Are There Visible Accession Effects? Comparing Some Key Indicators of the Trajectories of Central and Eastern European Countries Inside and Outside the EU since the 1990s*

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Abstract: Comparing four groups of post-communist transition countries—those which became EU members, those with candidate status, and two groups which are considered mere partners with or without a future membership perspective—the authors examine to what extent there are visible accession effects. The basic assumption is that countries which were under the pressure of the Copenhagen criteria and under constant EU supervision should have developed more favourably than the others with respect to good governance, dynamic market economy growth, and public policies in line with the idea of a European social model. The empirical analysis seeks to clarify to what extent there were selection effects prior to EU candidacy, to what extent countries with and without a membership option diverged, and to what extent there was convergence within the groups of member states, of candidate countries and of other post-socialist countries. Accession effects are found to be more discernible in the fields of economic growth and of political democracy than in the fields of social cohesion and quality of life.

Keywords: European Union, Eastern enlargement, neighbourhood policy, accession effects, Copenhagen criteria, positive and negative integration

Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2011, Vol. 47, No. 3: 473–506

Introduction: research question and guiding hypotheses

The question to what extent EU membership affects economic growth and social well-being has been the topic of much empirical research since the late 1980s. The best-known study is probably the so-called Cecchini Report [1988], which highlighted the positive effects of European integration and drew attention to the assumed serious costs of non-membership. The semi-official Kok Report assessing

* The article is based on a lecture delivered by Jens Alber at Charles University Prague, 31 March 2010. We thank two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

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the prospects of enlargement in 2003 basically re-iterated this positive assessment arguing that 'the prospect of accession to the EU has accelerated the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe that followed the collapse of Communism' [Kok 2003: 16]. Scholarly studies concurring with the positive view of EU effects include Henrekson, Tortenson and Tortenson [1997], Bornschier [2000], Delhey [2002, 2003], and with some qualification also Alber, Fahey and Saraceno [2008]. As is usual in econometric or sociological empirical analyses, there were also dissenting results. Examples of more seasoned views highlighting only weak positive or even negative effects include De Melo, Montenegro and Panagariya [1992], Landau [1995], Vanhout [1999] and Haller [2009]. There is a body of recent political science literature that has focused on more qualitative accounts of the effects of the EU on the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe that entered into accession negotiations. This literature drew attention to the transformative powers of the EU in the accession process by pointing out the costs of exclusion, the economic benefits of membership, and the benefits of voice in EU decision-making; in addition, it showed how the EU influence interacted with domestic institutions and elite strategies to produce country-specific transformation patterns [Dimitrova 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Vachudova 2005; Grabbe 2006; Haughton 2007; Schimmelfennig 2007; Sedelmeier 2008; Vachudova 2009; see also Héritier 2001].

Our contribution is linked to these earlier assessments, but adds a new empirical perspective by focusing on the impact of EU membership and of EU accession negotiations on selected indicators of socioeconomic and political development in post-communist transition countries.¹ The basic question we address here is whether there are discernible differences in the development of four groups of countries that differ with respect to their proximity to full EU-membership status: (a) the ten post-communist countries that have already become member states; (b) three countries with candidate status; (c) five potential candidate countries; (d) the Eastern Partnership countries that have not been given a membership perspective (see Appendix Table 1 for more details). By focusing on a comparison of these four groups rather than on individual countries we here refrain from attempting to analyse in what ways EU pressures interact with domestic structures and strategies within a particular country.

Our basic hypothesis is as follows: the more a country is under the pressure of EU membership criteria and of accession negotiations, the more favourable its socioeconomic development will be with respect to selected goal dimensions championed and pursued by the European Commission. Our independent variable thus consists of the four degrees of EU membership status varying from full EU membership to mere partnership as captured by the distinction of the four groups of countries. Our set of dependent variables consists of various aspects

¹ Of course, Turkey is not one of the post-communist countries. We decided to include Turkey, however, because it is one of the just three countries that at present have official candidate status.

of Europeanisation, which the European Commission highlights as part of the European Social Model that it seeks to promote [Alber 2006] and that it uses to varying degrees as criteria of accession. These aspects of Europeanisation may be subdivided into four dimensions: (1) GDP growth and full employment in a dynamic market economy; (2) the rule of law and good governance in a democratic order; (3) social cohesion policies; (4) quality of life.

Our basic approach is to examine whether our four groups of countries have developed differently, as our guiding hypotheses suggest, with respect to these indicators. A central methodological problem then is how to disentangle specific processes of Europeanisation from more general modernisation processes, or how to decide which changes are a consequence of the European integration process and which are due to other—external or internal—factors [Delhey: 2003]. Our descriptive comparisons here hinge upon the somewhat bold *ceteris paribus* assumption that our four country groups differ decisively with respect to their proximity to full EU membership status, while other variables for which we do not control here do not vary across the four groups systematically or affect the results only to a negligible degree.

Appendix Table 2 summarises how some key social background variables for which we do not control here are distributed among the 23 countries under study. Major differences besides population size and various levels of industrialisation include the scope and structure of service sector employment and the experience of violence in the transition process. Whereas, except for Turkey, all the countries in our analysis share a communist past, the length of communist rule and the specific policy legacies from the past may differ. The countries furthermore differ with respect to their institutional structures such as the party systems, the presence or absence of veto points in their constitutional structure, and elite ideologies that may facilitate or impede the implementation of reforms demanded by the EU [Héritier 2001; Dimitrova 2002; Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig 2007]. We do not control for such variables statistically because the coefficients of multivariate statistical analysis tend to conceal the substantial problems connected with the quality of the data. As there are many gaps and inconsistencies in the available data, we have here opted for a descriptive strategy that makes the problems of data availability and of data inconsistency transparent.

In order to take the potential impact of uncontrolled background variables into consideration, we examined to what extent our substantive results remain identical if we eliminate those countries which are at very different levels of development compared to the new member states in terms of the size of agricultural employment as a key dimension of socioeconomic modernisation. For this reason, our figures show the results for the potential candidates with and without Albania, and for the Eastern Partnership countries once for the entire group and then solely for Belarus (BY) and Ukraine (UA) as the only two countries that have a similar size of agricultural employment as the new member states. As the figures show, none of our substantive conclusions hinges critically upon such

differences in group composition of the potential candidates and of the Eastern Partnership countries.

