformation of experience become clear. The beneficiaries of *Erlebnis* are not the men and women who are consigned to live in the perpetual certain hour, but rather the institutions which derive profit from filling up those hours and, moreover, promising something better on the next click. There is also the question of politics: without experience as *Erfahrung*, politics becomes little more than a variation on Taylorism and so outrages can be perpetrated with little obstacle. This is why it is actually important to do what Baricco and Carr have done—commit reflections on the intent to print and thus to play a part in trying to stimulate the neural pathways upon which self-scripting human life to some degree depends.

Keith Tester  
University of Hull  
K.Tester@hull.ac.uk

#### References

- Benjamin, W. 1983. *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*. Trans. by Harry Zohn. London: Verso.

#### Nicole Bolleyer: *New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in Seventeen Democracies*

Oxford and New York 2013: Oxford University Press, 272 pp.

There is a large comparative literature on new parties, both as a generic phenomenon and as expressed by the rise of new party families such as the Greens or the radical right. The bulk of this literature has been preoccupied with how and why new parties break through electorally. However, a more intriguing—and largely unexplored—question, suggests Nicole Bolleyer, is how and why some successful new parties endure while others live out meteoric existences as 'flash' parties but then quickly collapse.

To answer this question Bolleyer examines new parties in 17 established democracies in the period 1968–2011: eleven core West European EU states plus Norway, Iceland and Switzerland and additionally Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For once such a case selection is not 'advanced democracy' parochialism, but is central to Bolleyer's attempt to distinguish the organisational *persistence* of new parties from their *sustainability* as actors repeatedly able to win representation in national parliaments. A comparative study of new parties in well-established party systems, she argues, makes it possible both to distinguish between the two phenomena empirically and to unpick the factors conducive to each. Newer East European and Southern European democracies (Greece, Spain and Portugal) are therefore excluded, as is Italy, where party system collapse in the mid-1990s makes it conceptually difficult to distinguish new and established parties.

Much of the literature on new parties in Western Europe has been preoccupied with underlying sociological forces driving them: value shift; newly emerging material/post-material cleavages; or patterns of

ideological innovation. This, Bolleyer argues, has biased the literature towards subgroups of new parties—typically Green and radical-right formations—that best fit such explanations. However, Greens and the far right constitute only around half of the 140 organisationally new parties which she identifies. The remainder are an array of ideologically more conventional parties including liberals, regionalists, evangelical Christians, and left-socialist groups.

Whether and how new parties persist and/or sustain themselves, Bolleyer argues, depends less on emergent new cleavages or tectonic shifts in electoral demand than on *organisational* choices they make and the strategies of party-building (or non-building) their leaders adopt. Ideologically similar parties can make quite different organisational choices, while similar party-building strategies cut across groups with ideological outlooks that are completely at variance. Such strategies are, however not arbitrary, but are path-dependently shaped by initial patterns of party formation.

As Bolleyer readily acknowledges, this institutional perspective draws centrally on the classic work of Angelo Panebianco in *Political Parties: Organisation and Power* (CUP, 1988). Like Panebianco she believes that parties endure mainly because processes of *institutionalisation* allow them to withstand shocks and setbacks. She also follows Panebianco in viewing institutionalisation in terms of twin processes of value infusion and routinisation. However, unlike Panebianco and many other writers, she is alert to the possibility that functional equivalents and substitute forms may be possible. Persistence and sustainability may simply be the product of repeated electoral success rather than institutionalisation, while institutionalisation itself need not necessarily take the form of building up formal mass organisation. Charismatic individual leaders can infuse values, while routinisation can equally occur through in-

formal structures and networks (as, for example, in Argentina's Peronist movement).

Bolleyer's twin innovations, however, are to apply these perspectives to *newly emerging* parties rather than historically long-established parties and to explore how organisational struggles between different internal actors play out across different *phases* of party development, rather than simply focusing on a single set of locked-in effects stemming from a formative moment.

Patterns of formation, Bolleyer argues, can be defined in three dimensions: (1) whether a new party develops in a 'rooted' form drawing on organised social groups and movements, or 'entrepreneurially' as a project seeking out a gap in the electoral market; (2) whether a formation is formed through a top-down or bottom-up process; (3) and whether the organisational ideology of those forming the party favours centralisation or de-centralisation (if indeed it favours organisation-building at all). The configurations generated by this typology cover many of the models that have proliferated in the party organisation literature.

Bolleyer also sees that the differing phases of a new party's development may make different and contradictory organisational demands. The loose, eccentric anti-organisational culture that fuels a successful electoral insurgency, for example, may be a recipe for failure and division in the post-breakthrough phase, when a new party and its representatives need to deliver political results or, at the very least, fend off critical scrutiny.

In choosing organisational strategies, new parties' founders, leaders, and activists need not only to consider if and how to secure their own power, but must trade off the conflicting demands of short-term and long-term success. Moreover, as Bolleyer notes, for its founders, a new party is by definition initially a means-to-an-

end (whether ideological or office-seeking) which may in certain circumstances be abandoned or dispensed with. Whatever their initial formative configuration, all new parties have to overcome some form of this 'structure-leadership dilemma' to start on the road to party-building.

Bolleyer empirically tests these expectations both quantitatively and qualitatively. She first uses survival analysis and regressions on new parties' short-term and long-term endurance to assess the importance of organisational origins. These results broadly confirm her Panebiancian perspective. 'Rooted' new parties with larger grassroots bases are more likely to endure both short-term and long-term. The scale of a new party's electoral initial breakthrough and the availability of regional tiers of government also contribute to short-term endurance, while programmatic distinctiveness, the openness of electoral systems, and levels of free media access also feed into longer-term sustainability.