Proceeding from our guiding hypothesis two questions remain to be clarified: (1) Should we expect identical or similar effects from our EU membership status variable across all selected indicators? (2) Under what conditions are we willing to acknowledge visible differences between the country groups as an effect of the accession process? With respect to field-specific effects we follow the distinction between positive and negative integration suggested by Fritz Scharpf [1999, 2009] and expect that the impact of the EU will be stronger in the fields of market creation and of the build-up of democracy than in social policies and the advancement of the quality of life. According to Scharpf, the EU is strong in the fields of market making or 'negative integration', where the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons is at stake, but rather weak in the fields of market-correcting redistributive policies in which unanimity or qualified-majority voting rules institutionalise veto positions in the Council of Ministers [Scharpf 1999]. In Scharpf's assessment, 'liberalization could be extended, without much political attention, through interventions of the European Commission against infringements of treaty obligations, and through the decisions and preliminary rulings of the European Court of Justice', whereas positive integration, by contrast, 'depends upon the agreement of national governments in the Council of Ministers and, increasingly, on the agreement of the European Parliament as well' [Scharpf 1999: 50]. On this basis we expect the impact of EU decision making to be much stronger in the field of negative integration than in the field of positive integration where consensus is difficult to achieve and where the EU relies mainly on soft methods of regulation such as the open method of coordination.²

Authors like Bob Deacon [2000], Graham Room [2008] and Martin Potucek [2008] have drawn attention to discrepant effects in a similar vein by highlighting the phase-specific agenda-setting that the Commission has pursued in the accession process. As Potucek notes, the original emphasis of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria was exclusively on the building of a free market and of democratic political institutions, whereas the virtues of the European Social Model were stressed only much later and only temporarily following the European Council meetings in Laeken 2001 and Barcelona 2002. These summits emphasised the virtues of social inclusion and called for national action plans to promote and monitor progress in the fields of social inclusion and of social protection on the basis of a set of social indicators (Laeken indicators) and education benchmarks. The 2005

² Scharpf [2009] furthermore notes a double conservative bias of EU policy. First, new legislation hinges upon broad consensus, but once it is adopted, it cannot be abolished or amended in response to changed circumstances or changed preferences as long as either the Commission refuses to present an initiative or a few member states object. Second, political legislation must be negotiated in the shadow of judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice, which usually have a liberalising and deregulatory focus.

Review of the Lisbon Process, however, put the emphasis once again on growth, competitiveness, and employment, which appear to be the prime objectives of Commission policies.³ As previous research found, 'the precision and certitude of EU demands' to be one of the key factors determining the strength of Europeanisation effects [Grabbe 2006: 206], we assume that the inconsistent stress laid on social policy objectives by the Commission and the Council left a visible mark on the accession process. In sum, we hypothesise for two reasons that the effects of EU membership will be more discernible in the fields of economic growth and of political democracy as asserted by the Copenhagen criteria, but less strong in the fields of social cohesion and of quality of life, where we not only find a variety of national social policy models among EU member states and only soft methods of regulation [Alber 2006; Alber, Fahey and Saraceno 2008; Alber and Gilbert 2009], but also less consistent emphasis of the European Commission which recurrently shifted its policy priorities.

The second question then is under what conditions we are willing to attribute observable country differences to accession effects. Without statistical controls for other potential variables from which we here abstract, our analysis can only be descriptive and preliminary. We tentatively conclude that there is evidence suggesting EU accession effects under the following four conditions:

1. The differences between country groups are in the direction of our basic hypothesis above, so that they reflect the variation in EU membership status, ranging from membership attained, to candidate status, to potential candidacy, and to mere partnership status.
2. The differences cannot be interpreted merely as selection effects occurring at the beginning in the sense that better-performing countries had better chances of obtaining candidate status.
3. The differences between the four country groups grow over time so that countries with different membership status diverge.
4. Besides the growing divergence between the four groups of countries we also find convergence within them, but the degree of convergence varies with EU membership status: countries that are under pressure to satisfy EU membership criteria tend to converge more than countries experiencing no or little such pressure.

Before we move on to an empirical examination of observable changes, in the next section we briefly describe the institutional mechanisms by which the EU exerts an influence on neighbouring countries aspiring for membership.

³ The shift of emphasis was based on the two reports by Wim Kok [European Employment Taskforce 2003b; High Level Group 2004] advocating 'more investment in human capital' as the best route to social inclusion. This shift is similarly highlighted by Barbier [2008] and by Room [2008]. Room criticised the facts that the revised Lisbon agenda separates economic and social policies, tends to marginalise the latter, and gives priority to economic growth, competitiveness, and employment.

Mechanisms of EU influence

In order to serve its strategic interests of stability and conflict prevention, the EU seeks to maintain a cooperative relationship with the states adjacent to it. The degree of cooperation ranges from rather loose Association Agreements (AA) with African countries or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with countries on the East European fringes, to the stepwise initiation of accession negotiations with countries that are considered candidates for future incorporation as a member state.

Any European country can apply to become a member of the EU. The accession process then follows a series of formal steps:

- a country submits a membership application to the European Council;
- the Commission issues a positive recommendation (*avis*) to make the country a candidate;
- the Council makes a decision to formally grant candidate status;
- accession negotiations begin and initiate a long monitoring process with annual screenings or progress reports;⁴
- the treaty of accession is signed.

In order to obtain a positive recommendation to open negotiations, a country must fulfil the so-called Copenhagen criteria developed by the European Council in 1993. These require:

- the presence of stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities;
- a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the pressure of competition;
- the ability to assume the obligations of membership including the adherence to the objectives of the political, economic, and monetary union.

The 1995 Madrid European Council further clarified that the candidate country must also be able to put the EU rules and procedures into effect.

Once the Council agrees to grant official candidate status and to open negotiations, a preparatory screening process begins in which certain chapters of law are scrutinised. During this process the *acquis*, i.e. the body of EU regulations, directives, and standards, is explained to the candidate countries. The countries then present their plans to implement the chapter in question. Negotiations are not about exceptions but only about temporary safeguard or transitional measures in specific areas of the *acquis* and financial aspects. A chapter is said to be closed if both sides have agreed that its regulations have been implemented. When all chapters are closed an accession treaty is signed.

At a number of points on the path to EU membership, the Commission and the Council act as gatekeepers. The European Commission can monitor the

⁴ Progress reports are also published for countries with a membership perspective.

pre-accession process through annual progress reports listing achievements and shortcomings of the candidate country in the chapters under scrutiny. In response to these reports, the European Commission together with the European Council, can assign or deny formal candidate status. It can decide to suspend negotiations, and it can fix time-lines for the adoption and implementation of the *Acquis communautaire*. The EU is thus in a position 'to impose a strict pre-accession conditionality' upon aspiring new member states [Sedelmeier 2008].

The Commission can influence policies in the accession process not only through sticks such as critical supervision and the threat of sanctions,⁵ but also through a number of supports serving as carrots. To prepare the post-communist states of Central Europe for accession, the EU introduced a pre-accession strategy in the 1990s. Its array of pre-accession assistance included 'accession partnerships' entailing administrative advice and technical help from EU experts as well as financial support and trade concessions. Once a country achieves membership status, it becomes potentially eligible for sizeable financial support from the Agricultural Fund, the Structural Funds, and the Cohesion Fund provided as part of EU regional policy, which aims to promote the cohesion and convergence of EU regions and member states. As rather succinctly summed up by a recent Commission Communication, 'enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful policy tools', as 'it serves the EU's strategic interests in stability, security, and conflict prevention' [Commission of the European Communities 2008].

In addition to the countries that have become new members in the two waves of eastern enlargement, Turkey, Croatia, and Macedonia were granted formal candidate status after having applied for membership in 1987, 2003, 2004, respectively. The western Balkan countries were given a membership perspective at the Thessaloniki Western Balkans Summit in 2003. Declared potential candidates, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia (including Kosovo) are given various forms of aid and support in accordance with the so-called 'Stabilisation and Association Process' (SAP—Commission of the European Communities [2006]). Country-specific Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) list concrete obligations in conformity with the Copenhagen Criteria in return for free access to the single market and for entitlements to various EU aids. As a result, practically all their exports already have free access to the EU market. In addition, there is economic and financial assistance amounting to over EUR 5 billion for the period 2000–2006, and also administrative and technical aid for democratic institution-building and for the implementation of civil service reforms. The aids are designed to facilitate the application and eventual accession to mem-

⁵ The two acts concerning the conditions of accession of the ten states in the first Eastern enlargement and the second Eastern enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania included safeguard clauses which allowed the EU to temporarily suspend the candidacy application, postpone the date of accession, and take steps for up to three years after accession aimed at remedying difficulties in the general economic situation, the functioning of the internal market, or specific judicial and domestic affairs.

bership. Formal applications for membership were made in 2008 by Montenegro and in 2009 by Albania, but an EU decision concerning the granting of candidate status is still pending.

The remaining six post-communist countries in Europe have not yet been given a membership perspective, but they have signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements within the framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy.⁶ An exception is Belarus, where the ratification procedure has been suspended since 1997 because the EU considers the country to be too undemocratic. The European Neighbourhood Policy is designed to support countries with their economic and political reforms without granting them a membership perspective. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy typically offer tariff-free access to some or all EU markets in exchange for commitments to implement political, economic, and human rights reforms. The gist of EU neighbourhood policies may be summarised as aiming at the twin process of mutually reinforcing economic and democratic reforms that lead to dynamic growth and good governance.

As summarised in Appendix Table 1, we thus have four groups of Eastern European countries with varying degrees of proximity to full EU membership:

- the ten post-communist new member states which have already been under EU scrutiny since the mid-1990s and came under the rule of EU law after accession (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; hereinafter abbreviated as NMS);
- the three countries that are official candidates; among them, Croatia and Turkey are currently in the process of negotiations, while negotiations with Macedonia have not yet started (hereinafter abbreviated as CC);
- the five Western Balkan countries that were promised a membership perspective (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Montenegro, Serbia; hereinafter abbreviated as PC);
- the six former CIS countries that merely have Partnership and Cooperation Agreements within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine; hereinafter abbreviated as EPC for Eastern Partnership Countries).

The following section examines to what extent the trajectories of socioeconomic development in these four groups of countries differed with respect to our hypotheses.

⁶ For useful accounts discussing the likely effects of the EU Neighbourhood policy without explicit reference to a systematic comparative data base, see Kutter and Trappmann [2008], Jacobsen and Machowski [2007], Vobruba [2007], Vobruba [2010], Kempe [2007], Dodini and Fantini [2006], Kelley [2006], Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier [2004], Lavenex [2004].

Trajectories of socioeconomic development in country groups with different relationships to the EU

A first and somewhat unexpected finding from our research is that many of the rather basic indicators that we were searching for proved to be extremely hard to come by and are only partly or not at all available as time series in common data sources. The progress reports on individual countries are in fact more like dry bureaucratic documents than colourful statistical portraits that could show where the potential member country fits within the social space encompassing EU member states. Only since 2006 does Eurostat publish a 'Pocketbook on Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries' with statistical indicators similar but not identical to the Europe 2020 indicators or other data supplied for EU member states [European Commission 2010]. No similar body of statistical indicators is available in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Eastern Partnership countries. Freedom House has built a database on democratic developments in the former communist states in Europe and Eurasia called 'Nations in Transit' with data going back to 1996 [Freedom House 2010]. The World Bank's World-wide Governance Indicators project also extends back to this year but has little on policies and social outcomes [Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010].

Because of the remarkable shortage of consistent time series which would go back to the early 1990s and cover the Eastern Partnership countries, our analysis limits itself to some simple descriptive comparisons of ten selected key indicators. Departing from the data base of the MONEE Project of the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre we tried to collect data for the period 1989–1990 to 2007–2008 for all countries on our list [UNICEF 2001, 2009]. Even though we also drew on other sources, including the World Bank's World Development Indicators and Public Expenditure Database [World Bank 2009], the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [2009], and the Quality of Government Database of the University of Gothenburg [Teorell et al. 2010], we still ended up with considerable data gaps for single countries or years. In order to assure that country group differences were not merely the result of changing group compositions, we decided to limit our analysis to those cases and phases where data are completely available for all the countries in our four membership status groups. Even though the post-communist transition countries already began to diverge in the mid-1990s with respect to their proximity to the EU, the lack of consistent time-series data forced us to take later years as the starting point of the analysis. The principle guiding our data collection was to go as far back in time as possible without changing the composition of country groups. In the figures (below) displaying the data, the fat lines indicate that data were available for all countries consistently over time, thin lines indicate that the group consists of at least half but not *all* of the countries in the group, and interrupted dotted lines indicate a change in group composition. Data for the potential candidates and for the Eastern Partnership countries are presented in two forms, once for the two groups together, and once for the two subsets of countries, eliminating in each case those

Figure 1. GDP per capita (PPP), 1990–2007 (current international USD)

Source: World Development Indicators database [World Bank 2009]; TransMonee Database [UNICEF 2009].