Bolleyer then uses case study chapters to trace the organisational development of individual parties across the three sub-groups. These sub-groups are defined both in terms of party family and patterns of initial formation: Greens and evangelical parties, which tend to emerge as 'rooted insiders'; liberal and left-wing parties which are more often 'entrepreneurial insiders'; and new right-wing populist parties which are a varied mix of 'entrepreneurial' and 'rooted' outsiders with contrasting attitudes to party-building.

These process tracing case studies confirm the dynamics of the 'leadership-structure dilemma' in differently formed types of party. She finds confirmation of key expectations. For example, the founders and leaders of successful new parties which formed through the 'entrepreneurial insider' route, such as Ireland's Progressive Democrats, resisted full blooded institutionalisation in favour of riskier, partial solutions which keep them fully in control.

More significant, however, are the case studies of outliers: successful new parties where unfavourable initial conditions for building a sustainable party were overcome (as with the Danish People's Party and Progress Party in Norway) or, conversely, where favourable patterns of 'rootedness' unexpectedly failed to translate into a sustainable party (the case of Australia's Nuclear Disarmament party). Such outliers Bolleyer suggests highlight that there are circumstances when political agency—driven by politicians' normative beliefs and learning from the experience of earlier parties—can overcome even the thorniest 'leadership-structure dilemma'.

Bolleyer's findings are at odds with much of the comparative literature, which has tended to stress the inexorable decline of party organisation into state-centric 'electoral professional' forms. But she makes a convincing case that organisation matters and that into order to endure new parties—and perhaps all parties—need to find their way to levels of party organisation that can balance professionalised elite-led politics with some degree of grassroots implantation.

The book is not without its limitations. Panebianco's classic notion of institutionalisation is perhaps accepted rather uncritically; the tensions between structure and agency are somewhat fudged; key configurations between new parties' origins, ideology, and endurance which are at the centre of the book's argument would have benefited from more sustained and sophisticated analysis. A method such as QCA would arguably have contributed much.

Overall, however, *New Parties in Old Party Systems* is a fine academic book and one which is striking in its originality. It asks an obvious, important, but unasked question and proceeds systematically to provide answers. The implications of Bolleyer's findings for the development of established Western party systems are less clear, although her stress on the long-term

success of parties established through bottom-up social mobilisation raises intriguing questions in the context of anti-austerity activism.

In many ways, however, the fate of party politics in older Western democracies depends more on the adaptive capacities of established parties than the ability of successful newcomers to dig in. Paradoxically, many of Bolleyer's theoretical innovations speak most eloquently to the situation of newer party systems of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Here her findings imply that frequent breakthroughs by ephemeral new protest parties—usually hard-to-institutionalise 'entrepreneurial' formations—will not necessarily condemn the region to cycles of instability, as some have suggested. At the same time, however, it is painfully clear that many of CEE's supposedly 'established' parties exhibit the same brittle forms of persistence and superficial consolidation characteristic of failed new party formations Bolleyer examines.

Seán Hanley  
University College London  
s.hanley@ucl.ac.uk

**Franz-Xaver Kaufmann: *European Foundations of the Welfare State***

(trans. from the German by John Veit-Wilson with the assistance of Thomas Skelton-Robinson and a foreword by Anthony B. Atkinson)  
New York and Oxford 2012: Berghahn Books, 400 pp.

Dismissing the stale debates around the various 'worlds of welfare', this book reconsiders the very understructure of the umbrella concept that is the welfare state (p. 7). Transcending its purported aim—a sociological theory of social policy—with a wealth of historical knowledge and political theory, Kaufmann delves into an in-depth analysis of the normative underpin-

nings of welfare states. With the isomorphism between nation-state and welfare state of the 'Golden Age' being gradually eroded, Kaufmann's selection as a case-study of the 'Western world' seems justified by a change in the traditional welfare paradigm, as it is precisely the poor in the rich countries that are more at risk [Ferge 1997]. Following a German reading of social policy (p. 2), which sometimes slips into a somewhat single-handed analysis of the German welfare state, the author pursues a putative deficit in reflexivity towards the welfare state (p. 240), manifested as a gap between linking social welfare issues with theories of the state (p. 5).

The first four chapters contain a lavish intellectual history stemming from Kaufmann's conviction that the push towards welfare states could not have been done without ideatic foundations (p. 90). From the vantage point of modern sociology, which speaks about the empowerment necessary to cope with modern life (p. 16), Kaufmann follows the tradition of other leading German sociologists who have argued that the influence of the state on human lives is still unsurpassed by any other organisational construct [Leibfried and Zurn 2005]. There are two features that set this book apart. On the one hand, rather than measuring the retrenchment-vs.-expansion line, Kaufmann asks how and why the specific problem of European welfare states is not their lack of power to intervene, but the consequences of their success (p. 11). On the other hand, he explicitly recognises that religious-historical factors sometimes superseded social-democratic thinking in the birth of welfare states (p. 76), although sometimes the timeline seems forcefully stretched as the author goes as far back as 12th century Europe (pp. 79–80). There are echoes here of the seminal work by Philip Gorski [2003]. Outside the slight overestimations of the role of Christian charity qua normative basis of welfare-ism, this detailed historical ac-