Note: In all the figures: UA = Ukraine, BY = Belarus, PC = Potential Candidates, AL = Albania; fat lines indicate that data were available for all countries consistently over time, thin lines that the group consists of at least half but not all the countries in the group, and broken dotted lines indicate a change in group composition.

countries which are least comparable to the new member states because of their still very large agricultural sectors.

For each selected indicator we will now discuss the following three issues:

1. How big were the differences between country groups at the beginning of the transition period and are they in line with the idea of a selection effect in favour of the countries which later became EU members?
2. Did the differences between groups grow over time thus suggesting a cumulative impact of differential EU membership status?
3. How did the internal variation within the groups develop, and are convergence processes more marked in the new member states than in the groups of countries which were under weaker EU pressures from the accession process?⁷

As it was one of the key goals of the EU Lisbon agenda to make the EU one of the most competitive economies in the world and to achieve full employment by 2010, we use the development of GDP per capita at purchasing power parities and the development of the employment rate as our first two indicators. Figure 1 displays the development of economic output per capita. It shows that the standard of living was already higher in the countries that later became EU members (NMS) in the early 1990s. In this sense there was a selection effect at the

⁷ Unfortunately, we are not yet in a position to include the most recent years since the financial crisis in our analysis.

Figure 2. Employment rate, 1989–2007: number of employed persons as a percentage of the population aged 15–59

Source: TransMonee Database [UNICEF 2009].

beginning, supplying the economically most promising countries with an early membership option. At the earliest comparable date—thus already before the accession process started to exert its effects—the rank order of our country groups corresponded to their later differences in membership status. If this points to a selection effect, the subsequent divergence sustains the idea of accession effects, because the economic advantage of the new member states clearly grew over time. The further away a country group remained from EU membership, the bigger the gap separating it from those that acceded. If we limit our comparisons to those countries at similar stages of economic development as indicated by the size of agricultural employment, the differences between the NMS and CC on the one hand, and the PC and EPC on the other shrink but do not vanish. The variation within country groups diminished slightly only among the NMS, but grew in the other three groups (see the coefficients of variation in Appendix Table 3). This pattern of results suggests that selection effects prior to the accession process were later complemented by accession effects that constituted an additional advantage for the countries within the EU or those more closely affiliated with it.

Figure 2 shows the development of the employment rate. Unfortunately, longer comparative time series are not available for the statistical concept used in official EU statistics and the Europe 2020 benchmarks, i.e. the percentage of the population aged 20–64 who have jobs, but only for the concept used in UNICEF data collection, i.e. the number of employed people expressed as a percentage of the population aged 15–59. These data reveal no selection effect at the beginning, as the NMS and the Eastern Partnership Countries (EPC) started out with very similar employment rates in the early 1990s. The relative advantage of the NMS

Figure 3. Political rights and civil liberties, 1991–2008: index averaging two dimensions, civil liberties and political rights on a scale from 1 (completely free) to 7 (free)

Source: Authors' calculations based on Freedom House [2009].

only emerged after the turn of the millennium, when these countries gradually began to translate economic growth into employment, whereas the EPC continued on their path of jobless growth. Only the two most comparable EPC countries, Belarus and Ukraine, have been able to stop the downward trend in their labour markets in recent years. Data for the other two country groups are incomplete. The two candidate countries for which there are data achieved a labour market turnaround only after some delay. In general, differences between the NMS and the other groups of post-communist transition countries tended to increase, whilst the internal variation became smaller in the NMS but grew in the EPC.

Figures 3–5 present three indicators showing to what extent the Copenhagen criteria of good governance are achieved. Two international nongovernmental organisations—Freedom House [2009, 2010] and Transparency International [2009]—monitor the observance of good governance by gauging the degree to which basic human rights are observed and to which the government and public administration are perceived by experts to be corrupt. Figure 3 reports how the Freedom House Index ranks countries in the two dimensions of civil liberties and political rights on a scale ranging from 1 signifying ‘completely free’ to 7 for ‘un-free’.⁸ We see that the NMS had better scores from the outset and that the EPC (as

⁸ Countries with average index values of 1 to 2.5 are classified by Freedom House as ‘free’, those with values from 3 to 5 as ‘partly free’, and those above 5 as ‘unfree’. The average for all EU member states is 1; the country with the worst performance is Romania with an index value of 2.

Figure 4. The Corruption Perception Index, 1998–2008: on a scale from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (completely incorrupt)

Source: Transparency International [2009].

well as later also the potential candidates) fared much worse, with the candidate countries in between. This suggests that there were selection effects in the early 1990s. Once again, however, we also see a pattern of divergence over time, so that selection effects do not tell the entire story. While the NMS and the CC clearly improved over time, the EPC saw hardly any progress at all. Consistent data for the PC are missing. The gap separating the NMS from the other groups grew in all three instances, suggesting that economic growth and democratic reform went hand in hand only in those countries that were under close EU supervision. Within country groups, the internal dispersion—as measured by the coefficient of variation—grew for the EPC as well as for the NMS.⁹

The Corruption Perceptions Index supplied by Transparency International and displayed in Figure 4 ranges from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (completely incorrupt). Again we see evidence for potential selection effects in the sense that the NMS received better scores even at an early stage of the accession process. However, since data for the beginning of the 1990s are not available, it is unclear to what extent the difference between country groups already reflects accession effects. Over time the gap separating the NMS and the CC from the EPC and the PC grew considerably, suggesting that countries which were under EU scrutiny

⁹ However, the NMS are the only group with a shrinking standard deviation, thus suggesting that the growing coefficient of variation merely reflects the approximation towards the lowest level of 1, which makes even small deviations from the low group mean appear high in relative terms.

Figure 5. General government debt (% of GDP), 1994–2008

Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [2009]; EUROSTAT [2009].

made more progress in the battle against corruption. For this indicator, the internal homogeneity as measured by the coefficient of variation increased in all groups of countries.

Figure 5 shows to what extent the different country groups succeeded in keeping the growth of public debt within limits. The Maastricht criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) specified an upper limit of 60% of GDP for the accumulated public debt. Even though this was not made a formal condition for entry, the limit increasingly came to serve as a point of reference for good governance. As the figure shows, all country group means stayed well below this limit up to the most recent period. Given that data are only available since the mid-1990s, selection and accession effects are particularly hard to disentangle here. The relative advantage of the NMS over the CC (and for some time also over the entire group of the EPC) disappeared over time, suggesting that the other countries were more successful in reducing their debt ratios. Why the NMS were relatively unsuccessful in this dimension of good governance is unclear to us at the moment, but we assume that concrete pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund may have been more compelling for the EPC than the informal pressure from the Maastricht EMU criteria was for the NMS. That the pressure exerted by world markets and international agencies may have been similar or even greater for countries outside of the EU is also suggested by the fact that the internal dispersion shrank similarly in all country groups.

Indicators that would allow us to determine to what extent various transition countries come close to the ideals highlighted in the European Social Model—such as extended public services, developed social welfare systems, or

Figure 6. The health expenditure ratio (% of GDP), 1995–2007

Source: TransMonee Database [UNICEF 2009]; for Turkey, OECD [2009b].

the elimination of educational poverty—are in remarkably short supply for our groups of countries. Hence we must limit ourselves to one available indicator—the public health expenditure ratio expressed as a percentage of GDP.¹⁰ This is a rather crucial indicator for the European Social Model, however, as it reflects the extension of public health care systems, which distinguishes EU Member States from the United States in some respects.¹¹

Figure 6 shows the development of the public health expenditure ratio from 1995 to 2007. The key result here is that the CC and the NMS had higher public health expenditure relative to GDP than the other two groups of countries in the mid-1990s. The pattern in the rank order of countries does not conform with the idea of selection effects, as the early rank order of country groups does not correspond to their later differences in membership status. Whilst the differences

¹⁰ Education is a field which is at least partly covered by available comparative statistics. To the extent that data on enrolment rates in upper secondary education (ages 15–18) are at hand, they show that the NMS had the highest enrolment rates at the turn of the millennium, but that their advantage over the other groups shrank in subsequent years. Data on enrolment rates in tertiary education (ages 18–22) are available from the World Bank, but since the Bologna process governing higher learning is a supranational process of intergovernmental coordination covering EU member states and other Eastern European countries alike there is little reason to expect EU accession effects.

¹¹ It should be borne in mind, however, that despite its gaps in health insurance coverage the United States has a higher public health expenditure ratio than many European nations because of the much higher per unit costs of medical care in the country [for details, see Alber 2010].

Figure 7. Total fertility rates, 1989–2007

Source: TransMonee Database [UNICEF 2009]; OECD [2009a].

between the NMS and the EPC grew slightly over time, the PC even moved ahead of the NMS. In the field of public health care, we thus see no trace of accession effects that could be attributed to EU pressures. This is particularly true if we limit the comparison to Belarus and Ukraine as the two EPC countries which are most comparable to the NMS with respect to economic development. Health care is a field where only soft regulation such as the open method of coordination is applied, so it is not an area in which we should expect EU accession or EU membership to have a strong impact. Correspondingly, we find that the internal variation within the EPC shrank similarly as in the NMS, and even more strongly in the CC (see Appendix Table 3).

The failure of the French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution and the results of the special Eurobarometer on 'The Future of Europe' [European Commission 2006] have shown that Europeans are increasingly sceptical about the EU's capacity to deliver the politics that citizens want [for more details, see Haller 2009; Alber, Fahey and Saraceno 2008]. In order to gain political legitimacy, the EU will thus have to prove that it actually promotes the quality of life of Europeans. Fritz Scharpf [1999] even argues that the weaker the 'input-legitimation' rooted in citizen participation and parliamentary control is, the more the supra-national governance of the EU will depend on its 'output-legitimation' rooted in demonstrable gains in citizen welfare. Therefore, we should also look at some indicators which capture actual social outcomes. Again, the possibility of comparisons is seriously constrained by the paucity of available data, so we will concentrate on just four basic indicators of quality of life development: fertility

Figure 8. Infant mortality rates, 1989–2007 (per 1000 live births—estimates based on vital registration data)

Source: TransMonee Database [UNICEF 2009]; OECD [2009b].

patterns and their relationship to the aspired ideal fertility, infant mortality, male mortality at mid-life, and crime rates.

All transition countries experienced a dramatic decline in fertility rates following the transition. To some extent this may simply be attributed to accelerated modernisation processes. Tony Fahey [2008] has shown, however, that the ideal family size professed by women in the enlarged EU on average is practically identical with the current population replacement fertility rate of 2.1 children born per woman and is at least 1.7. This suggests that low fertility is related not only to the growing opportunity costs of child-bearing but also to a lack of services allowing to combine child-bearing with work (and perhaps also to a lack of optimism concerning the future development of life chances). Figure 7 shows that actual fertility rates have fallen far below the replacement level, to which most women aspire, in all transition countries. At the beginning of the transition fertility rates were lowest in the NMS (and in the two comparable EPC), but over time there was convergence rather than divergence, as the rates in the potential candidates approximated the NMS, and developments in the EPC were parallel to those in the NMS. Thus, nothing in the pattern is suggestive of potential accession effects, and the degree of convergence within the NMS was no greater than in other country groups.

Higher levels of nutrition rooted in GDP growth and improved accessibility of public health care systems should translate into shrinking infant mortality rates. Figure 8 shows to what extent this has actually been the case. All country groups have similarly exhibited reduced infant mortality rates since the transi-

Figure 9. Mortality rates for males aged 40–59, 1989–2007 (deaths per 100 000 in each age group)

Source: TransMonee Database [UNICEF 2009].

tion. The NMS already had the lowest rates at the beginning of the 1990s together with Belarus and Ukraine in the EPC. They preserved their lead up to 2007, but the gap separating them from the other groups shrank in two of the three cases. Only the advantage relative to the entire group of Eastern Partnership countries grew, whereas the potential candidates caught up to them. As all country groups were experiencing similar declines in infant mortality, we find no convincing evidence in favour of EU policy effects in this dimension. As Appendix Table 3 shows, convergence within the NMS group was not greater than in the other groups, and the coefficient of variation even increased.

One of the key problems of the transition process was the rapid increase in the mortality of middle-aged men, who, if they lost their jobs, were released from social controls and frequently resorted to drinking, especially in Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union.¹² Figure 9 shows to what extent male mortality rates in middle age developed similarly in all country groups. At the beginning of the post-communist transition the mortality rates in the later NMS and EPC were rather similar. Both country groups also experienced similar increases in male mortality in the first half of the 1990s, but after the turn of the millennium death rates continued to shrink in the NMS but rose again in the EPC, so that the gap separating the two country groups widened. This trend is even

¹² As the UNICEF Innocenti Database shows, the life expectancy of Russian men at birth decreased from 64.2 to 57.6 years between 1989 and 1994, while the mortality rate of men aged 40–59 increased by 74% from 1387 to 2419.6 per 100 000.

Figure 10. The registered total crime rate, 1989–2007 (per 100 000 population)

Source: TransMonee Database [UNICEF 2009].

more pronounced if we limit the comparison to Belarus and Ukraine as the two most similar nations within the EPC. However, the trajectories of the candidate countries and the potential candidates paralleled those in the NMS, so there is no consistent pattern that could suggest potential EU policy effects. There is also no evidence of particular convergence, as only the CC grew more similar over time.

The last indicator we can look at here is the registered crime rate per 100 000 people in the population as a basic indicator of the extent to which a cohesive internal order has been successfully established. As registered crime is the result of a labelling process which hinges upon the prevalence of certain types of behaviour and on the identification and effective prosecution of the behaviour labelled as delinquent, the crime rate is a compound measure which reflects the frequency of illegal acts as well as the effectiveness of public controls. Which of the two components travels further in explaining the development of the crime rate cannot be determined simply on the basis of our crude figures. We can only highlight to what extent developments in countries with different EU membership status were similar or different. As Figure 10 shows, crime rates were from the outset higher in the NMS than in the other groups of countries, but the steep increase which the NMS witnessed up to the early years of the new century were unparalleled elsewhere, and this should be regarded as a serious challenge to EU policies. From a comparative Central and Eastern European perspective the steep increase in crime rates in the new member states of the EU appears to be the dark side of the European social model that on its bright side brings enhanced freedom and weakened authoritarian controls.

Conclusion

How do these empirical results relate to our hypotheses? Summarising our evidence, Table 1 helps to answer this question (see also Appendix Table 3, which provides the exact data). Consistent results in favour of the accession effects hypothesis can only be found for the growth dynamics of GDP per capita and to a lesser extent also for the development of the employment rate. Even though there were selection effects in favour of the NMS at the start of the transition period, the country group differences in GDP per capita grew over time and internal homogeneity increased most in the NMS, suggesting that EU cohesion policies exerted a positive effect. With respect to employment, there was no selection effect at the beginning, as there was hardly any difference between the NMS and the EPC, but later developments were more favourable in the NMS where internal heterogeneity decreased. For the two political indicators of good governance—freedom and the absence of corruption—we find clear selection effects at the beginning, but also growing differences between the NMS and the country groups outside the EU, especially the EPC. However, internal homogeneity did not increase more in the NMS than in the other countries. None of our findings confirmed the accession effect hypothesis for any of the other variables.

We conclude that the EU did have a visible effect on the dimensions highlighted by the Copenhagen criteria, namely, a functioning market economy, rule of law, and democracy, but had comparatively little impact on the other dimensions. This conforms to the notion that the impact of the EU is weak in those policy fields where positive integration would be required but where the EU only has soft forms of regulation, such as the open method of coordination, at its disposal. For citizens in the post-communist transition countries, the benefits of EU membership appear to be most visible in the standard of living and civil liberties, but are less apparent in other domains of quality of life or in the development of high quality public services such as health care. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the EU can deliver to its new citizens in these areas, too.

Summing up, our examination of some key empirical indicators resulted in four major insights:

1. Not all observable differences between post-communist transition countries inside and outside of the EU are attributable to accession effects. Selection effects were apparent at the very beginning of the transition, as the EU did some cherry-picking among countries, selecting those deemed suitable candidates for EU membership.
2. Over time, the differences between acceding countries and those which were left out only grew substantially in the areas of economic growth, employment, and civil liberties. This suggests that there were accession effects in these areas on top of the initial selection effects.
3. Accession effects reflected as diverging trajectories of countries with different EU membership status are more noticeable in those fields emphasised by the

Table 1. Summary of the major results

INDICATOR	Initial situation (Selection effect pattern suggesting the cherry-picking of NMS?)	Change over time (Growing gap varying by EU membership status suggesting accession effects?)	Internal group con- vergence (Strongest in NMS and CC suggesting accession effect?)
1) GDP per capita	Selection effect	Accession pattern	Some weak accession pattern (NMS only)
2) Employment	NO (NMS and EPC similar)	(Some accession pattern—strongest growth in NMS)	(Some weak acces- sion pattern)
3) Civil Liberties Index (Freedom House)	Selection effect	Accession pattern	NO clear pattern
4) Corruption Index (Transparency Inter- national)	Selection effect	(Some accession pat- tern—growing gap between NMS/CC and EPC)	NO
5) Public debt ratio	(Some selection ef- fect in 1998)	NO	NO
6) Public health expenditure ratio	NO clear pattern	NO	NO
7) Fertility	(Some inconsistent selection effect)	NO	NO
8) Infant mortality	(Some inconsistent selection effect)	NO	NO
9) Mortality of mid- dle aged men	NO clear pattern	(Some accession pat- tern—growing gap NMS—EPC)	NO
10) Registered crime rates	NO (some adverse selection)	NO (some adverse access. effect)	NO clear pattern (c.v. shrinking—s.d. growing in NMS)

Copenhagen criteria than in areas like social policy and quality of life, where the EU has only weak regulatory powers.

4. Within country groups, there tended to be greater convergence of economic variables among the NMS countries than among countries outside the EU, suggesting that EU cohesion policies do have an effect. The differences, however, are not very strong and similar trends towards stronger cohesion, as advocated by EU regional policies, are not evident in non-economic variables relating to other policy areas.

On a more theoretical level, our results suggest two more general conclusions which are consistent with previous literature. (1) Owing to the conditionality of accession the EU not only can force its member states to implement European law but also has considerable leverage to effectuate changes in the direction of 'Europeanisation' at the stage of accession negotiations. This supports arguments made earlier by Vachudova [2005], Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier [2005], Grabbe [2006], Haughton [2007], Sedelmeier [2008] and others. (2) As previously argued by Scharpf [1999; 2009], Kutter and Trappmann [2008] and by Haughton [2007], and as empirically demonstrated in novel ways here, the EU's transformative power varies markedly across policy fields. It is strongest in the fields of market making, where the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons is at stake. It is less strong in fields that hinge upon the build-up of redistributive social policies. It is the latter, however, which would justify speaking of a peculiar European social model and which are most likely to result in demonstrable gains in citizens' welfare beyond the granting of basic economic and political freedoms.

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Appendix

Table 1. Relationship to the EU of Central and Eastern European Countries—part 1

European Neighbourhood Policy		Steps in the EU accession process						
Abbreviation	Country name	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed	Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed (or similar association agreement)	Formal application for EU Membership filed	Candidate status granted by EU Council	Accession negotiations initiated	Membership treaty signed	Membership
CZ	Czech Republic		(1991)**	1996	1997	1998	2003	2004
HU	Hungary		(1991)	1994	1997	1998	2003	2004
PL	Poland		(1991)	1994	1997	1998	2003	2004
SK	Slovak Republic		(1991)**	1995	1997	1999	2003	2004
SI	Slovenia		(1996)	1996	1997	1998	2003	2004
EE	Estonia		(1995)	1995	1997	1998	2003	2004
LV	Latvia		(1994)	1995	1997	1999	2003	2004
LT	Lithuania		(1994)	1995	1997	1999	2003	2004
BG	Bulgaria		(1993)	1995	1997	1999	2005	2007
RO	Romania		(1993)	1995	1997	2000	2005	2007
TR	Turkey		1963	1987	1999	2004		
HR	Croatia		2001	2003	2004	2005		
MK	FYR Macedonia		2001	2004	2005			
AL	Albania		2006	2009				
ME	Montenegro		2007	2008				
BA	Bosnia and Herzegovina		2008					
RS	Serbia		2008					
KS	Kosovo as part of Serbia		2003***					

Table 1. Relationship to the EU of Central and Eastern European Countries—part 2

	European Neigh- bourhood Policy	Steps in the EU accession process						
		Abbreviation	Country name	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed	Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed (or similar association agreement)	Formal application for EU Membership filed	Candidate status granted by EU Council	Accession negotiations initiated
Eastern Partnership Countries	UA	Ukraine	1994					Membership treaty signed
	MD	Moldova	1994					
	GE	Georgia	1996					
	AM	Armenia	1996					
	AZ	Azerbaijan	1996					
	BY	Belarus	1995****					

Source: European Commission [2011a, 2011b].

** Revised in 1995.

*** Since Kosovo is not officially recognised by all EU members, the status of bilateral agreements remains uncertain. It is however agreed within the EU that the Stabilisation and Accession Processes apply to Kosovo as well.

**** PCA not ratified by the EU.

Table 2. Some uncontrolled background variables: population, GDP, share of labour force in agriculture and services, and urbanisation (2008)—part 1

	Population (millions)	GDP/ capita (PPP)		% labour force in agriculture	% labour force in services	Urbanisation (national definition)
		2000	2007			
CZ	10.2	14.974	23.194	3.6	60.1	73
HU	9.9	12.265	18.680	5.0	62.6	68
PL	38.5	10.504	15.811	17.4	53.4	61
SK	5.5	11.016	20.205	4.0	56.9	56
SI	2.0	17.174	27.093	2.5	61.5	48
New Member States	EE	9.778	21.257	4.7	61.6	69
	LV	7.670	17.517	12.1	61.8	68
	LT	8.364	17.673	14.0	56.9	67
	BG	6.144	11.298	7.5	57.0	71
RO	22.2	6.073	11.394	29.7	47.1	54
TR	76.8	8.600	12.810	29.5	45.8	69
Candidates	HR	9.168	15.515	5.0	63.6	57
	MK	6.188	8.543	19.6	50.0	67
	AL	3.815	6.385	58.0	27.0	47
Potential Candidates	BA	4.436	7.468	19.8	47.6	47
	ME	5.841	10.393	2.0	68.0	60
	RS	5.884	10.221	30.0	24.0	52

Table 2. Some uncontrolled background variables: population, GDP, share of labour force in agriculture and services, and urbanisation (2008)—part 2

	Population (millions)	GDP/ capita (PPP)		% labour force in agriculture	% labour force in services	Urbanisation (national definition)
		2000	2007			
AM	3.0	2.031	5.711	46.2	38.2	64
AZ	8.2	2.208	7.477	39.3	48.6	52
BY	9.6	5.153	10.850	14.0	51.3	73
GE	4.6	2.077	4.667	55.6	35.5	53
MD	4.3	1.290	2.560	40.6	43.3	42
UA	45.7	3.272	6.916	19.4	56.4	68

Source: CIA World Factbook. [2009].

Table 3. Summary statistics for single indicators by country group—part 1

		Initial level (1990s) or earliest possible year (in italics)				Change		Most recent levels		
		Mean	Coeff. of var.	(s.d.)	Differ- ence from NMS	Change	Differ- ence from NMS change	Mean	Coeff. of var.	Differ- ence from NMS
GDP per capita (PPP in USD)	NMS	8088	0.28	(2235)		10325		18412	0.27	(4917)
	CC	6672	0.20	(1344)	-1415	5617	-4707	12289	0.29	(3515)
	PC 1999	4694	0.22	(1030)		3923	-6402	8617	0.23	(2002)
	PC except AL	5099	0.15	(833)		4262	-6063	9361	0.18	(1641)
	EPC	3793	0.35	(1329)	-4294	2570	-7754	6363	0.44	(2809)
	UA, BY	5246	0.16	(833)	-2842	3636	-6689	8882	0.31	(2782)
1990–2007	All countries	6192	0.41	(2529)		6574	-3750	12767	0.51	(6495)
Employment rate (employed as % of popula- tion aged 15–59)	NMS	67.8	0.10	(7.0)		1.7		69.6	0.09	(6.1)
	CC 2	52.2	0.23	(12.0)	-15.6	-0.9	-2.7	51.3	0.20	(10.2)
	PC					incomplete data				
	PC except AL									
	EPC	71.2	0.10	(7.1)	3.4	-9.9	-11.6	61.4	0.14	(8.9)
	UA, BY	74.0	0.06	(4.5)	6.1	-5.2	-6.9	68.8	0.00	(0.1)
1996–2007	All countries	67.2	0.13	(9.1)		-2.4	-4.2	64.8	0.14	(9.4)

Source: World Development Indicators database [World Bank 2009]; TransMonet Database [UNICEF 2009]; Freedom House [2009]; Transparency International [2009]; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [2009]; Eurostat Government finance statistics [2009]; OECD Health Data [2009];

OECD Family database [2009].

Notes: Differences are based on rounding errors, i.e. not the rounded figures presented in the columns of each level; Methodology: times series as far back as possible without changing group structure, and group structure as complete as possible; if the year differs from other country groups then the year is in italics and the difference between the country group and the NMS refers to the year indicated next to the country group.

Table 3. Summary statistics for single indicators by country group—part 2

	Initial level (1990s) or earliest possible year (in italics)				Change		Most recent levels		
	Mean	Coeff. of var.	(s.d.)	Differ- ence from NMS	Change	Differ- ence from NMS change	Mean	Coeff. of var.	Differ- ence from NMS
Political rights and civil liberties (1 signifying 'completely free', 7 com- pletely unfree')	NMS	2.5	0.27	(0.7)	-1.3		1.3	0.34	(0.4)
	CC	3.5	0.14	(0.5)	-1.2	0.1	2.3	0.25	(0.6)
	PC								1.1
	PC except AL								
	EPC	4.1	0.21	(0.9)	1.6	0.8	4.9	0.24	(1.2)
1992–2008	UA, BY	3.8	0.27	(1.0)	1.3	2.4	5.0	0.42	(2.1)
	All countries	3.3	0.34	(1.1)	-0.7	0.5	2.6	0.67	(1.7)
									2.8
Corruption perception index (0 'totally corrupt', 10 'completely incorrupt')	NMS	4.3	0.22	(0.9)	0.8		5.0	0.20	(1.0)
	CC	3.0	0.23	(0.7)	-1.2	0.4	4.2	0.13	(0.5)
	PC	2.7	0.20	(0.5)	-1.6	-0.1	3.4	0.03	(0.1)
	PC except AL								
	EPC	2.6	0.35	(0.9)	-1.7	0.1	2.7	0.27	(0.7)
2003–2008	UA, BY	3.3	0.41	(1.34)	-1.0	-1.8	2.3	0.16	(0.35)
	All countries	3.1	0.3	-0.7	-1.4	0.3	3.8	0.2	-0.6
									-1.9

Table 3. Summary statistics for single indicators by country group—part 3

	Initial level (1990s) or earliest possible year (in italics)				Change		Most recent levels		
	Mean	Coeff. of var.	(s.d.)	Differ- ence from NMS	Change	Differ- ence from NMS change	Mean	Coeff. of var.	Differ- ence from NMS
General gov- ernment debt (% of GDP)	NMS	0.79	(24.0)		-3.8		26.8	0.67	(18.0)
	CC	0.31	(11.8)	6.3	-5.8	-2.0	32.6	0.23	(7.6)
	PC								-6.0
	PC except AL								
1998–2007	EPC	0.79	(35.6)	12.9	-27.4	23.6	17.6	0.42	(7.3)
	UA, BY	0.76	(18.6)	-5.9	-8.0	-4.2	16.5	0.30	(4.90)
	All countries	0.63	(23.8)		-12.2	-7.9	25.7	0.44	(11.0)
									-7.5
Public expendi- ture on health (% of GDP)	NMS	0.27	(1.3)		0.0		4.8	0.20	(1.4)
	CC	0.34	(1.8)	0.5	-0.4	-0.4	5.8	0.05	(0.3)
	PC 2001	0.10	(1.5)		1.3	1.4	4.9	0.32	(1.6)
	PC except AL	0.21	(1.0)		0.9	0.9	5.7	0.08	(0.45)
1995–2005	EPC	0.68	(2.1)	-1.6	-0.1	-0.1	2.9	0.56	(1.6)
	UA, BY	0.12	(0.6)	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	4.3	0.22	(0.94)
	All countries	0.43	(1.7)		0.2	0.2	4.4	0.34	(1.5)
									-0.1

Table 3. Summary statistics for single indicators by country group—part 4

	Initial level (1990s) or earliest possible year (in italics)				Change		Most recent levels		
	Mean	Coeff. of var.	(s.d.)	Differ- ence from NMS	Change	Differ- ence from NMS change	Mean	Coeff. of var.	(s.d.)
Total fertility rate	NMS	1.96	0.11	(0.21)	-0.6		1.38	0.08	(0.11)
	CC	2.37	0.39	(0.91)	-0.7	-0.11	1.68	0.26	(0.43)
	PC 2000	1.68	0.22	(0.36)	-0.3	0.30	1.39	0.15	(0.21)
	PC except AL	1.54	0.18	(0.28)	-0.1	0.46	1.42	0.17	(0.25)
	EPC	2.32	0.15	(0.35)	-0.8	-0.20	1.54	0.26	(0.40)
	UA, BY	1.96	0.05	(0.09)	-0.6	-0.04	1.34	0.04	(0.05)
1989–2007	All countries	2.08	0.22	(0.46)	-0.6	0.00	1.50	0.19	(0.29)
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	NMS	14.5	0.37	(5.4)	-8.0		6.5	0.43	(2.8)
	CC	36.8	0.68	(25.2)	-24.3	-16.3	12.5	0.66	(8.3)
	PC	26.2	0.26	(6.8)	-19.3	-11.3	6.9	0.07	(0.5)
	PC except AL	10.5	0.10	(1.0)	-3.4	4.6	7.1	0.06	(0.42)
	EPC	18.6	0.29	(5.3)	-7.9	0.0	10.6	0.26	(2.8)
	UA, BY	12.4	0.07	(0.9)	-4.3	3.7	8.1	0.51	(4.1)
1989–2007	All countries	20.2	0.60	(12.1)	-11.1	-3.1	9.1	0.45	(4.1)

Table 3. Summary statistics for single indicators by country group—part 5

	Initial level (1990s) or earliest possible year (in italics)				Change		Most recent levels		
	Mean	Coeff. of var.	(s.d.)	Differ- ence from NMS	Change	Differ- ence from NMS change	Mean	Coeff. of var.	Differ- ence from NMS (s.d.)
Mortality mid- dle-aged men (deaths per 100 000 relevant population)	NMS	1153.5	0.13	(154.8)	-67.1		1086.5	0.29	(318.0)
	CC 2	862.5	0.28	(241.7)	-174.0	-106.9	688.5	0.07	(49.4)
	PC 2000	657.1	0.35	(231.7)	-45.1	21.9	612.0	0.39	(241.5)
	PC except AL	757.2	0.19	(0.3)	-48.3	18.7	708.9	0.25	(176.6)
	EPC	1111.4	0.14	(153.2)	-42.1	105.0	1216.4	0.41	(497.4)
	UA, BY	1255.8	0.03	(32.4)	102.9	518.4	1707.1	0.16	(277.3)
1989–2007	All countries	946.2	0.23	(195.4)	-45.3	21.8	900.9	0.29	(276.6)
Crime rates (per 100 000 popula- tion)	NMS	1170.1	0.50	(586.4)	1721.0		2891.2	0.38	(1097.7)
	CC	993.4	0.27	(270.3)	-176.7	-1320.4	1394.1	0.32	(444.9)
	PC								
	PC except AL				incomplete data				
	EPC	499.8	0.58	(287.5)	-670.4	417.7	917.4	0.73	(672.4)
	UA, BY	639.8	1.28	(19.9)	-530.4	-997.9	1362.9	1.59	(702.5)
1989–2006	All countries	887.8	0.45	(381.4)	-423.5	-874.6	1734.2	0.5	(738.3)
									-1735.4